Date: 20100922
Docket: T-1234-09
Citation: 2010 FC 948
Ottawa, Ontario, September 22, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
BETWEEN:
FOND DU LAC DENESULINE FIRST
NATION,
BLACK LAKE DENESULINE FIRST NATION,
HATCHET LAKE DENESULINE FIRST NATION and
THE NON-FIRST NATION ABORIGINAL
PROVINCIAL COMMUNITIES OF CAMSELL PORTAGE,
URANIUM CITY, STONY RAPIDS and WOLLASTON LAKE
(known collectively as the “Athabasca
Regional Government”)
Applicants
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and
AREVA RESOURCES CANADA INC.
Respondents
and
CANADIAN NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMISSION and
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR SASKATCHEWAN
Interveners
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
APPLICATION
[1]
This
is an application pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C.,
1985, c. F-7 for judicial review of the June 30, 2009 decision (Decision) of
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (Commission) to renew the operating
licence for Areva Resources Canada Inc.’s McClean Lake Uranium mine and mill
under section 24 of the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, S.C., 1997, c. 9
(Act), and the incorporation of the care and maintenance activities at AREVA’s
Midwest Uranium Mine into the renewed licence for McClean Lake.
BACKGROUND
[2]
Areva
Resources Canada Inc. (AREVA) applied to the Commission to renew its McClean
Lake Operation Uranium Mine and Mill Operating Licence
UMOL-MINEMILL-McCLEAN.04/2009 (McClean Lake Licence), which authorizes AREVA to
operate a uranium mine, mill and other required facilities.
[3]
AREVA
applied for a ten-year licence renewal from May 31, 2009. AREVA also requested
that the Commission incorporate the care and maintenance activities at its
Midwest Uranium Mine site (Midwest Site) into the McClean Lake Licence and
revoke the existing Midwest Uranium Mine Site Preparation Licence (Midwest Licence).
Although AREVA anticipates mining the Midwest Site at some time in the future,
the Midwest Site is currently not in operation. Rather, it is undergoing
environmental assessment with regard to future development.
[4]
The
Applicants are a group of both First Nation and non-First Nation communities.
Three of the Applicants (Fond du Lac Denesuline First Nation, Black Lake
Denesuline First Nation, and Hatchet Lake Denesuline First Nation) are Treaty
First Nations.
The
Applicants were granted intervener status in order to participate in the public
hearing related to the renewal of the McClean Lake Licence before the Commission
scheduled for April 30, 2009.
[5]
On
April 12, 2009, the Applicants requested an adjournment of Day 2 of the public hearing
in order to receive and review disclosure of information and make fully
informed submissions and a response to AREVA’s application for renewal. However, the Commission decided
to proceed with the public hearing on the planned date, April 30, 2009, and the
Applicants participated in this hearing. The Applicants then requested
an extension of time to assess and provide submissions in response to
information received by them at the hearing on April 30, 2009. The Commission agreed to
extend the time for the Applicants to file written submissions to June 8, 2009.
[6]
On
June 30, 2009, the Commission issued its
Decision and granted AREVA’s McClean Lake Licence renewal for a period of eight
years. The Commission also incorporated the care and maintenance provisions for
the Midwest Site into the McClean Lake Licence for a period of eight years.
[7]
On
July 30, 2009, the Applicants filed their Notice of Application for judicial
review of the Decision.
[8]
The
Commission was granted intervener status in this matter on December 18, 2009.
The Attorney General for Saskatchewan (AGS) was granted intervener status on
January 6, 2010.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[9]
The Commission
determined that the issues before it were as follows:
a.
Whether
AREVA is qualified to carry on the activity that the renewed McClean Lake Licence
would authorize;
b.
Whether,
in carrying on that activity, AREVA would make adequate provision for the
protection of the environment, the health and safety of persons, and the
maintenance of national security and measures required to implement
international obligations to which Canada has agreed.
[10]
The
Commission determined
that AREVA was qualified to carry on the activities authorized in the McClean
Lake Licence and was satisfied that AREVA would make adequate provision for protection
of the environment, the health and safety of persons, and the maintenance of
national security. Accordingly, the Commission renewed AREVA’s McClean
Lake Licence until June 30, 2017, pursuant to section 24 of the Act. Furthermore,
the Commission also revoked
the Midwest Licence pursuant to section 24 of the Act and incorporated the
maintenance and caretaking activities at the Midwest Site into the McClean Lake
Licence.
[11]
Within
its Decision, the Commission directed
AREVA to create a status report of safety performance after the midpoint of the
eight-year licence. Commission staff were also directed by the Commission
to prepare a report with regard to compliance activities. Both reports are to
be presented at public proceedings of the Commission in June 2013.
Commission
Findings
[12]
The
Decision was premised on the Commission’s findings with regard to AREVA’s
proposed measures for protection of the environment, the health and safety of
persons, as well as national security and international obligations to which
Canada has agreed.
[13]
The
Commission first
examined AREVA’s operational performance. To make its determination, the Commission divided the
operational performance safety aspects into four sub-programs: mine operations;
mill operations; waste management; and packaging and transport. Upon
examination of these sub-programs, the Commission was satisfied that “facility
operations are effectively controlled with the safety programs in place and
that they do not pose an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of persons,
the environment and national security.”
[14]
Next,
the Commission considered the
radiation protection offered by AREVA by examining its past performance and
future plans. The Commission was satisfied
that AREVA has made, and will continue to make, adequate provision for the
protection of both workers and the public from radiation at the McClean Lake
Operation.
[15]
In
considering non-radiological health and safety, the Commission concluded
that AREVA’s Occupational Health and Safety Program and its implementation met the
requirements. Furthermore, the Commission was satisfied with regard to AREVA’s
provision for the protection of persons from conventional hazards.
[16]
The
Commission also
considered the environmental protections undertaken by AREVA concerning air
quality, surface water and environmental monitoring, and it examined the impact
of operations at McClean Lake on the environment. The Commission determined
that AREVA had made and is making adequate provision to protect the environment
at McClean Lake and
that adequate monitoring is performed to determine the effects of operations on
the environment.
[17]
The
Commission was also satisfied
with AREVA’s quality management and training, as well as its emergency
preparedness capabilities, its fire protection abilities and its nuclear
security. Similarly, the Commission determined
that AREVA was in compliance with its international obligations and that AREVA had
provided the Commission with all of the
reports and information necessary with regard to McClean Lake.
[18]
The
Commission then
considered AREVA’s Preliminary Decommission Plan and associated cost estimate
and determined that these were acceptable, although a proposed condition of the
licence was that AREVA review its preliminary decommission plan every five
years and maintain an adequate financial guarantee.
[19]
The
Commission then went on to consider AREVA’s public information programs. AREVA
says that its public information programs operate in a variety of ways,
including through consultation activities and informational meetings. According
to AREVA, the primary goal of its public consultation and information program
“is to ensure that the environmental, health and safety issues that may arise
as a result of AREVA’s activities are effectively communicated to the public.”
[20]
The
Commission inquired about
AREVA’s visits to northern communities and asked whether AREVA followed-up with
members of the public who asked questions or offered comments at meetings. The Commission was
satisfied that AREVA attempts to answer questions and provides informal
opportunities for the public to bring forward comments or concerns. Moreover,
AREVA noted that it provides many opportunities and invitations to meet with
specific community leaders in northern Saskatchewan.
[21]
Some
interveners, however, including the Applicants, expressed concern that the goal
of AREVA’s public information program seemed to be the provision of information
to promote an understanding of its activities at McClean Lake, as
opposed to engaging in meaningful consultation with impacted communities. The Commission, however, stated
that it was “satisfied that AREVA has in place an adequate public information
program”, but noted that, “based on the concerns expressed by some interveners,
the Commission invites
AREVA to provide meaningful information in a clear and understandable manner to
northern communities that are impacted by the McClean Lake Operation.”
Furthermore, the Commission stated that
it “also invites AREVA to respond to concerns expressed by impacted northern
communities in a clear and rapid manner.”
[22]
Two
interveners before the Commission contended that a duty of consultation existed
in this instance. The Applicants suggested that the Commission is a delegate of
the provincial Crown for the purpose of consultation and that both AREVA and
the provincial Crown have failed in their duties to consult and accommodate the
interests of the Applicants. The Applicants submitted that the Commission’s role
is to “consider whether the Crown has satisfied its constitutional duty
respecting consultation and accommodation of Aboriginal interests” and that “there
is no evidence of Crown consultation here.”
[23]
The
AGS’s position, however, as stated by the Commission was that “[the province] is
cognizant of its constitutional obligations regarding the duty to consult, and
that any issues with respect to the discharge of that duty by the province, are
beyond the constitutional bounds of the Commission’s jurisdiction and should be
dealt with by Saskatchewan.”
[24]
The
Commission determined
that, due to the submissions and issues before it, “it is necessary for the
Commission to provide some general comments respecting its view of the role of
the Commission with regard to the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples, and to
apply that reasoning to the arguments raised in this application.” While the Commission stated that
it is cognizant of the role that Parliament has set for it, it went on to say that
“[a]s an agent of the Crown, the Commission is called upon to make a decision
with respect to this licensing matter and it is incumbent on the Commission to
ensure that its decision accords with the honour of the Crown.”
[25]
The
Commission noted that
the concerns of the interveners who participated in the public hearing related
mostly to information and the ability of community members to understand the
relevant information and that, “in this case, the submissions of the interveners
did not indicate that there were specific unresolved impacts on rights, which
could be addressed within the authority of the Commission’s powers.”
[26]
Furthermore,
while the interveners in the public hearing sought funding, and to compel the Commission, the
province or AREVA to take certain actions with respect to their capacity
concerns, the Commission noted that
it does not have the authority to address such matters. Furthermore, the
Commission held that “in regards to the consultative efforts and obligations of
the province
of Saskatchewan, it is not
the role of the Commission to oversee matters over which it has no authority,
such as resource allocation matters, which are not engaged by the Commission’s
licensing decision.”
[27]
As
regards the duty to consult, the Commission concluded as follows:
The Commission is satisfied that its
process has provided an invitation to the intervenors to make submissions and
participate in the regulatory process, and the Commission hearing process
provided a forum in which concerns could be expressed and dealt with. In this
matter, in response to concerns about the licensing action and knowledge gaps
with respect to the information provided and understanding of the matters in
issue, the Commission granted an extension of time to the ARG [Athabasca
Regional Government] to provide it with time to seek, obtain and make
submissions on the matters before the Commission. This has also provided the
possibility for more discussions and engagement by the CNSC staff and AREVA,
with the ARG in particular.
The Commission is satisfied that its
process has been adequate to address the concerns expressed relating to the
impact communities receiving the information required and being able to speak
to the matters in issue regarding the scope of this specific hearing. The
Commission is satisfied that the intervenors have been informed of the
Commission process and of the licensing action at issue, and have had a full
opportunity to express their concerns and identify issues. The Commission has
heard the intervenors, and has considered all of the submissions in making its
decision. In this context, the Commission is satisfied that, to the extent that
a duty to consult was engaged, it was fulfilled in this case respecting the
licensing action, by the Commission process and by the opportunities that were
afforded for consultation within that process.
[28]
The
Commission then
considered the inclusion of the care and maintenance of the Midwest Site in the
McClean Lake Licence and determined that
[t]he activities are already authorized
by the CNSC and will remain unchanged under the renewed licence for the McClean
Lake Operation. As such, an environmental assessment pursuant to the CEAA [Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act] is not required.
The Commission was satisfied that an
environmental assessment was not required prior to a decision being made on the
licence renewal application for McClean Lake.
[29]
AREVA
requested a licence renewal for a period of ten years and asked the Commission to amend
the McClean Lake Licence to incorporate the care and maintenance activities at
its Midwest Site. Commission staff explained to the Commission that they expected
“the Midwest Site to be included in the McClean Lake Operation licence in a
manner similar to the other mine programs associated with the McClean
Operation, such as the Sue Mine,” since this approach allows for consistency in
programs and controls.
[30]
The
Commission was
satisfied that the effect of revoking the Midwest Licence and including the
care and maintenance activities under the McClean Lake Licence “does not in any
way alter the activities that have previously been assessed and authorized for
the Midwest Site.” The Commission noted further that “having the
care and maintenance activities authorized in the licence for the McClean Lake
Operation does not involve the transfer of a licence, which is prohibited under
subsection 24(8) of the [Nuclear Safety and Control Act] NSCA.”
[31]
Accordingly,
the Commission was
satisfied that AREVA met the requirements of subsection 24(4) of the Act, and it
renewed AREVA’s McClean Lake Licence until June 30, 2017. This Licence
incorporates the maintenance and caretaking activities at the Midwest Site in
the same operating licence. Consequently, the Commission revoked
the Midwest Licence.
ISSUES
[32]
The
issues on the application can be summarized as follows:
1.
Does
the Commission have
the jurisdiction to consider whether a constitutional duty to consult was owed to
the Applicants and whether that duty was met on the facts before it?
2.
If
the above is answered affirmatively, did the Commission err in concluding that,
to the extent the above duty to consult was owed, the duty was met?
3.
Did
the Commission err in
revoking the Midwest Licence and incorporating the care and maintenance
activities authorized under that licence into the renewed McClean Lake Licence?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
[33]
The
following provisions of the Act are applicable in these proceedings:
Establishment of
Commission
8. (1) There is hereby established a body corporate to be known as
the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.
Agent of Her Majesty
(2) The Commission is for all its purposes an agent of Her Majesty
and may exercise its powers only as an agent of Her Majesty.
Objects
9. The objects of the Commission are
(a) to regulate the
development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production,
possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed
information in order to
(i)
prevent unreasonable risk, to the environment and to the health and safety of
persons, associated with that development, production, possession or use,
(ii)
prevent unreasonable risk to national security associated with that
development, production, possession or use, and
(iii)
achieve conformity with measures of control and international obligations to
which Canada has agreed; and
(b) to disseminate
objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public
concerning the activities of the Commission and the effects, on the
environment and on the health and safety of persons, of the development,
production, possession and use referred to in paragraph (a).
