Date: 20091211
Docket: DES-5-08
Citation: 2009 FC 1266
Ottawa, Ontario, December
11, 2009
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Simon Noël
BEFORE THE COURT:
IN THE MATTER OF a certificate signed
pursuant to subsection 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
S.C. 2001, c.27, (the "Act");
IN THE MATTER OF the referral of that
certificate to the Federal Court of Canada pursuant to subsection 77(1),
section 83(1) of the Act;
AND IN THE
MATTER OF Mohamed HARKAT
REASONS FOR
ORDER
NOËL S. J.
[1]
These
are reasons for order in relation to the motion for disclosure filed by Mr.
Harkat (the “applicant”) on April 9, 2009. Submissions were heard on April 15
and April 16 in public.
[2]
An
order granting in part the motion of April 9, 2009, was issued on April 21,
2009, with reasons to follow.
[3]
Shortly
after the April 21, 2009 order was issued, the Court was informed of the
failure of the Ministers to disclose some information relating to one of the
human sources relied on to support the allegations in the Security Information
Report (SIR) (see 2009 FC 204). The intervening procedures, which came to a
close on October 15, 2009, as well as the most recent closed hearings on the
reasonableness of the certificate, which also addressed further disclosure,
have delayed the issuance of these reasons for the Order of April 21, 2009.
The
requests for disclosure brought by counsel for the applicant, Mr. Harkat, from
August 2008 to April 2009
[4]
On
August 28, 2008, counsel for the applicant sought full disclosure of the
information regarding Mr. Harkat in the possession of the Ministers and the
Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) subject only to the assertion
of a national security privilege. If a national security privilege was
asserted over such information, counsel wished to be informed of the basis of
the privilege so that the assertion could be challenged by the Special
Advocates. (Letter from Mr. N. Boxall dated August 28, 2008). In an appendix
to his letter, counsel listed the information he was seeking to be disclosed
which included but was not limited to:
·
CSIS
interviews;
·
Human
source information including information about the source’s relationship with
CSIS, motivation, payment, other targets, citizenship immigration status,
criminal record etc.;
·
Definitions
of specific terms used in the Security Intelligence Report (“SIR”);
·
Information
about employees involved in the preparation of the SIR;
·
Background
information about various individuals and organizations named in the SIR, e.g.
FIS, GIA, Ibn Khattab, AGAI;
·
The number
of Islamic extremists that entered Canada
on false Saudi passports; and,
·
Original
material of any interviews conducted.
[5]
On
March 20, 2009, counsel for Mr. Harkat wrote to the Court concerning potential
disclosure to Mr. Harkat. In his letter, counsel noted that the requests made
in August 2008 were still unanswered. In addition to the earlier requests, counsel
requested the following information:
·
declassified
versions of all reports generated concerning the reliability and/or
corroboration of human sources;
·
a list of
which of the conversations summarized and provided to Mr. Harkat are the result
of technical intercepts and which emanate from human sources;
·
transcripts
of the summarized conversations if available;
·
release of
further summarized conversations between Mr. Harkat and his family; and,
·
a detailed
accounting or inventory of all information that has been lost or destroyed.
[6]
Given the numerous demands for disclosure made by Mr.
Harkat, on April 3, 2009, this Court ordered that his requests be made the
subject of a motion for disclosure. This motion was filed on April 9, 2009 and
sought an order requiring that:
·
the
Ministers release evidence regarding two named individuals; Mohamed El Barseigy
and Ahmed Derbas;
·
the Ministers
release items of disclosure referred to in the disclosure request of counsel
dated March 20, 2009;
·
the
Ministers provide the fullest possible disclosure of material relied upon under
subsection 83(1)(e) of the IRPA to public counsel, such that public counsel
know the case to be met;
·
the
Ministers meet their Charkaoui II disclosure obligations by complying with the Stinchcombe
standard of disclosure of “all information, whether inculpatory or exculpatory,
except evidence that is beyond the control of the prosecution, clearly
irrelevant, or privileged.” and
·
the
Ministers comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Charkaoui II, by providing
a full inventory of destroyed and lost operational materials to date.
