Date: 20101207
Docket: T-124-08
Citation: 2010
FC 1238
BETWEEN:
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PFIZER CANADA INC. AND PHARMACIA
ATKIEBOLAG
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF HEALTH AND APOTEX INC.
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Respondents
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REASONS FOR ORDER
[1]
Pfizer
Canada Inc. and Pharmacia Atkiebolag (collectively “Pfizer”) successfully
obtained an Order of Prohibition pursuant to the Patented Medicines (Notice
of Compliance) Regulations, SOR/93-133 (the “Regulations”) relative to
Canadian Patent No. 1,339,132 (the “ ‘132 Patent”) by Reasons for Judgment and
Judgment issued April 26, 2010. Pfizer, being the successful party, was
awarded costs.
[2]
By Notice
of Motion dated May 18, 2010, Pfizer sought directions with respect to the
assessment of costs, pursuant to the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106
(the “Rules”).
[3]
By Notice
of Motion dated May 26, 2010, Apotex Inc. (“Apotex”), the responding party
to Pfizer’s prohibition proceedings, also sought directions with respect to the
assessment of costs. Apotex submitted its Notice of Motion for consideration
without personal appearance. Apotex filed the affidavit of Mr. Andrew Brodkin
in support of its motion.
[4]
By further
Notice of Motion dated October 12, 2010, Pfizer sought an order striking out
the affidavit of Mr. Brodkin.
[5]
All three
motions proceeded for a hearing at the same time. These Reasons will address
all three motions and individual orders will then be filed. I will first
address Pfizer’s motion to strike the affidavit of Mr. Brodkin.
Motion
to Strike the Affidavit of Mr. Andrew Brodkin
[6]
As noted above,
Pfizer filed a motion on October
12, 2010, seeking an order
to strike the affidavit of Mr. Andrew Brodkin. That affidavit was filed as part
of Apotex’s Motion Record and in support of its motion for directions.
[7]
Mr. Brodkin was
actively involved as counsel in the NOC proceedings. He participated in cross
examinations and argued the case at trial.
[8]
Pfizer objects to
this affidavit on a number of grounds. First, referring to Rule 82, it argues
that leave of the Court is required before reliance can be placed upon a
solicitor’s affidavit. Next, it submits that the affidavit is largely based on
hearsay and thereby flawed and inadmissible. Next, it argues that the affidavit
is argumentative.
[9]
Rule 82 provides as
follows:
Use of
solicitor's affidavit
82. Except
with leave of the Court, a solicitor shall not both depose to an affidavit
and present argument to the Court based on that affidavit.
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Utilisation de
l’affidavit d’un avocat
82.
Sauf avec l’autorisation de la Cour, un avocat ne peut à la fois être
l’auteur d’un affidavit et présenter à la Cour des arguments fondés sur cet
affidavit.
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[10]
In general, the Court
does not look favourably upon a solicitor’s affidavit, especially where such
affidavit refers to contentious facts as is the case here. In this regard, see Merck
& Co., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2004] 2 F.C.R. 459 (F.C.A). As well,
Apotex should have sought leave of the Court prior to filing the affidavit.
[11]
In my opinion, this
case is exceptional. Apotex is alleging misconduct on the part of Pfizer’s
counsel in the conduct of the cross examination of Dr. Stjernschantz. It argues
that this conduct should be considered by the Court in the motions for
directions for costs. I agree with the submissions by Apotex that the best
person to address the alleged misconduct of Pfizer’s counsel is Counsel for
Apotex. For that reason, I decline to dismiss the affidavit of Mr. Brodkin in
its entirety.
[12]
Nonetheless, I agree
with Pfizer that parts of this affidavit are inadmissible because they contain
hearsay evidence which fails to satisfy the criteria of necessity and
reliability, as discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Starr,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 144.
[13]
Paragraph 52 of Mr.
Brodkin’s affidavit will be struck on the grounds that it contains
hearsay evidence which does not meet the criteria for admissibility as
discussed in Starr. While Mr. Brodkin’s statement is likely reliable, it
is not necessary.
[14]
Nonetheless, other
paragraphs of Mr. Brodkin’s affidavit can stand. Paragraphs 10, 36, 48 and 49
are not, contrary to the submissions of Pfizer, hearsay evidence. They refer to
out-of-court statements but they are not tendered for the truth of their
contents but rather for the fact that the statements were made or otherwise
communicated.
[15]
Further, certain
paragraphs of the Brodkin affidavit contain legal argument, for example
paragraphs 11 and 23.
