Date: 20090811
Docket: T-664-09
Ottawa, Ontario,
August 11, 2009
PRESENT:
The Honourable Max M. Teitelbaum
BETWEEN:
ROGER
COLLARD
Applicant
and
THE ELECTORAL OFFICER OF THE BETSIAMITES BAND COUNCIL
AND PAUL VOLLANT AND RAPHAËL PICARD
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This is a
motion, by respondents Paul Vollant and Raphaël Picard, to dismiss or strike
out the applicant’s notice of application for judicial review of the decision
of the electoral officer of the Betsiamites Band Council, dated March 27, 2009,
on the ground that the custom election code of the Betsiamites Innu Nation (the
Election Code) provides that the time limit to contest an election is 14 days
following the date of the election in question, and no provision of the
Election Code provides for any possible extension of that time limit.
[2]
In his
notice of application for judicial review, the applicant alleges the following
causes of action against the respondents:
1.
The
electoral officer made a decision or order without regard for the evidence
before her.
2.
The
electoral officer erred in law in making a decision or order.
3.
There is a
reasonable apprehension of bias, since the office of the electoral officer,
Cynthia Labrie, represents the interests of the Betsiamites Band Council.
Background
[3]
The
applicant, Roger Collard, was a candidate for the position of vice-chief in the
Betsiamites Band Council elections on August 17, 2008. On the weekend of August
15, 2008, the applicant noticed a great deal of beer circulating in the
community and suspected that bribes were being distributed for the elections.
However, the applicant had no evidence and had not personally observed that any
corrupt electoral practices aimed at affecting the election results had been
used. The applicant lost the election.
[4]
After the
August 17, 2008, election until March 19, 2009, no evidence of corrupt election
practices aimed at affecting the election results came to the applicant’s
personal attention. It was not until March 20, 2009, that the applicant first
became aware of the sworn statements of Sandy Hervieu and Marjolaine St-Onge.
[6]
On March
27, 2009, the electoral officer of the Betsiamites Band Council informed the
applicant that his contestation of the August 17, 2009, elections was dismissed
on the following ground:
[translation]
After checking the Election Code of the
Betsiamites Band Council and, more specifically, article 8.1, I cannot allow
your application to contest. In fact, in order to be admissible and comply with
the process and with custom, the contestation must be filed within a time limit
of 14‑days after an election. You filed your application to contest on
March 25, 2009. Your application is therefore clearly outside the time limit,
and the Election Code does not authorize me to extend that time limit for any
reason whatsoever. Consequently, I will not forward your contestation to the candidates
pursuant to article 8.4 of the Election Code, since your contestation
fails to comply with article 8.1.
Respondents’ submissions
[7]
The
respondents, who are bringing this motion, submit that the Federal Court may
immediately dismiss the applicant’s application for judicial review, which must
fail on the grounds that the courts have recognized that a time limit for
contestation provided in a custom election code cannot be extended where the
language of that election code makes no provision to that effect. The Election
Code specifically provides that the time limit to contest an election is 14
days following the date of the election in question:
[translation]
Chapter 8 Appeal of the election
8.1 Within a 14-day time limit after an
election, an election candidate or an elector who voted or presented himself or
herself to vote may, after having paid a non-refundable $300 deposit, contest
the election, . . .
[8]
According
to the respondents, no provision in the Election Code provides for the
possibility of extending the 14-day time limit for contesting an election and,
absent an ambiguity in the Election Code, it is not workable to try to
interpret the Election Code so as to make it say what it does not, or add
terms, conditions or powers to it where none are provided therein (R. v.
McIntosh, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 686, 178 N.R. 161 at paragraph 18; R. v.
Multiform Manufacturing Co., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 624 at page 630, 113 N.R.
373).
[9]
The
electoral officer’s decision to refuse such a contestation filed over nine
months after the election date, after those elected had completed over a third
of their term of office (according to article 3.2 of the Election Code), is
clearly well founded.
[10]
The
respondents also submit that the arguments of bias raised against the electoral
officer were not made at the appropriate time and are also unfounded.
Therefore, the notice of application for judicial review of the electoral
officer’s decision to dismiss the contestation by reason of lateness is prima
facie doomed to failure.
