Date:
20120928
Docket:
IMM-7344-11
Citation:
2012 FC 1149
Ottawa, Ontario,
September 28, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Gleason
BETWEEN:
|
MOHAMUD ABDULLA FARAH
(AKA DAHIR OMAR SHIRE)
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
The
applicant, whose actual name is Dahir Omar Shire, is a 24-year-old male citizen
of Somalia. In this application for judicial review, he seeks to set aside the
decision of September 9, 2011 made by a Senior Immigration Officer in which the
Officer dismissed the applicant’s Pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA]
application. For the reasons set out below, I have determined that the
Officer’s decision is unreasonable and, accordingly, will be set aside.
Background
[2]
The
applicant and his family are from Somalia. Several years ago, they were
accepted as refugees by the UNHCR and the United States, came to the U.S. and
settled in Minnesota. The applicant dropped out of school in grade 10 and
developed an addiction to crack cocaine. In 2007, he pleaded guilty to a charge
of selling a controlled substance, crack cocaine. He spent 27 months in jail in
Minnesota between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, he was released on parole, and while
on parole in February 2010, was charged with a further count of illegal
possession of crack cocaine. The applicant was scheduled to attend before a
Minnesota Court for an omnibus hearing on August 6, 2010 but failed to appear.
The Court issued a warrant for his arrest and set bail at $100,000.00.
[3]
Fearing
he would be deported to Somalia by American authorities due to his drug
conviction and possible conviction for the pending charges, the applicant fled
to Canada on August 6, 2010. He presented a fraudulent passport at the port of
entry and claimed to be Mohamud Abdullah Farah. He made a refugee claim three
days later, in which he stated that he had entered Canada from Somalia, after
having merely passed through the United States.
[4]
On
September 2, 2010, the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] arrested the
applicant as a result of an investigation carried out by Citizenship and
Immigration Canada into the fingerprints the applicant provided upon entry to
Canada. These fingerprints showed him to be Dahir Omar Shire of Rochester,
Minnesota, for whom a warrant for arrest was outstanding. The applicant was
then placed in immigration detention.
[5]
In
a decision dated April 18, 2011, the Refugee Protection Division of the
Immigration and Refugee Board [RPD or the Board] determined that the applicant was
excluded from refugee protection by virtue of Article 1F(b) of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Can TS 1969 No 6 [Refugee
Convention or Convention], as incorporated into section 98 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA or the Act]. The Board held
that the applicant’s American drug conviction amounted to serious criminality,
which disentitled him to protection. Section 98 of the IRPA provides that:
A
person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention
is not a Convention Refugee or person in need of protection.
|
La
personne visée aux sections E ou F de l’article premier de la Convention sur
les réfugiés ne peut avoir la qualité de réfugié ni de personne à protéger.
|
Article 1F of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Can TS 1969 No 6 [ the Refugee
Convention or Convention] states in relevant part that the Convention:
[…]
shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering that:
[…]
(b) he
has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
[…]
|
[…] ne
seront pas applicables aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de
penser :
[…]
b)
qu’elles ont commis un crime grave de droit commun en dehors du pays
d’accueil
avant d’y être admises comme réfugiées;
[…]
|
[6]
While
the RPD determined that the applicant was excluded from protection by reason of
serious criminality, it made some non-binding comments in its decision,
indicating that if the applicant were returned to Somalia he would be a clear
target for al-Shabaab, a radical Islamist group in Somalia. The RPD also noted that the situation in Somalia was extremely unstable and urged
that its observations be taken into account if the applicant sought other forms
of protection in Canada (such as, for example, through a PRRA). The RPD wrote
as follows in this regard:
The claimant, who has spent the last ten years of
his life in North America, would be highly conspicuous in Somalia and in my
view, a target for recruitment by el-Shabaab. He would also be vulnerable as a
member of the Hamar Weyne, a minority clan in Somalia and as someone with no
experience as an adult in Somalia. Should the claimant seek other forms of
protection in Canada, I would urge this observation to be taken into
consideration.
[7]
On
January 25, 2012, this Court dismissed a judicial review application made in
respect of the RPD’s April 18, 2011 decision on the applicant’s refugee claim,
holding that the Board’s determination that the applicant had committed a
serious crime was reasonable (Shire v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 97, 212 ACWS (3d) 205). In non-binding obiter
comments, however, Justice O’Keefe echoed the sentiments of the RPD regarding
the nature of the risks that the applicant might face if returned to Somalia.
