Date: 20110420
Docket: IMM-4902-10
Citation: 2011
FC 327
Ottawa, Ontario,
April 20, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Rennie
BETWEEN:
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MARCIA AGATHA RALPH,
GARVIN GABRIEL RALPH,
SAGEENA NAKITA RALPH
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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AMENDED REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The
principal applicant,
Marcia Agatha Ralph, is a citizen of St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) who arrived in Canada in December, 2004 along
with two of her three children (Minor applicants Garvin Garbriel Ralph and
Sageena Nakita Ralph herein). The applicant’s third child
arrived in Canada independently. The
applicant made a claim to the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (the Board) in February, 2009,
based on abuse and violence by her two former partners in SVG. The Board
found that the applicants were neither Convention refugees nor persons
in need of protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). The Board
rejected the claim based on findings of credibility, noting the three and one
half year delay in advancing the claim for status was indicative of a lack
of subjective fear and that the applicant had failed to rebut the presumption
of state protection. For the reasons that follow, this application for
judicial review is dismissed.
[2]
The
applicant’s claim was predicated on a fear of further abuse by her first
partner, Joel, and her second partner, Onan. Onan arrived in Canada in 2005.
[3]
The Board found that the
applicant failed to prove that she had been abused by her first partner Joel,
or that Joel continued to be a threat to her. Although there was some
contradictory evidence as to when their relationship ended, the Board
found that it ended in 1991. In her amended Personal Information
Form (PIF), the applicant indicated that Joel came by her house once while
she was living with Onan, but no reference was made to threats
or violence, or, for that matter, to subsequent visits. The Board
concluded that given the length of time since their relationship ended, some 19
years, there was no basis upon which it could be concluded that she had a
reasonable basis for her fear.
[4]
Upon Onan’s arrival in Canada, the claimant resumed
cohabiting with Onan, along with her children. The Board again
drew a negative inference as to the applicant’s subjective fear by reasons
of the inability of the applicant to provide an explanation for behavior
inconsistent with the very basis of her claim. The Board was clearly
troubled by the fact that although the applicant fled SVG to escape her second
partner Onan, they were again living as a family. To compound the Board’s
concern the applicant testified that she left her two children behind with
Onan, but in her original PIF she stated that she had brought
her children with her. The claimant was asked by the Board to
explain the inconsistency in what was considered to be a critical
component of her claim. No response was provided, and the Board
drew a negative inference.
[5]
Finally,
the
applicant testified that Onan had sexually assaulted her daughter, who,
then 13, became pregnant. When pressed by the Board to explain why this was
omitted from her narrative, alternative explanations were tendered; either that
she was pressed for time in completing her narrative or that her counsel had ill-advised
her as to the significance of this issue. This too went to the applicant’s
credibility, in the Board’s view.
[6]
In
sum, the Board’s
findings on credibility are well-rooted in the evidence, and the Board’s conclusion
that the claimant does not possess a well-founded fear of persecution in SVG
is reasonable. I find the decision falls within a range of possible
acceptable outcomes having regard to the law and facts.
[7]
In
light of these findings, and
their implications for the subjective and objective fear components of the
tests under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA, it is
unnecessary to address the issues related to state protection. In this
regard, however, I note that I do not consider the reasoning or analysis with
respect to the existence of state protection in SVG to be compelling.
[8]
This
application
for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
[9]
No
question
arises for certification.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. This application for judicial review is dismissed.
2. No question arises for certification.
"Donald J. Rennie"
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