[11]
The Federal
Courts Rules do not specifically provide for the possibility of requesting
the dismissal of a notice of application for judicial review on motion.
However, following the comments made by the Federal Court of Appeal in David
Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C. 588, 176
N.R. 48 (Pharmacia), the Court allowed this in limited circumstances.
The dismissal of an application for judicial review by means of a preliminary
motion may be ordered by the Court when it is plain and obvious that the
application will fail (Maracle v. Six Nations of the Grand River Band of
Indians, (1998), 146 F.T.R. 208, 78 A.C.W.S. (3d) 649 at paragraph 10).
[12]
The Innu
of Betsiamites First Nation’s election process, its supervision by the
electoral officer and the appeal mechanisms are governed by the custom Election
Code adopted by the band members, which came into force in 1994. The custom
Election Code provides for a mechanism by which it can be amended, but no
amendments have been made.
[13]
The
respondents submit that when the members of the Innu of Betsiamites First
Nation adopted their custom Election Code, nothing prevented them from agreeing
upon a provision for a possible extension of the time to appeal. Moreover,
other First Nations have expressly provided such a power for an extension of
time in their election codes (see, for example, Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation
v. Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation (Appeal Committee), 2003 FCT 464, 232 F.T.R.
187 at paragraphs 4 and 51). In the case at hand, the applicant is relying
on the modern rules of interpretation to lead the Court to find certain powers
in the Election Code for which no provisions are made on matters of election
contestations. However, the electoral officer committed no error in deciding
that in the absence of an express power to that end, she was not empowered to
extend a time to appeal set forth in the Election Code.
[14]
The
Federal Court of Appeal has already recognized that in the absence of a
provision in the custom Election Code, the courts do not have the power to make
orders having the effect of complementing or adding to the Election Code. If
the Federal Court of Appeal believes that it does not have such power, despite
the broad remedial powers recognized at section 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act, R.S., 1985, c. F-7, it must necessarily be the same in the
event that the decision-maker is an electoral officer (Bill v. Pelican Lake
Indian Band, 2006 FC 679, 294 F.T.R. 189, aff’d by the Federal Court of
Appeal, 2006 CAF 397, 357 N.R. 314; Giroux v. Swan River First Nation,
2007 FCA 108, 361 N.R. 360).
[15]
According
to the July 19, 1994, ministerial order of the Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada, the band’s return to the custom election format, rather than
the format under the Indian Act, R.S., 1985, c. I-5, was recognized on
the grounds that “for the good government of the Betsiamites Band, reversion to
custom for selecting the members of the Council of the band would better serve
the needs of the band”. A band’s inherent power to adopt a custom Election Code
is not a power conferred on the band by the Indian Act but, rather, is
an inherent power of the band (Bone v. Sioux Valley Indian Band No. 290,
(1996), 107 F.T.R. 133, 61 A.C.W.S. (3d) 214 at paragraph 32).
[16]
The
customs documented in a custom Election Code reflect the practice established
or adopted by the persons to whom the code applies and who have accepted to be
governed by it. Setting down an election process in keeping with custom aims,
among other things, to keep disputes out of the courts and thus spare bands the
financial consequences that litigation with respect to such disputes can bring
(McLeod Lake Indian Band v. Chingee, [1998] 153 F.T.R. 257, 82 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 414, at paragraphs 8 to 9).
[17]
The
respondents note that this Court has already found that when a time for appeal
is provided by a custom Election Code and that there is no provision allowing
an extension of that time, an appeal committee provided for under that same
code does not have jurisdiction to extend the time in question (Big “C”
First Nation v. Big “C” First Nation (Election Appeal Tribunal), [1994], 80
F.T.R. 49, 48 A.C.W.S. (3d) 683 at paragraph 8). The respondents submit that
the same rule must apply to an electoral officer appointed under a code.
[18]
As well,
as regards the argument of a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the
applicant electoral officer, the applicant refers to a letter dated January 10,
2008, sent by the respondent’s office to certain persons. Insofar as
this letter is the only evidence supporting the grounds of bias raised by the
applicant, the respondents submit that the applicant was aware of this evidence
as early as January 2008, namely over a year before he filed the application to
contest which is at issue.