Justice O’Keefe concluded his Reasons for Judgment as follows (at para 66):
A final comment should be made regarding the risk
that the applicant would face if returned to Somalia. As stated by the Board,
Somalia has been without effective government for two decades. Violence is
rampant and more populous clans prey upon smaller ones, such as the applicant's.
The applicant has little remaining family in Somalia and his father and two of
his brothers have been killed by al-Shabaab. Having lived abroad for over a
decade, the applicant would likely face severe difficulties if returned.
However, the practical effect of section 98 of the Act is that the applicant
cannot obtain refugee protection […] Permanent resident status is also not
available to him […] It is therefore recommended that the hardship of being
returned, coupled with the lack of other available protection, be carefully
considered in the review of any future immigration applications made by the
applicant.
[Citations omitted.]
[8]
Following
the dismissal of his refugee claim by the RPD, the applicant made a PRRA
application on June 20, 2011, in which he claimed that he would face risk of
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if returned to Somalia. Because he
was disentitled to refugee protection pursuant to paragraph 113(d) of the IRPA,
the applicant’s PRRA was conducted on a limited basis, considering only
whether, if returned to Somalia, he would face risk of torture or of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA.
[9]
In
support of his PRRA application, the applicant alleged that he would be targeted
for recruitment by al-Shabaab as a young male returnee from the U.S., that he
does not share that organization’s radical views, has no desire to join
al-Shabaab and would therefore risk abuse and torture by al-Shabaab members
and, more generally, that he would be at risk of death or injury due to the
volatile situation in Somalia and to his lack of affiliation to any clan.
[10]
In
a decision dated September 9, 2011, a Senior Immigration Officer dismissed the
applicant’s PRRA application, holding that an Internal Flight Alternative
[IFA], or essentially a safe haven, was available to the applicant in
Mogadishu. The Immigration Officer concluded that the applicant would not face
risk of torture or risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if he were returned to Somalia as he could safely reside in Mogadishu, where he had lived as a young child. The Immigration
Officer premised the IFA finding principally on five news reports from Reuters,
dated August 6, 11, 24, 27 and 31, 2011. These reports indicated that
al-Shabaab had at least temporarily pulled out of Mogadishu and that, as a
result, thousands of Somalis and the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees [UNHCR] representatives were re-entering the city. The Reuters reports
as well as a report from the Canada Security Intelligence service, dated July
2011, further indicated that rifts were developing between senior commanders in
al-Shabaab, and, accordingly, that it had been weakened. The Immigration
Officer also reasoned that the applicant faced no risk of recruitment by
al-Shabaab because he had not yet been identified by al-Shabaab and did not
possess an American passport, noting that the country documentation indicated
that “… while the militants uniquely targeted Americans and English speaking
disenfranchised American and English-speaking young men into its fold, they
were also more valuable if they had an American passport” (Decision at p 9,
Certified Tribunal Record [CTR] at p 11).
Analysis
[11]
In
this application for judicial review, the applicant raises several arguments;
however, only one needs to be considered, namely, the assertion that the
Officer’s determination is unreasonable because it ignores the bulk of the
evidence before the Officer, which demonstrated that south-central Somalia and,
in particular, Mogadishu, are extremely dangerous places, where civilians risk
death due to the ongoing struggle between al-Shabaab and the Transitional
Federal Government [TFG] forces. For the reasons set out below, I have
determined that the Officer’s finding is unreasonable because it was based on
erroneous findings of fact made “without regard for the material before it” as
provided for by section 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Court Act, RSC 1985, c F-7. The decision is
premised on a handful of news reports that detail what is described in one
report as a “tactical move” by al-Shabaab and from these limited sources
unreasonably concludes that the applicant would face no forward-looking risk if
he were returned to Somalia. This conclusion ignores the bulk of the evidence
before the Officer, including the full content of those news reports, and,
moreover, ignores the history of strife in Somalia, that was detailed at length
in the evidence before the Officer.