Licences
24. (1) The Commission may establish classes of licences authorizing
the licensee to carry on any activity described in any of paragraphs 26(a) to (f) that is specified
in the licence for the period that is specified in the licence.
Application
(2) The Commission may issue, renew, suspend in whole or in part,
amend, revoke or replace a licence on receipt of an application
(a) in the
prescribed form;
(b) containing the
prescribed information and undertakings and accompanied by the prescribed
documents; and
(c) accompanied by
the prescribed fee.
Refund of fees
(3) The Commission may, under the prescribed circumstances, refund
all or part of any fee referred to in paragraph (2)(c).
Conditions for issuance, etc.
(4) No licence may be issued, renewed, amended or replaced unless,
in the opinion of the Commission, the applicant
(a) is qualified to
carry on the activity that the licence will authorize the licensee to carry
on; and
(b) will, in
carrying on that activity, make adequate provision for the protection of the
environment, the health and safety of persons and the maintenance of national
security and measures required to implement international obligations to
which Canada has agreed.
Terms and conditions of licences
(5) A licence may contain any term or condition that the Commission
considers necessary for the purposes of this Act, including a condition that
the applicant provide a financial guarantee in a form that is acceptable to the
Commission.
Application of proceeds of financial guarantee
(6) The Commission may authorize the application of the proceeds of
any financial guarantee referred to in subsection (5) in such manner as it
considers appropriate for the purposes of this Act.
Refund
(7) The Commission shall grant to any person who provided a
financial guarantee under subsection (5) a refund of any of the proceeds of
the guarantee that have not been spent and may give the person, in addition
to the refund, interest at the prescribed rate in respect of each month or
fraction of a month between the time the financial guarantee is provided and
the time the refund is granted, calculated on the amount of the refund.
Licence not transferable
(8)
A licence may not be transferred.
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Constitution
8. (1) Est constituée une personne morale appelée la Commission
canadienne de sûreté nucléaire.
Mandataire de Sa
Majesté
(2) La Commission est mandataire de Sa Majesté et ne peut exercer
ses attributions qu’à ce titre.
Mission
9. La Commission a pour mission :
a) de réglementer le
développement, la production et l’utilisation de l’énergie nucléaire ainsi
que la production, la possession et l’utilisation des substances nucléaires,
de l’équipement réglementé et des renseignements réglementés afin que :
(i) le
niveau de risque inhérent à ces activités tant pour la santé et la sécurité
des personnes que pour l’environnement, demeure acceptable,
(ii)
le niveau de risque inhérent à ces activités pour la sécurité nationale
demeure acceptable,
(iii)
ces activités soient exercées en conformité avec les mesures de contrôle et
les obligations internationales que le Canada a assumées;
b) d’informer
objectivement le public — sur les plans scientifique ou technique ou en ce
qui concerne la réglementation du domaine de l’énergie nucléaire — sur ses
activités et sur les conséquences, pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes
et pour l’environnement, des activités mentionnées à l’alinéa a).
Catégories
24. (1) La Commission peut établir plusieurs
catégories de licences et de permis; chaque licence ou permis autorise le
titulaire à exercer celles des activités décrites aux alinéas 26a) à f) que la licence ou le
permis mentionne, pendant la durée qui y est également mentionnée.
Demande
(2) La Commission peut délivrer, renouveler, suspendre en tout ou
en partie, modifier, révoquer ou remplacer une licence ou un permis
lorsqu’elle en reçoit la demande en la forme réglementaire, comportant les
renseignements et engagements réglementaires et accompagnée des pièces et des
droits réglementaires.
Remboursement
(3) Dans les cas réglementaires, la Commission peut rembourser la
totalité ou une partie des droits visés au paragraphe (2).
Conditions
préalables à la délivrance
(4) La Commission ne délivre, ne renouvelle, ne modifie ou ne
remplace une licence ou un permis que si elle est d’avis que l’auteur de la
demande, à la fois :
a) est compétent
pour exercer les activités visées par la licence ou le permis;
b) prendra, dans le
cadre de ces activités, les mesures voulues pour préserver la santé et la
sécurité des personnes, pour protéger l’environnement, pour maintenir la
sécurité nationale et pour respecter les obligations internationales que le
Canada a assumées.
Conditions des
licences et des permis
(5) Les licences et les permis peuvent être assortis des conditions
que la Commission estime nécessaires à l’application de la présente loi,
notamment le versement d’une garantie financière sous une forme que la
Commission juge acceptable.
Affectation du
produit de la garantie financière
(6) La Commission peut autoriser l’affectation du produit de la
garantie financière fournie en conformité avec le paragraphe (5) de la façon
qu’elle estime indiquée pour l’application de la présente loi.
Remboursement
(7) La Commission rembourse à la personne qui a fourni la garantie
la partie non utilisée de celle-ci; le cas échéant, elle peut ajouter les
intérêts calculés au taux réglementaire sur le montant du remboursement, pour
chaque mois ou partie de mois entre le moment où la garantie a été donnée et
celui du remboursement.
Incessibilité des
licences et permis
(8)
Les licences et les permis sont incessibles.
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[34]
The
following provision of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 is also applicable
in these proceedings:
Recognition of
existing aboriginal and treaty rights
35. (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights
of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
Definition of "aboriginal peoples of
Canada"
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the
Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
Land claims agreements
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) "treaty
rights" includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements
or may be so acquired.
Aboriginal and treaty rights are guaranteed
equally to both sexes
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal
and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to
male and female persons.
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Confirmation des
droits existants des peuples autochtones
35. (1) Les droits existants —
ancestraux ou issus de traités — des peuples autochtones du Canada sont
reconnus et confirmés.
Définition de
« peuples autochtones du Canada »
(2) Dans la présente loi, « peuples autochtones du
Canada » s'entend notamment des Indiens, des Inuit et des Métis du
Canada.
Accords sur des
revendications territoriales
(3) Il est entendu que sont compris parmi les droits issus de traités,
dont il est fait mention au paragraphe (1), les droits existants issus
d'accords sur des revendications territoriales ou ceux susceptibles d'être
ainsi acquis.
Égalité de garantie
des droits pour les deux sexes
(4) Indépendamment de toute autre disposition
de la présente loi, les droits — ancestraux ou issus de traités — visés au
paragraphe (1) sont garantis également aux personnes des deux sexes.
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STANDARD
OF REVIEW
[35]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Dunsmuir) held that a standard of review analysis
need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review
applicable to the particular question before the court is well-settled by past
jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only
where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a
consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[36]
The
first issue before the Court is whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to
consider whether a duty to consult was owed to the Applicants. Issues of true
jurisdiction or vires are to be considered on a standard of correctness.
See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph 59. According to Dunsmuir, questions of true jurisdiction arise where a tribunal must
determine whether its statutory grant of power gives it the authority to decide
a certain issue. In my view, this issue was before the Commission. Hence,
whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to
consider whether a duty to consult was owed to the Applicants will be reviewed
on a standard of correctness.
[37]
If
it is determined that the Commission had the jurisdiction to determine the duty to
consult in this instance, the review of the Commission’s Decision as to whether
such a duty was owed to the Applicants and whether this duty was properly discharged
is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness. See Brokenhead Ojibway Nation
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 484, [2009] F.C.J. No. 608 (Brokenhead)
at paragraphs 17-18.
[38]
The
final issue before the Court is whether the Commission erred in revoking the
Midwest Licence and incorporating the care and maintenance activities
authorized under that licence into the renewed McClean Lake Licence. This issue
is one of statutory interpretation in that the Court must consider whether the Commission erred
in its interpretation of subsection 24(8) of the Act.
[39]
According to Dunsmuir, above, legal questions of central
importance to the legal system as a whole and outside a decision-maker’s
specialized area of expertise attract scrutiny on a correctness standard.
However, questions of law that do not rise to this level may be compatible with
a reasonableness standard. See Dunsmuir, above, at
paragraphs 55 and 60.
[40]
Considering whether the issue of statutory interpretation requires
review on a standard of correctness or a standard of reasonableness
necessitates consideration of the factors laid out by the Supreme Court of
Canada in paragraph 64 of Dunsmuir, above, including: (1) the presence or
absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal; (3) the nature
of the question at issue; and (4) the expertise of the tribunal. The Supreme
Court directs that in many cases it will not be necessary to consider all of
these factors.
I believe that this is such a case.
[41]
According
to paragraph 54 of Dunsmuir, above, deference is generally owed where a
tribunal is interpreting its own statute or statutes closely connected to its
function with which it will be particularly familiar. In this instance, the Commission is
interpreting its enabling statute. As such, the Commission can be said to have
relative expertise with regard to the Act.
[42]
Furthermore,
in this instance, the nature of the question at issue (the validity of the renewal of a
licence and amalgamating activities within that licence), the purpose of the Commission
(in part, to dispense licences under the Act) as well as the expertise of the Commission, suggest that
reasonableness is the appropriate standard upon which to review the Commission’s
interpretation and application of the Act. As such, I am satisfied that a
standard of reasonableness is appropriate when considering whether the Commission erred in its
interpretation and application of subsection 24(8) of the Act.
[43]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the
analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether
the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir, above, at paragraph 47. Put another way, the Court
should intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
ARGUMENTS
The Applicants
Jurisdiction of
Commission
[44]
The
Applicants contend that the issue of whether the Commission has the jurisdiction
to determine issues pertaining to Aboriginal and treaty rights, or other
matters of constitutional law, is dependent on whether the Commission has been
granted the power to determine questions of law through its enabling statute. According
to Cooper v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission),
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115 (Cooper), “if a tribunal does
have the power to consider questions of law, then it follows … that it must be
able to address constitutional issues.”
[45]
However,
in order for a tribunal to address a constitutional issue – for example, an
issue under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c.11 – the tribunal must “already have jurisdiction over the
whole of the matter before it, namely, the parties, subject matter and remedy
sought.” See Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations
Board),
[1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, 81 D.L.R. (4th) 121 (Cuddy Chicks).
[46]
The
Applicants argue that jurisdiction is to be determined by a variety of practical
matters, including the composition and structure of the tribunal, the procedure
before the tribunal, the appeal route of the tribunal and the expertise of the
tribunal. According to the Supreme Court in Cooper, above, “[t]hese
practical considerations, in so far as they reflect the scheme of the enabling
statute, provide an insight into the mandate given to the administrative
tribunal by the legislature.” Based on these considerations, the Applicants
submit that whether a tribunal has the authority to consider questions of law,
the duty to consult and other constitutional issues is dependent upon its
statutory authority and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
[47]
The
Applicants contend that the AGS erred in his determination of the authority of
the Commission in his letter of June 8, 2009:
It is the Attorney General’s position
that any issues related to the Province’s duty to consult and accommodate
Aboriginal peoples and, in particular, any issues related to whether the
Province has fulfilled its obligations in connection with decisions related to
either McClean Lake or Midwest projects are not within the mandate of the
Commission and, in fact, are beyond the constitutional bounds of the Commission’s
jurisdiction.
[48]
The
Applicants rely on the reasoning of Justice Iacobucci in Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1
S.C.R. 159, [1994] S.C.J. No. 13 (National Energy Board), (QL) at
paragraph 60 to suggest that limitations of authority ought to be balanced with
other factors when considering issues of federal and provincial overlap:
In defining the jurisdictional limits of
the Board, then, this Court must be careful to ensure that the Board’s
authority is truly limited to matters of federal concern. At the same time, however,
the scope of its inquiry must not be narrowed to such a degree that the
function of the Board is rendered meaningless or ineffective.
The Applicants contend that the
jurisdictional limitations on the Commission, as suggested by the AGS,
would render the function of the Commission meaningless or ineffective.
[49]
The
Applicants further submit that the AGS is attempting to evade his own responsibility
to Aboriginal people by distinguishing himself from the Federal Crown.
Furthermore, they say that the AGS is also denying that any consultation was
required in this instance.
[50]
According
to a letter from Saskatchewan’s Ministry of Environment dated April 22, 2009 to
Vincent Martin, President and CEO of AREVA, “this type of licence amalgamation
would be assessed as not triggering a duty to consult because it does not have
the potential to adversely impact the exercise of Aboriginal rights as affirmed
by section 35.1 of the Constitution Act, 1982.” Furthermore, the Deputy
Minister of the Provincial Ministry of Environment (Deputy Minister) has
characterized the licence amalgamation as “an administrative process that has
no material impact on the functioning of either site and will not result in any
new impacts to the landscape itself.” The Applicants submit that the Provincial
Crown’s pre-determination of its duty of consultation based on whether the action
in question is administrative in nature is unsupported by law and difficult to
reconcile with existing laws.
[51]
The
Applicants contend that members of the Athabasca Regional Government (ARG)
worked to develop a Land Use Plan for the Athabasca region. This plan was
communicated to many entities, including the Provincial Crown.
[52]
The
Applicants say that the Commission erred by
failing to determine that the Province of Saskatchewan owed a duty to consult
with regard to the licensing of lands identified as hunting, trapping, fishing
and gathering lands.
[53]
Furthermore,
the Applicants submit that if the Commission truly had jurisdiction to address
consultation on the Crown’s behalf, then it further erred in failing to
consider the lack of Provincial Crown involvement. Moreover, the Commission’s
conclusion that “to the extent that a duty to consult was engaged, it was
fulfilled in this case” is unreasonable.
Doctrine
of Reconciliation
[54]
The
Applicants also contend that the position of the Provincial Crown with regard
to the consultation and accommodation of Aboriginal rights is inconsistent with
its own policy. In its publication entitled “The Legal Duty to Consult
Aboriginal Peoples Saskatchewan Environment Policy,” Saskatchewan Environment clearly
acknowledges its duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples prior to engaging in,
or authorizing, activities that could infringe on Aboriginal or treaty rights. The
Applicants suggest that the position of Saskatchewan in this
application is contrary to “the endorsement of both the Deputy Minister of the
Environment and the Attorney General for Saskatchewan.”
[55]
Moreover,
in the Saskatchewan Environment Policy of 2003, Saskatchewan Environment notes
that its legal duty to consult cannot be delegated to a third party and that
“the legal duty and final accountability to protect and minimize infringements
on constitutionally protected Treaty and Aboriginal rights will continue to be
carried by the Crown.”
