Date: 20090506
Docket: IMM-2091-09
Citation: 2009 FC 463
Ottawa, Ontario, May 6, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
SYED RIZWAN HAIDER RIZVI,
SAEYDA TABASSUM HAIDER, SUKAINA
HAIDER RIZVI (by her litigation guardian,
SEYED RIZWAN HAIDER RIZVI),
SYED HIDER RAZA (by his litigation
guardian, SEYED RIZWAN HAIDER
RIZVI), and MASSUMA RIZVI (by her
litigation guardian, SEYED RIZWAN
HAIDER RIZVI)
Applicants
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
and
THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1]
The denial of a humanitarian and compassionate exemption does not
involve the determination of an applicant’s legal rights but rather is an
exemption from the normal requirement that all persons seeking admission to
Canada must make their application before entering Canada (Gautam v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1999) 167 F.T.R. 124, 88 A.C.W.S. (3d) 652
(F.C.T.D) at paras. 9-10).
[2]
This Court should not intervene in this decision unless the
Officer’s decision does not fall within the range of possible acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. This Court does
not have the jurisdiction to intervene in this case as the standard is a
deferential one, as per the Supreme Court of Canada (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 190 at paras. 47, 53, 55, 62; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v. Khosa,
2009 SCC 12 at para. 89; Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para. 62, p. 858; Thandal
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 489, 167 A.C.W.S. (3d) 166 at para. 7).
II. Introduction
[3]
To obtain the extraordinary remedy of a stay, the Applicants,
citizens of Pakistan, must meet the three-part conjunctive test. They have shown
no serious issue regarding their refused Humanitarian and Compassionate (H&C)
application. In an eleven page decision, the Officer considered all evidence
adequately and applied the test. Removal, albeit inconvenient, will not cause
irreparable harm. The balance of convenience favours removal in this case.
III. Background
[4]
The Applicants, citizens of Pakistan, are scheduled to be removed
from Canada to the United States, on May 7, 2009.
[5]
The Applicants are a family from Pakistan: husband,
wife, two daughters and a son. They have lived in Canada since April
2002. They unsuccessfully sought refugee protection in 2003. They then applied
to remain in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds and also made
an application under Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) guidelines, both in
2005. Three years later the same officer refused their H&C and PRRA
applications. They successfully reviewed their negative H&C decision in
this Court. A PRRA officer refused their H&C application, on March 25, 2009,
and communicated his decision to the Applicants, on April 15, 2009. They have
sought leave of this Court to review that decision. They are now before this
Court seeking a stay of removal pending the determination of their judicial
review application.
[6]
The Applicants have had the benefit of a refugee claim, a PRRA,
H&C consideration and reconsideration, administrative deferrals and a
judicial stay of removal.
IV. Issue
[7]
Have the Applicants satisfied all three parts of the conjunctive
test for a stay?
V. Analysis
[8]
The test for the granting of an order staying execution of a
removal order is:
a.
whether there is a serious question to be determined by the Court;
b.
whether the party seeking the stay would suffer irreparable harm
if the stay were not issued; and
c.
whether on the balance of convenience the party seeking the stay
will suffer the greater harm from the refusal to grant the stay.
(Toth
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 86 N.R. 302, 11
A.C.W.S. (3d) 440 (F.C.A.); R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc.
v. Canada (Attorney
General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311).
[9]
The test for a stay is conjunctive and the Applicant must
therefore satisfy each branch of this tri-partite test (Chavez v. Canada (Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2006 FC 830, 150 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 189 at paras. 9, 26).
Preliminary
Matter – Style of Cause to be Amended
[10]
This is a motion seeking a stay of removal until the underlying
application for leave and judicial review is decided. The application for leave
and for judicial review concerns a decision of a PRRA Officer, emanating from
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration; however, the decision to enforce
the Applicants’ removal order emanates from Canada Border Services Agency
(CBSA). The style of cause is therefore amended to add the Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness as a responding party, as the CBSA does not
fall under portfolio of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Pursuant
to the coming into force of the Department of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness Act (Bill C-6), on April 4, 2005, the Solicitor General’s
responsibilities with respect to the CBSA have now been transferred to the
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (Public Services
Rearrangement and Transfer of Duties Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-34; Orders in Council,
P.C. 2003-2061 & P.C. 2003-2063; Department of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness Act, S.C. 2005, c. 10, s. 7).
A. Serious Issue
[11]
As the Applicants have failed to establish a serious issue, this
motion should be dismissed on this basis alone.