[16]
Paragraph 19 contains
a fact that Pfizer considers contentious but otherwise, this paragraph is not
argumentative nor does it contain inadmissible hearsay evidence. In my opinion,
a paragraph that sets out a fact that Pfizer disagrees with is not per se,
subject to being struck.
[17]
In paragraph 36, only
the last sentence should be struck. The remainder of that paragraph sets out
uncontested factual matters.
[18]
The remaining
paragraphs of Mr. Brodkin’s affidavit challenged by Pfizer should be struck. The
admissible portions of the affidavit provide a useful factual background which
is relevant to Apotex’s motion for directions.
Motions for Directions
[19]
Both
Pfizer and Apotex seek directions relative to the assessment of Pfizer’s costs
in this matter. Rule 403 allows the Court to give such directions and provides
as follows:
Motion
for directions
403.
(1) A party may request that directions be given to the assessment officer
respecting any matter referred to in rule 400,
(a)
by serving and filing a notice of motion within 30 days after judgment has
been pronounced; or
(b)
in a motion for judgment under subsection 394(2).
Motion
after judgment
(2)
A motion may be brought under paragraph (1)(a) whether or not the judgment
included an order concerning costs.
Same
judge or prothonotary
(3)
A motion under paragraph (1)(a) shall be brought before the judge or
prothonotary who signed the judgment.
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Requête
pour directives
403.
(1) Une partie peut demander que des directives soient données à l’officier
taxateur au sujet des questions visées à la règle 400 :
a)
soit en signifiant et en déposant un avis de requête dans les 30 jours suivant
le prononcé du jugement;
b)
soit par voie de requête au moment de la présentation de la requête pour
jugement selon le paragraphe 394(2).
Précisions
(2)
La requête visée à l’alinéa (1)a) peut être présentée que le jugement
comporte ou non une ordonnance sur les dépens.
Présentation
de la requête
(3)
La requête visée à l’alinéa (1)a) est présentée au juge ou au protonotaire
qui a signé le jugement.
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[20]
First,
I note that both parties filed their motions pursuant to Rule 403 on a timely
basis.
[21]
Pfizer
seeks the assessment of costs at the mid-point of Column IV, Tariff B of the Rules. The
parties agree that Pfizer is entitled to costs for two counsel, one senior and
one junior, in the conduct of cross examinations, and the cost for one senior
counsel in defending cross examinations. Pfizer seeks to recover costs for
three counsel at the hearing, two senior and one junior, on the basis that it
argued this case immediately after the hearing in Cause T-2221-07.
[22]
Further,
Pfizer seeks a 25 percent increase in the Tariff costs, as a penalty against
Apotex, on the grounds that Apotex had withdrawn the issue of invalid
selection, only to argue that issue at the hearing.
[23]
Apotex
submits that all travel costs should be assessed in economy class, for single
hotel rooms and exclusive of entertainment and alcohol expenses.
[24]
Apotex
argues that costs for photocopying should be recoverable for only a limited
number of pages, not for all the copies of pleadings and jurisprudence that
were filed by Pfizer. The parties agree that the allowable recovery should be $00.25
per page.
[25]
Pfizer
disagrees with Apotex’s proposed limit on the number of copies for which costs
should be awarded and submits that this item should be addressed by the
assessment officer on the standard of reasonableness.
[26]
Apotex, for its part,
seeks directions concerning the award of costs and disbursements relating to
the cross-examination of Dr. Stjernschantz. It submits that the costs and
disbursements in this regard should be reduced by 25 percent to account for the
conduct of Pfizer, specifically the introduction of the Stjernschantz affidavit
as a “fact” affidavit when it clearly was an opinion affidavit.
[27]
Apotex also argues
that Pfizer should be unable to recover the costs of its travel to Sweden for the cross-examination and that the travel costs of
Apotex should be set-off, since the cross-examination of Dr. Stjernschantz
could have been conducted in a venue other than Sweden.
[28]
Pfizer responds to
this argument by saying that the issue of costs relative to Dr. Stjernschantz
had been addressed by Prothonotary Aalto in his Order of June 25, 2009. In rendering
that Order, Prothonotary Aalto found that Dr. Stjernschantz was an expert
witness, not a fact witness, and denied Pfizer’s motion to introduce evidence
from more than five expert witnesses.
[29]
The Prothonotary
allowed Pfizer to elect the five of its six experts that it would rely on, but
awarded Apotex costs for the sixth expert that Pfizer would discard.
Prothonotary Aalto’s award of costs did not address Pfizer’s conduct in its
continuing treatment of Dr. Stjernschantz as a fact witness, the implications
of that treatment on Apotex’s discovery of Dr. Stjernschantz, or the scheduling
of that discovery in Uppsala, Sweden.