[7]
To
date, Mr. Harkat has been provided with:
-
all
publicly available material relied on in the confidential Security Intelligence
Report (the “SIR”) including news articles etc.;
-
all
information provided by other Canadian government agencies relied on in the
confidential SIR;
-
summaries
of all conversations in which Mr. Harkat was a participant relied on in the
confidential SIR;
-
further
information on the MAK;
-
more
detail concerning previously known allegations as well as previously
undisclosed allegations made in the confidential SIR. Supplementary information
may be disclosed as the proceedings are unfolding;
-
A
summary of the information contained in the Charkaoui 2 disclosure
material;
-
some
original information that was produced as part of the Charkaoui 2
disclosure;
-
Summaries
of other conversations, not relied on in the SIR, between Mr. Harkat and
others;
-
Summaries
of 22 documents in the Charkaoui 2 material that were identified as essential
by the Special Advocates;
[8]
The
bulk of the information disclosed to the applicant, over the course of the
closed hearings of the proceeding, has been in the form of summaries. Some
limited original material has also been provided to the applicant.
[9]
Mr.
Harkat has received substantial disclosure of the allegations made against him including
some of the information on which those allegations are based. Special
advocates have been permitted to communicate with counsel for Mr. Harkat (order
of May 6, 2009) who was, as a result of the authorized communication, able to
forward instructions to the Special Advocates.
[10]
On
November 10, 2009, this Court authorized a further oral communication between
the Special Advocates and counsel for Mr. Harkat. The object of the
communication was to allow Mr. Harkat to give instructions to the Special
Advocates for the purpose of their cross-examination of the witnesses during
the closed hearings of November and December 2009, on the following matters:
·
The
guesthouse in Babi.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s relationship with Ibn Khattab.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s relationship and contacts with Ahmed Said Khadr before and after he
came to Canada.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s relationship with Wael.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s relationship with Al Shehri.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s presence in Afghanistan and any activities
there.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s relationship with Abu Zubayda.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s relationship with Bin Laden and any contacts with him.
·
Mr.
Harkat’s access to large sums of money while in Canada.
[11]
Both
of these authorized communications were subject to conditions designed by the
Court to prevent any inadvertent disclosure of confidential information.
[12]
I
note that these reasons for order do not address the constitutional sufficiency
of the disclosure mandated by paragraph 83(1)(e) IRPA; this issue, among
others, is the subject of an omnibus motion brought by counsel for Mr. Harkat
which is to be argued at the end of the reasonableness hearings. I agree with
Mosley J. that to determine these issues prior to the reasonableness hearing
would be premature: Re Almrei 2009 FC 322 para. 54.
[13]
I
will first address the scope of the disclosure which is mandated by IRPA and by
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 SCC 38 (Charkaoui 2)
The
scope of the information that must be filed with the Court and provided to the
Special Advocates: must the Ministers comply with a Stinchcombe standard of
disclosure?
[14]
In
his motion record, Mr. Harkat takes the position that in the absence of the
assertion of a privilege, all of the information concerning him should be
disclosed. His counsel refers to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) 2007 SCC 9 (Charkaoui 1) and Charkaoui 2 as
authority for this assertion.
[15]
Counsel
for Mr. Harkat submits that the gravity of the consequences facing Mr. Harkat,
namely, possible removal from Canada or indefinite detention, elevates the
required level of procedural fairness pursuant to section 7 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Charter”). He submits that
regardless of the non-criminal nature of the proceeding, the consequences for
Mr. Harkat’s life, liberty and security of the person require that standards of
procedural fairness equivalent to those applied in the criminal context must be
met in a security certificate proceeding. Counsel further submits that
summaries of information are not sufficient to meet the disclosure requirements
mandated by section 7 and the Charkaoui cases. Mere summaries do not,
according to counsel, allow counsel to verify or test the allegations made
against Mr. Harkat. The presence of Special Advocates is not, in the
applicant’s opinion, sufficient to replace the role of counsel because of the
prohibition on communication between the applicant and the Special Advocates.
In the end analysis, only Mr. Harkat is in a position to effectively instruct
his counsel in relation to the information relied on by the Ministers.