Officer did
not fetter discretion
[12]
This Court has rejected the notion that the analysis of hardship
is an improper lens for an H&C Officer to use. The Federal Court of Appeal
has held that the use of unusual, undeserved, or disproportionate hardship in
the Guidelines merely assist decision-makers. The use of hardship in an H&C
Officer’s decision or the particular wording chosen by the officer is not
determinative and does not indicate that he or she has fettered their
discretion:
[9] Fourth,
"hardship" is not a term of art. As noted in section 6.1 of Chapter
IP 5 of the Immigration Manual (reproduced at para. 30 of my colleague's
reasons), the administrative definition of "unusual and undeserved
hardship" and "disproportionate hardship" in the Manual are
"not meant as 'hard and fast' rules" and are, rather, "an
attempt to provide guidance to decision makers when they exercise their discretion"…
(Hawthorne
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA
475, [2003] 2 F.C. 555 (C.A.) at para. 9; Dang v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC
290, 310 F.T.R. 161 at paras. 14 and 28).
[13]
Inherent in the notion of H&C applications is that hardship
is a normal consequence of deportation proceedings, and that relief is to be
granted only when hardship goes beyond the inherent consequences of
deportation. The Officer did not fetter her discretion by assessing whether the
Applicants would suffer unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship if
required to leave Canada. This is the proper burden to be met in an H&C
application before the requirement to hold a visa can be exempted (Uddin v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT
937, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 930 at para. 22; Irimie v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 10 Imm. L.R. (3d) 206, 101 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 995 (F.C.T.D.) at paras. 12 and 26).
[14]
The argument that the focus on hardship is incompatible with the
language of ss. 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001,
s. 27 (IRPA) and that immigration officers should be approaching the
H&C analysis by using factors similar to those used by the Immigration
Appeal Board (IAB) in Chirwa v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1970]
I.A.B.D. No. 1, has been rejected by this Court. In Lim v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCT 956, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d)
929, Justice Eleanor Dawson noted that the jurisprudence of the IAB has
not been followed in connection with H&C applications:
[16] To the extent it was argued that
jurisprudence from the Immigration Appeal Division, including Chirwa v.
Canada (The Minister of Manpower and Immigration) (1970), 4 IAC 338
(I.A.B.) and Jugpall v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Canada) [1999] IADD No. 600 (I.A.D.), provides proper guidance as to what H
& C considerations are, that jurisprudence was developed in consideration
of provisions other than subsection 114(2) of the Act. That jurisprudence has
not been followed by this Court in connection with H & C applications under
subsection 114(2). See, for example, Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2001]
F.C.J. No. 139 (T.D.).
[15]
In Lim, above, the Court made the following further
comments regarding the approach in Chirwa, above:
[17] Moreover,
I am not sure that there is significant difference between the guidance offered
in IP-5 and that offered by the jurisprudence of the Immigration Appeal
Division. In cases such as Chirwa, the Appeal Division has relied on a
definition of compassionate considerations as being "...those facts,
established by the evidence, which would excite in a reasonable man in a
civilized community a desire to relieve the misfortunes of another - so long as
these misfortunes warrant the granting of special relief from the provisions of
the Immigration Act". Circumstances of unusual and undeserved or
disproportionate hardship would seem to me to be generally co-extensive with
those which would excite a desire to relieve misfortune within the Chirwa
definition.
[16]
The Officer in this case had regard to the particular
circumstances of the Applicants, and did not fetter her discretion by rigidly
adhering to the Guidelines at the expense of a full consideration of the
evidence before her. The Applicants have not raised a serious issue respecting
whether the Officer fettered her discretion by allowing herself to be guided by
the Ministerial Guidelines contained in IP 5 (Fernandez Mendoza v. M.C.I., (30 June 2008), Doc.
No. IMM-2471-08 (F.C.), by Justice Carolyn Layden-Stevenson, stay granted; Fernandez
Mendoza v. M.C.I., (4 September 2008), Doc. No. IMM-2471-08 (F.C.), by
Justice Yves de Montigny, leave dismissed).