[30]
Apotex submits that
no one expert should receive compensation that is disproportionate to the costs
awarded in respect of all other experts. Pfizer argues that this is an issue of
reasonableness that is best left to the assessment officer.
[31]
Apotex submits that
the recoverable fees for expert witnesses should be limited to the time spent
preparing the experts’ affidavits and the time required to prepare for and
participate in cross-examination. In other words, Apotex takes the position
that Pfizer should not recover for time spent by its experts in preparing
counsel for the cross-examination of Apotex’s expert witnesses. Pfizer,
unsurprisingly, disagrees and seeks recovery for the costs of such preparation
on the grounds that such preparation time is a reasonable expense in the context
of this proceeding.
[32]
Apotex argues that
since there is overlap between the witnesses in this proceeding and Cause
T-2221-07, a prohibition proceeding involving the same drug and commenced by
Pfizer as Applicant against Pharmascience Inc. as Respondent. Apotex says that
the overlap justifies a 50 percent reduction in the costs to be awarded to
Pfizer.
[33]
Pfizer, in reply,
submits that the overlap in the substantive portions of the affidavits is
not significant, indeed Pfizer argued that only the background information
was the same and in any event, will be reflected in the fees
charged.
Discussion
and Disposition
[34]
The
overriding principle applicable to the assessment of costs is set out in Rule
400(1) of the Rules which provide as follows:
400.
(1) The Court shall have full discretionary power over the amount and
allocation of costs and the determination of by whom they are to be paid.
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400.
(1) La Cour a le pouvoir discrétionnaire de déterminer le montant des dépens,
de les répartir et de désigner les personnes qui doivent les payer.
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[35]
Although both Pfizer
and Apotex identified multiple issues in their respective Notices of Motion,
certain matters were resolved between them either before or after the hearing
of the motions. The parties agree that the hourly rate for the allowable
experts shall be capped at the hourly rate of senior counsel for Pfizer, that
is Ms. Robinson, and that no costs will be recoverable for the fees of
other people including in-house counsel, law clerks, students, and support
staff who may have assisted in the conduct of this litigation.
[36]
The parties also
agree that Pfizer
shall be entitled to recover costs only for those experts who deposed to
affidavits that were filed in this proceeding. It is not necessary for me to comment further on
these matters. I will now address the contentious issues.
[37]
First, there is the
question of recoverable costs in relation to Dr. Stjernschantz. I agree with
the submissions advanced by Apotex that the Order of Prothonotary Aalto did not
deal with the matter of costs for the role of Dr. Stjernschantz as an expert
witness.
[38]
I am satisfied,
independently of Prothonotary Aalto, that the evidence of Dr. Stjernschantz is
essentially opinion evidence and properly characterized as expert evidence.
This is apparent from Dr. Stjernschantz himself in the early minutes of his
cross-examination.
[39]
The fact that Dr.
Stjernschantz provided expert opinion evidence but was cross-examined prior to
a judicial determination on the nature of that evidence, affected the ability of
Counsel for Apotex to fully test that evidence. Apotex made that argument upon
the hearing of its motion for directions. I am satisfied, from my review of the
transcript of Dr. Stjernschantz’s cross-examination, that the argument is
solidly established. In this regard, I refer to pages seven, twenty, and twenty-one
of that cross-examination transcript. While insisting that Dr.
Stjernschantz was a fact witness, although his own discovery evidence indicated
the contrary, Pfizer’s counsel objected to questions from Apotex’s counsel
regarding Dr. Stjernschantz’s opinion evidence. This interference improperly
limited the scope of the discovery.
[40]
It is inappropriate
for me to estimate how the lack of a broad cross-examination of Dr.
Stjernschantz, that is an examination on all the matters raised in his
affidavit, may have affected the final outcome. It is sufficient to say that
Apotex was deprived of its right to a full cross-examination and that should be
recognized in the assessment of costs. I will direct the assessment officer to
reduce the amount Pfizer would otherwise be entitled to recover for fees paid
to Dr. Stjernschantz by 50 percent.
[41]
The scope of Dr.
Stjernschantz’s cross-examination is one thing, the location of that
cross-examination is another. Apotex contends that Pfizer unreasonably required
the cross-examination to be held in Sweden, a locale that required two days travel
time. From the admissible, uncontested evidence in Mr. Brodkin’s affidavit, it
is apparent that counsel for Pfizer unreasonably insisted on producing Dr.
Stjernschantz in Uppsala, Sweden, rather than in London, United Kingdom, or another location that would have been
more convenient for counsel for both parties. As a result, I will direct that Pfizer
will not be entitled to recover its costs for its counsel to travel to Sweden.