[56]
In
this instance, however, the Applicants say that the Government of Saskatchewan
has failed to acknowledge or address any existing legal duty. This is incompatible
with the doctrine of reconciliation, which seeks to reconcile the pre-existence
of Aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.
Jurisdiction Conferred
by the Act
[57]
The
Applicants submit that the Act does not provide either an express or implied
mandate for the Commission to consider
questions of law, constitutional issues or Aboriginal and treaty rights. The
objects of the Commission are as follows:
Objects
9. The
objects of the Commission are
(a) to regulate the
development, production and use of nuclear energy and the production,
possession and use of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed
information in order to
(i) prevent unreasonable
risk, to the environment and to the health and safety of persons, associated
with that development, production, possession or use,
(ii) prevent unreasonable
risk to national security associated with that development, production,
possession or use, and
(iii) achieve conformity
with measures of control and international obligations to which Canada has
agreed; and
(b) to disseminate
objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public
concerning the activities of the Commission and the effects, on the
environment and on the health and safety of persons, of the development,
production, possession and use referred to in paragraph (a).
|
Mission
9. La Commission a pour mission :
a) de réglementer le
développement, la production et l’utilisation de l’énergie nucléaire ainsi
que la production, la possession et l’utilisation des substances nucléaires,
de l’équipement réglementé et des renseignements réglementés afin que :
(i) le
niveau de risque inhérent à ces activités tant pour la santé et la sécurité
des personnes que pour l’environnement, demeure acceptable,
(ii)
le niveau de risque inhérent à ces activités pour la sécurité nationale
demeure acceptable,
(iii)
ces activités soient exercées en conformité avec les mesures de contrôle et
les obligations internationales que le Canada a assumées;
b) d’informer
objectivement le public — sur les plans scientifique ou technique ou en ce
qui concerne la réglementation du domaine de l’énergie nucléaire — sur ses
activités et sur les conséquences, pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes
et pour l’environnement, des activités mentionnées à l’alinéa a).
|
[58]
Based
on these objects, it appears that the Commission may consider matters of fact.
There is nothing in the Act, however, to suggest that decisions of law ought to
be made with regard to Aboriginal and treaty rights. Nevertheless, the
Applicants acknowledge that “Courts and the Commission have found that they
perform a Federal Crown function and as such, the honour of the Crown must be
upheld, and that the Commission must itself act in accordance with s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 and its imperatives.”
[59]
Notwithstanding
such findings, the Applicants say that the Commission has no jurisdiction to
determine that it has jurisdiction to deal with consultation on behalf of the
Crown or that its process was the appropriate forum in which to deal with these
issues.
[60]
Alternatively,
if the Commission does have
jurisdiction to consider questions of law, the Applicants contend that the Commission’s
statements that it “has the jurisdiction to deal with consultation on behalf of
the Crown”, and that “its process is the appropriate forum in which to deal
with such issues” are erroneous. Indeed, these determinations would usurp the
quasi-judicial function of the Commission, which requires impartiality.
[61]
The
Applicants submit that designating the Commission’s process as the appropriate
forum to address issues of consultation on behalf of the Crown “is to further
place the Commission in the position of a fiduciary in relation to the
Applicants, but not the rest of the participating parties.” The Applicants also
say that such a decision also results in a conflict of interest, since the Commission would have to
administer its own consultation and accommodation processes rather than those
of the Crown. Moreover, the Applicants warn that courts must be careful not to
compromise the independence of quasi-judicial tribunals by imposing fiduciary
obligations on them.
[62]
The
Applicants concede that the Commission was correct to consider the rights of
Aboriginal peoples of the ARG in determining whether the Crown had a duty to
consult and accommodate Aboriginal interests. However, the Commission erred in
limiting its consideration to communities receiving information and in concluding
that the process was adequate to address the concerns expressed. The Commission erred
further in finding that, to the extent that a duty was engaged in this instance,
the duty was fulfilled by the Commission process and by the opportunities that
were provided for consultation within that process.
[63]
The
Applicants submit that the Commission is not the appropriate entity for undertaking consultation
or accommodation for many reasons, including the following:
a.
Information
was received by Commission staff following the hearing;
b.
The
Applicants were not given sufficient time to analyze thoroughly and respond to
all impacts of their Aboriginal or treaty rights;
c.
A
party cannot be consulted while it is either observing or participating in the
Commission proceeding;
d.
It
is unreasonable to expect a party to be consulted when it has not been fully or
accurately informed as to the matters at issue;
e.
Most
of the information received by the Applicants was received following Day 2 of
the hearing process and following notice of judicial review of the Decision.
[64]
Moreover,
the Applicants say that the Commission seemed to be unprepared to consider issues of
Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Applicants contend that this is unfortunate
in that “the Doctrine of the Crown’s duty to consult, and where appropriate,
accommodate members of First Nations, has become of fundamental importance to
Aboriginal peoples.”
Duty
to Consult
[65]
The
Applicants point out that they were well-known by both the Crown and industry
as having an interest in the Athabasca region and, in
particular, in the land taken up for mining purposes.
[66]
Delgamuukw
v. British
Columbia,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108 (Delgamuukw) established
that the duty to consult is engaged at a low threshold and that the extent of
the duty owed will vary depending on the circumstances. Delgamuukw at
paragraph 168 also established that, in most cases, the duty to consult will be
“significantly deeper than mere consultation.”
[67]
In
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3
S.C.R. 511, [2004] S.C.J. No. 70 (Haida) at paragraphs 43-44, the
Supreme Court of Canada discussed the spectrum of consultation required and
determined that the content of the duty to consult will vary according to the
circumstances of each case. Where an Aboriginal claim is relatively weak and
the potential adverse effects are minor, the Crown’s duties may be limited to
giving notice, disclosing information and discussing the issues raised in
response to the notice. However, at the other end of the spectrum, deep
consultation may be required. The important question to be asked in determining
the appropriate content of the duty to consult is “What is required to maintain
the honour of the Crown and to effect reconciliation between the Crown and
Aboriginal peoples with respect the interests at stake?” See Haida,
above, at paragraph 45.
[68]
While
the Commission in
this case considered the broad duty to consult, it failed to acknowledge any of
the specific concerns raised by the Applicants. Indeed, there is nothing on the
record before the Court to demonstrate that meaningful consultation or
accommodation took place. The Applicants submit that this is further emphasized
by the Commission’s failure to
address the concerns of the Applicants and, in particular, their concerns that
they had not had an opportunity to address fully and consider all of the
material provided to them.
[69]
Furthermore,
in this instance, the ARG was granted only one 30-day extension, which then
resulted in the receipt of additional information and a denial of any further
extension of time. The Applicants suggest that the facts of the case at hand
can be compared to the facts in Taku River Tlingit
First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3
S.C.R. 550, [2004] S.C.J. No. 69 (Taku River). The
Applicants submit that they are entitled to, but did not receive, all of the
same considerations that were granted in Taku River, above.
[70]
The
Applicants say there is no evidence before the Court that the duty to consult
or accommodate the Applicants was satisfied in the present case or that any
efforts at reconciliation were attempted. Instead, the Applicants contend that
it is clear on the evidence before the Court that:
a.
No
consideration was given to the Aboriginal or treaty rights of the Applicant
First Nations;
b.
The
ARG was not given any notice of the application until it so requested;
c.
The
ARG, despite having previously served notice of its vision of land use and
protocol arrangements, was not given notice of any pending application before
the Commission;
d.
The
ARG learned only through the Commission website of the pending application of
the McClean
Lake
and Midwest Lake Projects;
e.
The
ARG attempted to get as much information as possible but was not provided with
all of the information until either on or after the day of the hearing;
f.
The
ARG was granted only one extension, most of which was taken up receiving
information;
g.
Only
upon service of the Notice of Application in these proceedings did the ARG
receive the entire record of material before the Commission (which the
Applicants contend still has inherent deficiencies);
h.
No
questions asked by the ARG members during various meetings were accommodated;
i.
There
is no formal process within Saskatchewan to consult and
accommodate the interests of Aboriginal peoples.
Transfer
of Licence
[71]
On
this issue, the Applicants take the position that the incorporation of the care
and maintenance aspects of the Midwest Site into the renewed McClean Lake
Licence amounted to a licence transfer. The Applicants liken the case at hand to that of
Gitxsan First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 BCSC 1734, [2004]
B.C.J. No. 2714 (Gitxsan) in which the assignment of an existing licence
was found to result in a change of control. In Gitxsan, the Court
acknowledged that the potential infringement and impact on the claimed
Aboriginal rights were low. However, the Court found that, because the licence
already existed, the duty to consult also existed. Moreover, the Court in Gitxsan
determined that since consultation had not occurred during the granting or
subsequent renewals of the licence, the duty to consult at this stage had to
account for previous failures to consult.
Legality of
the Revocation and Amendment of the Licence Renewal Application
[72]
The
Applicants submit that subsection 24(8) of the Act prohibits the revocation of
the existing care and maintenance licence at the Midwest Site and the transfer
of these activities to the McClean Lake Licence. Subsection 24(8) of the Act
makes it clear that each licence must be dealt with separately.
[73]
In
this instance, there were two licences to address two separate projects which
are located in two different geographic areas. What is more, these projects
have separate and specific purposes, conditions and requirements.
[74]
The
Applicants contend that AREVA’s application is an attempt indirectly to transfer
one licence to another, which is prohibited by subsection 24(8) of the Act.
Furthermore, the Applicants submit that subsection 24(8) of the Act exists to
require accountability, certainty and public scrutiny. The Commission’s decision
to grant AREVA’s incorporation application could result in the avoidance of
processes and conditions required to obtain the licence properly.
[75]
Furthermore,
the Applicants contend that the Commission’s decision to allow
AREVA to bypass the required licensing scheme could constitute a risk to both
the environment and the affected people, including the Applicants. As such, consultation
and accommodation were required in order to “ensure [the ARG’s] opportunity to
protect themselves and be protected from what they perceive to be an obvious
undermining of the legislative protection which includes the creation of the
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.”
Remedy
Requested
[76]
At
the hearing of this application in Saskatoon, the Applicants deviated
significantly from their written submissions and submitted that their preferred
remedy would be a Court-imposed, and Court-supervised, negotiation process
between the Applicants, the Commission and both Crowns which would consider the
Applicants’ own protocol for consultation and land-use development in the
Athabasca Basin. However, they also took the position that, should such a remedy
not be feasible, then the Decision of the Commission should be quashed. This
would mean that operations at McClean Lake would have
to cease because there would be no operating licence.
The Respondents
Attorney General of
Canada
Duty
to Consult
[77]
The
Respondent, the Attorney General of Canada (AGC), notes that subsection 8(2) of
the Act states that the Commission is an agent of Her Majesty and may exercise
its powers only as an agent of Her Majesty. Accordingly, the AGC submits that in
“[s]o far as the Crown is obliged to consult with the Applicants respecting its
conduct, the Commission may fulfill the duty as a component of the overall
process of consultation.”
[78]
Based
on section 9 of the Act, the AGC says it is clearly within the Commission’s
mandate to assess and mitigate environmental, health and safety risks which
result from the production or use of nuclear substances. In order to address
these risks, the Commission has the technical expertise to gather and interpret
information. It also has a process to consider and respond to public concerns
with regard to the production of nuclear substances.
[79]
Section
24 of the Act provides the Commission with the authority to refuse, suspend,
revoke and place conditions on licences to carry out nuclear activities. If any
conduct of a licensee or proposed licensee causes a risk to health, safety or
environment, the Commission has resources to assess the risks and the authority
to impose mitigation measures or refuse or revoke the licence.
[80]
The AGC
points out that the Supreme Court of Canada determined in Taku River,
above, that the Crown can fulfill its duty to consult within an existing
regulatory process. Given the authority granted to the Commission and the
consultation processes conducted by the Commission in this instance, the
Applicants’ concerns fall within the Commission’s legislated mandate. The Court
also made this clear in Brokenhead, above, at paragraph 25.
[81]
Indeed,
the AGC points out that in Brokenhead, above, Justice Barnes rejected
the need for an alternative or additional consultation process when the
relevant regulatory process provided an adequate opportunity for consultation
and mitigation.
[82]
In
this case, the AGC submits that, so far as the focus of consultation relates to
matters that are within the Commission’s legislated mandate, the Commission is
the appropriate body to address the duty to consult with Aboriginal communities
on behalf of the Crown.
Jurisdiction
[83]
In Paul
v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 34 (Paul) at paragraph 39, the Supreme Court of
Canada determined that if the empowering legislation either explicitly or
implicitly grants a commission or tribunal authority to determine questions of
law, then it will also have the authority to determine these issues in light of
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
[84]
The
Commission’s empowering legislation states that the Commission is an agent of
the Crown (subsection 8(2)) and that it is a court of record (subsection
20(1)). The Act further establishes extensive authority and power for the
Commission to compel and collect evidence and to make and enforce a wide scope
of decisions, including implied authority to make decisions of law.
[85]
The
AGC contends that the Commission in this instance is comparable to the
Utilities Commission in Carrier Sekani Tribal Council v. British Columbia
(Utilities Commission), 2009 BCCA 67, [2009] B.C.J. No. 259 (Carrier)
(leave to the SCC granted, hearing to take place in May 2010). As was the
case with the Utilities Commission in Carrier, the Commission in this
instance has the implicit jurisdiction to decide on the adequacy of
consultation. Indeed, in paragraph 51 of Carrier, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal determined that the Utilities Commission had not only the
jurisdiction but also the duty to decide the issue of consultation. The case of
Standing Buffalo Dakota First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 2009
FCA 308, [2009] F.C.J. No. 1434 (Standing Buffalo) at paragraphs 40-43
also contains a useful discussion on the Crown’s duty to consult that is
consistent with the key Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence in Haida
and Taku River.
[86]
In
summary, the AGC takes the position that the Commission has the authority under
its governing legislation to determine questions of law and that the subject
matter of consultation falls within the Commission’s mandate. As such, the
Commission is the appropriate body to determine the adequacy of the consultation
in this instance.