Purpose of exemption not
to create a new substantive right
[17]
The existence of a humanitarian and compassionate review offers
an individual special and additional consideration for an exemption from
Canadian immigration laws that are otherwise universally applied. The purpose
of humanitarian and compassionate discretion is to allow flexibility to approve
deserving cases not anticipated in the legislation. It cannot be “a back door
when the front door has, after all legal remedies have been exhausted, been denied
in accordance with Canadian law” (Mayburov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 183 F.T.R. 280, 98
A.C.W.S. (3d) 885 at para. 39; also: Chapter IP 5 Immigrant Applications in
Canada made on Humanitarian or Compassionate Grounds (IP 5), s. 1.4; Irimie,
above at para. 26; Chau v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002
FCT 107, 111 A.C.W.S. (3d) 804 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 27; Li v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1292, 152 A.C.W.S. (3d) 699 at
para. 20).
Standard of review of
merits of decision requires deference
[18]
As the Court noted in Dunsmuir, above:
[48] The move towards a
single reasonableness standard does not pave the way for a more intrusive
review by courts and does not represent a return to pre-Southam
formalism. In this respect, the concept of deference, so central to judicial
review in administrative law, has perhaps been insufficiently explored in the
case law. What does deference mean in this context? Deference is both an
attitude of the court and a requirement of the law of judicial review. It does
not mean that courts are subservient to the determinations of decision makers,
or that courts must show blind reverence to their interpretations, or that they
may be content to pay lip service to the concept of reasonableness review while
in fact imposing their own view. Rather, deference imports respect for the
decision-making process of adjudicative bodies with regard to both the facts
and the law…
…
[62] In summary, the process
of judicial review involves two steps. First, courts ascertain whether the
jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of
deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question.
Second, where the first inquiry proves unfruitful, courts must proceed to an
analysis of the factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of
review.
[19]
The issue for this Court is not whether the Court would make the
same decision, but rather whether the decision is reasonable in the
circumstances of the case. In Mayburov, above, Justice François Lemieux
stated:
[5] When deciding the issue of whether such a
decision is unreasonable, the reviewing court cannot overstep its role. This is
not an appeal but a judicial review. I cannot review the evidence and
substitute my opinion for that of the immigration officer. The perspective of
the review judge is to examine the evidence before the immigration officer and
determine, in this case, whether there was absence of evidence or was the decision
made contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. I cannot reach that
conclusion.
[20]
The Court cannot lightly interfere with the discretion given to
immigration officers. The H&C decision is not a simple application of legal
principles but rather a fact-specific weighing of many factors. As long as the
immigration officer considers the relevant, appropriate factors from a
humanitarian and compassionate perspective, the Court should not interfere with
the weight given to the different factors, even if it would have weighed the
factors differently. As held by the Federal Court of Appeal in Legault v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 125, [2002] 4 F.C. 358:
[11] In Suresh, the
Supreme Court clearly indicates that Baker did not depart from the
traditional view that the weighing of relevant factors is the responsibility of
the Minister or his delegate. It is certain, with Baker, that the
interests of the children are one factor that an immigration officer must
examine with a great deal of attention. It is equally certain, with Suresh,
that it is up to the immigration officer to determine the appropriate weight to
be accorded to this factor in the circumstances of the case. It is not the role
of the courts to reexamine the weight given to the different factors by the
officers.
(Reference is also made to Suresh v.
Canada, 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 34-37).
Onus on Applicants to
establish claim to positive H&C
[21]
It is well established that the onus on an application for
H&C relief lies with the Applicants. They were unable to meet the onus in
this case where the information provided did not establish that they would
suffer undue, unusual or disproportionate hardship by having to apply from
outside Canada such that they would be entitled to an exemption from the normal
requirement (IRPA at s. 11 and s. 25; Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (Regulations)
at s. 66; IP 5 at s. 5.1; Owusu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2003 FCT 94, 228 F.T.R. 19 at paras 11-12 (appeal dismissed
2004 FCA 38, [2004] 2 F.C.R. 635).
[22]
The Notes, which constitute the reasons for decision, are not to
be read microscopically but rather as a whole (Boulis v. Canada (Minister of
Manpower and Immigration), [1974] S.C.R. 875; El Doukhi v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1464, 304 F.T.R. 266 at
para. 27).
Decision not unreasonable
– Best interests of children adequately considered
[23]
While the children’s best interests must be considered, the
existence of children does not entitle the Applicants to a particular result (Baker, above, at paras. 74-75;
Legault, above, at para. 11).
[24]
In finding that the Applicants had not established their H&C
claim, there has been no inconsistency with the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC). All of the children’s best interests have been very carefully
considered in the portion of the decision that runs for more than two pages;
the Officer was alert, alive and sensitive to all of the impacting factors for
all three children.
[25]
With respect to the children’s education, the Officer noted that,
although there is still discrimination for female students, primary education
is available. Although secondary education may be less available in rural areas,
the Applicants, who are from Karachi, have not indicated that they will be
returning to a rural area.
