Date: 20101118
Docket: IMM-5599-09
Citation: 2010
FC 1158
Ottawa, Ontario,
November 18, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Heneghan
BETWEEN:
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JUAN FRANCISCO CORTES RUZ
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
Mr. Juan
Francisco Cortes Ruz (the “Applicant”) seeks judicial review of the decision of
a visa officer at the Canadian Embassy in Mexico, denying him a permanent resident visa
as a member of the family class. The decision in question was made on September
29, 2009.
[2]
The
Applicant is a citizen of Mexico. In June 1998, he came to Canada as a visitor. In March 2001,
he claimed refugee protection. In his sworn Personal Information Form (the
“PIF”), he claimed a fear based on his former involvement with street gangs in Mexico. He did not attend his
refugee hearing and the claim was declared abandoned.
[3]
On
November 20, 2004, the Applicant met his future spouse. He proposed marriage on
February 14, 2005, before being deported from Canada on February 28, 2005. The Applicant
married his spouse in Mexico on May 21, 2005. In June
2005, he submitted an application for a permanent resident visa. He was found
inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the “Act”), due to his membership in a
criminal organization, that is the street gangs that he mentioned in his PIF. In
the course of that application, the Applicant did not amend his PIF. He only
attempted to orally contradict its contents when he was interviewed about the
PIF by a visa officer in Mexico.
[4]
The Applicant
was granted leave to judicially review the decision of the visa officer
relative to the refusal of his permanent resident visa application. By Judgment
dated April 12, 2007, the application was dismissed by Justice Phelan; see Cortes
Ruz v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 380. With respect to
the visa officer’s credibility findings, Justice Phelan held that the
“timing of the change in his story was critical to the credibility finding”; Ruz,
paragraph 9. In other words, the Court found that the change in the story, when
convenient, was a reasonable basis to raise concerns about the Applicant’s
credibility.
[5]
The
Applicant submitted a second application for a permanent resident visa in
August 2007. He was interviewed to address the prior inadmissibility findings
and again, he was found to be inadmissible pursuant paragraph 37(1)(a) of the
Act.
[6]
With the
application for permanent residence, the Applicant submitted new evidence to
show that his PIF could not be accurate. He provided school records and
employment documents that purported to show that at the time of his
alleged involvement in street gangs, he could not have been where the street
gang was operating according to his PIF.
[7]
In this
application for judicial review, the Applicant has proposed a single issue:
Did the Canadian Embassy commit
reviewable errors of law by failing to consider the submissions and evidence
that demonstrated that the statements in the PIF were false, and by stating
that there was no evidence to indicate what was written in the PIF was not
genuine?
[8]
In the
decision in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, paragraph 43,
the Supreme Court of Canada stated that decisions of administrative
decision-makers are reviewable on one of two standards, that is correctness or
reasonableness. The standard of reasonableness also applies to the process by
which the decision was reached, that is “reasonableness is concerned mostly
with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within
the decision-making process”; Dunsmuir, paragraph 47.
[9]
As well,
in Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court said that when the jurisprudence has
established the standard of review applicable to a particular type of decision,
that standard of review should be adopted. It is established that decisions of
visa officers are reviewable on the standard of reasonableness; see Thomas
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
& Immigration) (2009),
85 Imm. L.R. (3d) 133 (FC). Accordingly, the decision of the visa officer in
this case will be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.
[10]
The
Applicant was found to be inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 37(1)(a) of the
Act which provides as follows:
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Organized
criminality
37.
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of
organized criminality for
(a)
being a member of an organization that is believed on reasonable grounds to
be or to have been engaged in activity that is part of a pattern of criminal
activity planned and organized by a number of persons acting in concert in
furtherance of the commission of an offence punishable under an Act of
Parliament by way of indictment, or in furtherance of the commission of an
offence outside Canada that, if committed in Canada, would constitute such an
offence, or engaging in activity that is part of such a pattern; or
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Activités
de criminalité organisée
37.
(1) Emportent interdiction de territoire pour criminalité organisée les faits
suivants :
a)
être membre d’une organisation dont il y a des motifs raisonnables de croire
qu’elle se livre ou s’est livrée à des activités faisant partie d’un plan
d’activités criminelles organisées par plusieurs personnes agissant de
concert en vue de la perpétration d’une infraction à une loi fédérale
punissable par mise en accusation ou de la perpétration, hors du Canada,
d’une infraction qui, commise au Canada, constituerait une telle infraction,
ou se livrer à des activités faisant partie d’un tel plan;
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[11]
A belief on
reasonable grounds, for the purposes of paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Act, must be
based on credible evidence. I agree with that submission of the Applicant. He
also argued that his PIF was not credible and accordingly, it could not be the
basis of “reasonable grounds” for the purposes of paragraph 37(1)(a) of the
Act.
[12]
In my opinion, the
visa officer should not be precluded from relying upon the PIF, as long as the
balance of the evidence is considered as well. A PIF is a sworn document which
should carry the same weight as any other sworn document. In the face of evidence
that contradicts the PIF, the officer must weigh the other evidence that
contradicts the PIF.
[13]
The Applicant further
submitted that the officer erred by stating that there was “no evidence to
discart (sic) that what was declared in the PIF was not genuine”. This
statement is found in the Computer Assisted Immigration Processing System (“CAIPS”) notes.
[14]
The Applicant submitted
additional documentary evidence that contradicted his PIF when he submitted his
most recent application for a permanent resident visa. When invited to attend
the interview on March 20, 2009, the Applicant was asked to bring “documents
demonstrating all his activities during the time he has declared (sic)
he was working or studying…”. However, he did not bring any additional evidence
to the interview.
[15]
It is reasonable to
conclude that when reviewing the CAIPS notes, in the context of the chronology
of events, that the officer’s comment related to what happened at the
interview. The Applicant did not present further documents at the interview. I
reject the Applicant’s submissions that this brief reference in CAIPS notes
means that the officer ignored “59 pages of submissions”. Having regard to all
of the circumstances, it is reasonable to find that this statement relates to
the context of the interview.
[16]
The CAIPS notes
contain the statement by the visa officer that “I presented my concerns to the
subject during the interview but subject was unable to provide additional
information”. This notation indicates that the Applicant was informed of the
officer’s concerns, at the interview. When considering the CAIPS notes, the
Applicant’s sworn PIF and the outcome of his initial application for a
permanent resident visa, I am satisfied that the Applicant was given an
intelligible explanation for the refusal of his visa.
[17]
The visa officer
committed no reviewable error and there is no basis for judicial intervention
in the decision. The application for judicial review will be dismissed.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that this application for judicial
review is dismissed, no question for certification arising.
“E.
Heneghan”