Reasonable
Consultation by the Commission
[87]
The
AGC submits that, based on the evidence before the Commission, the consultation
was adequate and reasonable in this instance. Where, in the case at hand, the
potential impact on Aboriginal rights is merely technical in nature, deference
to the expertise of the Commission should be afforded on judicial review.
[88]
The
Crown is not obliged to reach an agreement with Aboriginal peoples for
consultation to have been meaningful and adequate. Moreover, consultation does
not allow Aboriginal groups to have a veto power over development, and
accommodation does not require that the Crown consent to the position of the
Aboriginal peoples concerned. Rather, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in
paragraph 48 of Taku River, above,
[a]ccommodation requires that Aboriginal
concerns be balanced reasonably with the potential impact of the particular
decision on those concerns and with competing societal concerns. Compromise is
inherent to the reconciliation process.
[89]
In
this case, AREVA’s licensing application contemplated virtually no new
activity. Both mine sites have been taken up by the province for mining
purposes and have been leased to AREVA for a number of years. In the absence of
significant new activity within AREVA’s renewal of licence request, the
potential for any impact on existing Aboriginal rights to result from the
Commission’s Decision is limited. Because the potential adverse impact on
Aboriginal and treaty rights was minor, the AGC says that the duty to consult in
this instance was satisfied by providing notice and information and by entering
into discussion with interested parties.
[90]
The
AGC submits that, through a combination of AREVA’s efforts and the Commission’s
licensing process, the duty to consult in this instance was discharged.
Evidence before the Court demonstrates that AREVA made efforts to inform relevant
communities about its ongoing operations at the McClean Lake and Midwest sites, including meetings and attempts to
set up meetings with community leaders. Furthermore, the Applicants
participated fully in the licensing hearing with the presence of legal counsel.
In this case, the Commission (with the cooperation of AREVA) provided the
Applicants with the information they requested and granted the Applicants’
request for an extension of time to file materials.
[91]
The
Commission’s process provided the Applicants the opportunity to raise concerns
with regard to potential adverse impacts its decision might have on their
Aboriginal and treaty rights. However, the Applicants have failed to articulate
which rights were likely to be adversely affected by the Commission’s Decision
and which specific Aboriginal rights the Commission failed to consider.
[92]
Had
the Applicants identified specific Aboriginal or treaty rights that were likely
to be adversely affected by the Decision, the Commission could have undertaken
more extensive consultation and taken steps to address and accommodate these
concerns. However, in the circumstances, the Applicants’ concerns with regard
to the environment and health and safety were adequately addressed. As noted by
Justice Barnes in paragraph 34 of Brokenhead, above, “[t]here is no
at-large duty to consult that is triggered solely by the development of land
for public purposes. There must be some unresolved non-negligible impact
arising from such a development to engage the Crown’s duty to consult.”
[93]
The
Applicants failed to provide evidence of any specific unresolved impact on
rights that could be addressed within the authority of the Commission. As such,
the Commission’s Decision on the adequacy of the consultation was reasonable.
Environmental Assessment
not Necessary
[94]
The
AGC also submits that, because there were no new activities contemplated by the
licence application in this case, the licensed activities do not trigger an
environmental assessment under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act,
S.C., 1992, c. 37. As noted by the Commission staff, the inclusion of the care
and maintenance aspects at the Midwest Site into the McClean Operating Licence
is already an authorized activity that will remain unchanged, so the Canadian
Environmental Assessment Act does not apply. Because an environmental
assessment is not required for the licensed activities contemplated by AREVA’s
application, the Commission’s Decision on this point was correct.
Standing
[95]
While
it is clear that the ARG has an interest in being able to make submissions to
the Commission with regard to the duty to consult, the AGC submits that the non-Aboriginal
communities of Camsell Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston Lake do not have
similar interests at stake. According to the AGC, “there does not appear to be
any evidence on the record as to the particular collective of persons within
these communities that may be entitled to Aboriginal rights under section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982.”
[96]
While
the AGC concedes that the standing issue is not of practical significance with
regard to the hearing before the Commission, he contends that standing may
become an issue in this application if the Court were to decide to order
specific relief.
Procedural
Fairness
[97]
If
the Applicants have standing to intervene in a licensing application before the
Commission, then procedural fairness should be addressed on a general scale.
[98]
The
AGC points out that AREVA and the Commission staff provided the ARG with
disclosure of all of the submissions in this instance. The ARG was also given
the opportunity to have legal representation and to make submissions. The
Commission made specific inquiries to both AREVA and the Commission staff with
regard to their efforts to consult the ARG. Furthermore,
the Commission granted the Applicants a further period of 30 days to provide
written submissions.
[99]
When
considered in the context of AREVA’s application for a licence renewal, and the
fact that the Commission hearing involved seven other interveners, the AGC
submits that the ARG was afforded ample opportunity to provide its submissions
before the Commission. As such, the Commission was correct in providing the
Applicants with procedural opportunities that resulted in meaningful
participation in the hearing process. See, for example, Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Khosa).
AREVA
Jurisdiction
of the Commission
[100] AREVA notes that the
Applicants have taken a different position with regard to the jurisdiction of
the Commission in their Amended Notice of Application from that taken in their
Memorandum of Fact and Law. While the Applicants now state that the Commission has
no express or implied mandate to decide questions of law, constitutional
issues, or Aboriginal and treaty rights, the Applicants stated during the Commission
hearing that “it is very much within the mandate of this Commission to consider
and provide guidance with respect to this issue.”
[101] The Supreme Court of
Canada determined in Paul, above, that where a tribunal has
jurisdiction to decide any question of law, it is presumed to also have
jurisdiction to consider that question in light of section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982, or any other relevant constitutional provision.
[102] In applying Paul,
above, the British Columbia Court of Appeal determined in Carrier,
above, that a quasi-judicial tribunal with the authority to decide questions of
law has the jurisdiction to determine whether a duty to consult exists in the
case before it and, if so, whether this duty has been discharged. As stated by
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Carrier, at paragraph 54, “[t]he
honour of the Crown requires not only that the Crown actor consult, but also
that the regulatory tribunal decide any consultation dispute which arises
within the scheme of its regulation.”
[103] Section 8 of the Act
provides that the Commission is an agent of Her Majesty. Section 20 of the Act
provides that the Commission is a court of record and that decisions and orders
of the Commission may be enforced in a similar way to orders and decrees of the
Federal Court. Moreover, section 43 of the Act describes the appeal of Commission
decisions and orders. These provisions suggest that the Commission can consider
issues beyond simple questions of fact.
[104] AREVA
contends that the Commission is a quasi-judicial tribunal with the authority to
determine questions of law. Accordingly, the Commission has the jurisdiction to
determine whether a duty to consult existed in this case and, if so, whether
this duty was discharged.
Duty to Consult
[105] The duty to
consult arises when the Crown: a) has knowledge of the potential existence of
Aboriginal rights, title or Treaty rights; and b) contemplates conduct that may
adversely affect those rights. However, the duty to consult may not be triggered
where there is minimal adverse affect on the rights or title alleged. Indeed,
there must be evidence to establish an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights.
Moreover, such evidence must: a) support the finding of an interference with an
interest; b) be linked to the project or decision under consideration; and c)
be more than simply submissions or generalities: see Brokenhead, above,
at paragraphs 30, 33-34. As stated by the Court in paragraph 34 of Brokenhead,
“to establish a procedural breach … there must be some evidence presented which
establishes both an adverse impact on a credible claim to land or to Aboriginal
rights accompanied by a failure to adequately consult.” Furthermore, the Court in
Brokenhead determined that “there must be some unresolved non-negligible
impact arising from such a development to engage the Crown’s duty to consult.”
[106] In this
instance, AREVA says that the Applicants failed to identify specific Aboriginal
or treaty rights that could be adversely affected by the Commission’s Decision. Moreover,
the Applicants failed to present any evidence of an adverse impact or
interference with specific Aboriginal or treaty rights. Rather, the Applicants
simply expressed broad and generalized concerns on matters unrelated to the
particular licensing application before the Commission. What is more, the
mining and milling operations associated with the McClean Lake Licence have
been in existence for over ten years. For these reasons, AREVA contends that
the duty to consult was not triggered.
[107] In the
alternative, AREVA submits that any duty to consult that arose in this instance
was minimal in scope and consisted only of giving notice, disclosing information
and discussing with the Applicants the issues raised by them in response to the
licensing application.
Duty was Discharged
[108] The Commission concluded
that, to the extent that a duty to consult was engaged in this instance, it was
fulfilled by the Commission process and by the opportunities given for
consultation within that process. AREVA submits that the government is required
to make reasonable efforts to inform and consult and that such efforts will
discharge its duty of consultation. See Haida, above, at paragraph 52.
[109] The concerns
of the Applicants in this instance were mostly with regard to requests for
information as well as their lack of comprehension of the operations of the
nuclear facility at McClean Lake. AREVA submits that, throughout the
regulatory process, additional information was provided to the Applicants.
Moreover, AREVA notes that extensions of time were granted to the Applicants in
order to allow them to participate fully in the Commission’s process.
[110] Furthermore,
the Applicants’ concerns with regard to the potential impact of the licensing application
on their ability to participate in the environmental assessment process for the
Midwest project were answered during the course of the regulatory process; it
was also made clear to the Applicants that the environmental assessment process
of the Midwest Site would not be affected by the decision to revoke the Midwest
Licence.
[111] AREVA’s
request to revoke the Midwest Licence and to amalgamate the care and
maintenance activities under that licence with the McClean Lake Licence was
also discussed during the hearing. The Commission staff explained that, from a
regulatory perspective, this request was administrative and that the same level
of control and expectations for nuclear facilities would exist, whether under
one licence or two.
[112] In Carrier,
above, the British Columbia Court of Appeal determined that the regulatory
scheme was the most appropriate forum in which to determine issues of
consultation. In paragraph 42 of Carrier, above, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal held that “aboriginal law is not in the steady diet of the
Commission”, but that “there is no other forum more appropriate to decide
consultation issues in a timely and effective manner.” A similar finding was
made in Brokenhead, above, in paragraph 37, where the Federal Court held
that “except to the extent that Aboriginal concerns cannot be dealt with, the
appropriate place to deal with project-related matters is before the NEB and not in a
collateral discussion with either the GIC or some arguable relevant ministry.”
[113] To the extent
that the Applicants’ concerns are not related to the licensing action at issue but
to their efforts to obtain agreement from the Government of Saskatchewan with
regard to implementing the Applicants’ own consultation protocol, such concerns
fall outside the scope and the mandate of the Commission and cannot be properly
addressed within this federal regulatory scheme.
[114] AREVA compares
the case at hand to that of Taku River, above, in which the Supreme
Court of Canada determined that the province had fulfilled the requirements of
its duty to consult and accommodate notwithstanding that some of the broader
concerns of the applicants in Taku River were outside of the scope of
the environmental assessment process and could be the subject only of later
negotiation with the province. A similar finding was made in Brokenhead,
above, in which it was determined that the tribunal in question could not
address the larger Aboriginal concerns raised and that larger issues such as
land claims could properly be determined only outside of the regulatory
process.
[115] In this
instance, AREVA submits that the Crown’s duty to consult was fulfilled by the
public information and consultation activities carried out by AREVA, by the
regulatory process itself and by the Applicants’ participation in the
regulatory process.
No Transfer
of Licence
[116] The Commission has
broad powers with regard to granting licences, pursuant to sections 24 and 25
of the Act. While subsection 24(8) of the Act states that a licence may not be
transferred, the Commission was
correct in determining that having the care and maintenance activities for the
Midwest Project authorized in the McClean Lake Licence did not involve a
transfer of a licence, as per subsection 24(8).
Remedy
[117] AREVA submits
that this application ought to be dismissed. However, if the Court determines
that relief is warranted, AREVA contends that quashing the Decision is drastic
and not appropriate in the circumstances.
[118] The Supreme
Court of Canada determined
in MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2,
[2010] S.C.J. No. 2 (MiningWatch) that a court has the power to exercise
its discretion not to grant a remedy or to choose not to grant the entire
remedy sought. AREVA submits that consideration of any disproportionate impact
on third parties is a relevant consideration in the Court’s exercise of its
discretion.
[119] An order
quashing the Commission’s Decision will have a disproportionate effect on AREVA
since it will essentially shut down mining and milling operations at McClean Lake. Such
an order would not be in the best interest of any of the parties and would, according
to AREVA, “be counterproductive to ongoing relationships amongst the parties.”
[120] Finally,
AREVA submits that this relief is not warranted on the facts before the Court,
where AREVA has demonstrated that it has met all of the licensing requirements
with regard to the licensing application.
The
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Intervener
Status
[121] The
Commission was granted intervener status to submit representations to the Court
on the nature of the Commission’s
jurisdiction with regard to the constitutional duty to consult Aboriginal
peoples. This is of significance to the Commission because no jurisprudence
currently exists with regard to its jurisdiction to consult with Aboriginal
peoples.
[122] The Commission
was also granted status to address the standard of review with respect to
decisions made by the Commission. This is significant to
the Commission because there is currently no jurisprudence with respect to the appropriate
standard of review to be applied to Commission decisions.
[123] In their
Application, the Applicants request
[a]n order or Declaration the CNSC
satisfy and grant the Applicants [ARG] a consultation process for the purpose
of accommodation and reconciliation of the aboriginal rights and issues, at
minimum in accordance with the Interim Guidelines for Federal Officials to
Fulfill the Legal Duty to Consult of the Government of Canada, dated February
2008.
Based on this request, it appears that the
Applicants tacitly accept that the Commission’s process is the proper
forum to address the duty to consult and that it is within the Commission’s
jurisdiction to deal with issues relating to the duty.
[124] However,
regardless of the Applicants’ view, the Commission submits that its process is
indeed the proper forum for dealing with issues relating to the duty to consult,
to the extent that these issues fall within the Commission’s jurisdiction
pursuant to the Act.