[19]
It makes
no sense that the applicant knowingly made his application to contest an
election directly to the respondent electoral officer on March 25, 2009, but in
his notice of application in this case, filed barely one month later, alleges
that she is biased. Does this mean that had the electoral officer agreed to
allow his application to contest an election, the applicant would not have
challenged her impartiality?
[20]
The
respondents take the position that the argument of bias was, in addition, not
made at the appropriate time. In Marshall v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC
34, 128 A.C.W.S. (3d) 781, this Court had before it an application for judicial
review of a decision of the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee
Board of Canada. The Court concluded that the argument of bias raised by the
applicant in that case should have been raised by motion before the presiding
member and not on judicial review.
Applicant’s arguments
[21]
The
applicant notes that although the Federal Court accepts that it is possible to
file a motion to dismiss or strike out a notice of application for judicial
review, such a motion will only be allowed exceptionally, if the application is
so clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success. The
applicant emphasizes that a very strict standard and a very heavy burden are
placed on the person moving to strike out a notice of application.
[22]
The Court
must be extremely prudent in striking out an application for judicial review,
for there is a risk that justice will be denied. Given that the full hearing of
an application for judicial review proceeds in much the same way as the hearing
of a motion to strike out a notice of application, such a motion does not seem
necessary and incurs costs for both parties, while placing additional demands
on their time. The applicant submits that the appropriate way to request the
dismissal of a notice of application is to appear and argue at the hearing of
the motion.
[23]
In a
motion to strike out a notice of application, the Federal Court must take the
facts alleged by the applicant in the notice of application to be proven and
read the notice as generously as possible, in a manner that accommodates any
inadequacies in the allegations (Elders Council of Mitchikanibikok Inik v.
Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2008 FC 975,
333 F.T.R. 275 at paragraph 23 (Wawatie)).
[24]
In light
of the respondents’ statement that the applicant’s application is clearly
unfounded, the applicant examined each of the arguments set out in his notice
of application. First, the applicant submits that the electoral officer made a
decision or order without regard for the material before her.
[25]
The
applicant submits that the standard of review in this case is patent
unreasonableness, and therefore the new standard of unreasonableness according
to Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (see also Laurentian Pilotage Authority v.
Gestion C.T.M.A. Inc., 2005 FCA 221, [2006] 1 F.C.R. 37 at paragraph 19).
In neglecting to make a decision on certain important facts, the electoral
officer made an unreasonable finding of fact within the meaning of Dunsmuir.
[26]
In his
application for judicial review, the applicant relies on Sandy Hervieu’s and
Marjolaine St-Onge’s sworn statements dated March 20, 2009. According to Sandy
Hervieu’s sworn statement, signed on March 12, 2009, at Betsiamites, it appears
that Stéphane Tshernish, a former bodyguard of Raphaël Picard, told Sandy
Hervieu personally that before the election on August 17, 2008, he had made an
agreement with Paul Vollant and Raphaël Picard which had the primary purpose of
distributing alcohol and money to electors so as to influence them to vote for
their team.
[27]
Stéphane
Tshernish’s job was to meet with electors and offer them alcohol and/or money
in exchange for their promise to vote for Paul Vollant and Raphaël Picard’s
team. Then, if the elector agreed, the elector entered himself or herself on a
list of the persons who had accepted the offer.
[28]
In his
sworn statement, Sandy Hervieu personally acknowledged having received two
cases of 24 beers that were delivered to his home on August 15, 2008, by
Stéphane Tshernish, who asked him to vote for Paul Vollant’s and Raphaël
Picard’s team in return.
[29]
As well, a few days after the election on August
17, 2008, Stéphane Tshernish himself told Sandy Hervieu that, owing to his
practices, Paul Vollant’s and Raphaël Picard’s team had been elected and he
estimated that at least 300 electors had accepted alcohol or money on the
condition that they cast their vote for Paul Vollant’s and Raphaël Picard’s
team.
[30]
In her
sworn statement signed on March 20, 2009, at Québec, Marjolaine St-Onge
personally reported that on August 16, 2008, she was on her balcony with her
friend Johanie Simon when Stéphane Tshernish arrived in a rented wine-red van
to offer them 12 beers each if they voted for Paul Vollant and Raphaël Picard.
