Date: 20100826
Docket: IMM-6290-09
Citation: 2010 FC 849
Ottawa, Ontario, August 26,
2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
VIPUL
NISANTHA KUMARA HETTIGE
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of
the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and
Refugee Board (the RPD) dated November 27, 2009
concluding that the applicant is not a Convention refugee or a
person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27
because the applicant does not have a well-founded fear, the alleged risk of
persecution is generalized and there is an internal flight alternative (IFA) in
Colombo.
FACTS
Background
[2]
The
applicant is a thirty-four (34) year old Sinhalese citizen of Sri Lanka (The
Sinhalese are the majority ethnic group in Sri Lanka while the
Tamils are the minority ethnic group). The applicant is married and has a wife,
a son and a daughter in Sri Lanka. The applicant arrived
in Canada on September 15, 2008 from Sri Lanka and claimed refugee
protection.
[3]
The
applicant is originally from Chilaw, a western coastal town located north of the
capital Colombo. In 1994 the
applicant moved to Trincomalee in the northwest of the country to work as a
civilian motor mechanic for the National State Administration at a naval base.
The applicant was injured on August 1, 2007 by a bomb dropped by the
“Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam” (LTTE) on the naval base. He said that he became
fearful of living in Sri Lanka.
[4]
On
June 19, 2008 the applicant attended a party hosted by a Tamil friend. Alcohol
and heroin were consumed during the night and a violent brawl ensued. The
applicant assisted in stopping the fight and confronted two Tamil youths named “Arun”
and “Bala”. The two youths later met the applicant on the road following the
party and threatened to kill him. The applicant contacted the police and filed
a police report on June 19, 2008. On June 20, 2008 the same two youths attacked
the applicant with a wooden stick while he was walking to town. While the
youths were beating the applicant, a police jeep appeared on the road which
caused the youths to flee. The applicant was taken to hospital for treatment
and later filed a second police report on June 20, 2008. The police captured
Arun a few days later at his house and discovered large quantities of heroin. The
police informed the applicant that Arun and Bala were connected to an
underground Tamil drug gang which supplied the LTTE with money to purchase
weapons. The police told the applicant that they will pursue the Bala but not
the rest of the Tamil drug gang or the LTTE liaison because such operation was
beyond their capacity. The applicant feared that the LTTE or the Tamil gang
would target him. After he began to receive threatening telephone calls on his
cell phone. The applicant and his family went into hiding at his brother’s
house in Ambalagoda, located southwest of Colombo. He resigned
his position at the naval base, and fled Sri Lanka with the aid
of an agent on September 15, 2008.
Decision under review
[5]
The
applicant’s refugee claim was dismissed by the RPD on November 29, 2009 based
on the lack of foundation for the claim, the generalized nature of alleged
risk, and the existence of an IFA in Colombo. The “well-foundedness”
of the refugee claim was identified as the determinative issue.
[6]
The
RPD determined that the applicant was not credible for the following reasons:
- the police reports
do not mention Arun or Bala’s connection to the LTTE or that the youths
are members of an underground drug gang;
- the letter from the
Administrative Officer of the Trincomalee naval base links Arun to the
LTTE, but it was dated on August 20, 2009, just before the refugee hearing;
- a letter from the
applicant’s brother dated October 10, 2009, and just before the RPD
hearing dated of November 12, 2009;
- it is unlikely Bala
would be able to trace the applicant since he is likely dead or in a detention
camp in the north of the country following the last major assault by the
army against the LTTE; and
- Arun would not
bother the applicant since he is in detention.
The RPD determined that the references to
the drug gang or the LTTE were added in order to enhance or embellish the
refugee claim. The RPD concluded that Arun and Bala may never have existed.
[7]
The
RPD also held that Colombo is a viable IFA. The RPD determined that there
is no indication that persons with a similar profile to the applicant, who is a
Sinhalese and former government employee, are subjected to persecution in Colombo. The RPD
held that it was inferable that the applicant would enjoy the support and
protection of the authorities since police have already captured Arun and the
applicant’s family have been able to live in peace in the Sinhalese controlled
city of Ambalagoda. The RPD
further determined that the risk alleged by the applicant is a generalized risk
for the following reasons:
- the LTTE has
disappeared as a fighting force since the applicant fled;
- it was unlikely
that the remaining or emerging drug organizations currently have ties to
the LTTE; and
- even if Arun and
Bala were part of a drug gang, there was no evidence that the applicant
was targeted based on direct or imputed political opinion.
[8]
Since
the risk of persecution by criminal drug gangs is a generalized risk, the RPD
determined that section 97 of the IRPA cannot ground the claim and that there
is no nexus between the refugee claim and the five grounds for refugee status
under the Convention. The applicant’s refugee claim was therefore dismissed.
