Date: 20060426
Docket: IMM-5014-05
Citation: 2006
FC 522
Ottawa, Ontario,
April 26, 2006
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Blanchard
BETWEEN:
ABDUL
RAHMAN KHWAJA
Applicant
and
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review of the decision, dated June 14, 2005, of Nicolas
Drouin (the visa officer) at the Canadian Embassy in Moscow, Russia, which determined that the Applicant
does not meet the requirements to be issued a permanent resident visa because
he is not a member of the Convention Refugee Abroad or Humanitarian-protected Persons
Abroad classes. The visa officer concluded that the Applicant did not meet the
requirements of subsections 11(1) and 16(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the Act) by reason that the evidence
regarding his occupation and military service was not credible.
[2]
For ease
of reference, I have attached the statutory provisions applicable to this case
in Appendix “A”.
1. Facts
[3]
The
Applicant, Abdul Rahman Khwaja, is an ethnic Tajik born in Kabul, Afghanistan on October 18, 1965. On
graduating high school, the Applicant commenced his mandatory military service
in 1983 and was assigned to the airport at Kabul. He was discharged in 1986 and was later
employed as a clerk at the Kabul electrical power company. In
1988 the Applicant went to the USSR and was admitted to the Tajik
Agrarian University in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
[4]
On August 14,
2004, the Canadian Embassy in Moscow received and application on behalf of the
Applicant, his wife and five children for permanent residence resettlement
through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as members of
the Convention Refugees Abroad or Humanitarian-protected Persons Abroad classes.
2. First interview
[5]
The visa
officer first interviewed the Applicant on October 15, 2004, and concluded that
he met the definition of a Convention refugee by reason that he feared
persecution by Afghanistan’s authorities because of a perceived connection to
the former communist government in that country. The visa officer advised the
Applicant that his application for permanent residence was granted pending
verification of medical, criminal and security clearances.
3. Informant allegations of Applicant’s
criminality
[6]
On April 13,
2005, the visa officer received a telephone call from an identifiable third
party (informant) who stated that the Applicant was a former drug trafficker, had
been imprisoned in Dushanbe, had been a Khalqi member of the PDPA, and had been
involved in combat while serving in the military in Afghanistan. The visa officer told the informant to
send the information to the Canadian Embassy in writing. On April 19, 2005, the
informant faxed to the Embassy a letter alleging that the Applicant was an
active member of the Hizbi Halq, that he had served in the Khad, that he had
smuggled gold and precious stones in the preceding five to six years, that he had
trafficked people from Afghanistan abroad, and that he had been imprisoned
twice for people-trafficking and smuggling stones.
4. Second interview
[7]
The visa officer
was satisfied the informant’s allegations raised sufficient criminality and
security concerns to re-interview the Applicant. The Applicant was not given prior
notice of the reason for convening the second interview, rather, the visa
officer confronted the Applicant with the allegations during the interview held
on May 21, 2005. The Applicant denied the allegations in their entirety.
5. Decision under review
[8]
By letter
dated June 14, 2005, the visa officer denied the Applicant’s application for
permanent residence on the ground that the evidence regarding his occupation
and military service was not credible. The visa officer concluded that the
Applicant was neither a member of the Convention Refugees Abroad or Humanitarian-protected
Persons Abroad classes within the meaning of sections 145 and 147 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (the Regulations). The
letter reads in material part:
...
Paragraph 16(1) of the Act stated that a person who makes an
application must answer truthfully all questions put to them for the purpose of
an examination and must produce a visa and all relevant evidence and documents
that the officer reasonably requires.
After carefully assessing all factors relative to your
application, I am not satisfied that you are a member of any of the classes
prescribed because your answers to my questions were contradictory and evasive
during the interview. I did not find credible your explanations about your
military service and your occupation in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Therefore, you do not meet the
requirements of this paragraph.
Subsection 11(1) of the Act states that:
A foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a
visa or for any other document required by the Regulations. The visa or
document shall be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied
that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of the
Act.
Subsection 2(2) specifies that, unless otherwise indicated,
references in the Act to “this Act” included regulations made under it.
