Date: 20120525
Docket: IMM-7945-11
Citation: 2012 FC 633
Toronto, Ontario, May 25, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
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J.R.G. AND C.I.V.C.
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
I. Introduction
[1]
As
stated by this Court in Khoja v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2010 FC 142, 362 FTR 118:
[1] When applying the standard of
reasonableness, a court must show deference to the reasoning of a decision
under review and must be cognizant of the fact that certain questions before
administrative entities and tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific
result. As the Supreme Court of Canada explained, reasonableness is
concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process”, as well as “whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] SCC 9, [2008] 1
S.C.R. 190 at para. 47). [Emphasis added].
II. Judicial Procedure
[2]
This
is an application for judicial review, pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], of a decision made
by the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
[Board], rendered on October 17, 2011, wherein it was determined that the
Applicants were not Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection
pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.
III. Background
[3]
The
Applicants, J.R.G and C.I.V.C., aged respectively 33 and 29 years old, are
citizens of Mexico and resided in Mexico D.F.
[4]
They
alleged to be homosexuals and common-law partners. The principal Applicant,
C.I.V.C., worked as a reporter for a social events magazine in Mexico. In
August 2009, he mistakenly took pictures of a large house, thinking it was that
of a well-known star. On September 4, 2009, after his partner picked him
up at work, they were stopped by two vans and taken by armed occupants, who
were members of the Beltran Leyva cartel [B.L.C.]. The B.L.C members beat
them and raped them, asking for the pictures taken of their (B.L.C.) boss’s
residence.
[5]
The
Applicants attempted to report the incident without success. They hid at a
relative’s residence in Cuernavaca, Morelos. After being traced by the B.L.C
members, they returned to Mexico and fled to San Francisco, U.S., on October 7,
2009.
[6]
Almost
ten months later, without having had requested refugee protection in the U.S.,
the Applicants returned to Mexico on August 3, 2010, subsequently, after
hearing on the news that the head of the B.L.C had been killed by the
authorities.
[7]
The
Applicants alleged that, nevertheless, they still received death threats from
the B.L.C members. On August 23, 2010, J.R.G. flew to Canada where he claimed
refugee protection. The principal Applicant, C.I.V.C., still harassed by the
B.L.C members, flew to the U.S., on December 7, 2010, and later crossed
the Canadian border, where he claimed refugee protection on December 20, 2010.
IV. Decision under Review
[8]
The
Board concluded that, as the claim was based on criminality and as the
Applicants were not targeted because of their homosexuality, there was no nexus
to any of the Convention grounds.
[9]
The
Board further found that the Applicants’ story was not credible because of its
lack of plausibility. The Board found that it was not reasonable that the
Applicants did not give the pictures to the B.L.C. members when demanded by
them. The Board found that it was not credible that the B.L.C. members
would have conducted a long harassment campaign instead of confronting the
Applicants directly, personally and without delay. With respect to the oral
testimony related specifically to the taking of the pictures, the Board found
it not credible that the B.L.C. members did not confront the principal
Applicant the same day.
[10]
The
Board found that the Applicants’ decision to leave the U.S. and return to
Mexico brought into question their subjective fear. The Board also drew a
negative inference from the fact that the Applicants had not claimed refugee
protection in the U.S. The Board underlined the fact that the Applicants had
obtained Canadian visas in September 2009, before any alleged kidnapping had
taken place. The Board also noted that the Applicants’ relatives in
Mexico had not been approached by the persecutors.
[11]
With
regard to state protection, the Board noted that the Applicants had not taken
further action to access state protection once they were discouraged from doing
so at the police station.
[12]
After
reviewing the documentary evidence in light of the case law, the Board noted
that the Mexican government takes a variety of measures against criminal
organizations. The Board found, furthermore, that Mexico has taken action
against sexual orientation discrimination.
[13]
Finally,
the Board addressed the Applicants’ argument that the Board is biased and is
statistically more likely to reject Mexican claims. The Board analyzed the case
law as to its record in respect of Mexican claimants to reach its conclusion in
that regard.
V. Issue
[14]
Is
the Board’s decision reasonable?
VI. Relevant Legislative Provisions
[15]
The
following legislative provisions of the IRPA are relevant:
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Convention
refugee
96. A Convention refugee is a
person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
political opinion,
(a) is outside each of their
countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling
to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or
(b) not having a country of
nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
Person
in need of protection
97. (1) A person in need
of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
(a) to a danger, believed on
substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of
the Convention Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk to their life or
to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if
(i) the person is unable or, because of
that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the
person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals
in or from that country,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or
incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
(iv) the risk is not caused by the
inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
Person
in need of protection
(2) A person in Canada who is a member
of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of
protection is also a person in need of protection.
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Définition
de « réfugié »
96. A qualité de réfugié au
sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison
d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de
son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont
elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se
réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité
et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne
peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.
Personne
à protéger
97. (1) A qualité de
personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait
personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou,
si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence
habituelle, exposée :
a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs
sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article
premier de la Convention contre la torture;
b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au
risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne
veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de
ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y
trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte
pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes
internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte
pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé
adéquats.