[42]
Next, I refer to the
evidence of the expert witnesses put forward by Pfizer in this proceeding and
the alleged overlap with the expert evidence presented in the related
Pharmascience prohibition proceeding. I reject Pfizer’s argument that this
overlap is limited to background information. Pfizer filed the evidence of Dr.
Fechtner, Dr. Maxey, Dr. Neufeld, and Dr. Stjernschantz in this matter as well
as in Cause
T-2221-07.
[43]
From my review of the
affidavits filed by these witnesses in both the Pharmascience and Apotex
applications, there is a significant degree of overlap, particularly in the
evidence of Dr. Fechtner and Dr. Neufeld. The majority of the paragraphs in the
affidavit filed by Dr. Fechtner in this matter, sworn on January 15, 2009, are
identical or nearly identical to the affidavit filed by that expert in Cause
T-2221-07 on August 26, 2008. Otherwise, additions and modifications are made
primarily in response to the evidence of Apotex’s expert witnesses. The same is
true of the affidavits filed by Dr. Neufeld in this matter compared to those
filed in Cause T-2221-07.
[44]
Apotex submits that
the recoverable costs for these experts should be reduced by 50 percent to
account for the overlap in the evidence. In particular, the evidence filed by four of
Pfizer’s expert witnesses overlaps to a significant degree. I am satisfied that the fees should be reduced for any of
the four expert witnesses who provided evidence in Cause T-2221-07 and then
subsequently in this case. This overlap may be reflected in the experts’ fees.
Since their bills were not tendered to the Court on these motions, I am unable
to determine whether this is the case. As a result, I will direct the
assessment officer to reduce the fees of each of the common experts by up to 25
percent to account for the overlap.
[45]
Pfizer seeks costs
for three counsel at the hearing of the application. It says this is justified
because the lawyers argued this case immediately after the hearing of Cause No.
T-2221-07, a prohibition proceeding involving Pharmascience. It argues that the
lawyers who participated in that case had to prepare further materials over the
weekend in preparation for the hearing of the within matter.
[46]
I am not persuaded
that the “back to back” hearings justify an award of costs for third counsel, a
cost that would be borne by Apotex who was not a party in the Pharmascience
matter. The consecutive hearings were scheduled by the Court. Pfizer, in their
written material filed upon its motion for directions, did not provide evidence
about any extra work that was required to prepare for the hearing that began on
September 14.
[47]
In any event, the
majority of counsel’s work had been completed prior to the hearing. An
award of costs for a third lawyer would be inappropriate. Counsel fees shall be
assessed by the assessment officer on the basis of one senior and one junior
counsel at the hearing.
[48]
The experts Pfizer
retained to provide evidence may have provided technical assistance to Pfizer’s
counsel beyond preparing their own affidavits and preparing for their own cross
examinations. However, Pfizer shall only be entitled to recover for such costs
where Pfizer can demonstrate that it was reasonable and necessary. In this
regard, I refer to Biovail Corporation v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)
et al. (2007), 61 C.P.R.
(4th) 33 (F.C.):
Experts
may provide technical assistance, in addition to the work for their own reports
and their oral evidence, in areas of case preparation beyond the capacity of
supervising counsel. However, such work, potentially recoverable on a full
indemnity basis as a function of reasonable necessity, should not stray into
areas for which supervising counsel bear sole responsibility. That is, Tariff limitations
could be circumvented because the assessable costs for counsel are limited to
partial indemnity.
[49]
Pfizer seeks a 25
percent increase in assessed costs on the basis that Apotex “withdrew” its
allegations as to the status of the ‘132 Patent as a selection patent only to
raise the issue at the hearing and to make further submissions on the issue
post-hearing.
[50]
There was much debate
in the course of the September 2009 hearing about the selection patent issue
and the meaning of certain emails and letters that were exchanged
between counsel for the parties in June and July 2009. This correspondence is included
in Pfizer’s Application Record at Volume 11, pages 3371 to 3377.
[51]
Pfizer argued at the
hearing that these emails mean that Apotex had abandoned the selection patent
issue. Apotex argued that Pfizer had addressed that issue in its Memorandum of
Fact and Law that was filed as part of its Application Record.
[52]
Post-hearing, Counsel
for Apotex submitted a recent decision of the Federal Court that dealt with
selection patents, that is Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd.
(2009), 78 C.P.R. (4th) 1 (F.C.). Counsel were given the opportunity, if they
wished, to make submissions about the relevance of this decision to the matters
raised in the within proceeding.