LEGISLATION
[9]
Section
96 of IRPA grants protection to Convention refugees:
96. A
Convention refugee is a
person who, by
reason of a
well-founded fear of
persecution for
reasons of race,
religion,
nationality,
membership in a
particular
social group or
political
opinion,
(a) is
outside each of their
countries of
nationality and is
unable or, by reason
of that
fear, unwilling to
avail
themself of the
protection of
each of those
countries; or
(b) not
having a country of
nationality, is
outside the
country of their
former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling
to return to that country.
|
96. A qualité de
réfugié au
sens de la
Convention — le
réfugié — la
personne qui,
craignant avec
raison d’être
persécutée du fait
de sa race,
de sa religion, de
sa
nationalité, de son
appartenance à un
groupe
social ou de ses
opinions
politiques :
a) soit se trouve
hors de tout
pays dont elle a la
nationalité
et ne peut ou, du
fait de cette
crainte, ne veut se
réclamer de
la protection de
chacun de ces
pays;
b) soit, si
elle n’a pas de
nationalité et se
trouve hors du
pays dans lequel
elle avait sa
résidence habituelle,
ne peut
ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
|
[10]
Section
97 of IRPA grants protection to certain categories of persons:
97. (1) A person in
need of
protection is a
person in
Canada whose
removal to their
country or countries
of
nationality or, if
they do not
have a country of nationality,
their country of
former
habitual residence,
would
subject them
personally
(a) to a
danger, believed on
substantial grounds
to exist, of
torture within the
meaning
of Article 1 of the
Convention
Against Torture; or
(b) to a risk
to their life or to a
risk of cruel and
unusual
treatment or
punishment if
(i) the person is
unable or,
because of that
risk, unwilling
to avail themself of
the
protection of that
country,
(ii) the risk would
be faced by
the person in every
part of that
country and is not
faced
generally by other
individuals
in or from that
country,
(iii) the risk is
not inherent or
incidental to lawful
sanctions,
unless imposed in
disregard
of accepted
international
standards, and
(iv) the risk is not
caused by
the inability of
that country to
provide adequate
health or
medical care.
|
97. (1) A qualité de
personne à
protéger la personne
qui se
trouve au Canada et
serait
personnellement, par
son
renvoi vers tout
pays dont elle
a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a
pas de nationalité,
dans lequel
elle avait sa
résidence
habituelle, exposée
:
a) soit au
risque, s’il y a des
motifs sérieux de le
croire,
d’être soumise à la
torture au
sens de l’article
premier de la
Convention contre la
torture;
b) soit à une
menace à sa vie
ou au risque de
traitements ou
peines cruels et
inusités dans
le cas suivant :
(i) elle ne peut ou,
de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce
pays,
(ii) elle y est
exposée en tout
lieu de ce pays
alors que
d’autres personnes
originaires
de ce pays ou qui
s’y trouvent
ne le sont
généralement pas,
(iii) la menace ou
le risque ne
résulte pas de
sanctions
légitimes — sauf
celles
infligées au mépris
des normes
internationales — et
inhérents
à celles-ci ou
occasionnés par
elles,
(iv) la menace ou le
risque ne
résulte pas de
l’incapacité du
pays de fournir des
soins
médicaux ou de santé
adéquats.
|
ISSUES
[11]
The
applicant raises the following issue:
1. Did the Refugee
Division err in fact, err in law, breach fairness or exceed jurisdiction in
determining that the applicant was not credible?
The Court notes that the applicant raises a
number of other issues in its submissions. I will substitute the following as the
list of issues which will encompass all of the individual issues listed by the
applicant:
1. Was it
reasonably open to the RPD to determine that the applicant was not credible?;
and
2. Was it
reasonably open to the RPD to find that a viable IFA was available to the
applicant in Colombo?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[12]
In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 372 N.R.
1, the Supreme Court of Canada held at paragraph 62 that the first step in conducting a
standard of review analysis is to “ascertain whether the jurisprudence has
already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of (deference) to be
accorded with regard to a particular category of question”: see also Khosa
v. Canada (MCI),
2009 SCC 12, per Justice Binnie at para. 53.
[13]
Questions
of credibility, state protection and IFA concern determinations of fact and
mixed fact and law. It is clear that as a result of Dunsmuir and Khosa
that such issues are to be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. Recent
case law has reaffirmed that the standard of review for determining whether the
applicant has a valid IFA is reasonableness: Mejia v. Canada (MCI), 2009
FC 354, per Justice Russell at para. 29; Syvyryn v. Canada (MCI), 2009 FC
1027, 84 Imm. L.R. (3d) 316, per Justice Snider at para. 3; and my decision in Perea
v. Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 1173 at para. 23.
