Date: 20070517
Docket: T-1875-06
Citation: 2007
FC 530
Ottawa, Ontario, May 17, 2007
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Barnes
BETWEEN:
AYR
MOTOR EXPRESS INC.
Applicant
and
MERRILL
MCKAY
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
If a
person wants to keep a job, it is never a good idea to tell the boss that he’s
an idiot. This is a particularly worthy rule for an employee with a less than
stellar employment record. Such was the situation facing Mr. McKay when he was
summarily dismissed on February 20, 2006.
[2]
The
question facing Canada Labour Code Adjudicator, Christine A. Fagan, Q.C. (the
Adjudicator), was whether Mr. McKay’s obviously objectionable behaviour
constituted grounds for termination for cause. Following a hearing at Woodstock, New Brunswick on September 21, 2006, the Adjudicator
ruled that Mr. McKay’s termination was not lawful and it is from that decision
that this application for judicial review arises.
Background
[3]
Mr. McKay
was hired as a truck driver by the Respondent, Ayr Motor Express Inc. (the Company),
in November 2003. During his relatively brief tenure, he was disciplined for
falling asleep at the wheel causing the total loss of the Company tractor and
trailer and, later, for taking two weeks of unauthorized leave. For each of
those incidents, he received a formal letter of reprimand. Although each of
the reprimands indicated that similar behaviour in the future would not be
tolerated, neither contained a warning of the possibility that he could be
terminated.
[4]
It is
undisputed that Mr. McKay left Inglis, Ontario on February 18, 2006 with a load bound
for Winnipeg. From there, he had been
dispatched to Calgary. Once in Winnipeg, Mr. McKay
was legally required to rest (called a re-set) either for 24 hours for further
driving in Canada or 34 hours for driving in
the United States. Mr. McKay testified that he
had arranged with the Company dispatcher, Toby Gerard, for a 34-hour re-set to
permit him to drive in the United States if required after Calgary.
[5]
The
President of the Company, Joe Keenan, was unhappy when he found out that Mr.
McKay had not left Winnipeg as had been initially
planned. Mr. Keenan called Mr. McKay several times on February 20th
and, when they finally spoke, an argument ensued. In the course of that
argument Mr. McKay called Mr. Keenan an idiot several times. Needless to say,
Mr. Keenan was not impressed and he told Mr. McKay to remove his personal
effects from the truck and to return to New Brunswick.
[6]
Mr.
McKay’s employment with the Company was orally terminated by Mr. Keenan on
February 20, 2006 followed by a letter of termination dated March 30, 2006. In
addition to Mr. McKay’s “insubordinate” conduct, that dismissal letter
referred to Mr. McKay’s earlier motor vehicle accident, to his unauthorized
leave and to non-specific argumentative behaviour with Company dispatchers.
[7]
Mr. McKay
brought a complaint under Division XIV, Part III, of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2, seeking financial
compensation for unpaid severance. The Adjudicator found that Mr. McKay had
been wrongly dismissed and awarded him one (1) month of salary in lieu of
notice.
The Adjudicator’s Decision
[8]
The
Adjudicator heard evidence from several witnesses including Mr. McKay and Mr.
Keenan. She made a number of significant factual findings largely favouring
Mr. McKay. Those findings included the following:
(a)
the
telephone exchange of February 20, 2006 between Mr. Keenan and Mr. McKay
was heated and Mr. Keenan was “infuriated” when he learned that Mr. McKay had
not left Winnipeg on time;
(b)
Mr. McKay
had made a new arrangement with the Company dispatcher for a longer Winnipeg re-set and Mr. Keenan had no
knowledge of that change when he called Mr. McKay in Winnipeg;
(c)
the
Company witnesses did not place much emphasis on Mr. McKay’s motor vehicle
accident and one of them stated that he was not the first driver to have an
accident;
(d)
the
Company’s allegations of unprofessional or argumentative conduct were supported
by “little evidence of substance” and were mostly “unsubstantiated”;
(e)
The events
relied upon by the Company prior to the February 20, 2006 argument did not
constitute “a progression of corrective discipline sufficient to view [that
later dispute as] a culminating incident”. Furthermore, the Company had failed
to meet its onus to amplify those earlier incidents or to “link them in a
meaningful or progressive manner”;
(f)
Mr. McKay
did not refuse to drive to Calgary and therefore did not ignore
an order to do so;
[9]
It was
largely against the above referenced findings that the Adjudicator considered
the legal significance of the events of February 20, 2006 placing it into the
following context:
Mr. Mckay was insubordinate to his
employer by calling him an idiot on several occasions in the February 20, 2006
telephone conversation. I note that while Mr. Mckay acknowledged he made a
poor choice of words in that exchange, there was no evidence of a direct
apology to Mr. Keenan. However, my earlier finding of fact substantiates Mr.
Mckay’s understanding of his arrangement with the Company dispatcher on
February 18th for the Calgary
trip. The Employer is not correct when it alleges that Mr. McKay refused to do
the trip. I have therefore considered the context and misunderstandings
underlying the telephone exchange. Tempers were acute on both sides and this
was worsened by the differing knowledge of the circumstances that each party
was operating on. It is a given that drivers must follow directions and in Mr.
Bard’s words cannot “self-dispatch”.
[Quoted from original text]
The Adjudicator concluded by holding that the Company’s
termination of Mr. McKay was an “excessive response”.
Issues
[10]
(a) What
is the appropriate standard of review?
(b) Did the Adjudicator
commit any reviewable errors in her decision?