[26]
The Officer did not ignore the children’s language issues. She
noted that it was reasonable to assume (in the absence of sufficient evidence
to the contrary) that the children would have been exposed to Urdu and
Pakistani culture as well as the fact that the Applicants do have family
members in Pakistan. In light of the evidence which describes the children as
intelligent and adaptable, this finding was open to her.
[27]
Although the Applicants argue that the Officer failed to
understand the psychological report with respect to the oldest child and argued
that the Officer relied on irrelevant considerations, they have provided no
specifics. In fact, the Officer appropriately understood and applied the
findings in the report (which report was based to some extent on facts which
have not been found to be so in other immigration proceedings) to conclude that
although she wants to stay in Canada, no undue, unusual or disproportionate
hardship would occur if she were required to return to Pakistan.
[28]
Further, the Officer carefully analyzed the evidence with respect
to the oldest child’s health issues and the medical record in that regard was
assessed. Based on the evidence before her, it was open to her to conclude that
requiring the Applicants to obtain health care in Pakistan would not result in
the kind of hardship that would lead to a positive determination.
[29]
In light of the careful analysis which is very specific to these
children, it cannot be said that the Officer engaged in boiler plate decision
making. The Applicants disagree with the Officer’s conclusion with respect to
how the child’s best interests factor into the H&C decision. As the Federal
Court of Appeal held in Hawthorne, above:
[5] … living in Canada can offer a child many
opportunities and that, as a general rule, a child living in Canada with her
parent is better off than a child living in Canada without her parent.
[6] To simply require that the officer
determine whether the child's best interests favour non-removal is somewhat
artificial - such a finding will be a given in all but a very few, unusual
cases…
(CRC, Article 3; Baker, above).
[30]
The Federal Court of Appeal in Hawthorne went on to reaffirm
the principle confirmed in Legault, above, that the best interests of
the child are an important factor but not a determinative one. As noted in Legault:
[11] In
Suresh, the Supreme Court clearly indicates that Baker did not
depart from the traditional view that the weighing of relevant factors is the
responsibility of the Minister or his delegate. It is certain, with Baker,
that the interests of the children are one factor that an immigration officer
must examine with a great deal of attention. It is equally certain, with Suresh,
that it is up to the immigration officer to determine the appropriate
weight to be accorded to this factor in the circumstances of the case. It is
not the role of the courts to reexamine the weight given to the different factors
by the officers.
[12] ...
It is not because the interests of the children favour the fact that a parent
residing illegally in Canada should remain in Canada (which, as justly
stated by Justice Nadon, will generally be the case), that the Minister must
exercise his discretion in favour of said parent. Parliament has not decided,
as of yet, that the presence of children in Canada constitutes in itself an
impediment to any "refoulement" of a parent illegally residing in Canada (see Langner v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (1995), 184 N.R. 230 (F.C.A.), leave
to appeal refused, SCC 24740, August 17, 1995). (Emphasis added).
(Reference is also made to Hawthorne, above, at para. 8).
Applicants do not benefit
from non-compliance with IRPA and Regulations
[31]
The Applicants were issued a conditional departure order which
became a removal order thirty days after their refugee proceedings were finally
determined negative, in April 2004. Thus, they were expected to return to Pakistan
as they were found not to be Convention refugees or persons in need of
protection. There is no evidence on the record that they could not return or
that Canada was not returning people to Pakistan (Regulations s. 224, 230 and 231).
[32]
The onus is on the Applicants to ensure that they comply with the
immigration laws; they cannot blame the fact that they remained in Canada
without status on the fact that removal arrangements were not initiated right
away. They were under removal orders. The Applicants received the appropriate consideration
for their establishment in Canada; however, it was open to the Officer to note
that, in the circumstances, requiring them to leave Canada and apply for
permanent resident status in the normal manner would not result in unusual,
undeserved or disproportionate hardship (IP 5, s. 5.21).
[33]
None of the issues raised by the Applicants amount to serious
issues to be tried. They have not met the first branch of the tri-partite test.
B. Irreparable Harm
[34]
The onus is on the Applicant to demonstrate, through clear and
convincing evidence of irreparable harm, that the extraordinary remedy of a
stay of removal is warranted. Irreparable harm must constitute more than a
series of possibilities and cannot be based on assertions and speculation (Atwal v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 427, 136 A.C.W.S (3d) 109
at para. 14).
