Date: 20100609
Docket: T-2077-09
Citation: 2010
FC 621
Toronto, Ontario, June 9, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
BETWEEN:
THE
NATURAL AND SOVRAN-ON-THE-LAND, FLESH, BLOOD AND BONE, NORTH AMERICA SIGNATORY AERIOKWA TENCE
KANIENKEHAIKA INDIAN MAN: GREGORY-JOHN: BLOOM©, AS CREATED BY THE CREATOR (GOD)
Plaintiff
and
HER
MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This is a
motion dated May 18, 2010 by the plaintiff, Mr. Gregory-John Bloom, acting on
his own behalf, for:
1. An
extension of time for an Order striking out the order of KEVIN R. AALTO,
ESQUIRE PROTHONOTARY in the "Statement of Claim" File number
T-2077-09 heard on April 12, 2010, decision dated May 4, 2010;
2. Alternatively,
an extension of time for an order granting all of the relief sought in the
"statement of claim" T-2077-09 as the defendants were knowingly in
default and further granting the plaintiff his costs;
3. Such further and
other relief as this Honourable Court deems just.
[2]
The
plaintiff commenced an action against Her Majesty the Queen by Statement of
Claim, dated December 7, 2009.
[3]
The
Statement of Claim appears to seek, in addition to millions of dollars of aggravated
and punitive damages for pain and suffering, an order in the nature of mandamus
requiring the defendant to return “all income tax that was removed from source
since 1966 onward”, “return all pension funds that have been garnished by
Revenue Canada” and “removal of the lien that was placed on the home of Gregory-John:
Bloom ©, a North American Indian Signatory”.
[4]
The
plaintiff alleges, among other things, that agents of the Canada Revenue Agency
(“CRA”) made an “arbitrary decision over unlawful collection of Income Tax” and
that the defendant “sent out unlawful Third Party Demands not only to his
Ironworkers Pension Plan Administrators but also to his Ironworker Company.”
[5]
The
defendant brought a motion on March 23, 2010 to strike the statement of claim
as disclosing no reasonable cause of action, as being scandalous, frivolous and
vexatious, and as seeking relief that is only available on application for
judicial review. Service of the motion proved difficult as the plaintiff has
consistently refused to accept service of documents. The plaintiff then filed
a motion seeking default judgment which was set down for hearing on April 12,
2010.
[6]
By written
direction issued on April 8, 2010, Justice Mactavish determined that there was
no indication in the affidavit of service filed by the plaintiff that counsel
for the defendant had been provided with notice of the motion for default
judgment and that it was inappropriate for the motion to be dealt with until
such time as the defendant’s motion to strike had been heard and decided. The
default judgment motion was, therefore, adjourned sine die to be brought
back on notice to the defendant in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Courts Rules, SOR/2004-283,s.2.
[7]
The
defendant’s motion was heard by Prothonotary Aalto on April 12, 2010 and his
order of May 4, 2010 granted the motion and struck the Statement of Claim in
its entirety without leave to amend.
[8]
Prothonotary
Aalto adopted the following statement of Prothonotary Hargrave in Ceminchuk
v. Canada, (1995), 56 A.C.W.S. (3d) 277, [1995] F.C.J. No. 914, at para.
24, as applicable with equal force to the present case:
24 The Court of Appeal recently
remarked, albeit in a slightly different context, that "Courts are public
institutions for the resolution of disputes and cost substantial public money.
Court congestion and delay is a serious public concern.": Adams v.
Commissioner of The Royal Canadian Mounted Police et al., an unreported
decision of October 7, 1994, in action A-634-93 at p. 7 [Please see [1994]
F.C.J. No. 1480]. That proposition was subsequently endorsed by the Chief
Justice in Jangir Sidhu v. Minister of National Revenue, an unreported decision
of November 16, 1994, in action A-679-93 [Please see [1994] F.C.J. No. 2028]. Litigants,
and that includes lay litigants, who bring actions which are forlorn and
doomed, cannot expect the luxury of being allowed to continue proceedings of
which nothing can come. To allow this action to proceed would not only be an
abuse of the process of the Court, but also an abuse of the taxpayer. The
Statement of Claim is therefore struck out. [Emphasis of Prothonotary
Aalto]
[9]
Prothonotary
Aalto found that the Statement of Claim gives no information to ascertain with
particularity the facts giving rise to a cause of action which would be
properly before this Court. In his view, the claim’s offensive statements
sufficed to illustrate why the Statement of Claim was bereft of any chance of
success.
[10]
Under Rule
51 of the Federal Courts Rules, a party may appeal a prothonotary’s
decision within ten (10) days of the date of the order. Pursuant to Rule 8,
the Court may extend a period provided by the Rules. The plaintiff did not
appeal Prothonotary Aalto’s order within the ten days as required under Rule
51. He brought this motion on May 18, 2010 for an extension of time to appeal.
[11]
The
defendant has consistently encountered difficulties in attempting to serve the
plaintiff with documents in these proceedings. Accordingly, on May 31, 2010
Justice Pinard adjourned the hearing of the appeal motion in order to allow defendant
to serve their motion record in response to that of the plaintiff by ordinary
mail. The plaintiff appeared at the hearing with a copy of the defendant’s
motion record unopened in the envelope in which it was delivered to him.