Analysis
[11]
For the reasons
outlined below, I have concluded that the determinative issue resolved in this
case by the Adjudicator was one of mixed fact and law – that is, it was a
question about whether the proven facts of Mr. McKay’s conduct satisfied the
legal standard for dismissal for cause. The standard of review for such issues
is reasonableness simpliciter: see North v. West Region Child and Family
Services Inc., [2005] F.C.J. 1686, 2005 FC 1366 and Dynamex Canada Inc.
v. Mamona (2003), 305 N.R. 295, [2003] F.C.J. No. 907, 2003 FCA 248, at
para. 45.
[12]
Counsel
for the Company argued that the proven events of February 20, 2006, including
the mitigating factors identified by the Adjudicator, could lead to no other
conclusion but that Mr. McKay’s termination for cause was justified. He
characterized this as an issue of law and not one of mixed fact and law.
[13]
While
there may well be forms of employee misconduct that can never be excused (theft
comes to mind), I do not accept that the kind of conduct exhibited by Mr. McKay
on February 20, 2006 would inevitably constitute just cause for dismissal.
Such behaviour is subject to explanation and here the Adjudicator found enough
mitigating evidence to reduce the gravity of Mr. McKay’s misconduct below the
termination threshold. The Adjudicator, of course, had the benefit of hearing
the witnesses – a distinct advantage over the Court on judicial review. She found
that Mr. McKay’s objectionable remarks were delivered in the heat of the moment
and in the course of an angry exchange of views. Mr. Keenan was described as
infuriated when he placed the call and he was also found to be unaware of Mr.
McKay’s arrangement for a longer re-set in Winnipeg.
[14]
Not every
act of insolence by an employee will justify summary dismissal and it was not
unreasonable for the Adjudicator to come to that conclusion on the strength of
her factual findings. Indeed, the general rule appears to be that an isolated
incident of insolent or disrespectful behaviour does not constitute cause for
dismissal. This point is made by Harris on Wrongful Dismissal,
looseleaf (Toronto: Thomson Canada Ltd., 2007)
in the following passage at para. 6.12(c):
However, dismissal for a single act of
insubordination is comparatively rare in adjudications under the Canada
Labour Code. More frequently, adjudicators have found “just cause” in a
pattern of incidents of insubordination: Donaghue v. Southwest Air Ltd.
(April 28, 1980) (Brent).
[15]
The
authorities also indicate that the level of appropriate discipline for such
behaviour depends very much on the context giving rise to it. There may well
mitigating circumstances that reduce the seriousness of an employee’s
behaviour: see Newman v. ADM Milling Co., [2004] C. L.A.D. No. 448 and Haldane
v. Shelbar Enterprises Ltd. (c.o.b. Tool & Cutter Supply Co.) (1997),
31 O.T.C. 78, [1997] O.J. No. 2295 (Ct.
J. (Gen. Div.)). Given the contextual nature of this problem, the issue before
the Adjudicator is, therefore, properly characterized as one of mixed fact and
law for which judicial deference is owed.
[16]
Counsel
for the Company stated in argument that this was not a progressive discipline
case. Nevertheless, he did not ever completely abandon his reliance on Mr.
McKay’s prior history of misconduct to support the termination decision.
Suffice it to say that if the Company intended to rely upon the other matters
leading up to a culminating incident on February 20, 2006, it had an obligation
to give a clear and unequivocal warning to Mr. McKay that further misbehaviour
could result in termination: see Olson v. Richards Transport Ltd.,
[2001] C.L.A.D. No. 103, at para. 19. Here, no such warning of possible
dismissal was extended to Mr. McKay and that appears to be the basis for the
Adjudicator’s holding that the Company had failed to link the disciplinary
incidents “in a meaningful or progressive manner”.
[17]
There is
Canada Labour Code authority to support the Adjudicator’s approach to this
issue including the decision in Heaslip v. TST Overland Express, [2004]
C.L.A.D. No. 339 where the adjudicator held at para. 58:
58 It follows from the above that the
Employer has failed in its burden of proof to establish a culminating incident
which would justify the dismissal of the Complainant. The Employer did show
that Mr. Heaslip had, in the past, been verbally abusive and/or inappropriate
and/or excessively angry to drivers and customers on three occasions, as well
as disrespectful and excessively angry with his Supervisor on one occasion.
However, in each of these instances, the only punishment meted out by the
Employer was the placing of a letter or note on Mr. Heaslip's personal file relating to the incident.
There was no progressively severe discipline imposed upon the Complainant. In
the absence of any acceptable evidence establishing a culminating incident,
there can be no finding of just cause for dismissal. The "trigger"
for the dismissal of Mr. Heaslip was the culminating incident of December 2,
2003 and the Employer failed to satisfy its burden of proof with respect to the
allegations upon which it relied.
[18]
This is a
very clear situation where the Adjudicator’s decision must be respected. She
was dealing with an issue of mixed fact and law for which the standard of
review is reasonableness. She heard the evidence from which she made
reasonable factual findings. She then applied those findings to accepted legal
principles of employment and dismissal and found Mr. McKay’s termination to be unjustified.
There is absolutely no basis for finding that the Adjudicator’s decision cannot
be supported on the record after a somewhat probing examination and, indeed, I
would not be inclined to disturb her decision even if I had the right to do
so.
[19]
In the
result this application for judicial review is dismissed with costs payable to
the Respondent under Column IV.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ADJUDGES that this application for judicial
review is dismissed with costs payable to the Respondent under Column IV.
"R. L. Barnes"
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