[16]
The
Ministers object to the disclosure of most of the information sought by the
applicant on the grounds that the disclosure of the information would be injurious
to national security. They rely on section 83 of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”) which they assert is clear on its face.
[17]
There
are two statutory mechanisms designed to provide disclosure to the subject of a
security certificate. The first is found in subsection 77(2) of IRPA which
requires the Ministers to file the information and evidence on which the
certificate is based in the Court. A public summary of this information must
be provided to the subject of the certificate. The second is found in
paragraph 83(1)(e) of IRPA which puts a dual obligation on the designated judge
to maintain the confidentiality of information, the disclosure of which would
injure national security, and to ensure that the subject of the certificate is
reasonably informed of the case made by the Ministers.
[18]
A
further duty to disclose information to the designated judge was established by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui 2.
[19]
This
further duty to disclose in Charkaoui 2 has been interpreted by this
Court as imposing an obligation on the Ministers to provide the Court, and subsequently
the Special Advocates, with all information in CSIS’ possession or holdings relating
to the named person, in this case Mr. Harkat: Re Harkat 2009 FC 203 at
paras 10 and 11.
[20]
In
Re Harkat 2009 FC 340, this Court concluded that CSIS is not required to
disclose all of its holdings regarding every person or organization that is
alleged to have a connection with Mr. Harkat; it must provide such information
where the Special Advocates have established that access to the information is
necessary for them to fulfill their legislative role: see paragraph 17.
[21]
The
focus of the Charkaoui 2 exercise is to ensure that the designated
judge, and now the Special Advocates, has all of the information relevant to
the verification of the allegations made against the named person and all of
the information relied on to support those allegations: Re Almrei 2009 FC
240 at paras. 19-20 per Dawson J.
[22]
When
discussing how this new duty to disclose is to be discharged, the Supreme Court
observed at paragraph 62 of Charkaoui 2:
To uphold the right to procedural
fairness to people in Mr. Charkaoui’s position, CSIS should be required to
retain all information in its possession and to disclose it to the ministers
and the designated judge. The ministers and the designated judge will in turn
be responsible for verifying the information they are given. […] The designated judge, who will have
access to all the evidence, will then exclude any evidence that might pose a
threat to national security and summarize the remaining evidence – which he or she will have been able
to check for accuracy and reliability – for the named person.
(Emphasis added)
[23]
I
take from this statement that the Supreme Court did not contemplate that the
named person, the subject of a security certificate, would be granted access to
all of the information or records retained by CSIS. Nor did the Supreme Court
contemplate that the entire intelligence file relating to the named person
would necessarily be provided to him or her. Consistent with s. 83(1)(e) IRPA,
the Supreme Court held that a judge must exclude evidence that “poses a threat
to national security” and determine which of the original information may be
provided to the named person or summarized without harming national security.
[24]
The
ultimate obligation to protect information that would injure national security,
is placed on the designated judge: 83(1)(d) IRPA. Indeed, in Re Almrei
2009 FC 240 Dawson J. concluded that even where the Ministers consent to the
disclosure of information, the designated judge has an obligation, as set out
in paragraph 83(1)(d) IRPA, to assess whether the information would, in the
judge’s opinion, cause injury to national security or endanger any person.
[25]
Again,
it is important to note that the constitutionality of paragraph 83(1)(e) IRPA
is not at issue in this motion, nor is the sufficiency of the special advocate
model set out in IRPA; these issues will be argued as part of the final submissions
on the reasonableness of the certificate. I am consequently bound to refuse to
disclose information where such information would, in my opinion, cause injury
to national security or endanger the safety of any person.
[26]
The
designated judge’s duty to protect information is not discretionary. Where I
have come to the opinion that disclosure would injure national security or
endanger any person I must refuse to disclose that information.
[27]
I
will now deal with the specific requests made by Mr. Harkat which may, for the
most part, be divided into two categories. First, I will address requests for
information filed with the Court pursuant to section 77(2) IRPA or, in
accordance with the Ministers’ disclosure obligations as established by Charkaoui
2 (“information that is filed with the Court”). Second, I will
address requests for information that is not currently before the Court. Last,
I will deal with the request for the disclosure of information concerning two
individuals who Mr. Harkat wishes to call as witnesses in this proceeding, and
the request for the disclosure of a list of all original material that has been
destroyed.