[12]
In
considering whether to grant an application to extend time, the Court must
consider whether (i) the applicant had an continuing intention to pursue his or
her application; (ii) the application has some merit; (iii) that no prejudice
to the respondent arises from the delay; and (iv) that a reasonable explanation
for the delay exists: Canada (Attorney General) v. Hennelly (F.C.A.),
(1999), 244 N.R. 399, [1999] F.C.J. No. 846; Marshall v. Canada 2002 FCA
172. The length of the period of the extension may also be a relevant consideration.
The underlying consideration is to ensure that justice is done between the
parties: Grewal v.Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1985] 2 F.C. 263. The four-pronged test set out in Hennelly
is a means to ensure the fulfillment of that underlying consideration. An
extension of time may still be granted if one of the criteria is not satisfied:
Canada (Minister of Human Resources
Development) v. Hogervorst,
2007 FCA 41.
[13]
Based on
his oral and written submissions, I accept that the plaintiff had a continuing
intention to appeal Prothonotary Aalto’s order. There is no assertion of
prejudice to the defendant arising from the brief delay. The plaintiff's
explanation for the delay is that he had assumed from his experience in a
status review proceeding arising from another matter that he would have 15 days
in which to file his appeal. In other circumstances involving an unrepresented
ligitant, this might be considered a reasonable explanation notwithstanding the
clear terms of Rule 51(2) which sets out the 10 day limitation period.
[14]
The Court
must also, in the exercise of its discretion, consider whether the application
has some merit. That is, in this context, whether there is any merit to the plaintiff’s
appeal of the prothonotary’s decision, applying the standard set out by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., (2003), 315
N.R. 175, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1925. The Court may intervene if it considers that
the questions in the motion are vital to the final issue of the case or, the
prothonotary’s order is clearly wrong in the sense that the exercise of
discretion by the prothonotary was based upon a wrong principle or upon a
misapprehension of facts.
[15]
Having read
the plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, his affidavits and written representations
and having listened to his efforts to articulate the basis for the claim, I
have no difficulty coming to the conclusion that the learned prothonotary made
no error of fact or principle. The claim and supporting material filed by the
plaintiff is a bizarre compilation of irrelevant excerpts and quotes drawn from
a variety of British, American and Canadian constitutional documents and other
sources.
[16]
Mr. Bloom
attempts to bolster his claim with assertions of aboriginal rights. But these
are not developed in any intelligible fashion that could be recognized as a
valid claim and the references to aboriginal treaty rights have no apparent
connection to the remainder of the material. There is nothing in those
references that could have been severed and proceeded with to maintain the
action.
[17]
The result
is, as Prothonotary Aalto characterized it, “a mishmash of statements from
legal treatises and statutes.” These signify nothing upon which the defendant
could identify the case it would have to meet. For that reason alone, I find
that there is no merit to the plaintiff’s appeal and will dismiss this motion
for an extension of time. I think it necessary, however, to make some
additional comments about the plaintiff’s claims.
[18]
Mr. Bloom
describes himself as a “constitutional consultant”. He freely acknowledged
during his oral submissions that he had borrowed much of his material from U.S. sources that share his views regarding state
authority in fiscal matters. Much of his documentation is concerned with arcane
disputes regarding events in American history that have no relevance to
Canadian law.
[19]
The
plaintiff’s theory, as best can be determined, is that there is a distinction
between a “natural person” and the person recognized by the Income Tax Act and
other legislation. As a natural person, Mr. Bloom argues, he is not responsible
for any taxes levied on the “person”, as defined by the statute, who bears his
name and social insurance number. This argument, popular in certain libertarian
circles at the very outer fringes of society, has been thoroughly discredited
by trial and appellate courts in several Canadian jurisdictions: see for
example, Kennedy v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), [2000] 4 C.T.C. 186, [2000]
O.J. No. 3313, at para. 23; R.
v. Klundert, 2008 ONCA 767, [2008] O.J. No. 4522; R. v. Lindsay,
2006 BCCA 150, [2006] 3 C.T.C. 146.
[20]
In this
Court, the argument has been analysed and dismissed in Canada (Minister of
National Revenue) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99, [2009] F.C.J. No. 133 and Canada
(Minister of National Revenue) v. Camplin, 2007 FC 183, [2007] 2 C.T.C. 205.
In Stanchield, Justice Gauthier held that natural persons, whether
described as acting in their own private capacity for their own private benefit
or not, are directly included in the definition of "person" contained
in the Income Tax Act. I adopt her reasoning and conclusions for the
purposes of this motion.
[21]
The
plaintiff’s efforts to use this Court to advance this untenable theory in this
action were, in Prothonotary Hargraves’ words, “forlorn and doomed” from the
outset. He could not “expect the luxury of being allowed to continue
proceedings of which nothing can come.” Prothonotary Aalto was correct to put
an end to it.
[22]
The
plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations of bias against Prothonotary Aalto are also
entirely without merit. When pressed for a justification of these allegations
during the hearing, Mr. Bloom asserted that the defendant’s motion had been
prejudged and that Prothonotary Aalto had displayed an animus against him in
other proceedings. These assertions are based solely on Mr. Bloom’s subjective
impressions. He has pleaded no facts upon which a person applying the objective
standard described by Justice de Grandpré in Committee for Justice and
Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at 394, could find a
reasonable apprehension of bias.
[23]
Costs
fixed in the amount of $500 and payable forthwith were awarded against the
plaintiff by Prothonotary Aalto. The defendant seeks and is entitled to the costs
of this motion. They shall be fixed in the amount of $1000 payable forthwith in
addition to those outstanding from the prothonotary’s order.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1.
The
motion for an extension of time to appeal the Order of Prothonotary Aalto dated
May 4, 2010 is dismissed;
2.
The
defendant is awarded costs for this motion fixed in the amount of $1000 payable
forthwith in addition to the costs awarded in the May 4, 2010 order.
“Richard G. Mosley”
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