Date: 20071030
Docket: T-414-07
Citation: 2007
FC 1120
Toronto, Ontario, October 30, 2007
PRESENT: Kevin R. Aalto, Esquire, Prothonotary
BETWEEN:
DENNIS
BOISSONNEAULT
Applicant
and
CANADA POST CORPORATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This is a
motion pursuant to Rule 369 by the Applicant for an Order permitting the
Applicant to file a further affidavit in the form of the proposed draft
affidavit in the Applicant’s Motion Record. The Applicant also seeks leave of
the Court to permit Mr. Rodney L. Hoff to represent him in these
proceedings as well as an extension of time to file the Applicant’s Record.
[2]
Upon a
review of the Motion Record of the Applicant, the Motion Record of the
Respondent and the Applicant’s Written Reply to the Responding Motion Record,
it is apparent that there is little merit to the affidavit and that it should
not be allowed to be filed. There is also no basis upon which to permit Mr. Hoff to act for the Applicant.
[3]
In this
Application, the Applicant seeks to quash a settlement with the Human Rights
Commission and have the matter determined by the Federal Court. The Applicant,
who is self represented, has filed a nine page affidavit with twenty exhibits
in support his Notice of Application. He now seeks to file a further affidavit
which is alleged to reply to the responding affidavit filed by the Respondent.
As well, it raises matters which are subsequent to the settlement in dispute.
The Respondent opposes the filing of the affidavit primarily on the grounds
that the proposed affidavit contains bald assertions and statements that are
argumentative, abusive, prejudicial, irrelevant, immaterial and will not assist
the Court in determining the issue in dispute. As such, the proposed affidavit
does not meet the requirements of Rule 81 (1) of the Federal Courts Rules
which provides as follows:
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81. (1) Affidavits shall be
confined to facts within the personal knowledge of the deponent, except on
motions in which statements as to the deponent's belief, with the with the
grounds therefore, may be included.
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81. (1) Les affidavits se limitent aux faits dont le
déclarant a une connaissance personnelle, sauf s’ils sont présentés à l’appui
d’une requête, auquel cas ils peuvent contenir des déclarations fondées sur
ce que le déclarant croit être les faits, avec motifs à l’appui.
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[4]
In
reviewing the proposed affidavit, it is quite clear that it contains much that
is argumentative, abusive and prejudicial and will not advance the interests of
justice. One example from the affidavit is contained in paragraph 10. The
first part of paragraph 10 reads as follows:
“Para 30 of the Respondents SWORN
Affidavit has deliberately and with purpose TAMPERED WITH A PIECE OF
EVIDENCE to suit their nefarious needs, up till this point the Applicants
have been aware of how the Respondents have twisted the rules of the Collective
Agreement Duty to Accommodate Law and Privacy Law to their own advantage, a
trait that persists through out with CP. As will be seen, but to now alter
evidence to suit their needs is unacceptable and deserves the utmost
condemnation! Exhibit 2 page 13 This makes CP’s testimony very
discreditable! This is despicable in the extreme, and can only corroborates
[sic] the depths this Corporation is prepared to go to, to keep this case from
ever being heard in Federal Court. This alone should be enough to discredit
all that Canada Post have been trying to blur the truth and minimise [sic] the
suffering and loss the Applicant is enduring at their hands. . . “
[5]
There are
many other examples of this type of vituperative language. There are also many
examples of statements which are pure argument [“that’s acting in Bad Faith. CP
will stop at nothing” (par. 14); . . . this is farcical, CP are flip flopping .
. . (par. 2)]; or are abusive and prejudicial [“Yet another distortion of the
rules to suit CP” (par. 7); “tampered with a piece of evidence” (par. 10);
“just by the fact of CP altering evidence alone should send shudders down any
reasonable person’s spine!” (par. 17); “That’s despite CP Altering Evidence to
their betterment!” (par. 31)]. Further, the affidavit relates matters which
occurred subsequent to the impugned settlement. In all, a fair reading of the
entire proposed affidavit leads to the conclusion that it does not meet the
requirements of Rule 81 and does not comply with the jurisprudence of this
Court. As noted by Prothonotary Hargrave in Hughes v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency) [2004] F.C.J. No. 1285 at
par. 7:
In Mazhero (supra) Mr.
Justice of Appeal Evans observed that “…the
discretion of the Court to permit the
filing of additional material should
be exercised with great circumspection.”,
going on to adopt a passage from
Deigan v. Canada (1999) 168 F.T.R. 277 at page 278:
”The new Federal Court rules allow the
filing of a supplementary affidavit and of a supplementary record, however such
should be allowed in limited instances and special circumstances, for to do
otherwise would not be in the spirit of judicial review proceedings, which are
designed to obtain quick relief through a summary procedure. While the general
test for such supplementary material is whether the additional material will
serve the interests of justice, will assist the Court and will not seriously
prejudice the other side, it is
also important that any supplementary
affidavit and supplementary record neither deal with material which could have
been made available at an earlier date, nor unduly delay the proceedings.”
Diegan was affirmed by the
Trial Division (1999) 165 F.T.R. 121.
These principles, on which
the Court should exercise its discretion to
allow in supplemental
evidence, were more clearly set out by Mr. Justice
of Appeal Nadon in Atlantic
Engraving (supra) at page 246:
i) The
evidence to be adduced will serve the interest of justice;
ii) The evidence will
assist the Court;
iii) The evidence will not cause
substantial or serious prejudice to the other side (see Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Apotex Inc. (1997), 76 C.P.R. (3d) 15 (T.D.); Robert Mondavi Winery v.