Following an examination of your application, I am not
satisfied that you meet the requirements of the Act and the Regulations for the
reasons explained above. I am therefore refusing your application.
[9]
By notice
of application filed August 17, 2005, the Applicant seeks judicial review of
the visa officer’s decision dismissing his application for permanent residency.
6. Issues
[10]
Three
issues are raised on this application:
A. Can the Court
consider evidence that was not before the visa officer?
B. Did the visa
officer breach the duty of fairness by failing to provide the Applicant with a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations of criminality?
C. Did the visa officer
err in making a global adverse credibility finding by reason that:
(1) the Applicant’s
evidence regarding his military booklet was internally contradictory?; and
(2) untested evidence
alleging the Applicant’s criminality was preferred over the Applicant’s
testimony?
7. Analysis
A. Can the Court
consider evidence that was not before the visa officer?
[11]
The
Respondent objects that the Applicant seeks that this Court review the visa
officer’s decision on the basis of new evidence which was not before the
decision maker. Specifically, it is submitted that paragraphs 3 to 10, 12, 18,
and 24 of the affidavit sworn by the Applicant on October 1, 2005, adduces new
facts that were not before the visa officer at the time of his decision. The
same new facts are restated in portions of the supporting affidavits sworn by
Khwaja Sidiqi and Zohira Vali Muhammad on October 2, 2005. The Applicant
produces these affidavits as proof of his credibility with respect to his
occupation and his military service, and in support of his contention that the
visa officer erred in finding the Applicant inadmissible.
[12]
It is
settled law that on judicial review, evidence that was not put before a
decision maker is not admissible before the reviewing Court: see Asafov v.
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994), 48 A.C.W.S. (3d)
623 (F.C.T.D.), [1994] F.C. J. No. 717 (T.D.) (QL). The Federal Court of Appeal
held in Bekker v. Canada, 2004 FCA 186. (2004), 323 N.R. 195 (F.C.A.),
that the nature of judicial review limits the Court to assessing the legality
of decisions based on the record that was before the decision maker. Justice Gilles
Létourneau stated in Bekker at paragraph 11:
[11] Judicial review proceedings are limited in scope.
They are not trial de novo proceedings whereby determination of new issues can
be made on the basis of freshly adduced evidence. As Rothstein J.A. said in Gitxsan
Treaty Society v. Hospital Employees' Union, [2000] 1 F.C. 135, at paragraph 15, "the
essential purpose of judicial review is the review of decisions" and, I
would add, to merely ascertain their legality: see also Offshore Logistics
Inc. v. Intl. Longshoremen's Assoc. 269 (2000), 257 N.R. 338 (F.C.A.). This
is the reason why, barring exceptional circumstances such as bias or
jurisdictional questions, which may not appear on the record, the reviewing
Court is bound by and limited to the record that was before the judge or the
Board. Fairness to the parties and the court or tribunal under review dictates
such a limitation. ...
[13]
New
evidence however can properly be considered by the Court when considering
allegations of breach of procedural fairness: see Ontario Assn of
Architects (Ont.) v. Assn. of Architectural Technologists of Ontario (C.A.), [2003] 1 F.C. 331.
[14]
I have
reviewed the visa officer’s decision and reasons filed with the Court on
September 1, 2005, and the supplementary certified tribunal record filed on
February 27, 2006. I conclude that the affidavit evidence referred to above did
not form part of the record before the visa officer and, as a consequence, may
not be considered by this Court reviewing his decision. For this Court to
review the decision on the basis of evidence unknown to the visa officer would
be to depart from its scope of review on the record to a de novo appeal
on the merits. In the Applicant’s affidavit, paragraphs 3 to 9 disclose
particulars of family background unknown to the visa officer; paragraphs 10 and
12 relate to the Applicant’s military service and responsibilities in the
Logistics Unit at the military airport in Kabul, Afghanistan; paragraph 18
discloses that the Tajik government would not grant the Applicant permanent
residence; and paragraph 24 describes the Applicant’s residence permit to live
in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. There is no material in the record to suggest that this
information was known to the visa officer on or before June 14, 2005, and this
Court will not consider these new facts in disposing of this case.
B. Did the visa
officer breach the duty of fairness by failing to provide the Applicant with a
meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations of criminality?