[12]
In
this regard, in addition to voluminous discussion of the turmoil that has faced
Somalia over the past two decades, the following evidence regarding recent
conditions in Somalia was before the Officer:
·
The
Amnesty International 2011 Somalia Report which indicates that only part of
Mogadishu is controlled by the TFG, that armed groups are continuing to carry
out “unlawful killings, torture and forced recruitment”, that there are ongoing
indiscriminate attacks in Mogadishu and that humanitarian organizations are
having to restrict operations (CTR at pp 126-128);
·
An
April 29, 2011 report from the UNHCR noting the “deteriorating security
situation” resulting in large-scale displacement of citizens (50,000 civilians
fled Somalia in the first quarter, double from a year earlier) (CTR at pp
137-138);
·
A
statement by Human Rights Watch in March 2011 that “Somalia is in the throes of
one of the worst upsurges in violence in recent years.” (CTR at p 194);
·
The
2010 Amnesty International report noting that the organization is
[…] concerned at the widespread violations of
international humanitarian law and human rights law, including war crimes, and
the dire humanitarian situation that civilians face in southern and central
Somalia. Civilians are at high risk of being killed and injured in
indiscriminate attacks by all parties to the internal armed conflict, and as a
result of a situation of generalized violence and collapse of the rule of law… Somalia’s capital Mogadishu has since 2007 been the epicentre of armed conflict between the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and its allies, and the armed
Islamist groups al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam. Since 2008, al-Shabab has extended
its control to most of the territory in south and central Somalia, including
major towns, but heavy fighting and attacks continue in Mogadishu.
(CTR at p 220);
·
The
United States Department of State Human Rights Report on Somalia, dated April
8, 2011, describing a “worsening human rights situation” in Central and
Southern Somalia due to al-Shabaab control (e.g. “arbitrary killings,
kidnappings, torture, rape, amputations, and beatings; official impunity; harsh
and life-threatening prison conditions; and arbitrary arrest, deportation, and
detention”) (CTR at p 147);
·
An
October 2010 Amnesty International Briefing that refers to Mogadishu as the
“epicenter of armed conflict” between fighting factions and discusses the huge
affect this fighting is having on civilian population, including the cutting
off of deliveries of humanitarian aid (CTR at p 220);
·
A
2010 report from the UNHCR on Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the
International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia which states that
there is no available IFA in southern or central Somalia (CTR at p 270);
·
A
2010 Human Rights Watch Report describing how young men are fleeing Mogadishu
due to threats against their lives for refusing to join al-Shabaab (see e.g.
CTR at p 343);
·
A
January 2010 report of the Representative of the United Nations Secretary
General on the human rights of internally displaced persons indicating that the
Representative was unable to travel to central and southern Somalia due to the
instability and lack of security in the region (CTR at p 376); and
·
A
2010 report from Minority Rights Group International which highlights the vulnerable
position of minorities, especially in south and central Somalia, to violence
(including beheadings, shootings, etc.) (CTR at pp 417-454).
[13]
Indeed,
approximately 800 pages of country documentation were before the Officer, of
which only 16 pages of the Reuters reports addressed the recent developments in
Mogadishu that led to the withdrawal of al-Shabaab from the capital. Given
the history of volatile conflict in the country as a whole, and the Mogadishu
region in particular, to rely on a single development that was only weeks old falls
outside of the range of a reasonable conclusion, particularly in light of the
evidence regarding the fate of other similar developments in the past. In this
regard, the record before the Officer indicated that moments of stability have
not been long-lived in Somalia during its conflict. For example, the March 2010
Amnesty International report before the Officer described how, following the
appointment of a new President in 2009, 60,000 people returned to Mogadishu but
“hopes of an improvement in the lives of civilians proved short-lived … armed
opposition groups … launched a major offensive [and ever since] … Mogadishu has
been the scene of some of the most intense fighting and the security situation
in the city has deteriorated significantly as a result” (CTR at p 357). This
context needed to form part of the Officer’s consideration of developments
described in the 2011 Reuters news reports he relied on.
[14]
In
addition, even if it had been appropriate to base his determination exclusively
on the recent development mentioned in the August 2011 Reuters news reports, the
Officer’s conclusions did not reasonably reflect the content of those articles.