1. Mr. Harkat’s specific
requests for information filed with the Court
[28]
Mr.
Harkat (by way of letters dated March 20, 2009 and August 28, 2008) made
specific requests for the disclosure including:
·
declassified
versions of all reports generated concerning the reliability and/or
corroboration of human sources;
·
Human
source information including information about the source’s relationship with
CSIS, motivation, payment, other targets, citizenship immigration status,
criminal record etc.;
·
Information
regarding foreign agencies;
·
a list of
which of the conversations summarized and provided to Mr. Harkat are the result
of technical intercepts and which emanate from human sources;
·
transcripts
of the summarized conversations if available;
·
a detailed
accounting or inventory of all information that has been lost or destroyed;
·
CSIS
interviews.
(a)
Reports
concerning covert human sources
[29]
Mr.
Harkat is requesting declassified versions of all reports generated concerning
the reliability and/or corroboration of human sources.
[30]
The
Ministers object to the disclosure of this information. They assert that
disclosure of the information requested would identify covert human
intelligence sources and consequently, would injure national security and
potentially endanger the safety of individuals. In their submission, there is
no meaningful way to redact these reports.
[31]
Having
reviewed the reports provided to the Court concerning the reliability and/or
corroboration of human sources in this proceeding, this Court concludes that it
would be injurious to national security to provide them to counsel for Mr.
Harkat: Re Harkat 2009 FC 204. The reports are highly sensitive, would
identify human sources and at times include foreign agency information provided
to CSIS in confidence.
[32]
I
agree that there is no way to meaningfully redact the reports in a way that
would allow them to be declassified and disclosed to Mr. Harkat. However, the
information is available to the Court and has been given to the Special
Advocates who may use it to test the evidence and information relied on by the
Ministers.
[33]
The
applicant’s request is denied.
(b)
Human source information including information about the source’s relationship
with CSIS, motivation, payment, other targets, citizenship immigration status,
criminal record etc.
[34]
In
Mr. Boxall’s letter dated August 28, 2009 he requests human source information
including information about the source’s relationship with CSIS, motivation,
payment, other targets, citizenship immigration status, criminal record, etc.
[35]
The
Ministers object to the applicant’s request that the Ministers disclose reports
concerning human sources “on the grounds of national security and danger to the
security of persons.” They note that the Special Advocates have access to
some, if not all, of this information and are able to test the evidence with
it. According to the Ministers, it would be impossible to redact such
documents “…without removing any meaningful content.”
[36]
Information
about covert human intelligence sources is privileged and may not be publicly
disclosed without permanent damage to the national security of Canada. (Re
Harkat 2009 FC 204).
[37]
I
conclude that disclosure of the requested information would injure national
security and therefore deny the request to provide the applicant with any
information concerning a human source or that might lead to the identification
of such an individual. This information cannot be summarized in any meaningful
way.
(c)
A list of which of the conversations summarized and provided to Mr. Harkat are
the result of technical intercepts and which emanate from human source.
[38]
The
applicant also seeks a list of which of the conversations provided to Mr.
Harkat are the results of technical intercepts and which emanate from the
reports of human sources.
[39]
The
Ministers object to this request since to identify the source of the
conversation as a technical intercept or as a human source report would
disclose the identity of human sources and methods of operation.
[40]
In
my opinion, the disclosure of this information would also be injurious to
national security. Given the relatively small number of conversations summarized
and provided to Mr. Harkat, any indication of which conversations, if any, are
the result of a human source report would likely reveal the identity of a source
to the applicant. As noted in Re Harkat 2009 FC 204, the protection of covert
human intelligence sources is paramount to the national security of Canada and to the
safety of its residents.
[41]
The
applicant’s request is denied.
(d)
Transcripts of the summarized conversations provided to Mr. Harkat
[42]
Mr.
Harkat is also seeking transcripts of the conversations that have been summarized
and provided to him by the Court pursuant to paragraph 83(1)(e) IRPA.