[31]
It was
only on March 20, 2009, that the applicant, Roger Collard, became aware of
these pieces of evidence which may prove that corrupt election practices were
used before and during the August 17, 2008, election at Betsiamites. This is the evidentiary
basis for the legal facts giving rise to his right to contest the election.
[32]
The
applicant submits that the electoral officer, in her March 27, 2009, decision,
did not make a full determination on the evidence, since she only states that
the application is clearly out of time and that pursuant to the Election Code
and custom, she has no authority to extend the time limit for any reason
whatsoever.
[33]
Second,
the applicant submits that the electoral officer erred in law in making a
decision or order and that the standard of review in this case is correctness
in accordance with Dunsmuir and the case law established prior to that
decision which remains relevant (Dunsmuir, Grand Rapids First Nation
v. Nasikapow, [2000] 197 F.T.R. 184, 101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 660 at
paragraph 65 (Ballantyne)).
[34]
The
applicant acknowledges that the electoral officer has the power to decide the
time limit to contest, pursuant to articles 8.1 and 8.5 of the Betsiamites’
Election Code. The electoral officer must ask herself whether, prima facie,
the applicant has an exceptional ground that justifies extending the time
limit.
[35]
The
applicant submits that the Betsiamites’ Election Code must be interpreted
according to the modern approach to statutory interpretation, which is to seek
the intent of the legislators by reading the words of the provision in context
according to their grammatical and ordinary sense, harmoniously with the scheme
and object of the law and the legislators’ intent (Kootenhayoo v. Alexis
First Nation Council, 2003 FC 1128, 240 F.T.R. 49 at paragraph 13).
[36]
The courts
often rely on the pragmatic rule of interpretation when they interpret and
apply statutory provisions that produce absurd, irrational, unfair or
unreasonable effects. This means that such consequences may be avoided by
applying the “golden rule”, whereby the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical
and ordinary sense may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity or
inconsistency (Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, Ruth Sullivan,
Toronto, Butterworths, 1994, at p. 80). This rule of interpretation, recognized
by the Federal Court (see Canada (M.C.I.) v. Lai, 2001 FCT 118, [2001] 3
F.C. 326 at paragraph 23), is based on the presumption that Parliament cannot
have wished to adopt provisions producing absurd, irrational or unfair results.
[37]
According
to the applicant, even though the Election Code is silent on the matter of an
extension of time and does not expressly confer this power on the electoral
officer, the discretionary power to grant of an extension of time on an
exceptional basis is a power inherent to the function of the electoral officer
in accordance with the purpose of the Election Code, its underlying principles
and the drafters’ intent, and the customs of the Betsiamites Aboriginal
community. Moreover, the Federal Court recognized that an electoral officer has
a discretionary power that extends beyond those which are expressly established
by law (Ballantyne, above at paragraph 66).
[38]
The
applicant is using a caricatured and hypothetical situation, in which an
election is held at Betsiamites and band members and elected members of the
Band Council use corrupt election practices, but all of the community members
who are eligible to contest the election at Betsiamites are trapped by a flood
preventing them from reporting to the electoral officer’s office within the 14‑day
time limit stipulated at article 18.1 of the Election Code. Yet, according to
the March 27, 2009, decision and the interpretation of the Election Code
made therein, in no circumstances does the electoral officer have the power to
grant an extension of time for any reason whatsoever.
[39]
Consequently,
in this hypothetical situation, the 14-day time limit to contest the election
in the interests of stability and the rule of law would create injustice, since
the Band Council members who used corrupt election practices could continue to
serve their terms of office, thus flouting the principle of democracy. There is
a presumption that, when the Electoral Code was adopted, the drafters did not
intend to produce such an absurd result arising from a limiting and strictly
textual interpretation of the electoral officer’s powers. No law or code is of
perfect completeness, and the drafters cannot provide for everything.
[40]
The
applicant notes that the principles of time limit for appeal and of
prescription are founded, inter alia, on legal stability and certainty,
which flow from the rule of law. However, in electoral matters, the purpose of
the law is to safeguard citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and ensure
the effectiveness of democracy, two principles that must guide the
interpretation of the courts (see Reference re Secession of Quebec,
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 798 at paragraphs 50, 61, 64 and
67). To strike the right balance between democracy and the rule of law, it must
be open to the electoral officer to extend, on exceptional grounds, the time
limit to contest the election under the Election Code.