[125] Furthermore,
the Commission contends that it has the jurisdiction to determine
constitutional questions, including issues related to section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982. As long as reasonable efforts to inform and consult are made,
then the Commission is justified
in determining that the existing duty has been discharged.
Nature
of the Commission’s Jurisdiction
[126] The Commission
says that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and at least some of the
Applicants does not impose a duty on the Commission to make decisions in
the best interest of the Applicants. See National Energy Board, above.
[127] Where the Commission, as an agent
of the Crown, determines that a duty to consult is engaged, the scope of the
duty will vary according to the circumstances. The scope of the duty will be
proportionate to the strength of the claim and the seriousness of the potential
adverse effects of the planned activity.
[128] The Commission
submits that it not only had the jurisdiction to decide questions related to
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 but that it is the only
appropriate forum within which to decide these issues in a timely way.
Moreover, the honour of the Crown obliges it to determine these issues.
According to the Commission, “[a]s a body to which powers have been delegated
by Parliament, it must not deny Aboriginal groups timely access to a
decision-maker with authority over the subject matter.”
[129] The Commission says
it has jurisdiction to address consultation on behalf of the Crown in cases
where there are project-related matters that may cause concern to rights-holders
with regard to potential impacts within the authority of the Commission. For
example, see Standing Buffalo, above, at paragraph 40.
Standard
of Review
[130] The Commission
contends that, with regard to the duty to consult, the Commission’s process
should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. The question at issue is
whether the
Commission’s regulatory
scheme, when viewed as a whole, accommodates the collective Aboriginal right in
question. See Haida, above, at paragraph 62. In other words, according
to the Commission, “[i]nsofar as the Commission process evidences reasonable
efforts to inform and consult, a determination that the duty was discharged is
reasonable and should be upheld.”
[131] It is only
where the Commission misconceives
the seriousness of the claim or the impact of the infringement that a standard
of correctness is appropriate with regard to the duty to consult.
Attorney
General for Saskatchewan
Intervener
Status
[132] The Attorney
General for Saskatchewan (AGS) was granted intervener status in order to
address: a) whether the Applicants are entitled to consultation; b) whether the
Commission exceeded its
jurisdiction with regard to determining the duty to consult; c) whether the
Commission is the proper forum for addressing the Crown’s duty to consult; and
d) whether the Commission erred in failing to satisfy its duty of consultation.
Furthermore, the Federal Court also granted the AGS leave to respond to any
submissions the Applicants have made concerning the duty to consult and
accommodate.
[133] The AGS
intervened in the proceedings before the Commission by way of a letter, dated
June 8, 2009, which sets out the Province’s position in relation to its control
over Crown lands and the Province’s consultation policy. The letter stated that
“any issues related to the Province’s duty to consult and accommodate
Aboriginal Peoples … are not within the mandate of the Commission and, in fact,
are beyond the constitutional bounds of the Commission’s jurisdiction.”
[134] Although the
Applicants refer to a letter written by the Deputy Minister, the AGS submits
that it is not clear that this letter was before the Commission. The Commission
did not refer to this letter in its reasons.
Jurisdiction
of Commission
[135] The AGS says
that no matter what the Commission’s jurisdiction involves in relation to the
duty to consult, it does not include the authority to determine whether the
Provincial duty has been triggered or to review the adequacy of Provincial
consultations.
[136] The duty to
consult is triggered when the Crown contemplates conduct that might adversely
affect the exercise of treaty or Aboriginal rights. In this instance, the only
Crown conduct at issue relates to the licensing decisions before the Commission.
The Commission is a federal body over which Saskatchewan has no
responsibility or jurisdiction. As such, the Commission’s Decision or process
cannot be properly described as conduct that could trigger a duty to consult
for Saskatchewan.
[137] The Crown is
divisible, and the duty to accommodate is triggered for Saskatchewan only when
the Crown in right of Saskatchewan contemplates conduct
that could adversely affect the exercise of treaty or Aboriginal rights. The
AGS takes the position that “[i]t is for the Crown in right of Saskatchewan to inform
itself of whether its decisions or activities trigger a duty and, if so, to
determine the proper scope of its consultations.” It is not appropriate for a
federal commission to usurp this responsibility.
[138] Where a First
Nation or Aboriginal group seeks to assert the existence of a Provincial duty
to consult or disputes the scope of such consultations, these matters must be
taken up with the Province. Failing this, a remedy may be sought in the
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench. Federal commissions, boards and tribunals
are not the proper fora in which to bring or determine such issues.
[139] The
Commission was correct in its Decision not to address whether Saskatchewan owed or
satisfied any duty of consultation in this instance. Indeed, the Commission
noted in its Decision that it is not within its authority to oversee the
Province’s consultative efforts or obligations.
[140] The Commission’s
acknowledgement of its jurisdictional limits is consistent with the Supreme
Court of Canada’s determination in National Energy Board, above, which
held that the jurisdiction of a federal board is limited to matters of federal
concern only.
[141] Although the
Applicants cite National Energy Board, above, to suggest that the
Commission would be rendered “meaningless and ineffective” if it was unable to
determine the adequacy of provincial consultations, the AGS submits that the
Applicants have mischaracterized this case. National Energy Board does
not stand for the proposition that the National Energy Board had jurisdiction
to review the adequacy of provincial decisions, policies or processes, let
alone that the Board’s function would be rendered meaningless and ineffective
because it was unable to do so. Moreover, the AGS submits that in Standing
Buffalo, above, the Federal Court of Appeal confirmed that the National
Energy Board is without jurisdiction to review provincial consultations.
[142] The Commission’s
jurisdiction is similarly limited. The alternative of this would be an
untenable constitutional situation in which a federal commission could be used
as a reviewing body for provincial licensing decisions and concomitant
processes.
Other
Allegations Irrelevant
[143] The
Applicants make a number of allegations against the Province that are
irrelevant to the application before the Court. Such allegations include:
a.
That
the Provincial Crown foists all responsibility for Aboriginal consultation, involving
the environment and the safety of Canadians, on the Federal Crown. The Province
denies this. The Province states that “[it] takes seriously its obligation to
consult Aboriginal peoples where its decisions or activities have the potential
to negatively impact the exercise of Treaty or Aboriginal rights”;
b.
Concern
with the April 22, 2009 letter from the Deputy Minister, which did not form any
part of the Commission’s Decision;
c.
An
alleged inconsistency between letters and a policy on the duty to consult neither
of which are relevant to the current proceeding;
d.
That
the Province’s interim consultation guidelines are “an unstructured
discretionary administrative regime.”
No
Crown Obligation to Consult with the ARG
[144] The Province
does not recognize the ARG as an entity that is entitled to consultation or
accommodation. Where these duties are triggered, they are owed to the
“rights-bearing community or communities whose rights, or asserted rights, have
the potential to be negatively impacted.” The AGS points out that while some of
the ARG’s members are rights-bearing communities, the ARG itself is not an
entity to which a duty to consult is owed.
[145] Federal Court
jurisprudence has determined that a body representing Aboriginal peoples is not
owed a duty to consult even if its members might be owed such a duty. See Native
Council of Nova Scotia v. Canada, 2002 FCT 6, [2002] F.C.J. No. 4 (Native
Council of NS) at paragraph 13. The AGS suggests that “these cases stand
among other Federal Court decisions in which such representative bodies were
found not to have standing to bring actions on the basis of Treaty or
Aboriginal rights.”
[146] While some
courts have held that the Crown may satisfy its consultative obligations
through multilateral processes, such cases do not stand for the proposition
that the Crown is required to consult in this manner or to consult a
representative organization. See Ahousaht Indian Band v. Canada (Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans), 2008 FCA 212, [2008] F.C.J. No. 946 (Ahousaht)
at paragraphs 47-51 and R. v. Douglas, 2007 BCCA 265, [2007] B.C.J. No.
891 (Douglas) at paragraph 40.
[147] A number of
the ARG’s member are not rights-bearing communities to whom the duty to consult
is owed; rather, they are creatures of Provincial statute. Moreover, the ARG,
which is composed of both First Nation and provincial communities is not an
entity that the Crown is required to consult.
ANALYSIS
General
[148] During the
hearing of this matter in Saskatoon on June 8, 2010, the Applicants made
significant adjustments to their position – in terms of the capacity and
jurisdiction of the Commission to address the Crown’s consultation obligations
and in terms of the remedies they are seeking from this Court – that helped to
clarify both their objectives in bringing this application and why they see the
Decision in question as an opportunity to further those objectives.
[149] When it comes
to mining and other development initiatives in the Athabasca region of Northern
Saskatchewan, the Applicants feel that their rights and interests are not being
taken seriously by the Province or the Federal Crown and they want a greater
say (a significant degree of control in fact) over all such initiatives. They
have developed their own Consultation Protocol and Development Review Process
and Approval Process, which they think should govern all development
initiatives in their region. As yet, however, they have not succeeded in having
their position recognized to the full at the political level. The Saskatchewan
Crown, for instance, does not recognize the ARG as an entity that is entitled
to be consulted and accommodated.
[150] Still feeling
marginalized and unheeded by the powers that control development in their
region of Northern Saskatchewan, the Applicants have turned to the Court with a
view to establishing at a legal level the degree of consultation and control
over development in the Athabasca Basin that they
believe is rightly theirs. They have chosen, in fact, to use the Decision under
review in this application to try to secure legal recognition for the rights
set out in their own Consultation Protocol. Moreover, they have invited the
Court to use this Consultation Protocol as a comparator for the inadequate
consultation which they say took place around the Commission’s Decision both to
renew the McClean Lake Licence and to roll the care and maintenance aspects of the
Midwest Site into the McClean Lake Licence.
[151] What they
would like to see – and the principal remedy proposed – is a Court-ordered and
Court-supervised negotiation process whereby the Province, the Federal Crown
and the Applicants would establish a consultative protocol (much like the
Applicants’ own Consultation Protocol) to govern any aspect of development in
the Athabasca basin. This would also involve the Court ordering that the
negotiations towards such a protocol be fully financed and resourced by the
Federal and Provincial Crowns.
[152] In other
words, the Applicants now want the Court both to order that the Province and
the Federal Crown negotiate with them and to oversee the process that will lead
to the achievement of the Applicants’ developmental objectives for the
Athabasca basin as embodied in their own Consultation Protocol.
[153] This remedy
was suggested at the hearing only and did not appear in the Applicants’ written
materials. Consequently, there has been no opportunity for the Court or
opposing counsel to explore fully what such an approach would involve or
whether there is any legal precedent for what would inevitably be a long and
confrontational ordeal for all involved. The Court knows nothing about other
communities (Aboriginal or otherwise) in the region, some of whom might have
very different ideas from the Applicants. In the end, the Court cannot compel
the Federal Crown and the Province to negotiate with the Applicants on matters
of such historical difficulty. There is insufficient material presented in this
application to allow the Court to ascertain what such a proposal would involve,
the legalities of implementing it and why the ARG – an entity that is not even
recognized by, at least, the Province – is entitled to play such a role when
the interests of the whole region are taken into account. The Applicants have
established neither a factual nor a legal basis for such an extraordinary
remedy.
[154] The
Applicants say that, if the Court cannot or will not impose the negotiation
regime outlined above, then they want the Court to quash the Decision renewing
the McClean Lake Licence. This would, of course, have very serious
consequences, and not only for AREVA. AREVA has been operating the mine at McClean Lake for years.
Provincial, regional and community development as well as individual
livelihoods depend upon the mine. In fact, it is clear from the evidence before
me that the Applicants themselves have a significant interest in the continued
operation of the mine at McClean Lake.
[155] As part of
the written submissions made to the Commission when the renewal and amendment
of the McClean Lake Licence were being considered, the Athabasca Basin
Development Limited Partnership provided the following letter of support:
Athabasca Basin Development Limited
Partnership (ABDLP) is owned by seven northern Saskatchewan Athabasca
communities: three First Nations (Black
Lake, Fond du Lac and Hatchet Lake) and four settlement/hamlets (Camsell
Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston
Lake).
ABDLP is a mining and exploration
services company that provides construction, underground mining, drilling,
janitorial and security as well as logistical services. ABDLP was recently
awarded the inaugural Skookum Jim Award by the Prospectors and Developers
Association of Canada for excellence by a Canadian aboriginal firm in the
mining and exploration sector.
ABDLP supports the renewal of the McClean Lake operating license in its
present form as the benefits derived from the current operations at McClean Lake are substantial. This operation has
provided us, and would continue to provide us with construction, security and
janitorial, and drilling contracts. The McClean Lake Mine also provides
increased traffic to Points North Landing which benefits one of our holdings,
Points North Freight Forwarding.
As a result of the contracts that ABDLP
receives and from direct employment by AREVA, the Athabasca region benefits
from the operation of the McClean Lake mine, and these benefits
would carry on into the future with the continuation of its operation. These
benefits include such things as a significant increase in First Nations
employment levels, increased education and training of First Nation and other
local employees, and additional spin off opportunities for the First Nations
people and their communities.
ABDLP has partnered with AREVA because we
feel their operations will strive to deliver economic benefits to the Athabasca, ensure safety of their
employees and the region, and bring prosperity to the people and the land.
It is the goal of the Athabasca region to
fully participate in the economy and ABDLP supports all companies and
operations that share this goal as well. We are confident that the existing
operations at McClean Lake share our goal and we
would fully support the renewal of McClean
Lake’s licence in its present
form.
[156] This letter
of support speaks eloquently of the regional importance of the mine and the
need for the renewal of the McClean Lake Licence.
[157] It cannot
escape the Court’s notice that the ABDLP – which wrote such a
glowing letter in support of the renewal of the McClean Lake Licence – is made
up of Black Lake, Fond du Lac and Hatchet Lake First Nations, as well as
Camsell Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston Lake Settlement, the
very same entities that make up the ARG. Now, as the Applicants in this
application, the ARG is telling the Court that, if the Court cannot impose upon
the two Crowns some form of mandatory negotiation process to give the
Applicants a broad say in land-use and development in the Region, then the
McClean Lake Licence should be quashed indefinitely.