[43]
There
are no remaining original recordings or transcripts of the conversations relied
on in the confidential SIR and provided in summarized form to Mr. Harkat; the
only remaining record of these summarized conversations are found in reports
filed in the CSIS database.
[44]
A
full accounting of the remaining original material was provided to the
applicant on April 24, 2009.
[45]
The
Court is therefore unable to grant this request.
(e) CSIS interviews of
Mr. Harkat
[46]
Mr.
Harkat has been provided with the reports of all of his interviews conducted by
CSIS. One audio recording of an Immigration and Refugee Board proceeding was
disclosed to Mr. Harkat on April 24, 2009.
[47]
There
is no further information to be disclosed. There are no remaining notes or
recordings of any interview with Mr. Harkat.
3.
Requests
for other information
[48]
A
number of the other requests made by the applicant have been characterized by
the Ministers as falling within the realm of discovery and not disclosure. For
example, counsel for Mr. Harkat has requested:
·
Disclosure
of the identity of CSIS employees who assisted in the preparation of the SIR,
·
definitions
of terms used in the SIR,
·
information
concerning the number of Islamic extremists that entered Canada on false Saudi passports,
·
information
about various organizations mentioned in the SIR.
[49]
The
Ministers take the position that they are not required to answer or disclose
information that would be the equivalent of information that would be the
product of examinations for discovery. (Letter from D. Tyndale dated April 7,
2009). They rely on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R.
v. Girimonte for the proposition that the obligation to disclose the
Crown’s case against an accused does not extend to discovery of that case by
the accused (R. v. Girimonte (1997), 37 O.R.
(3d.) 617 at para. 37).
[50]
They
assert that an obligation to disclose information does not necessarily entail a
right to discover the Crown’s case. Nor does the obligation to disclose, set
out in Charkaoui 2, extend as far as the obligations imposed on the
Crown in the context of a criminal prosecution. Even in the context of a
criminal prosecution, an accused is not entitled to discovery of the Crown’s
case. He or she is simply entitled to disclosure of all relevant material in
the Crown’s file.
[51]
Mr.
Harkat asserts that this information is relevant to his defence and is within
the control of the Ministers and should therefore be disclosed.
[52]
I
conclude that most of the information requested by Mr. Harkat in the letter of
August 28, 2008 does not fall within the disclosure obligations placed on the
Ministers by Charkaoui 2 and need not be provided to the Court or to Mr.
Harkat except where the questions have been put in the context of an
examination of a witness.
[53]
In
R. v. Hynes (2001 SCC 82 at para. 31) the majority of the Supreme
Court held that the discovery mechanism provided by a preliminary inquiry is not
the primary purpose of that proceeding (see also R. v. Huynh [2008]
O.J. No. 2466). In Hynes, supra, Chief Justice McLachlin observed:
Over
time, the preliminary inquiry has assumed an ancillary role as a discovery
mechanism, providing the accused with an early opportunity to discover the
Crown's case against him or her: Skogman, supra, at pp. 105-6. Nonetheless,
this discovery element remains incidental to the central mandate of the
preliminary inquiry as clearly prescribed by the Criminal Code; that is, the
determination of whether "there is sufficient evidence to put the accused
on trial" (s. 548(1)(a)).
[54]
Thus,
even in the criminal context, the accused is not entitled to benefit from the
discovery permitted by the holding of a preliminary inquiry. The Crown has
the discretion to proffer a direct indictment and proceed directly to trial
(see section 577 of the Criminal Code). I therefore conclude that
section 7, in the context of this proceeding, does not require me to give the
applicant an opportunity to discover the Ministers’ case by requiring the
Ministers to answer written inquiries.
[55]
The
applicant will have an opportunity to explore the questions raised by his
requests for information during the cross-examination of the witnesses
presented by the Ministers in support of the reasonableness of the
certificate.
4.
Request for disclosure of information regarding two named individuals; Mohamed
El Barseigy and Ahmed Derbas
[56]
Counsel
for Mr. Harkat would like to call these individuals as witnesses. They point
to the evidence in the previous certificate proceeding before Dawson J. to
illustrate that the two individuals are important witnesses and have filed an
affidavit in support of this motion indicating that they have not been able to
contact these individuals. They believe that CSIS has files relating to Mr.