[41]
Therefore,
according to the applicant, the electoral officer has the discretionary power
to allow an elector, for whom it was impossible in fact to act, to extend the
time limit stipulated at article 8.1 of the Election Code in certain rare and
exceptional circumstances. This interpretation must prevail because it
promotes the purpose of the Election Code (Simon v. Samson Cree Nation,
2001 FCT 467, 205 F.T.R. 49 at paragraph 24).
[42]
By
analogy, the applicant notes that Quebec
civil law recognizes the suspension of prescription if it was impossible in
fact for the applicant to act (see, for example, article 2904 of the Civil
Code of Québec (C.C.Q.), S.Q. 1991, c. 64). If an applicant is not in a
position to freely and voluntarily waive the exercise of his or her right
because the applicant is not aware of the legal facts which are the basis of
his or her right, neither public order nor the public interest, nor even a
legitimate security of legal relations, will be served.
[43]
What is
more, the Federal Court has the power to grant certain extensions of time
under, inter alia, Rule 8 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106
and subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act (see also Parrish
& Heimbecker Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Agriculture), 2007 FC 789, 159
A.C.W.S. (3d) 178, at paragraph 17; Grewal v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1985] 2
F.C. 263, 63 N.R. 106 and CP Ships Trucking Ltd. v. Kuntze, 2006 FC
1174, 303 F.T.R. 54 at paragraph 84).
[44]
The
applicant submits that he meets the criteria developed by Federal Court case
law in matters of extension of time, since his explanation for the delay by
reason of it being impossible to act has merit. Furthermore, the applicant
always intended to bring the judicial review within the period allowed for
bringing the application and that intention was continuous thereafter. In fact,
right after he became aware of Sandy Hervieu’s and Marjolaine St-Onge’s sworn
statements on March 20, 2009, the applicant filed a contestation of election on
March 25, 2009. The length of the period of the extension, nine months, is not
overly long and remains contemporaneous. The applicant submits that in electoral
matters, the prejudice to the opposing party is not a primary consideration
because public interest must prevail. Moreover, there is no prejudice to the
other party from a contestation of election filed out of time. Lastly, the
applicant’s case is arguable and contains serious allegations based on the
sworn statements of Betsiamites electors.
[45]
In Ballantyne,
this Court noted the following at paragraph 67:
Although the notion of aboriginal
self-government is a goal towards which many aboriginal communities strive
(although it is not expressed in the Constitution), Courts have recognized that
they must step in where an injustice exists.
[46]
The
applicant submits that it would be unjust and contrary to his right of action
to refuse to hear him on the merits of his application because of noncompliance
with the time limits imposed by the Election Code. Indeed, when it is
impossible in fact for an applicant to act, that is an exceptional reason that
warrants an extension of time. In electoral matters, the rules related to time
limits for contestation should be interpreted and applied so as to allow the
parties to assert their rights to do justice between the parties (Parrish
& Heimbecker Ltd., at paragraph 17).
[47]
Lastly,
the applicant believes that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias in this
case, since the office of the electoral officer, Cynthia Labrie, represents the
interests of the Betsiamites Band Council. Applicant Roger Collard’s
contestation of election concerns certain members of the Betsiamites Band Council,
and also affects Raphaël Picard’s personal interests.
[48]
Given this
appearance of conflict of interest and bias, the applicant submits that an
informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically and having
thought the matter through, would think that it is more likely than not that
the electoral officer, whether consciously or unconsciously, would be unable to
decide fairly.
[49]
Finally,
the applicant submits that in determining whether certain reasons such as the
Committee’s bias and the apprehension of bias following the elections could be
submitted on the merits, a motion to strike out a notice of application for
judicial review is not the appropriate way to decide this type of issue. In
fact, in Kulbashian v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), 2007 FC 354, 156 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 732, at paragraphs 37 to 39, the Court noted that the courts have
long frowned on the practice of raising new points on appeal.