[15]
The
Federal Court of Appeal in Ha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2004 FCA 49, (2004), 316 N.R. 299 (F.C.A.), reviewed
the context of a visa officer deciding an application for permanent residence
in Canada and held that the content of the duty of fairness is a question of
law that is dependent on the facts of each case. The Applicant here submits
that the visa officer breached his duty of procedural fairness by not giving
the Applicant a meaningful opportunity to respond to the informant’s
allegations of criminality. The Applicant contends that he should have been
given an opportunity after the second hearing concluded to produce evidence
rebutting the claims against him.
[16]
John v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
2003 FCT 257, (2003), 26 Imm. L.R. (3d) 221 (F.C.T.D.), and Haghighi
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) [2000]
4 F.C. 402, (2000), 257 N.R. 139
(F.C.A.), are authority for the proposition that a visa officer must disclose
his or her specific concerns to the applicant and grant that person sufficient
opportunity to respond to the concerns in a meaningful way. In John, Justice
Allen Linden (ex officio) set aside a decision of a visa officer where the
applicant was only advised of the reason for being re-interviewed at the
hearing itself, and had been refused his request to produce rebuttal evidence
after the hearing. Justice Linden found that the applicant, in that case, was
denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to the officer’s concerns. At
paragraphs 6 and 17 to 18 he stated:
[6] The
Visa Officer states that the Applicant was given an opportunity to respond to
his concerns about the fraudulent birth certificate, but the Applicant disagrees.
He states that he was not advised in advance about the subject of the second
interview, and that the Visa Officer ignored his explanation and request for an
opportunity to prove his relationship to his aunt. This, it is argued, was not
a meaningful opportunity to respond.
…
[17] It
is the Respondent’s position that the Visa Officer discharged the duty of
fairness by advising the Applicant of his concerns, and providing him with an
opportunity to respond to them at the hearing. The Respondent relies on Patel
v. Canada (Secretary of State), [1995] F.C.J. No. 1410 (F.C.T.D.), a case
in which the Court found that the duty of fairness was met when the Applicant
was interviewed a second time so that he could respond to the visa officer's
concerns about his lack of credentials and experience as a printing mechanic.
[18] In
Patel, the Court concluded that the Applicant was advised of the visa
officer’s concerns and given a full opportunity to respond to them in a second
interview. In Patel, however, the prospective immigrant was advised of
the purpose of the second interview by a letter in advance of the interview. The
Applicant in this case was not advised why he was being re-interviewed until he
arrived at the second interview. For this reason, it cannot be said that he was
given a full opportunity to respond to the Visa Officer’s concerns about the
authenticity of his aunt's birth certificate. Had he been told in advance of
the purpose of his second interview, or given some time after the interview, he
may have been able to gather evidence to meaningfully address the Visa Officer’s
concerns about the document. This might be done by telephone or other written
means of communication.
[17]
The duty
of fairness requires that an applicant be given notice of the particular
concerns of the visa officer and be granted a reasonable opportunity to respond
by way of producing evidence to refute those concerns. Where notice is given at
the interview itself, the visa officer must allow the Applicant a reasonable
period of time in which to meaningfully respond to the allegations.
[18]
In this
case, the visa officer summoned the Applicant in mid-May 2005 for a second
interview convened on May 21, 2005. The Applicant was not given prior notice of
the allegations but was confronted with them at the hearing. The Applicant and
Respondent differ as to when, during the interview, the Applicant was
confronted, a distinction I do not find material. The Applicant was notified of
the reason for his second interview, was given an opportunity to respond to the
informant’s allegations, and did in fact give explanations which the visa
officer rejected. The onus lies on the Applicant to provide sufficient evidence
to support his application for permanent residence: see Lam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
(1998), 152 F.T.R. 316 (T.D.); Dhillon v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration),
[1998] F.C.J. No. 574 (T.D.); and Tahir v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
(1998), 159 F.T.R. 109 (T.D.).