[35]
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that such harm must be done
to the Applicant (R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc., above, at para. 58)
[36]
The Federal Court
jurisprudence also establishes that irreparable harm must be something more
than the inherent consequences of deportation. As Justice Denis Pelletier
stated, in Melo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) (2000), 188 F.T.R. 39, 96 A.C.W.S. (3d) 278:
[21] …
if the phrase irreparable harm is
to retain any meaning at all, it must refer to some prejudice beyond that which
is inherent in the notion of deportation itself. To be deported is to lose your
job, to be separated from familiar faces and places. It is accompanied by enforced
separation and heartbreak…
[37]
There is no statutory stay
pending the outcome of an H&C application or an application for leave and for
judicial review of such a decision. It is expected that processing, or in this
case, the litigation can continue (Regulations at s. 231; Akyol v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 931, 124 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 1119 at para. 11).
[38]
This case can be
distinguished from Owusu
v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 470, 139 A.C.W.S. (3d) 915); in that case, the irreparable harm stemmed from
the fact that employment in Canada was necessary to support his children who were
not living here. That is not the case at bar where, in fact, there is
insufficient evidence to conclude that the Applicants, some of whom are highly
educated, cannot find employment in Pakistan.
[39]
In light of the evidence about the children characterizing them
as adaptable, a suggestion that the psychological effects of removal would be
any more than is expected, is speculative and not irreparable harm.
[40]
The disruption of the Applicants’ school year does not constitute
irreparable harm. The Federal Court of Appeal has addressed this issue:
[12] I am not persuaded that the appellants
have met the requirement of showing that, unless their removal is stayed
pending the determination of their appeal, they will suffer irreparable harm…
[13] The removal of persons who have
remained in Canada without status will
always disrupt the lives that they have succeeded in building here. This is
likely to be particularly true of young children who have no memory of the
country that they left. Nonetheless, the kinds of hardship typically occasioned
by removal cannot, in my view, constitute irreparable harm for the purpose of
the Toth rule, otherwise stays would have to be granted in most cases,
provided only that there is a serious issue to be tried: Melo v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2000), 188 F.T.R. 29.
[14] I am not persuaded that the adult
appellants' success in finding employment (which they will lose on removal),
their commitment to improving their vocational qualifications, and their
community involvement, are sufficient to demonstrate that their situation is
any different from that of most others who face removal. Similarly, their
child's separation from his school and friends pending the disposition of the
appeal is a routine, if painful, incident of removal.
(Selliah v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 261, 132 A.C.W.S. (3d) 547).
[41]
The Applicants have not shown that the loss of their business
would result in irreparable harm. In this case, they have known for over eight
months that removal was imminent. They have not provided evidence of any
attempt to divest themselves of their business during this time in order to
mitigate the effects (Akyol, above, at para. 9; Bajwa
v. Canada (Secretary of State) (1994), 46 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 687, [1994] F.C.J. No. 232 (QL) (F.C.T.D.)).
[42]
As the Applicants have failed to satisfy the test for irreparable
harm, this motion should be dismissed on this basis alone.
C. Balance
of Convenience
[43]
Section 48 of the IRPA provides that an enforceable removal order
must be enforced as soon as is reasonably practicable.
[44]
The Applicants are seeking extraordinary equitable relief. The
public interest must be taken into consideration when evaluating this last criterion.
In order to demonstrate that the balance of convenience favours the Applicants,
the latter would have to demonstrate that there is a public interest not to
remove them as scheduled (Dugonitsch v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 1992, 53
F.T.R. 314, 32 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1135; R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc., above; Blum
v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1994), 90
F.T.R. 54, 52 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1099).
[45]
The balance of any inconvenience which the Applicants may suffer
as a result of removal from Canada does not outweigh the public interest which
the Respondent seeks to maintain in the application of the IRPA – specifically
an interest in executing a deportation order as soon as reasonably practicable.
In this case, the Applicants have had the benefit of a refugee claim, PRRA,
H&C consideration, administrative deferral of removal in the appropriate
situation and a judicial stay of removal. It was understood that after the last
deferral for the daughter’s medical appointment that the Applicants would
comply with the order and leave; they have not done so. Now, given the very
thorough H&C determination which raises no serious issue, the balance favours
the Minister (Atwal, above, at para. 19).
VI. Conclusion
[46]
For
all of the above reasons, the Applicants’ motion for a stay of the execution of the
removal is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicants’
motion for a stay of the execution of the removal be dismissed.
“Michel M.J. Shore”
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