Analysis
[50]
The test
upon a motion to strike out pleadings, as set out in Hunt v. Carey Canada
Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959, 117 N.R. 321, is whether it is plain and obvious
that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action. In Pharmacia,
the Federal Court of Appeal said that parties cannot use a motion to strike out
an originating motion, now a notice of application, except in very exceptional
cases. At paragraph 11 of that decision, the Court of Appeal found that to
strike out an application for judicial review, the application must be “so
clearly improper as to be bereft of any possibility of success”:
It is obviously important that parties
not be put to the delay and expense involved in taking a matter to trial if it
is “plain and obvious” (the test for striking out pleadings) that the pleading
in question cannot amount to a cause of action or a defence to a cause of
action. Even though it is important both to the parties and the Court that
futile claims or defences not be carried forward to trial, it is still the rare
case where a judge is prepared to strike out a pleading . . .
[51]
The remarks
of Justice Strayer of the Federal Court of Appeal in Pharmacia are
clear, and a motion to strike out an application imposes a very heavy burden on
the moving party. The principles governing motions to strike out applications
for judicial review were summarized by this Court in Amnesty
International Canada et al. v. Chief of the Defence Staff et al., 2007 FC 1147, 320 F.T.R. 236 at
paragraphs 22 to 23.
[52]
Keeping in
mind the admonition of the Court in Amnesty International regarding the
heavy onus on the moving party and the need to read the notice of application
as generously as possible, I am not persuaded that this case can succeed.
[53]
The
respondents argue that the band’s custom Election Code is clear and that the
Court should not interfere with the electoral officer’s decision. By way of
example, in Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation, above, this Court determined
that the Appeal Committee in that case did not have the jurisdiction to hear an
appeal regarding the decisions made by the electoral officer at the nomination
meeting on August 14, 2002. That is because no appeal with respect to those
decisions was filed within the seven days provided, namely within the period
from August 14 to August 21, 2002. Accordingly, since the applicants did not
file their appeal until September 2, 2002, the Court found that the Appeal
Committee did not have the jurisdiction to consider it.
[54]
I agree
with the respondents that a broad and liberal interpretation of the Election
Code does not provide for an extension of time to contest an election. In R.
v. Multiform Manufacturing Co. at paragraphs 9 and 10, the Supreme
Court of Canada noted that when the courts must interpret a statute, their task
is to discover the intention of Parliament:
When the words used in a statute are clear
and unambiguous, no further step is needed to identify the intention of
Parliament. There is no need for further construction when Parliament has
clearly expressed its intention in the words it has used in the statute.
[55]
Furthermore,
in R v. McIntosh at paragraph 18, the Supreme Court explained that,
In resolving the interpretive issue
raised by the Crown, I take as my starting point the proposition that where no
ambiguity arises on the face of a statutory provision, then its clear words
should be given effect. This is another way of asserting what is sometimes
referred to as the “golden rule” of literal construction: a statute should be
interpreted in a manner consistent with the plain meaning of its terms. Where
the language of the statute is plain and admits of only one meaning, the task
of interpretation does not arise (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes
(12th ed. 1969), at p. 29).
[56]
It is not
for the Court to interfere with the electoral officer’s decision in this case.
However, the applicant has also raised other causes of action, namely that the
electoral officer erred in law and that there is a reasonable apprehension of
bias, and I see nothing plain and obvious that shows the lack of a cause of
action at this stage in the proceedings which could justify striking out the
notice of application for judicial review.
[57]
For these
reasons, the Court orders the dismissal of the respondents’ motion to strike
out or dismiss the notice of application for judicial review.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that the respondents’ motion to
strike out or dismiss the applicant’s application for judicial review be
dismissed with costs.
“Max
M. Teitelbaum”
Certified
true translation
Sarah
Burns
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-664-09
STYLE OF CAUSE: Roger
Collard v. The Electoral Officer of the Betsiamites Band Council and Paul
Vollant and Raphaël Picard
PLACE OF
HEARING: Québec,
Quebec
DATE OF
HEARING: July
15, 2009
REASONS FOR
ORDER
AND ORDER
BY: TEITELBAUM
D.J.
DATED: August
11, 2009
APPEARANCES:
|
Ibrahima Dabo
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
|
François Lebel
|
FOR THE RESPONDENTS
|
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
|
Gaucher,
Lévesque, Tabet
Québec, Quebec
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
|
Langlois,
Kronström, Desjardins, s.e.n.c.r.l.
Québec, Quebec
|
FOR THE RESPONDENTS
|
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