[19]
The facts
of this case are clearly distinguishable from those in John. The
Applicant did not request an opportunity in which to gather evidence to address
the officer’s concerns. The onus was on the Applicant to request an extension
of time to refute the allegations against him, and he did not do so. It cannot
be said that he was denied an opportunity to produce further evidence after the
hearing to address officer Drouin’s concerns; he simply did not request such an
opportunity. There is no evidence either in the record before the visa officer
or in the affidavits before the Court to support a finding that the Applicant communicated
an intention, either at the hearing or afterward, to produce evidence to refute
the claims of criminality made against him.
[20]
It was not
for the visa officer at the second interview to suggest to the Applicant that
he seek out new evidence after the hearing to rebut the informant’s claims. That
onus was on the Applicant. By cross-examination January 30, 2006, on his
affidavit sworn on November 2, 2005, Officer Drouin stated that he would have
examined such evidence had the Applicant produced it:
[504] Q – Was there any
particular hurry to make a decision in this case after the second interview?
A – No, no special hurry
[505] Q – Was there –
did you offer them time to try and obtain documents to refute the allegations?
A – No. I mean, if they had
provided me with these documents, I would have looked at them.
[21]
While the Applicant
was only given notice of the substance of allegations against him at the second
interview, he was given a meaningful opportunity to respond, and he bore the
onus to request an adjournment or further time to provide evidence addressing
the officer’s concerns. That the Applicant did not so request does not
constitute a breach of the duty of fairness by the visa officer.
C. Did the visa officer err in
making a global adverse credibility finding?
[22]
Neither
party addressed the standard against which to review the decision of a visa
officer to grant or deny an application for permanent residence, or against
which to review an officer’s cumulative finding of adverse credibility. In Ouafae
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 459, Justice Yves de Montigny reviewed and noted that the Court was
divided on whether standard of reasonableness simpliciter
or patent unreasonableness applied to decisions of visa officers. After
considering the pragmatic and functional analysis conducted by Justice John
O’Keefe in Yin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
(2001), 106 A.C.W.S. (3d) 726 (F.C.T.D.), Justice de Montigny concluded that decisions of visa
officers based on purely factual assessments are reviewable on a patently
unreasonable standard, whereas decisions of visa officers based on application
of the facts to legal standards are reviewable on a reasonableness standard. At
paragraphs 18 to 20 and 22, Justice de Montigny held:
[18] Opinion on the appropriate standard of review for
decisions by visa officers is divided and appears to have spawned seemingly
contradictory decisions. In some cases, reasonableness simpliciter was
the chosen standard (see, inter alia, Yaghoubian v. Canada (M.C.I.),
[2003] FCT 615; Zheng v. Canada (M.C.I), IMM-3809-98; Lu v. Canada
(M.C.I.), IMM-414-99). In other decisions, patent unreasonableness was
chosen instead (see, for example, Khouta v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2003] FC 893; Kalia v. Canada
(M.C.I.), [2002] FCT 731).
[19] And yet, on closer inspection, these decisions are
not irreconcilable. The reason for the different choices is essentially that
the nature of the decision under review by this Court depends on the context.
Thus it goes without saying that the appropriate standard of review for a
discretionary decision by a visa officer assessing a prospective immigrant's
occupational experience is patent unreasonableness. Where the visa officer’s
decision is based on an assessment of the facts, this Court will not intervene
unless it can be shown that the decision is based on an erroneous finding of
fact made in a perverse or capricious manner.
[20] However, it is not the same for a decision by a
visa officer involving an application of general principles under an Act or
Regulations to specific circumstances. Where the decision is based on a
question of mixed law and fact, the Court will show less deference and seek to
ensure that the decision is quite simply reasonable. That is what my colleague
O’Keefe J. held after using the pragmatic and functional approach in Yin v.
Canada (M.C.I.), [2001] FCT 661…
…
[22] …[T]his Court must show deference when the
impugned decision is purely factual. That is not the case here: on the
contrary, this is a question of mixed law and fact, which calls for a lower
level of deference than a question of fact. In addition, given that there is no
privative clause in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and that
the visa officer is determining the applicant's rights rather than dealing with
a polycentric issue, to use the words of Bastarache J. in Pushpanathan v.
Canada (M.C.I.), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, there is no doubt that the
appropriate standard is reasonableness simpliciter.