Spagnol’s Wine & Beer Making Supplies Ltd. (2001), 10 C.P.R. (4th)
331 (T.D.)).
The Court of Appeal in
Atlantic Engraving then went on to add a further requirement, that an
applicant, wishing to file additional material, must show that it was not
available before cross-examination, for Rule 312 is not a means by which a
party may split its case: the obligation on a party is to put forward its best
case at the earliest opportunity:
Further, an applicant, in
seeking leave to file additional material, must show that the evidence sought
to be adduced was not available prior to the cross-examination of the
opponent’s affidavits. Rule 312 is not there to allow a party to split its
case and a party must put its best case forward at the first opportunity (see Salton
Appliances (1985) Corp. et al. v. Salton Inc. (2000), 181 F.T.R. 146,
C.P.R. (4th) 491 (T.D.); Inverhuron & District Ratepayers
Association v. Canada (Minister of Environment) et al. (2000), 180 F.T.R.
314 (T.D.)).
[6]
There are
other authorities to the same effect There are other authorities to the same
effect [see, for example, Innovation and Development Partners/IDP Inc.
v. Canada, [1993] F.C.J. No. 602 and Expressvu
Inc. v. NII Norsat International Inc. (c.o.b. Aurora Distributing),
[1997] F.C.J. No. 276]. Thus, leave to file the proposed affidavit is denied.
[7]
The
Applicant also seeks leave to have Mr. Hoff represent him in these
proceedings. There is correspondence in the Motion Record in which Mr. Hoff describes himself as Agent and
Power of Attorney for Mr. Boisseaunault. Mr. Hoff is not a solicitor. Rule 119
mandates that a person may act in person or be represented by a solicitor.
There is no rule which permits an individual in a proceeding to be represented
by a non-solicitor. The jurisprudence of the Federal Courts has consistently
upheld this rule [see, Scheuneman v. Attorney General of Canada,
[2003] F.C.A. 439; and Erdmann v. Her Majesty the Queen, [2001]
F.C.A. 138]. It is arguable that the Court, only in the most unusual of cases,
will stray from the requirement of self-representation or solicitor
representation [see, for example, Parmar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
[2000] F.C.J. No. 1000; Morrisroe v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1178; Giagnocavo
v. Canada, [1995] F.C.J. No. 1355 (F.CA.); and, Moss v. Canada, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1415]. In
Moss, Justice
Russell
observed:
“As regards representation by
her husband, she now says “there is precedent that the Court’s have allowed my
husband to speak on my behalf because I am unable to represent myself nor am I
able to afford representation as I live on a disability pension.” However, the
Applicant does not address Rules 119 or 121 and she doesn’t explain how the
Court could allow her husband to represent her in an action, or what precedents
she is relying upon.”
[8]
This case
is similar. There are no precedents upon which the Applicant relies and there
are no grounds set out which would permit the Court to grant the relief
requested. There is no factual or legal basis in the motion materials which
support granting leave to Mr. Hoff to represent the Applicant.
That part of the motion is also denied.
[9]
Finally,
the Applicant seeks an extension of time to serve and file the Applicant’s
Record. Given that this Application got off to a somewhat rocky start by
having named the wrong party as Respondent, which error has now been corrected,
in the circumstances the Applicant should have additional time to serve and
file the Applicant’s Record. The time will be extended to November 16, 2007.
[10]
The
Respondent seeks its costs. The Respondent has been substantially successful
in its opposition to the motion. In considering costs it should also be noted
that the Applicant is an in-person litigant. However, as Justice Hugessen noted in Scheuneman v.
Her Majesty the Queen, [2003] F.C.T. 37 at par. 4:
The plaintiff’s lack of legal training
does not give him any additional rights and if he insists upon representing
himself, he must play by the same rules as everyone else.
One of those rules is that
costs usually follow the event. They are discretionary. Rule 400(1) provides:
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400. (1)
The Court shall Have full discretionary power over the amount and allocation
of costs and the determination of by whom they are to be paid.
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400. (1) La Cour a le pouvoir discrétionnaire
de déterminer le montant des dépens, de les répartir et de désigner les
personnes qui doivent les Payer.
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[11]
Given the
fact that the proposed affidavit does not meet the requirements of affidavits
in the Federal Court and that there is no basis for supporting the right to be
represented by a non-solicitor, it is appropriate that the Respondent receive
costs. In balancing all of the facts and considering the
factors set out in Rule 400(2), an appropriate award of
costs is $500 payable by the Applicant to the Respondent within 30 days of the
date of this Order.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. This motion, insofar as it
seeks to file a further affidavit of the Applicant, is dismissed.
2. This motion, insofar as it
seeks leave to permit Mr. Rodney L. Hoff to represent the Applicant in
this proceeding, is dismissed.
3. The Applicant is granted an
extension of time to November 16, 2007 to serve and file the
Applicant’s Record.
4. The time for taking subsequent
steps in the proceeding is extended to run from the date of
service of the Applicant’s Record on the Respondent.
5. The Applicant shall pay costs
fixed in the amount of $500, inclusive of GST, to the Applicant
within 30 days of the date of this Order.
“Kevin
R. Aalto”