The articles contained the following statements regarding al-Shabaab’s
withdrawal:
·
“Analysts
said they expected al Shabaab, which still controls large swathes of the south
and central Somalia, to return to Mogadishu and adopt guerrilla tactics.” (CTR
at p 15);
·
A
reference to the statement of the leader of al Shabaab (Sheikh Muktar Abu
Zubeir) that, “We didn’t abandon the fighting and we aren’t weak. We are now
launching a new phase of fighting against you which will prove to be your end.”
Indeed, one of the headings in this article is “Mogadishu Unsafe”. The article
goes on to report that “Government troops and AU [African Union] peacekeepers
acknowledge they do not control all of Mogadishu and there are still some
pockets of resistance”. (CTR at p 15);
·
“The
al Qaeda-inspired al Shabaab rebels had been waging a four year insurgency
against Western-backed government troops and African Union peacekeepers, before
retreating from the capital earlier this month, in a move they said was
tactical. Analysts believe the militants will soon re-emerge in the capital as
a guerrilla fighting force to carry out high-profile suicide bombings.” (CTR at
p 17);
·
“Thousands
of Somalis have been returning to Mogadishu since the Islamist rebels announced
their withdrawal, but the capital is still suffering from the effects of years
of warfare. Two children were killed on Saturday after they mistakenly played
with a landmine in the Karan district of Mogadishu which al Shabaab had
abandoned. Nine people were also wounded, witnesses said.” (CTR at p 18);
·
The
title of one article was, “Mogadishu Celebrates Al-Shabab Withdrawal But
Militants Nearby” [emphasis added]. The article goes on to describe how
al-Shabaab executed three men through the use of a firing squad in northern
Mogadishu and notes that “Al-Shabab said the retreat was a strategic move and
vowed to remain nearby and continue its efforts to topple the United
Nations-backed government.” (CTR at p 22);
·
Another
article entitled “Mogadishu Remains Risky Despite Al-Shabab Withdrawal” notes
that “the Somali capital is still a dangerous place, including for aid workers
[but] [d]espite that, many Somalis are traveling to the city hoping to find
food and water in a country hit by drought and famine.” The article continues,
“While the withdrawal of al-Shabab has allowed greater access to parts of the
city, the Somali capital cannot be called safe.” A representative from Doctors
Without Borders is quoted as stating that the withdrawal “has left a security
vacuum of sorts. And so, even, say, during the height of the conflict in
Mogadishu, as dangerous as that city was, there was a clear front line even if
there might be various targeted killings and bombings within TFG areas ...There
are also private militias related to different clans and so on. And working in
those circumstances I actually find almost as dangerous, if not more dangerous,
than when there was a front line running through the city.” The article notes,
“Now pro-government forces have a much wider area to control without any
additional troops. That allows other armed groups to act more freely.” (CTR at
p 24);
·
The
article dated August 26, 2011 notes, “Somali Islamist rebels have beheaded at
least 11 civilians in the capital in the past two weeks, a campaign of terror
that residents said Friday is designed to show the insurgency can still act in
Mogadishu after withdrawing from their bases there earlier this month …
Residents – some to[o] terrified to give their names – appealed to the Somali
government and AU troops to secure their neighbourhood. Although al-Shabaab has
pulled back, individual fighters are still active in the city and gunfire is
still common”. (CTR at p 26); and
·
“Somalia’s
struggling government hailed the rebels’ exit as a major victory but al Shabaab
said their withdrawal was just tactical and promised to return, and analysts
said the exit could herald a wave of al Qaeda-style suicide attacks.” (CTR at p
32).
[15] Thus,
contrary to the Officer’s conclusions, the Reuters August 2011 articles reveal
a situation of uncertainty and ongoing risk. While Somalis were returning to
the capital, the documentation indicates that this was in large part the result
of extreme famine and drought elsewhere (see e.g. CTR at pp 29-32). As noted by
a senior U.S. official travelling with the Vice President’s wife in Somalia in
August 2011 who was quoted in one of the articles, “I think this is one of the
riskiest operating environments of any humanitarian operation in the world
right now so I think sure, there’s risk of an uptick in the fighting, there are
all sorts of risks” (CTR at p 32).