I adopt my learned colleague’s reasoning in respect to the
applicable standard of review of visa officer’s decisions.
[23]
The
specific question to be answered here is whether the visa officer erred in
making his credibility findings. Such findings of fact are clearly within the
purview of a visa officer’s responsibilities under subsection 11(1) of the Act.
The Court must show deference in reviewing such findings. They are to be
reviewed on the standard of patent unreasonableness.
[24]
For the
reasons that follow, I find that the visa officer’s credibility findings were
not patently unreasonable. It follows therefore that the Court’s intervention
is not warranted. The visa officer’s decision should not be disturbed.
(1) Contradictory
evidence regarding military booklet
[25]
The visa
officer stated that the Applicant produced his military booklet at his first
interview, but then claimed at his second interview that the booklet had been
stolen from his home in 1993. The Applicant submits that the visa officer drew
an adverse credibility finding without regard to the evidence.
[26]
The Computer
Assisted Immigration Processing System (CAIPS) notes of the first interview
convened on October 15, 2004, indicate that the visa officer inspected the Applicant’s
military booklet:
... Did his military service as a private
with the Ministry of Defense at the Kabul
Airport. Military booklet seen.
[27]
The CAIPS
notes of the second interview convened on May 21, 2005, indicate that the
Applicant did not have his military booklet at that time and explained it had
been stolen in 1993. The visa officer’s notes indicate he checked the previous
interview notes which described his having seen the military booklet at that
time:
... The applicant also stated that he had never been
involved in fightings while the information we received tells us the opposite.
The applicant said that he had done his military service in the Kabul airport. When I asked the applicant to
show me his military booklet, he said that he had lost it. Stated that someone
stole his military booklet in 1993. According to the last interview notes, the
applicant had his military [booklet] with him at the time of interview.
[28]
By sworn
affidavit, the Applicant submits that he did not show his military booklet at
his first interview on October 15, 2004, that it had been stolen from his home
in 1993, and that the officer asked him at his second interview on May 21, 2005,
whether he had “found” the document, in reply to which he explained it had been
stolen. The Applicant’s submission, in essence, is that the officer mistakenly
prepared incorrect CAIPS notes during a time of heavy caseload surrounding the
first interview.
[29]
The Court
is unable to resolve this conflicting evidence in favour of the Applicant. The
CAIPS notes at the first interview disclose that the Applicant served as a
private at the airport in Kabul, which could reasonably be
based on the ensuing statement that the military booklet was viewed. The notes
further state that the officer had “no particular security concerns” which may
also have been concluded on a viewing of the same document. Officer Drouin in
his November 2, 2005 affidavit attests that the contents of the CAIPS notes
were true and accurate, that the Applicant produced his military booklet at the
time of his first interview, and that he viewed and noted seeing that document.
It cannot be concluded, therefore, that the visa officer’s finding that he had
seen the booklet at the first interview is without regard to evidence in the
record.
(2) Informant alleging
criminality
[30]
The
Applicant submits that the visa officer was unreasonable in preferring the
informant’s allegations of criminality over the Applicant’s evidence denying
those claims. The Respondent submits that the visa officer made no finding in
respect of the Applicant’s criminal inadmissibility to Canada, for which reason it cannot be concluded
the officer preferred the informant’s evidence over the Applicant’s. The
Respondent submits that the visa officer confronted the Applicant with the
informant’s allegations of criminality and reasonably concluded that the Applicant
was not credible by reason of his vague and evasive answers in connection with
his military activities and occupation in Afghanistan.
[31]
I agree
with the Respondent. The visa officer did not simply accept the veracity of the
untested allegations in the informant’s correspondence and made no finding in
respect of criminal inadmissibility. Instead, at the second interview, the
officer put the substance of the allegations to the Applicant and asked him to reply.
The CAIPS notes on May 21, 2005 indicate that the visa officer concluded that the
Applicant’s testimony was not credible on the basis of reply to questions of
occupation and military service:
The applicant was confronted with the information we
received that he had been involved in the smuggling of persons and gem stones
and that he had been jailed. The applicant said that it was not true as he was
a leather specialist. When asked to explain his work of leather specialist, the
applicant provided me with very evasive answers and couldn’t provide any
concrete details about his occupation.