[14]
In reviewing the RPD’s
decision using a standard of reasonableness, the Court will consider "the
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process" and "whether the decision falls within a
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law”: Dunsmuir, supra, at
paragraph 47; Khosa, supra, at para. 59.
ANALYSIS
Issue No. 1: Was it reasonably open to
the RPD to determine that the applicant was not credible?
[15]
The
applicant submits that the RPD erred in finding that the applicant was not
credible. The applicant submits that the RPD’s credibility finding is
erroneously based on the following findings:
1. misconstruction
of the police report evidence by requiring that the applicant’s complaints
contain a reference to the LTTE or drug gangs when the police only found out
about those links after Arun was arrested and his house was searched; and
2. speculation
by the RPD as to Bala’s possible death or detention following the government’s
decisive victory against the LTTE.
The applicant submits that the RPD’s errors
with respect to credibility are material and prejudice the alternative findings
on IFA and generalized risk.
[16]
Sworn
testimony is
presumed true unless there is a reason to doubt its truthfulness: Maldonado
v. Canada (MEI), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (F.C.A.), per Justice Heald at para. 5.The RPD is
entitled to draw adverse findings of credibility from the applicant’s testimony
by assessing vagueness, hesitation, inconsistencies, contradictions
and demeanor,
for which deference is entitled when judicially reviewed: Zheng v. Canada
(MCI), 2007 FC 673, 158 A.C.W.S. (3d) 799, per Justice Shore at para. 17.
The Court is not in as good a position as the RPD to assess the credibility of
the evidence: Aguebor v. Canada (MEI) (1993), 160 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.). When
a credibility finding is based on a number of points, the reviewing Court’s analysis
does not involve determining whether each point in the RPD’s reasoning meets
the reasonableness test: Jarada v. Canada (MCI), 2005 FC 409, per
Justice de Montigny at para. 22.
[17]
The
RPD combined its credibility assessment with the inquiry into the
“well-foundedness” of the applicant’s fear. The two issues are related but not
identical. Credibility is one factor that determines whether a fear is well-founded.
The RPD determined that one of the reasons why the applicant did not have a
well founded fear of persecution is his lack of credibility. For the reasons
that follow, the Court finds that it was not reasonably open to the RPD to find
the applicant was not credible, but it was nevertheless reasonably open to the
RPD to find that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution.
[18]
The
credibility finding in this case was based on the documentary evidence produced
by the applicant which consisted of the following:
a. two police
reports, dated June 19, 2008 and June 20, 2008;
b. a letter from
the Administrative Officer of Trincomalee naval base;
c. a letter from
the applicant’s brother dated October 10, 2008; and
d. a letter of
resignation by the applicant dated June 21, 2008.
[19]
The RPD noted that the police reports did not
mention Arun and Bala’s links to the LTTE or their role in the underground drug
gang. This omission led the RPD to find that the allegations of Arun and Bala’s
ties to the LTTE and drug gangs was an embellishment which was added to the
above correspondence in order to bolster the applicant’s refugee claim. The
adverse credibility finding is therefore based on the failure of the police
reports to corroborate certain elements of the refugee claim.
[20]
Both police reports are date stamped prior to
the arrest of Arun and the discovery of the heroin in his house. These reports
are a record of the applicant’s complaints to the police, not an official
summary of the investigation. It was not reasonably open to the RPD to base its
assessment of the credibility because the police reports did not contain
information that has yet to be discovered. The mischaracterization of the
police reports is a material error which infects the entirety of the
credibility assessment.
[21]
However,
the RPD determined at paragraph 14 on a separate basis that the applicant did
not have a well founded fear of persecution because of the change of
circumstances in Sri Lanka since the applicant left in 2008:
¶14 The claimant had also
cited the injury he suffered from the LTTE bombing of the Trincomalee naval
base in August 2007, but that occurred two years prior to the route of the LTTE
by government forces in May 2009. Since the LTTE was no longer an effective
fighting force or a viable organization, with its leaders killed or gone and
its structure decimated and in disarray, the chance that they would still be
looking for him for crossing paths with Arun and Bala, even if there had been
such a connection between the gang of drug dealers and the LTTE, the panel
finds hard to believe, particularly if he stayed away from Trincomalee in the
North-East.
[22]
In
Hassan v. Canada (MEI) (1992), 147 N.R. 317 (F.C.A.), Justice Heald held
that a change in the circumstances of the home country since the applicant
departed will affect the determination of whether a fear is well-founded:
¶9 In finding as it did that the situation in Uganda had changed, however, it is
clear the Board was simply concluding that the appellant's fear of persecution,
no matter how sincerely it was held, did not have the objective element
necessary to make it well-founded.
