Docket: T-1588-10
Citation: 2012 FC 487
Ottawa, Ontario, April 25, 2012
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Rennie
BETWEEN:
|
|
ERICH KAINDL
|
|
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
|
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
|
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
The
applicant appeals a decision of a Citizenship Court judge dismissing his
application for Canadian citizenship. His appeal is brought pursuant to
subsection 14(5) of the Citizenship Act, RS, 1985, c C-29 (the Act),
and is governed by the Federal Courts Rules (SOR/98-106) pertaining to
applications; hence his status as applicant and the Minister’s as respondent.
For the reasons that follow this appeal is dismissed.
Facts
[2]
The
applicant, Mr. Erich Kaindl, together with his wife and five children arrived
in Canada on November
1, 1998 at the request of his employer, Siemens, to take on responsibilities for
Siemens’ Canadian operations. Two years later, the significant global downturn
in the technology sector and the economy generally, resulted in the decision by
Siemens to close its Canadian operations. After two years of searching for
work in Canada Mr. Kaindl
accepted the offer of his employer to take on responsibilities for Siemens back
in Austria. He thus
began a long period of what was, in effect, commuting between his workplace in
Austria and his family, in Kanata, Ontario. His family
remained in Canada, his
children attended the local high school and universities. They are now all,
save Mr. Kaindl, Canadian citizens, successfully integrated into and fully participating
as active members of Canadian society. Mr. Kaindl's wife is the principal of
the German Language School of Ottawa; three of his five children are in
university, and two are nearing the end of high school.
[3]
Mr.
Kaindl became a Canadian permanent resident on November 6, 2003. He applied
for Canadian citizenship on September 1, 2008. On September 15, 2010 the
Minister communicated to the applicant that his citizenship application had
been refused because he had not met the residence requirement under paragraph
5(1)(c) of the Act.
[4]
The
applicant conceded before the Citizenship Judge that it was his personal choice
to accept the position in Austria; however, he argues that his absence from Canada was driven
by economic necessity. His choice was social assistance or to accept the
position in Siemens. He said he made a choice that was reasonable and in the
interests of Canada as he would
not depend on employment insurance and social assistance.
[5]
The
Citizenship Judge applied the decision of this Court in Re Pourghasemi,
[1993] FCJ No 232 in arriving at his decision not to grant the applicant
Canadian citizenship. The Citizenship Judge found that the applicant fell
short of the 1,095 days required under the Act in order to qualify for
citizenship. The applicant had only 224 days of physical presence in Canada. He had
been outside Canada for 871
days. The Citizenship Judge also found that a favourable exercise of
discretion under sections 5(3) and (4) of the Act was unwarranted.
[6]
The
applicant is correct in noting that there was a miscalculation in the setting
of the frame of reference for the calculation of the residency period. The
Citizenship Judge extended the residency period by three months from September
1, 2008 to December 12, 2008, resulting in the an incorrect total residency
requirement of 1236 days. However, the error is immaterial. Adjusting for the
error in setting the dates for the four year period, the applicant was still
only resident in Canada only 224 days during the required period. This
does not warrant setting aside the decision.
Standard of Review and Issue
[7]
The
issue in this case is whether the decision of the Citizenship Judge refusing
the applicant’s citizenship application is correct in law per Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 and whether the decision not to
recommend that the Minister give favourable consideration to the applicant’s
application for citizenship is a reasonable exercise of discretion.
Analysis
[8]
In
Martinez-Caro v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 640 I concluded that it was Parliament’s intention
that residency was to be determined on the basis of physical presence in Canada:
It is my opinion that Re Pourghasemi
is the interpretation that reflects the true meaning, intent and spirit of
subsection 5(1)(c) of the Act…. For this reason it cannot be said that the
Citizenship Judge erred in applying the Re Pourghasemi test.
Furthermore, the Citizenship Judge correctly applied the Re Pourghasemi
test in determining that a shortfall of 771 days prevented a finding that 1,095
days of physical presence in Canada had been accumulated.
[9]
There,
as here, the applicant was absent from Canada for a
considerable period of time. In light of this, and in light of my view that Pourghasemi
is the interpretation that reflects the intention of Parliament as set forth in
section 5(1)(c) of the Act, the Citizenship Judge committed no error of
law in adopting the test of physical presence in Canada to determine residency.
[10]
The
applicant does not challenge the correctness of the test; rather, he contends
that had the error in the calculation of the residency period not been made,
the outcome might have been different. He contends that the Citizenship Judge
drew an adverse inference as to his credibility and that this, in turn,
affected his approach to the exercise of discretion to make a favourable
recommendation to the Minister that, in all the circumstances, citizenship be
granted.
[11]
There
is nothing in the decision of the Citizenship Judge which suggests that adverse
inferences were drawn as to the applicant’s credibility. Indeed, the contrary
seems to be the case. The Citizenship Judge accepted the facts as laid out
before him by Mr. Kaindl and there is no indication, direct or indirect, that
the he disbelieved or discounted the applicant’s evidence for any reason, let
alone for reasons related to the Citizenship Judge’s error in setting the
period of residency.
[12]
Mr.
Kaindl also points to the fact that the Department of Citizenship and
Immigration separated, administratively, his application from that of his wife
and children when it became apparent that they had received citizenship. Mr.