[158] The
Applicants have offered no explanation for this inconsistency. Apparently, all of
the benefits outlined in the ABDLP letter can now be sacrificed to give the
Applicants leverage in their negotiations with the Provincial and Federal
Crowns over the establishment of a general Consultation Protocol for the
Athabasca basin.
[159] Whatever the
reason for these contradictions, they highlight the need for extreme caution
when considering the evidence, arguments and remedies that the Applicants have
now placed before the Court to justify quashing the Commission’s Decision. In
fact, one of the problems with such a contradiction is that the Court cannot be
certain that the persons directing this application on behalf of the Applicants
are truly representing the views and objectives of the Applicants. The Court
has no authorizing resolutions to rely upon and must confront a request for a draconian
remedy in the face of a record that is unclear on the issue of what the
Applicants truly want. This confusion became clear at the hearing before me
when the Applicants tried to back away from asking for an order to quash the
Decision in favour of a Court-imposed negotiation process that would lead to
the adoption of their own Consultation Protocol.
[160] It is also
clear from a review of the Applicants’ submissions to the Commission and the
record before me in this application that the Applicants are seeking to assert
a general right to consultation, and a right to control development, in the
Athabascar region irrespective of whether or not section 35 rights under the Constitution
Act, 1982 are engaged. As I shall discuss later, our present jurisprudence
does not support such a general right.
Standing
[161] As the
contradictions and political dimensions evident in the evidence suggest, there
are serious issues of standing with regard to the Applicants making this
judicial review application.
[162] To begin
with, the ARG is not a legal person. Counsel’s information is that the ARG is
just a collective term for the individual Applicants. So the ARG has no rights
of its own to assert and has no capacity to engage in these proceedings in its
own right. Any rights to be asserted must be those of individual Applicants.
[163] The general
tenor of this application suggests that the Applicants are attempting to rely
upon both the rights referred to in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982
and the right to consultation that our jurisprudence recognizes is owed by the
Crown to Aboriginal peoples in certain contexts. Camsell Portage, Uranium City, Stony
Rapids and Wollaston
Lake
may well have Aboriginal residents and connections to Aboriginal communities,
but these entities themselves do not enjoy section 35 rights. Counsel for the
Applicants has explained that these entities are being used in a convenient
representative capacity for the Aboriginal members of their respective
communities, but there is nothing before the Court to show how they acquired
this representative capacity and whether they are truly authorized to make this
application on behalf of the Aboriginal members of their communities.
Consequently, in so far as this application depends upon section 35 rights and
the duty of the Crown to consult with Aboriginal groups or persons, Camsell
Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston Lake have not established
that they have standing.
[164] A more
general problem occurs in relation to subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal
Courts Act:
18.1 (1) An application for
judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or by anyone
directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought.
|
18.1 (1) Une demande de
contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général du Canada ou
par quiconque est directement touché par l’objet de la demande.
|
[165] The Decision is the renewal
of the McClean Lake Licence for a further eight years and the incorporation of
the care and maintenance activities at the Midwest Site into the same McClean
Lake Licence. Subsection 18.1(1) requires that those seeking judicial review be
“directly affected” by this Decision, but it is by no means clear to the Court
how any of the Applicants see themselves as being so affected. The Applicants
have not sought or asserted public interest standing. Their own evidence, when
they were wearing the hat of the ABDLP, was that the McClean Lake Licence
should be renewed because the benefits derived from operations at McClean Lake “are substantial” for
the region. If the Applicants have been affected by the Decision, the evidence
before me suggests that they can only have been affected in a positive way.
[166] The same parties, now wearing
the hat of the ARG, say that the Decision should be quashed if necessary
because their rights to consultation were denied during the process that led to
the renewal of the McClean Lake Licence. In short, the Applicants now wish to
quash the renewal of an operating licence that they enthusiastically supported
as members of the ABDLP.
[167] The only sense I can
make of this paradox is that the Applicants support the renewal of the McClean
Lake Licence but also wish to assert cultural, political and legal rights (in
the form of a right to consultation and control over development in their
region), and so they have chosen the licensing process undertaken by the
Commission in this case as the forum in which to assert those rights.
[168] It is not clear to me how
the Applicants can support a decision and then, when the decision is rendered,
attempt to have the same decision quashed because they now wish to assert
section 35 rights and claim inadequate consultation.
[169] This casts doubt on the substance
of the Applicants’ opposition to the Decision as manifested in this application.
Moreover, it raises the issue of how a group that supported the Decision through
its own limited partnership can now say it was “directly affected” by it such
that they should have standing to attack it and attempt to have it quashed in a
judicial review application.
[170] This situation is unique
in my experience. It suggests to me that the Applicants are now impugning a
Decision they once endorsed as members of the ABDLP so as to advance a broader
objective. I think they know full well that the McClean Lake mine must go on operating because, inter
alia, it provides the numerous benefits to the region, and to the Aboriginal
people of the region, that they themselves have identified. Knowing that the McClean
Lake Licence will continue, they now wish to use the Decision to achieve a
further benefit by having the Court endorse and order that they be given more
control over general development in the Athabasca basin.
[171]
How
can the Applicants argue that a positive Decision – one which they played a
material role in helping to bring about – affects their legal rights, imposes a
legal obligation on them or directly and prejudicially affects them such that
they should now have standing to attack that Decision by way of judicial review?
In my view, they cannot. If the Decision has unforeseen consequences and they
now regret supporting it (and there is no evidence of this), then the
Commission cannot be blamed for such consequences that were not before it. And
if the Applicants now wish to use the Decision to promote a general right of
consultation in a bid to secure greater control over development in their
region, I do not think they can qualify as being “directly affected” by the
Decision in the way required by our jurisprudence for standing. Any effect of
the Decision has been promoted, encouraged and endorsed by the Applicants
themselves in their role as the ABDLP.
[172]
This Court has
determined that the phrase “anyone directly affected by the matter” should not
be given a restricted meaning. See Alberta v. Canadian Wheat Board, [1998]
2 F.C. 156 (Alberta). However, the Court has also held in Friends
of the Island Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), [1993] 2 F.C. 229, 102 D.L.R.
(4th) 696 at 737 (Friends cited to D.L.R.) that
the wording in
subsection 18.1(1) allows the court discretion to grant standing when it is
convinced that the particular circumstances of the case and the type of
interest which the applicant holds justify status being granted. (This assumes
there is a justiciable issue and no other effective and practical means of
getting the issue before the courts.)
[173]
In Alberta, above, there was a vast number of permit book
holders directly affected by the decision, none of whom had joined the judicial
review. As such, the Court determined that the Applicant did not meet the test
for standing because, clearly, there was another way that the issue could be
brought before the Court.
[174]
Alberta, above, at paragraph 31 also makes the
helpful distinction between having an interest in a decision and being directly
affected by it:
On the evidence
before me, I find no basis to conclude that the applicant is “anyone directly
affected” within the meaning of subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal Court Act.
While it is undoubtedly true that the applicant has an interest in the respondent’s
grain delivery programs, and the evidence is sufficient for that purpose, that
is not, I conclude sufficient to establish direct affect.
[175]
In the recent case
of Irving Shipbuilding Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 116,
[2009] F.C.J. No. 449 (Irving), the Federal Court of Appeal also
considered the issue of standing under section 18.1. The Court determined at
paragraph 28 that “the question of the appellants’ standing should be answered …
in the context of the ground of review on which they rely, namely, breach of
the duty of procedural fairness.” Therefore, if the applicants were owed a duty
of procedural fairness, then they had the right to bring their application
before the Court. However, “if they do not have a right to procedural fairness,
that should normally conclude the matter” (paragraph 28).
[176]
Jurisprudence from
other jurisdictions is also helpful in determining the scope of the term
“directly affected.” For instance, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench noted in Athabasca
Environmental Assn. (Friends of) v. Alberta (Public Health Advisory and Appeal
Board), (1993), 24 Admin. L.R. (2d) 156, [1994] A.J. No. 296 (Athabasca)
(QL), that the phrase ‘directly affected’ is different from the mere use of the
word ‘affected’ because “the adverb ‘directly’ brings a restrictive connotation
to the word ‘affects’.”
[177]
The Privy Council has
also offered some insight into this term in Re Endowed Schools Act,
[1898] A.C. 477 (P.C.) at 483, noting that “directly affected” points to “a
personal and individual interest as distinct from the general interest which
appertains to the whole community.”
[178]
Also of relevance to
the present application is Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-kwa-mish Tribes v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2003 FCT 30, [2003] F.C.J. No. 98 (Tribes).
In that case at paragraph 12, the Federal Court held as follows:
The fact that an
activity may be “disrespectful” to one’s way of life is not sufficient to
establish that one is suffering a direct, adverse impact from such activity such
as to bring oneself within the scope of s. 18.1(1) of the Federal Court Act.
[179] According to Tribes, above, to be
directly affected by a decision a party must be “suffering a direct, adverse
impact” from the decision at issue. The Applicants in the instant case have not
provided any evidence that they have suffered a direct, adverse impact from the
licence renewal at McClean Lake or from the incorporation of the care
and maintenance activities at the Midwest Site into the McClean Lake Licence.
Indeed, the Aboriginal Applicants have failed to show any Aboriginal or treaty
right that has been impacted by the licence renewal or incorporation. What is
more, the non-aboriginal communities have not even shown that they have a right
that could have been impacted in any way.
[180] Also, as noted above, the ABDLP letter
supporting the licence application demonstrates how the Applicant communities
actually benefit from the Decision. Accordingly, they cannot be said to
be suffering a direct, adverse impact from it. As a result, I believe that all
of the Applicants lack standing to bring the current application before the
Federal Court.
Evidentiary Problems
[181] AREVA submits
that the Applicants’ affidavits contain hearsay, opinion and argument and that
they refer to irrelevant and extraneous matters. Furthermore, they are replete
with material that was not before the Commission when it made its Decision.
AREVA has filed affidavit material to respond to incorrect evidence contained
in the Applicants’ affidavits, in the event that such was determined by the
court to be admissible evidence. However, in all of the circumstances, AREVA
submits that the Applicants’ affidavits should be disregarded and given little
or no weight.
Fond du Lac Evidentiary Problems
[182] Upon
examination of the affidavits in question, it is clear to me that they contain
a great deal that is hearsay, opinion and/or extraneous information and
argument.
[183] In
situations such as this where the affiants have not adhered to the Federal
Court Rules when swearing their affidavits, the Court may choose to strike
portions of an affidavit or the entirety of an affidavit; in the alternative,
it may choose to assign no weight to an affidavit.
[184] Although
the Applicants’ affidavits should not be struck in their entirety, I conclude
that, given the problems noted above, they do not provide a sufficient
evidentiary basis for the principal allegations made by the Applicants in this
application, and they certainly do not provide a sufficient evidentiary basis
for the draconian relief requested by the Applicants.
[185] In my view, then, the
serious issues of standing and evidence before me suggest that the Court should
not grant the relief sought. I will, nevertheless, address the merits of the
application.
The Decision
[186] There are two principal
aspects to the Decision:
a.
The
McClean Lake Licence was renewed, pursuant to section 24 of the Act, from July
1, 2009 to June 30, 2017; and
b.
The
Midwest Uranium Site Preparation Licence was revoked pursuant to section 24 of
the Act, and the maintenance and caretaking activities at the Midwest Site were
incorporated into the McClean Lake Licence.
[187] A great deal is made in
the Applicants’ evidence and argument about what could happen at the Midwest Site.
However, the process for dealing with Midwest will run its own course and the
Applicants will be given a full opportunity to participate and raise any
objections they might have long before Midwest becomes operational. If they are not given such
opportunities, then they are at liberty to bring their concerns before this Court
at the appropriate time. As I will discuss later, the incorporation of the
interim care and maintenance aspects of the Midwest Site into the McClean Lake
Licence changes nothing on the ground. It is a mere administrative measure that
does not affect the Applicants’ rights in any way. It is a common practice
throughout Saskatchewan to include different
sites under one licence where the Commission sees no negative impact upon its
statute-defined responsibilities. The Applicants’ attempts to incorporate the
Midwest situation into their present attack upon the McClean Lake Licence
simply highlights, in my view, the lack of genuine grounds they have to quash the
Decision.
The Alleged Grounds
Jurisdiction
and Capacity
[188] Generally speaking, I am
in agreement with most of the points made by the Respondents on the merits of
this application. Consequently, I have adopted and incorporated portions of
their submissions into my own reasons because they provide comprehensive
summaries of the existing relevant jurisprudence.
[189] In their written
materials, the Applicants argue that the Commission has no jurisdiction or
capacity to deal with consultation issues on behalf of the Crown and can only
inquire and decide whether the Crown has otherwise fulfilled its obligations to
consult.
[190] This has led to
contradictions in the Applicants’ position because part of the relief requested
is as follows:
(c)
An Order or declaration that the [Commission] satisfy and grant the Applicants
… a consultation process for the purpose of accommodation and reconciliation of
the Aboriginal rights and issues, at minimum in accordance with the Interim
Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Legal Duty to Consult of the
Government of Canada, dated February 2008.
[191] The Applicants would not
ask for this relief if they really believed the Commission lacked the
jurisdiction and capacity to fulfill the terms of such an order. At the hearing
on June 8, 2010, the Applicants acknowledged to the Court that the Commission
does have the jurisdiction and capacity to address section 35 rights and the
Crown’s obligations regarding consultation. I think this position is correct.
[192] As the AGC pointed out
in his submissions, subsection 8(2) of the Act states as follows:
8(2) The Commission is for all
its purposes an agent of Her Majesty and may exercise its powers only as an
agent of Her Majesty.
|
8(2) La Commission est
mandataire de Sa Majesté et ne peut exercer ses attributions qu’à ce titre.
|
[193] So far as the Crown is
obliged to consult with the Applicants respecting its conduct, the Commission
may fulfill the duty as a component of the overall process of consultation.