Personne
à protéger
(2) A également qualité de personne à
protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie
de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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VII. Position of the parties
[16]
The
Applicants submit that the Board erred when it found no nexus to a Convention
ground. The Applicants argue that they were targeted because of their sexual
orientation. They further submit that the credibility findings were erroneous
and that the Board ignored relevant evidence such as a medical letter and
medical prescription corroborating their allegation of rape, as well as
photographs, a report from a clinical counsellor in Toronto and contemporaneous
e-mails. With respect to state protection, the Applicants sustain that the
Board’s analysis did not focus on the treatment of journalists in Mexico, nor
did it analyze the effective protection of the bodies cited.
[17]
The
Respondent submits that the claim was based, not on the Applicants’ sexual
orientation, but on the fact that they were targeted in Mexico; in addition,
the negative credibility findings were based on the distinct discrepancies
noted by the Board. The Respondent argues that the determinative issues
before the Board were based on credibility and state protection. The Respondent
maintains that the Board’s failure to discuss the medical letter and the note
from a psychologist does not constitute a reviewable error as that evidence
does not demonstrate the Applicants’ contact with the B.L.C members, nor the
fact that they were ever targeted by the B.L.C.; in that regard, the Respondent
also points to other elements of the Applicants’ claim that the Board held in
question as discussed above. The Respondent further specifies that the Board’s
state protection analysis was rendered as an alternative to its findings on
credibility and that analysis is reasonable.
VIII. Analysis
[18]
It
is trite law that the Board’s conclusions with respect to credibility and state
protection should be given deference since they rest on assessments of fact.
The appropriate standard of review is reasonableness (Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190; Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339; Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),
2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708).
[19]
This
Court notes that the present case was based on criminality and not on sexual
orientation as it appears from the oral evidence: the Applicants clearly
expressed their fear of the B.L.C members (Tribunal Record [TR] at p 517) as a
result of taking the pictures. Even after it found no nexus to a Convention
ground, the Board analyzed state protection in Mexico with respect to the
treatment of homosexuals. Not only did the Board not ignore evidence but it
scrutinized the situation as to protection of homosexuals in Mexico (R.E.A.J.
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 209 at para
24).
[20]
This
Court most strongly disapproves of the use of the word “opportunity” (used by
the Board at para 6 of its Decision) to describe a rape; however, that does not
vitiate the Board’s decision due to its state protection determination in
addition to its lack of credibility finding; yet, the lack of sensitivity in
the choice of the word used can neither be overlooked, nor left unsaid; it must
be signalled as an inappropriate use of language.
[21]
In
the present case, the Board’s credibility finding is clearly based on the
implausibility of the Applicants’ narrative. This Court in Aguebor v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No 732 (QL/Lexis)
(FCA), made the following statement that applies to the present case:
4 There is no longer any doubt
that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete
jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better
position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and
to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the
tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings
are not open to judicial review… [Emphasis added]
[22]
The
Board gave numerous reasons in support of the negative inference it drew from
the Applicants’ voluntary return to Mexico from the U.S. without claiming
refugee protection (Board’s Decision at para 12). The Applicants have not
demonstrated this to be unreasonable.
[23]
With
regard to the Board’s failure to discuss evidence such as the medical letter,
the prescription for treatment of the Applicants’ injuries, the photographs and
the report from the clinical counsellor in Toronto, this Court notes the
Board’s conclusion on credibility:
[15] […] The Panel, consequently,
does not find a ring of truth in the crucial elements of their story that
cover their contacts with Beltran Leyva people and their targeting by this group. The Panel, therefore, does
not find, on a balance of probabilities, their fear to be well-founded.
[Emphasis added].
[24]
The
Board did make an allusion to a blanket with a threatening message (Board’s
Decision at para 9) but did not mention the medical letter, the
prescription or the counsellor’s report. Although the Board could have been
more clear in its citing of the evidence, that would not have changed the
conclusion as to the lack of credibility therein. A reading of the Board’s
decision reveals that the evidence clearly does not contradict its conclusion
in regard to plausibility.
[25]
Furthermore,
the Board conducted an alternative analysis on state protection. This Court has
stated that the availability of state protection is a determinative issue (Sarfraz
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] FCJ No 1974
(QL/Lexis).
[26]
In
the present case, the Board conducted an extensive review of the documentary
evidence before coming to its conclusion on state protection. The Board did not
err in law in assessing this issue. Furthermore, its analysis was conducted
despite the negative credibility finding and in light of the particular context
of the case. Indeed, the Board fully considered the sexual orientation of the
Applicants as well as the fact that the principal Applicant worked for a
magazine. It was reasonable for the Board to conclude that the principal
Applicant, because of the nature of his work, did not have the profile of a
reporter targeted by criminal organizations (Board’s Decision at para 25).
[27]
The
Applicants essentially propose that this Court have a different point of view
on the documentary evidence assessed by the Board. In the present case, as per
the above reasoning, this is not a proper ground for judicial review and the
intervention of this Court is unwarranted.
IX. Conclusion
[28]
For
all of the above reasons, the Applicants’ application for judicial review is
dismissed.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS that the application for judicial review be
dismissed. No question of general importance for certification.
“Michel M.J. Shore”