[16]
As
is clear from the preceding paragraphs, the vast majority of the country
documentation evidence shows Mogadishu to be an incredibly dangerous place. In
his reasons, the Officer ignored this greater context and, moreover, did not
even accurately capture the key message in the articles he relied on which
indicated that notwithstanding al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from the capital, the
situation in and around Mogadishu remained extremely volatile and unsafe.
[17]
The
lack of safety in Mogadishu has been recognised in two recent judicial
determinations and in a recent decision of the RPD.
[18]
In
April of this year, Chief Justice Blais of the Federal Court of Appeal was
faced with a similar issue in respect of a motion for a stay of removal to
Somalia of a young man in similar circumstances to the applicant’s (in Mohamed
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FCA 112 [Mohamed]).
Relying on virtually the same country evidence as was before the PRRA Officer
in this case, Chief Justice Blais found that an IFA would be open to the
applicant in northern Somalia as it appeared to be relatively stable. However,
he noted that “the evidence provided by both sides demonstrates that the
situation is much more dangerous and unstable in the south and the area
surrounding the Somali capital, Mogadishu” and concluded that “the situation is
particularly difficult in southern and central Somalia, including Mogadishu
[…]” (Mohamed at paras 19 and 25).
[19]
Similarly,
the case of Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, Applications nos 8319/07 and
11449/07 from the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR] (28 June 2011), while
not binding on me, is informative. In that case, the ECHR was confronted with
applications from two male Somali citizens who asserted that their removal to
Somalia from the United Kingdom would place them at real risk of ill-treatment
in violation of Article 2 and 3 (the right to life and the prohibition of
torture, respectively) of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 222, ETS no 5, and would
also interfere with their rights under Article 8 of that Convention (right to
respect for private and family life). The Court “conclude[d] that the violence
in Mogadishu is of such a level of intensity that anyone in the city, except
possibly those who are exceptionally well-connected to ‘powerful actors’, would
be at real risk of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention” (Sufi
at para 250).
[20]
Finally,
and notably, in the only RPD decision in the past year dealing with Somalia (RPD
File No VB0-04912, [2011] RPDD No 26), the Board
found the applicant to face a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of
al-Shabaab. In an oral decision of December 2011 (with written reasons
following in January 2012), the Board relied on the UK Country of Origin report
and found at paragraph 13 of its decision that:
… the main threat to the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) is posed by Al-Shabaab. It is on the U.S. Terror List and is accused of
having links with Al-Qaeda. The group controls much of southern and central
Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab is reportedly led
by a shadowy figure who goes by the name of Abu Zubeyr. This group's professed
aim is to spread Islam across the globe.
[Emphasis added]
Again, although not binding upon
me, it is telling that a decision rendered in the months that followed
al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from the capital found that there was ongoing risk in Mogadishu.
Conclusion
[21]
Thus,
the Officer’s decision was unreasonable because it was made without regard to
the evidence before him. That evidence indicated that Mogadishu is dangerous
and therefore cannot constitute an IFA. The Reuters reports of August 2011 did
not indicate otherwise. The conclusion that Mogadishu is not an IFA also finds
support in several recent decisions.
[22]
Because
the Officer premised his decision on the unreasonable determination that
Mogadishu was an IFA for the applicant, the Officer failed to consider and
analyze whether the risk posed to the applicant in returning to Mogadishu was a
generalized one within the meaning of s.97 of the IRPA and, whether, if so, the
applicant could nonetheless be returned to Somalia without violating his rights
under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c 11
(UK), RSC, 1985, Appendix II, No 44. (The issue of whether a Charter
analysis is required in these circumstances is currently pending for decision
before the Federal Court of Appeal in Mohamed.)
[23]
Accordingly,
the PRAA Officer’s decision will be set aside and the matter remitted to a
different officer for re-determination. No question was proposed for certification and none arises
in this case as my decision is closely tied to the facts and centers on the way
in which the Officer reasoned.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
1.
This
application for judicial review is allowed and the decision of the Officer is
set aside;
2.
The
applicant’s PRAA Application shall be remitted for re-determination by a
different PRRA Officer;
3.
The
parties shall be afforded the opportunity to file additional evidence and to
make additional submissions before the new PRRA Officer regarding the situation
in Somalia in existence at the time of the re-determination;
4.
No
question of general importance is certified; and
5.
There
is no order as to costs.
"Mary J.L.
Gleason"