[194] The objects of the
Commission, as established by section 9 of the Act are as follows:
9. The objects of the
Commission are
(a) to regulate the development,
production and use of nuclear energy and the production, possession and use
of nuclear substances, prescribed equipment and prescribed information in
order to
(i) prevent unreasonable risk, to the
environment and to the health and safety of persons, associated with that
development, production, possession or use,
(ii) prevent unreasonable risk to national
security associated with that development, production, possession or use, and
(iii) achieve conformity with measures of
control and international obligations to which Canada has agreed; and
(b) to disseminate objective
scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public concerning the
activities of the Commission and the effects, on the environment and on the
health and safety of persons, of the development, production, possession and
use referred to in paragraph (a).
|
9. La Commission a pour
mission :
a) de réglementer le
développement, la production et l’utilisation de l’énergie nucléaire ainsi
que la production, la possession et l’utilisation des substances nucléaires,
de l’équipement réglementé et des renseignements réglementés afin que :
(i) le niveau de risque inhérent à ces
activités tant pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes que pour
l’environnement, demeure acceptable,
(ii) le niveau de risque inhérent à ces
activités pour la sécurité nationale demeure acceptable,
(iii) ces activités soient exercées en
conformité avec les mesures de contrôle et les obligations internationales
que le Canada a assumées;
b) d’informer objectivement
le public — sur les plans scientifique ou technique ou en ce qui concerne la
réglementation du domaine de l’énergie nucléaire — sur ses activités et sur
les conséquences, pour la santé et la sécurité des personnes et pour l’environnement,
des activités mentionnées à l’alinéa a).
|
[195] Hence, it is within the
Commission’s mandate to assess and mitigate environmental, health and safety
risks resulting from the development, production or use of nuclear substances.
I agree with the Respondents that the Commission has taken appropriate steps to
address such risks. It maintains the technical expertise to gather, interpret
and assess complex information respecting the production and handling of
nuclear substances, and it provides a process to receive, consider and respond
to public concerns related to the production of nuclear substances.
[196] Furthermore, section 25
of the Act provides the Commission with authority to refuse, suspend, revoke or
place conditions upon any licence to carry out activities involving nuclear
substances. As the Respondents point out, if the conduct, proposed or real, of
any licencee of, or applicant to, the Commission causes unacceptable or
uncertain risks to health, safety or the environment, the Commission has
appropriate resources to assess the risks presented and the authority to impose
and enforce appropriate mitigation measures and, ultimately, to revoke or deny
the licence.
[197] The Supreme Court of
Canada in Taku River, above, provides authority for the proposition that
the Crown can rely on existing regulatory processes to fulfill its duty to
consult but need not do so if it chooses to employ other means.
[198] Considering the
authority granted to the Commission, and considering the consultation processes
conducted by the Commission, it is my view that the Applicants’ concerns
respecting potential risks to the environment, to health and to public safety,
and the Crown’s obligations of consultation, all fall within the Commission’s
legislated mandate. The Federal Court in Brokenhead, above, citing both
the Supreme Court of Canada and the British Columbia Supreme Court, stated at
paragraph 25 that
[i]n
determining whether and to what extent the Crown has a duty to consult with
Aboriginal peoples about projects or transactions that may affect their
interests, the Crown may fairly consider the opportunities for Aboriginal
consultation that are available within the existing processes for regulatory or
environmental review … . Those review processes may be sufficient to address
Aboriginal concerns, subject always to the Crown’s overriding duty to consider
their adequacy in any particular situation. This is not a delegation of the
Crown’s duty to consult but only one means by which the Crown may be satisfied
that Aboriginal concerns have been heard and, where appropriate, accommodated. (citations
omitted)
[199] In Brokenhead,
above, Justice Barnes specifically rejected the need for an alternative or
additional consultation process when the relevant regulatory process provides
adequate opportunity for consultation and mitigation. In response to the First
Nations’ assertion that an alternative consultation to the National Energy
Board’s process was required, Justice Barnes had the following to say at
paragraph 37:
This assertion seems to me to represent an impoverished view of
the consultation obligation because it would involve a repetitive and
essentially pointless exercise. Except to the extent that Aboriginal concerns
cannot be dealt with, the appropriate place to deal with project-related
matters is before the NEB
and not in a collateral discussion with either the GIC or some arguably
relevant Ministry.
[200] The Court in Brokenhead
proceeded to determine in paragraph 25 that the Brokenhead Ojibway First
Nation’s concerns respecting the passage of a pipeline through its traditional
territory were best and properly addressed by the National Energy Board, which
could provide for appropriate mitigation efforts and could further address
environmental concerns.
[201] Akin to the
circumstances in Brokenhead, so far as the focus of consultation relates
to matters within the scope of the Commission’s legislated mandate, it is my
view that the Commission is an appropriate body to address the duty to consult
with Aboriginal communities on behalf of the Crown.
The Commission’s Jurisdiction
to Decide on the Adequacy of Consultation
[202] The Supreme Court of
Canada established in Paul, above, at paragraph 39 that if the
empowering legislation implicitly or explicitly grants a commission or tribunal
the authority to interpret or decide any question of law, it will also have
authority to decide those matters in light of section 35 of the Constitution
Act, 1982.
[203] In the context of a duty
to consult, it is necessary to consider the particular facts of each case to
determine whether the subject matter of consultation and accommodation falls
within the deciding body’s mandate.
[204] As the Respondents point
out, subsection 8(2) of the Commission’s empowering legislation states that the
Commission is an agent of the Crown. Furthermore, subsection 20(1) of the Act
states that the Commission is a court of record, and subsections 20(2) through
21(1) establish the extensive authority and power of the Commission to compel
and collect evidence and to make and enforce decisions of a wide scope,
including the implied authority to make decisions of law.
[205] The extent to which any
particular body has the ability to decide issues related to consultation is
still an undetermined point of law in many cases. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal in Carrier, above, found that although the Utilities Commission
did not have explicit authority to determine consultation issues, it had
implicit jurisdiction to decide on the adequacy of consultation. Justice Donald
of the B.C. Court of Appeal declared in paragraph 51 of Carrier that the
Utilities Commission not only had jurisdiction to decide on section 35 matters,
it had a duty to decide:
Not only has the Commission the ability to decide the consultation
issue, it is the only appropriate forum to decide the issue in a timely way.
Furthermore, the honour of the Crown obliges it to do so. As a body to which
powers have been delegated by the Crown, it must not deny the appellant timely
access to a decision-maker with authority over the subject matter.
[206] The AGC maintains that
the approach of the Federal Court of Appeal in Standing Buffalo, above,
is more consistent with key Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence such as Haida
and Taku
River, above. For example, in
Standing Buffalo, the Federal Court of Appeal addressed whether the
National Energy Board had the authority to decide issues relating to the
Crown’s duty to consult. Justice Ryer provided the following guidance:
40 First,
as noted above, the decision in Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada
(National Energy Board) establishes that in exercising its decision-making
function, the NEB must act within the dictates of the Constitution, including
subsection 35(1) thereof. In the circumstances of these appeals, the NEB dealt
with three applications for Section 52 Certificates. Each of those applications
is a discrete process in which a specific applicant seeks approval in respect
of an identifiable Project. The process focuses on the applicant, on whom the NEB
imposes broad consultation obligations. The applicant must consult with
Aboriginal groups, determine their concerns and attempt to address them,
failing which the NEB can impose accommodative requirements. In my view, this
process ensures that the applicant for the Project approval has due regard for
existing Aboriginal rights that are recognized and affirmed in subsection 35(1)
of the Constitution. And, in ensuring that the applicant respects such
Aboriginal rights, in my view, the NEB demonstrates that it is exercising its
decision-making function in accordance with the dictates of subsection 35(1) of
the Constitution.
41 Secondly,
the appellants were unable to point to any provision of the NEB Act or any
other legislation that prevents it from issuing a Section 52 Certificate
without first undertaking a Haida analysis or that empowers it to order
the Crown to undertake Haida consultations.
42 Thirdly,
the Province of Saskatchewan argued that the NEB lacks jurisdiction to
undertake a Haida analysis where the Crown that is alleged to have a Haida
duty is the Crown in right of a province. The appellants did not contest this
limitation on the ability of the NEB to conduct a Haida analysis in
relation to the Crown in right of a province.
43 Fourthly,
a determination that the NEB was not required to determine whether the Crown
was under, and had discharged, a Haida duty before making the Decisions
does not preclude the adjudication of those matters by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Indeed, the quotations from paragraphs 37 and 60 of Haida
and paragraph 47 of Paul point towards recourse to the courts in such
circumstances.
[207] In relation to the
licence application before it, the Commission in the present case has the
authority under its governing legislation to decide questions of law, and the
subject matter of consultation falls within the Commission’s mandate and
expertise. Therefore, the Commission, in my view, is an appropriate body to
decide if the adequacy of the consultation is consistent with section 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982.
Does the Duty to Consult
Exist in this Case?
[208] As the evidence makes
clear, a considerable amount of consultation with the Applicants concerning the
Decision did occur in this case. This does not mean, however, that a duty to
consult existed.
[209] When the Crown knows
that Aboriginal rights or title exist, or that Treaty rights exist, and it contemplates
conduct that may adversely affect those rights, a legal duty to consult arises.
[210] As the Respondents point
out, the duty to consult may not be triggered at all where there is a
relatively minimal adverse effect on claims to Aboriginal title or rights or
treaty rights claims. In The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with
Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich, 2009 at page
34), Professor Dwight Newman summarizes when the duty to consult may be
triggered:
The
application of the triggering test is obviously far from simple. Where
government departments are uncertain about whether their action triggers a duty
to consult, the safer course may be to act as if it did and extend at least
notice of the proposed action to potentially affected Aboriginal communities.
After all, a failure to consult may provoke litigation that will cause delays
in the government action. Moreover, there is an important rationale for some
ease in the triggering of a duty to consult; in circumstances where an
Aboriginal community will be able to add to the Crown understanding of the
extent of impact of particular decisions, it may be valuable for the duty to be
considered triggered simply in order to ensure that there is input from the
Aboriginal community.
Government
departments need not consult in circumstances where there are overriding doubts
about the Aboriginal title or right or treaty right. They need not consult in
circumstances where there is no plausible adverse effect on an Aboriginal
claim. They need not consult if they are not involved in the kinds of action
that trigger a duty to consult. However, it is not always easy for government
officials to make those determinations with certainty, which may support the
notion that to avoid the risk of not consulting in circumstances where
consultation should have occurred, where there is any argument for doing so and
it is practical to do so, at least notice to Aboriginal communities should be extended.
It would be impractical to consult on every governmental decision, though, so
there is a need for good judgment in applying this principle.
[211] For the duty to consult
to arise there must be some evidence presented to establish an adverse impact
on Aboriginal rights. Further, evidence to support the finding of an
interference with a specific or tangible interest must be linked to the project
or decision under consideration and must constitute more than mere submissions
or generalities.
[212] In Brokenhead,
above, at paragraph 34, the Federal Court confirmed that no at-large duty to
consult arises in the absence of an unresolved non-negligible impact:
I do not question that the above statements reflect a profoundly
held concern not only of Chief Nelson but of others in the Manitoba Aboriginal
community. The problem is that to establish a procedural breach around
projects such as these there must be some evidence presented which establishes
both an adverse impact on a credible claim to land or to Aboriginal rights accompanied
by a failure to adequately consult. The Treaty One First Nations are simply
not correct when they assert in their evidence that a duty to consult is
engaged whenever the Government of Canada makes “any decision related to lands
in our traditional territory inside the boundaries of Treaty 1”. There is no
at-large duty to consult that is triggered solely by the development of land
for public purposes. There must be some unresolved non-negligible impact
arising from such a development to engage the Crown’s duty to consult. (emphasis
added)
[213] It is well established
that where a duty to consult is engaged, its content will vary according to the
circumstances. The scope of the duty has been said to be proportionate to a
preliminary assessment of the strength of the claim and to the seriousness of
the potentially adverse effect of the planned government activity upon the
right or title claimed. See Haida, above, at paragraph 39.
[214] It is also well
established that the specific consultation obligations that may be required
exist on a spectrum. At one end, where the Aboriginal claim is relatively weak
and the potential adverse impacts are minor, the Crown’s duties may be limited
to giving notice, disclosing information and discussing issues raised in response
to the notice with the Aboriginal group concerned. At the other end of the
spectrum, where a strong prima facie case for a claim is established and the
potential infringement is severe, deeper consultation may be required. See Haida,
above, at paragraphs 43-44.
[215] Accordingly, within this
spectrum, the governing jurisprudence, which is cited by the Respondents,
directs that the duty ranges from a minimal notice requirement to a duty to
carry out some degree of accommodation of the Aboriginal interest. However,
this spectrum does not include an Aboriginal veto power over any particular
decision. See Haida, above, at paragraphs 47-48.
[216] The Crown may delegate
procedural aspects of consultation to industry proponents, but the ultimate
legal responsibility for consultation and accommodation rests with the Crown.
The honour of the Crown cannot be delegated.
[217] My review of the record
before the Commission reveals that the Applicants failed to identify or
establish specific Aboriginal or Treaty rights that could potentially be
adversely affected by a decision to grant AREVA’s application for renewal of, and/or
the inclusion of the Midwest care and maintenance obligations within, the
McClean Lake Licence. Furthermore, despite having the full opportunity to
appear before the Commission and file several written submissions, the
Applicants provided no evidence of adverse impact or interference with specific
Aboriginal or Treaty rights. Instead, the Applicants expressed broad and
generalized concerns on matters unrelated to the particular licensing application
before the Commission.
[218] These mining and milling
operations have been in existence for over ten years; renewal of an operating
licence was being sought; and no evidence was provided that the granting of the
licensing application by the Commission would result in a negative impact on
specific Aboriginal or Treaty rights of the Applicants. In these circumstances,
I think that AREVA is correct to say that the duty to consult was not even triggered.
[219] At the very most, given
the low threshold for triggering the duty to consult, any duty triggered was
minimal in scope and at the lower end of the spectrum, and it was discharged
through the process that took place in this instance.