Kaindl argues that, in consequence, the Citizenship Judge did not have the full
context of evidence before him and was thus unable to properly exercise his
discretion under sections 5(3) and (4) of the Act to make a
recommendation to the Minister that he favourably consider granting citizenship
to Mr. Kaindl.
[13]
Attractive
as this argument is on its face, it does not fit well with the record. The
applicant testified before the Citizenship Judge, and the decision indicates
that the Citizenship Judge had before him a very complete picture of Mr.
Kaindl’s circumstances. The decision notes, for example, Mr. Kaindl’s
participation in the church choir, their home ownership, the fact that the
family is well established financially and the fact that the applicant’s wife
and children continue to live in the home in Kanata. The Citizenship
Judge also situates these findings of fact in context of the difficult choice
that Mr. Kaindl had to make.
[14]
While
it is true that the decision does not refer to the fact that Mr. Kaindl’s wife
and children are now Canadian citizens, there is no requirement that a decision
maker recite all of the evidence before them. The fact that the other family
members are Canadian citizens and that he is married to a Canadian wife is not
so compelling or determinative a consideration that the failure to mention it
expressly in the reasons renders the decision unreasonable.
[15]
Finally,
the applicant argues that the Citizenship Judge erred in the exercise of his
discretion in failing to consider the best interests of the children. The
applicant relies on the principles of Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 in support of this
proposition and notes that he is the parent of five Canadian children.
[16]
There
is no support for the proposition that in considering the grant of citizenship,
the best interests of Canadian children are to be taken into account. The
guidance, support and direction integral to parenting can be exercised
regardless of status as a permanent resident, or presence in Canada on a work or
visitor’s visa. The situation is far removed from that where parents are being
separated from Canadian children, and returned to their country of origin with
scant prospect of return or re-entry into Canada.
[17]
While
I am sympathetic to the applicant’s situation, the Citizenship Judge did not err
in reaching the conclusion that he did. For that reason the appeal must be
dismissed. Nothing in the Act prevents the applicant from re-applying
for Canadian citizenship when he has accumulated the number of days required to
satisfy the requirements set out in the Act.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT’S
JUDGMENT is that the appeal is dismissed. There
is no order as to costs.
"Donald
J. Rennie"
Annex
A
|
Citizenship Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29), Section
5(1)(c)
|
Loi sur la citoyenneté
(L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-29) section
5(1)(c)
|
|
5. (1) The Minister shall
grant citizenship to any person who
…
(c) is a permanent resident
within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, and has, within the four years immediately preceding the date
of his or her application, accumulated at least three years of residence in
Canada calculated in the following manner:
(i) for every day during
which the person was resident in Canada before his lawful admission to Canada
for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have accumulated
one-half of a day of residence, and
(ii) for every day during
which the person was resident in Canada after his lawful admission to Canada
for permanent residence the person shall be deemed to have accumulated one
day of residence;
…
|
5. (1) Le ministre attribue la
citoyenneté à toute personne qui, à la fois :
…
c) est un résident permanent au sens du
paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur l’immigration et la protection des réfugiés et
a, dans les quatre ans qui ont précédé la date de sa demande, résidé au
Canada pendant au moins trois ans en tout, la durée de sa résidence étant
calculée de la manière suivante :
(i) un demi-jour pour chaque jour de
résidence au Canada avant son admission à titre de résident permanent,
(ii) un jour pour chaque jour de
résidence au Canada après son admission à titre de résident permanent;
…
|
|
Citizenship Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29), Sections
5(3) and (4)
|
Loi sur la
citoyenneté (L.R.C. (1985), ch. C-29) Sections 5(3) and (4)
|
|
(3) The Minister may, in his
discretion, waive on compassionate grounds,
(a) in the case of any person, the
requirements of paragraph (1)(d) or (e);
(b) in the case of a minor, the
requirement respecting age set out in paragraph (1)(b), the requirement
respecting length of residence in Canada set out in paragraph (1)(c) or the
requirement to take the oath of citizenship; and
(c) in the case of any person who is
prevented from understanding the significance of taking the oath of
citizenship by reason of a mental disability, the requirement to take the
oath.
(4) In order to alleviate cases of
special and unusual hardship or to reward services of an exceptional value to
Canada, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Governor in
Council may, in his discretion, direct the Minister to grant citizenship to
any person and, where such a direction is made, the Minister shall forthwith
grant citizenship to the person named in the direction.
|
(3) Pour des raisons d’ordre
humanitaire, le ministre a le pouvoir discrétionnaire d’exempter :
a) dans tous les cas, des
conditions prévues aux alinéas (1)d) ou e);
b) dans le cas d’un mineur,
des conditions relatives soit à l’âge ou à la durée de résidence au Canada
respectivement énoncées aux alinéas (1)b) et c), soit à la prestation du
serment de citoyenneté;
c) dans le cas d’une
personne incapable de saisir la portée du serment de citoyenneté en raison
d’une déficience mentale, de l’exigence de prêter ce serment.
(4) Afin de remédier à une
situation particulière et inhabituelle de détresse ou de récompenser des
services exceptionnels rendus au Canada, le gouverneur en conseil a le
pouvoir discrétionnaire, malgré les autres dispositions de la présente loi,
d’ordonner au ministre d’attribuer la citoyenneté à toute personne qu’il
désigne; le ministre procède alors sans délai à l’attribution.
|