...
The applicant said that during his military service, he was
in charge of a team of soldiers who were sewing uniforms and doing embroidery.
When I asked the applicant to provide me with more info, he repeated the same
thing....
The applicant’s answers to my questions have been
contradictory and evasive during the interview. I don’t find credible his
explanations about his military service and his occupation in Afghanistan. Application to be refused on
lack of credibility.
[32]
In
reviewing the visa officer’s decision and the submissions of the parties, I
conclude that the visa officer’s credibility findings were open to him on the
applicable standard of review. It follows that the Court’s intervention is not
warranted.
8. Conclusion
[33]
In my
view, the visa officer did not breach his duty of fairness to the Applicant and
did not err in denying the applicant’s application for permanent residence
based on his lack of credibility. As a result, I will dismiss this application
for judicial review.
9. Proposed Certified Question
[34]
The
Applicant proposed that the following question be certified pursuant to
paragraph 74(d) of the Act:
Are individuals seeking resettlement to Canada as members of the Convention
Refugee Abroad Class or of the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad Class
entitled to a relatively high level of procedural fairness, given the criteria
articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Baker and the particular
vulnerability of Convention Refugees Abroad?
In my view, this question does not transcend the interests
of the immediate parties to the litigation nor does it contemplate issues of
broad significance or general application. Further, as the Federal Court of
Appeal noted in Ha, above, the content of the duty of fairness is
dependent on the facts and context of each case. As such, the question as
proposed does not satisfy the test for certification: see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Liyanagamage (1994), 176 N.R. 4 (F.C.A.) at paragraph 4. I therefore
decline to certify any question.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS
that:
1. The application for
judicial review is dismissed.
2. No question is
certified.
“Edmond P. Blanchard”
APPENDIX
“A”
1. Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27
|
11. (1) A foreign national must, before
entering Canada, apply to an officer for a
visa or for any other document required by the regulations. The visa or
document shall be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied
that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of
this Act.
16. (1) A person who makes an application
must answer truthfully all questions put to them for the purpose of the
examination and must produce a visa and all relevant evidence and documents
that the officer reasonably requires.
(2) In the case of a foreign national,
(a) the relevant
evidence referred to in subsection (1) includes photographic and fingerprint
evidence; and
(b) the foreign
national must submit to a medical examination on request.
...
|
11. (1) L’étranger doit, préalablement à
son entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent les visa et autres documents requis
par règlement, lesquels sont délivrés sur preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle,
qu’il n’est pas interdit de territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
16. (1) L’auteur d’une demande au titre de
la présente loi doit répondre véridiquement aux questions qui lui sont posées
lors du contrôle, donner les renseignements et tous éléments de preuve
pertinents et présenter les visa et documents requis.
(2) S’agissant de l’étranger, les
éléments de preuve pertinents visent notamment la photographie et la
dactyloscopie et il est tenu de se soumettre, sur demande, à une visite
médicale.
[...]
|
2. Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227
|
145. A foreign national is a Convention
refugee abroad and a member of the Convention refugees abroad class if the
foreign national has been determined, outside Canada, by an officer to be a Convention refugee.
147. A foreign national is a member of the
country of asylum class if they have been determined by an officer to be in
need of resettlement because
(a) they are outside
all of their countries of nationality and habitual residence; and
(b) they have been,
and continue to be, seriously and personally affected by civil war, armed
conflict or massive violation of human rights in each of those countries.
|
145. Est un réfugié au sens de la Convention
outre-frontières et appartient à la catégorie des réfugiés au sens de cette
convention l'étranger à qui un agent a reconnu la qualité de réfugié alors
qu'il se trouvait hors du Canada.
147. Appartient à la catégorie de personnes
de pays d'accueil l'étranger considéré par un agent comme ayant besoin de se
réinstaller en raison des circonstances suivantes:
a) il se trouve hors de tout
pays dont il a la nationalité ou dans lequel il avait sa résidence
habituelle;
b) une guerre civile, un
conflit armé ou une violation massive des droits de la personne dans chacun
des pays en cause ont eu et continuent d'avoir des conséquences graves et
personnelles pour lui.
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