[53]
The selection patent
issue was fully canvassed by both Pfizer and Apotex, both in September 2009 and
in a further hearing of January 2010. Indeed, in January 2010, Pfizer responded
to the Eli Lilly decision relied upon by Apotex by presenting a more
recent decision of the England and Wales Court of Appeal in Dr. Reddy’s
Laboratories (UK) Ltd. v. Eli Lilly and Co. Ltd., [2010] R.P.C. 9 (C.A.).
The selection patent issue was addressed in the Reasons for Judgment at
paragraphs 114 to 134.
[54]
In the result, I am
not persuaded that Apotex had withdrawn the selection patent issue. It was
fully argued and Pfizer has not shown that it was prejudiced either by having
been taken by surprise or deprived of the opportunity to address it. Pfizer had
made written arguments on the point prior to its oral submissions both in
September 2009 and January 2010. I decline to direct the imposition of a costs
penalty in any percentage.
[55]
Apotex seeks
directions as to the nature of the travel and accommodation expenses to be recovered
by Pfizer, saying that these disbursements should be assessed on the basis of
economy fares and single rooms.
[56]
In the absence of
authority to the contrary, this approach is reasonable and justifiable, in my
opinion. I direct that the assessment officer shall assess these expenses on
the basis of economy air fares and single hotel accommodation.
[57]
Apotex seeks
direction that a limit be placed on the number of photocopies for which costs
will be assessed. The parties agree on the cost, that is $00.25 a page, but
Pfizer does not agree that the number of copies be limited by the Court.
[58]
In my opinion, this
is an item that should be determined by the assessment officer, on the standard
of reasonableness. A certain number of copies were required, pursuant to the
Rules. The parties can address the reasonable requirements of other copies in
their submissions before the assessment officer.
[59]
Finally, there
remains the question of the appropriate column of Tariff B upon which the
assessment of fees will proceed. Pfizer seeks recovery at the mid-point of
Column IV, relying in that regard upon the statements of Justice Hughes in two
decisions, that is Novopharm Limited v. Canada (Health), 2010 FC 156 and
Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc. (2009), 75 C.P.R. (4th) 165 (F.C.).
[60]
Apotex submits that
costs on Column IV of Tariff B have not become the norm and further, that
Pfizer bears the onus of demonstrating that a departure from Column III is
appropriate. Apotex argues that Pfizer failed to bring any evidence to support
a deviation from Column III, and in any event, this is not a particularly
complex intellectual property case that would justify a costs award above
Column III.
[61]
The Federal Court of
Appeal has not commented, to date, on the recognition of Column IV of Tariff B
as the norm for the assessment of costs in prohibition proceedings. The
decisions cited by Pfizer do not set out a principled basis for resorting
to the mid-point of the Column IV of Tariff B as the standard in prohibition
proceedings. These proceedings, while complex, are not uniquely so.
[62]
The fact that this
proceeding went forward in tandem with Cause No. T-2221-07 allowed for a
certain degree of economies of effort. This fact weighs in favour of
directing the assessment of costs at the lower, not middle, of Column IV of
Tariff B.
[63]
In conclusion,
Pfizer’s costs in relation to this matter will be assessed in accordance with
the following directions:
a.
Pfizer’s
costs in relation to Dr. Stjernschantz’s fees shall be reduced by 50 percent;
b.
Pfizer’s
counsel’s costs for traveling to Sweden are disallowed;
c.
The hourly
rate for the allowable experts shall be capped at the hourly rate of senior
counsel for Pfizer, that is Ms. Robinson;
d.
No costs
will be recoverable for the fees of people including in-house counsel, law
clerks, students, and support staff;
e.
Pfizer shall be entitled
to recover costs only for those experts who deposed to affidavits that were
filed in this proceeding;
f.
Pfizer
may recover the fees paid to experts for time not spent preparing the expert’s
own affidavit or preparing for the expert’s own cross-examination where it is
demonstrated that it was reasonable and necessary to provide technical
assistance to Pfizer’s counsel;
g.
The fees of experts
overlapping with Cause T-2221-07 will be reduced by up to 25 percent to account
for overlap not reflected in the experts’ bills;
h.
Counsel fees shall be
assessed by the assessment officer on the basis of one senior and one junior
counsel at the hearing, one senior and one junior counsel in conducting
cross-examination, and one senior counsel for defending cross-examination;
i.
Travel
and accommodation expenses will be assessed on the basis of economy fares and
single rooms;
j.
Photocopying
costs will be assessed at $00.25 per page, and the assessment officer will
determine the number of copies for which recovery can be had based on the Rules
and reasonable requirements;
k.
Costs are
to be assessed at the lower end of Column IV of Tariff B.
“E.
Heneghan”
Ottawa,
Ontario
December
7, 2010