[23]
There
is no doubt that the situation in Sri Lanka changed drastically
after May 2009. It was reasonably open to the RPD to find that if the applicant
was targeted by an LTTE supported drug gang in August 2008; his alleged fear
following the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 was no longer well-founded. The
Court acknowledges that the RPD engaged in speculation over the possible fate of
Arun and Bala following the May 2009 offensive but in the Court’s view this is not
a material error since it does not detract from the reasonableness of the RPD’s
assessment. It is clear that Arun is in detention, and Bala is a youth who was
a Tamil.
Issue No. 2: Was it reasonably open to
the RPD to find that a viable IFA was available to the applicant in Colombo?
[24]
The
applicant submits that the RPD erred in formulating the test for an IFA when it
determined at paragraph 18 of the decision that the applicant’s “profile and
background does not fit that of a person who would be subject to the
persecution in Colombo, the capital city.”
[25]
In Farias v. Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 1035, I set out at
paragraph 34 a checklist summarizing the legal criteria for determining whether
an IFA exists. The
checklist is as follows:
1. If IFA will be an issue, the Refugee
Board must give notice to the refugee claimant prior to the hearing (Rasaratnam,
[1991] F.C.J. No. 1256,
supra, per Mr. Justice Mahoney at paragraph 9, Thirunavukkarasu, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1172)
and identify a specific IFA
location(s) within the refugee claimant's country of origin (Rabbani v.
Canada (MCI), [1997] 125 F.T.R. 141
(F.C.), supra at para. 16, Camargo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2006 FC 472, 147 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1047
at paras. 9-10);
2. There
is a disjunctive two-step test for determining that there is not an IFA. See, e.g., Rasaratnam,
supra; Thirunavukkarasu, supra; Urgel, [2004] F.C.J. No. 2171,
supra at para. 17.
i. Either
the Board must be persuaded by the refugee claimant on a balance of probabilities
that there is a serious possibility that the refugee claimant will be
persecuted in the location(s) proposed as an IFA by the Refugee Board; or
ii. The
circumstances of the refugee claimant make the proposed IFA location unreasonable for the claimant to seek refuge
there;
3. The
applicant bears the burden of proof in demonstrating that an IFA either does not exist or is unreasonable in the
circumstances. See Mwaura v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) 2008 FC 748 per
Madame Justice Tremblay-Lamer at para 13; Kumar v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) 130 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1010,
2004 FC 601 per Mr.
Justice Mosley at para. 17;
4. The
threshold is high for what makes an IFA
unreasonable in the circumstances of the refugee claimant: see Khokhar v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 449, per Mr.
Justice Russell at paragraph 41. In Mwaura, supra, at para.16, and Thirunavukkarasu,
supra, at para. 12, whether an IFA
is unreasonable is a flexible test taking into account the particular situation
of the claimant. It is an objective test;
5. The IFA must be realistically accessible
to the claimant, i.e. the claimant is not expected to risk physical danger or
undue hardship in traveling or staying in that IFA. Claimants are not compelled to hide out in an
isolated region like a cave or a desert or a jungle. See: Thirunavukkarasu,
supra at para. 14; and
6. The
fact that the refugee claimant has no friends or relatives in the proposed IFA does not make the proposed IFA unreasonable. The refugee
claimant probably does not have any friends or relatives in Canada. The fact that the
refugee claimant may not be able to find suitable employment in his or her
field of expertise may or may not make the IFA unreasonable. The same may be true in Canada.
[26]
The
jurisprudence establishes a high threshold which the applicant must satisfy on
the balance of probabilities to prove that an IFA is not reasonably available. The claimant
is required to demonstrate the existence of conditions which would jeopardize his
life and safety in locating the proposed IFA.
[27]
The
applicant in this case is a member of the Sinhalese majority group, has been
previously offered police protection, and is a former government employee. The
applicant could cite no reason why he could not resettle in Colombo or for that
matter in Ambalagoda except that he is afraid of Arun, Bala, the LTTE, and the
underground drug gang. The applicant proffered no evidence showing that his
alleged persecutors are still interested him and could trace him in Colombo. It was
reasonably open to the RPD to determine that the life and safety of the
claimant would not be jeopardized if he were to relocate to Colombo. While the
RPD misstated the IFA legal test, this error clearly would not have affected
the result. Accordingly, this ground of review must therefore fail.
CERTIFIED QUESTION
[28] Both parties
advised the Court that this case does not raise a serious question of general
importance which ought to be certified for an appeal. The Court agrees.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT
ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:
The
application for judicial review is dismissed.
“Michael
A. Kelen”