[220] In Mikisew Cree First
Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3
S.C.R. 388 (Mikisew), the Mikisew challenged the decision of the
Minister to approve the building of a winter road that tracked the reserve
boundary. There was evidence to show that the proposed road would reduce the
territory over which the Mikisew were entitled to exercise treaty rights,
remove hunting within the road corridor and injuriously affect the Mikisew’s
exercise of rights in the surrounding bush. The Supreme Court of Canada held
that where the proposed road was to be built on surrendered lands (where the
Mikisew hunting, fishing and trapping rights were subject to the “taking up”
limitation), the Crown’s duty was at the lower end of the spectrum. The Crown
was required to engage directly with the Mikisew, provide information, solicit
the Mikisew’s concerns and attempt to minimize adverse impacts on treaty
rights.
[221] In the present case,
where the licensing application sought renewal of an operating licence for a
mine and mill that have been in operation for over ten years with no new taking
up of land or authorized activities, and where there was no evidence of adverse
impacts on the Applicants’ Aboriginal or Treaty rights by a decision to grant
the licensing application, any duty to consult that existed was minimal and
consisted of giving notice, disclosing information and discussing with the
Applicants the issues raised by them in response to the licensing application. All
of this occurred.
[222] Accordingly, in my view,
if a duty to consult was triggered on these facts, then the Commission’s
decision on the existence and extent of the duty to consult in the
circumstances was correct.
[223] As the Commission itself
pointed out in its Decision, the specific concerns raised by the Applicants in
respect of the matter before the Commission related mostly to requests for
information and the Applicants’ need to understand certain technical matters concerning
the operation of this nuclear facility. The evidence before me shows that, through
the regulatory process, the Applicants received additional information
regarding the licensing application and extensions of time to allow them to participate
fully in the Commission’s process. The Applicants filed several written
submissions with the Commission. Their legal counsel and a leadership
representative participated in the public hearings. The Applicants engaged in
dialogue and discussed their concerns with both Commission Staff and AREVA.
[224] Also, in the course of
the regulatory process, concerns raised by the Applicants over the potential
impact of the licensing application on their ability to participate in the
environmental assessment process for the proposed Midwest project were answered
and addressed. The written submissions filed by Commission Staff and AREVA made
it clear that the proposed Midwest project was not the subject of the McClean
Lake licensing application and that the environmental assessment process for
the proposed Midwest project would not be affected by a decision to revoke the
Midwest Licence.
[225] The request by AREVA to
revoke the Midwest Licence and to amalgamate the care and maintenance
activities authorized under that licence into the McClean Lake Licence was also
discussed during Day 2 of public hearings, which the Applicants attended. Commission
Staff explained that, from a regulatory perspective, the request was purely
administrative in nature and that the same level of control and expectations
for nuclear facilities would carry forward whether there were one or two
licences. Commission Staff also explained that the licensing application did
not impact on the environmental assessment process for the proposed Midwest project,
for which a consultation approach was being developed under the Major Projects
Management Office.
[226] To the extent that the
Applicants’ concerns were not truly related to the licensing action under
consideration by the Commission but were instead an attempt to obtain the
agreement of the Government of Saskatchewan to implement the Applicants’
Consultation Protocol, those concerns fall outside the mandate of the Commission
and cannot properly be addressed within the federal regulatory scheme for the
licensing of nuclear facilities.
[227] As the Respondents point
out, in Taku
River, above, the Supreme
Court of Canada found that the province fulfilled the requirements of its duty
to consult and accommodate through its environmental assessment process. This
was so notwithstanding that broader concerns raised by the Taku River Tlingit
First Nation (TRTFN) (specifically, land-use planning strategy, an interest in
TRTFN jurisdiction to approve permits for the project and revenue-sharing) were
found to be outside the ambit of the environmental assessment process and could
be the subject only of later negotiation with the province.
[228] Similarly, in Brokenhead,
above, it was found that the NEB
could not deal with larger Aboriginal concerns that were raised, such as
unresolved land claims. Those issues could be properly addressed only outside
of the regulatory process.
[229] In all of the
circumstances of the present case, the Court agrees with AREVA’s submissions
that, if a duty to consult did arise, the Crown’s duty to consult was fulfilled
by the public information and consultation activities carried out by AREVA in
respect of the licensing application, by the regulatory process, and by the
full participation of the Applicants in that process.
The Province and the
Duty to Consult
[230] In my view, the duty to
consult did not involve the Province of Saskatchewan in this case. This is because there was no
provincial decision or conduct at issue before the Commission that could
trigger a duty to consult on the part of the Province. Even if such a duty had
arisen, the Commission has no jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
Province has fulfilled that duty. The Commission dealt correctly with these
issues in its Decision.
[231] The Applicants may well
be experiencing frustration with the Province regarding the acceptance and
implementation of their proposed Consultation Protocol, but there are processes
and remedies for dealing with this issue. It has no relevance to the matters
before me in this judicial review application. The Applicants, in effect, are
asking the Court to order the Province to deal with them on their terms. The
Court has no jurisdiction to do this. This is a matter for the Applicants to
work out with the Province. It is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission and
the Court.
Summary
[232] In the end, the
Applicants are, in my view, attempting to assert a general right to
consultation that exists irrespective of any specific section 35 rights and
impacts. This is the position adopted in the Applicants’ Consultation Protocol,
which they want to have adopted by both the Province and the Federal Crown. As
the above jurisprudence makes clear, such a general, free-floating right does
not exist in Canadian law.
[233] The evidence is clear in
the present case that both AREVA’s and the Commission’s processes provided the
Applicants with an opportunity to understand the nature of the Decision being
made and an opportunity to provide input regarding any Aboriginal and Treaty rights
affected and any impacts. The Applicants failed to articulate any Aboriginal rights
that would be affected by the Decision or any adverse impacts. The Commission
was correct at paragraph 131 of its Decision when it said that
…
the specific concerns that were raised relate mostly to information and the
ability of the members of the impact communities to understand the information
relevant to the operations of the licenced facility. The interveners did not
provide information about specific rights that could be affected by the renewal
of the licence for the McClean Lake Operation.
[234] By the time the Court
heard this matter on June 8, 2010, little had changed. Notwithstanding the
Court’s attempts to find out what the Applicant’s felt had not been addressed
by the Commission and what section 35 rights might have been impacted, there
was no clear articulation on these points by the Applicants. There were some
vague generalities and speculations about the concentration of mining
activities in the area but nothing upon which either the Court, or the
Commission, could act. In the end, the Court was left with a clear impression
that the Applicants have concerns about what may eventually happen at the
Midwest Site, a matter they will have an opportunity to address as the
development of that site proceeds, but they could come up with no clear
articulation of why their rights have been, or could be, impacted by a
continuation of activities at McClean Lake. This is hardly surprising given the
Applicants’ earlier support for McClean Lake, as found in the evidence. It seems to me that
the purpose of this judicial review application is not really an attempt to
review the Decision but is, rather, an attempt by the Applicants to have the
Court impose their Consultation Protocol upon the Province and the Federal
Crown in order to give the Applicants more control over general land-use and development
in their region. I do not fault the Applicants for what is an entirely
legitimate political aspiration, but that is not the purpose of judicial
review.
Midwest Care and Maintenance
[235] The Applicants assert
that the Commission was not authorized by the Act to incorporate the
care and maintenance activities of AREVA’s Midwest Site into AREVA’s McClean
Lake Licence.
[236] As AREVA pointed out in
its submissions, however, the Commission has broad powers with respect to the
granting of licences as set out in sections 24 and 25 of the Act. By way of
example, the Commission may, on its own motion, suspend in whole or in part,
amend, revoke or replace a licence.
[237] Subsection 24(8) of the Act
states that a licence may not be transferred. The Commission reviewed AREVA’s licensing
application and concluded that having the care and maintenance activities authorized
in the McClean Lake Licence did not involve the transfer of a licence under
subsection 24(8).
[238] On the evidence and
facts adduced in the present application, it is my view that a transfer of
licence did not take place. The existing Midwest Licence was revoked and the
present care and maintenance obligations at the Midwest Site were, for
administrative reasons, brought under the McClean Lake renewal.
[239] There is nothing
extraordinary in having two sites dealt with under one licence, and nothing has
changed with regard to ownership or the obligations required to care for and
maintain the Midwest Site. It is noteworthy that the two sites are within three
kilometers of each other and the nearest permanent community (Hatchet Lake) is 50 kilometers
away.
[240] The Court cannot see how
the Act prohibits what has occurred in this case, how uncertainty or a lack of
scrutiny might be created, how the licensing process may have been subverted or
how the Applicants, or anyone else for that matter, could be adversely impacted
by such an arrangement. What matters is that the activities in question are
regulated appropriately. There is no evidence before me to suggest that the new
care and maintenance aspects of the McClean Lake Licence pertaining to the
Midwest Site will prevent proper and effective regulation.
[241] Once again, the
Applicants appear to be attacking this aspect of the Decision in order to gain
leverage for their general aspirations to have the Province and the Federal
Crown adopt their Consultation Protocol.
Conclusions
[242] My findings and
conclusions in these reasons are not intended to cast aspersions upon, or to
discourage, the Applicants’ attempts to secure a greater degree of control over
land-use and resource development in the Athabasca region of Northern Saskatchewan. In fact, I do not
detect in the submissions of the Respondents or the Interveners any such
disapproval or discouragement. All participants obviously recognize that
harmonious and mutually supportive objectives and processes are absolutely essential
for the region and for those who live and work there. The objections raised by
the Respondents and the Interveners relate to the method chosen by the
Applicants to further their aspirations.
[243] This judicial review
application is, of necessity, focused upon a particular decision. In attacking
that decision, the Applicants have revealed that their real concerns relate to
more general policy and practice in the region. This is why their preferred
remedy is the implementation of a Court-ordered and Court-supervised
negotiation process that would secure provincial and federal recognition for
their Consultation Protocol and the general concerns it embodies.
[244] However, in terms of the
issues and the jurisprudence that the Court is required to consider as part of
a judicial review application, I do not think it can be said that the
Applicants have established any kind of reviewable error with regard to the
Commission’s Decision. Even if the duty to consult was triggered in this case,
and I do not think it was, that duty was fulfilled as part of the licensing
process. In addition, it is my view that this application presents the Court
with serious evidentiary and standing problems that disqualify the Applicants
from receiving the relief claimed. None of this, however, is meant as a
negative comment upon the Applicants’ more general aspirations, and I am
pleased to detect in the presentations of the Respondents and the Interveners
that they have not approached this application in a politically negative way;
they have, rather, concentrated upon the Decision in hand and the relevant
jurisprudence on consultation.
[245] At the oral hearing, the
Applicants alleged that the Decision was procedurally unfair in that they were
denied information and were not given the opportunity to bring their concerns
before the Commission. The Applicants simply assert that there is no evidence on
the record of the Commission and/or AREVA seeking traditional advice or of having
regard for their issues of concern. My review of the written record, however, reveals
it is replete with evidence that says otherwise. AREVA runs a comprehensive
information program and there is ample written correspondence about the licensing
activities specific to this case that was directed at the Applicants. When faced
with this evidence at the oral hearing, counsel for the Applicants could
provide no adequate explanation for the discrepancies between the Applicants’
assertions and what the written record shows.
[246] The Applicants also
complain that they did not receive all of the information they requested, which
they needed to enable them to make an informed decision about whether their
rights were in jeopardy. The Applicants may not have received everything as and
when they wanted it, but it has to be borne in mind that the Decision was about
the renewal of a long-standing licence. The Applicants knew this and they knew
that no new activities were contemplated. They must be taken to have known what
their section 35 rights were, and they have had ample time and opportunity over
the operational life of the McClean Lake Mine to observe and define any
negative impacts on those rights. All information has now been disclosed. Yet
there is still no indication from the Applicants of a negative impact upon any Aboriginal
or treaty rights.
[247] In oral argument, all
that counsel for the Applicants could say was that there was a “concern for the
implications” of renewing the McClean Lake Licence and bringing care and
maintenance at the Midwest Site under that licence. No specifics were offered
about the rights affected or any negative impact or, for that matter, about
safety and environmental concerns in general.
[248] The Applicants also say
that there is nothing on the record to show that their concerns were taken into
account. Quite apart from the Applicants’ refusal or inability to articulate
specific section 35 concerns that the Commission could address, the Decision
itself makes it clear that the Applicants’ concerns were heard and taken into
account. What the Applicants appear to be complaining about is that the
Commission did not use the whole licensing application process to assist the
Applicants in dealing with the Province over their proposed Consultation
Protocol. For reasons already explained – and as explained by the Commission in
its Decision – this was beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission and
irrelevant to the task in hand.
[249] At the oral hearing of
this matter before me, counsel for the Applicants conceded that “there may be
no impact on any rights of the Applicants as a result of the Decision.” The concern
appears to be, then, that the process did not sufficiently inquire into whether
there could be any such impact. The Applicants now argue that “no one is sure
what the impact will be.”
[250] I find this position not
only lacks the substance needed for the Court to deal with the remedies
requested, it is also disingenuous. The McClean Lake Mine has been operating
under a long-standing licence. All of its activities are heavily regulated. The
Applicants have had years and every opportunity to assess any negative impact
upon their rights. No new activities and no new impacts are contemplated under
the renewal of the licence; the licence is for “business as usual.”
[251] The Applicants’ own
position before the Court is, now, that there was no evidence of negative
impacts upon their rights but that such negative impacts could, conceivably,
occur. On the basis of this position they have asked the Court to quash the
McClean Lake Licence and shut operations down at the mine. I cannot think of a
more inappropriate approach to achieving the broader objectives of securing
more control over land-use and development in their region, which are the real
issues behind this application.
[252] The Applicants have not
shown that the Commission lacked the jurisdiction to make the Decision, that
the Decision was made in a way that was procedurally unfair or that the
Decision was incorrect or unreasonable in any respect. The success of the
McClean Lake Mine and its importance to the people of the region are adequately
attested to by the Applicants themselves who, in their role as the ABDLP, had
no reservations about assuring the Commission that “we are confident that the
existing operations at McClean Lake share our goal and we would fully support
the renewal of McClean Lake’s licence in its present form.”
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND
ADJUDGES that
1.
The
application for judicial review is dismissed;
2.
Any
party or participant may address the Court on costs. This should be done,
initially at least, by way of written submissions.
“James
Russell”