Barseigy and Mr. Derbas and, in the absence of being able to contact them
directly, they are seeking disclosure of any such file.
[57]
The
Ministers refuse to confirm or deny the existence of any file in relation to
the two named individuals. They assert that to do so would harm national
security.
[58]
Requiring
CSIS to provide Mr. Harkat with information concerning these two individuals
would result in a confirmation or denial of the existence of such information.
To do so could identify persons of interest (or not) to CSIS and jeopardize
on-going investigations and would, in my opinion, be injurious to national
security. The request is denied.
5. Request
that the Ministers comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Charkaoui II, by
providing a full inventory of destroyed and lost operational materials to date.
[59]
The
Ministers have provided the applicant with a list of original materials that
remain in existence. The applicant is aware that the amount of relevant
original material is limited.
[60]
Any
argument relating to the sufficiency and reliability of the remaining evidence
can be effectively made by the special advocates and possibly by counsel for
Mr. Harkat who are aware that there are several thousands of pages of Charkaoui
2 information. I conclude that such a disclosure would be harmful to
national security since it would necessitate that Mr. Harkat be provided with
an index of much of the information that has been provided to the Court. As
such, the disclosure would clearly tend to identify informants, reveal third
party communication, relationships and information and methods of operation.
[61]
Both
the Court and the special advocates have vigorously reviewed the Ministers’
claim that the remaining closed material should be withheld from the applicant.
Indeed, further disclosure will be made as a result of the most recent closed
hearing on the reasonableness of the certificate.
[62]
The
role of the Special Advocates is essential to the proper operation of paragraph
83(1)(e) IPRA. They have a statutory duty to test the Ministers’ claim that
the disclosure of information would be injurious to national security or
endanger any person. To this end, the Special Advocates have been given access
to all of the information filed with the court both in support of the
certificate and pursuant to the requirements of Charkaoui 2. The
Special Advocates are aware of the grounds on which the Ministers have refused
disclosure. They have vigorously contested the non-disclosure where they have
concluded that the undisclosed information is necessary to ensure that Mr.
Harkat is “reasonably informed” of the case against him.
[63]
A
substantial amount of new information has been disclosed as a result of the Special
Advocates’ thorough examination of the information filed both in support of the
certificate and pursuant to Charkaoui 2.
Conclusion
[64]
This
Court is of the opinion that the information that Mr. Harkat seeks to have
disclosed to him, that has already been filed with the Court may not be
disclosed pursuant to paragraphs 83(1)(d) and (e) IRPA. Where possible,
summaries of this information have been provided to Mr. Harkat. The other
information requested by Mr. Harkat is not information which falls within the
obligation to disclose set out in Charkaoui 2.
[65]
This
motion was granted in part on April 21, 2009. The Ministers were ordered to
provide a summary of the Charkaoui 2 disclosure to Mr. Harkat including
a list of the number and type of remaining original records. The Ministers
complied with this Order by serving and filing a “Summary and further
disclosure of Charkaoui II documents” on April 23, 2009. Further disclosure
was also made and may also be made as the proceedings are unfolding.
“Simon Noël”
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: DES-5-08
STYLE OF CAUSE: In the matter of a
Certificate pursuant to Section 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act and In the matter of Mohamed Harkat
PLACE OF
HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF
HEARING: April
15-16, 2009
REASONS FOR ORDER: NOËL S. J.
DATED: December
11, 2009
APPEARANCES:
Mr. M. Webber,
Mr. N. Boxall,
Mr. L.
Russomanno
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
(Mr. Harkat)
|
Mr. D.
Tyndale, Mr. A. Seguin
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(The Ministers)
|
Mr. P.
Cavalluzzo, Mr. P. Copeland
|
SPECIAL ADVOCATES
|
SOLICITORS
OF RECORD:
Webber,
Schroeder Goldstein & Abergel and Bayne Sellar & Boxall
|
FOR THE APPLICANT (Mr. Harkat)
|
John H. Sims,
Q.C., Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT (the Ministers)
|
Mr. P.
Cavalluzzo
Mr. P.
Copeland
|
SPECIAL ADVOCATES
|