Bowman,
J.T.C.C.:—These
appeals
were
heard
together
and
are,
in
the
case
of
Otineka
Development
Corp.,
from
an
assessment
for
1986
and,
in
the
case
of
72902
Manitoba
Ltd.,
from
assessments
for
1986
and
1987.
In
both
cases
the
issue
is
whether
the
appellant
corporations
are
subject
to
tax
under
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
Their
claim
for
exemption
is
based
upon
two
alternative
contentions:
(a)
that
they
are
organizations
of
the
type
described
in
paragraph
149(1
)(l)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
or
(b)
that
they
are
corporations
not
less
than
90
per
cent
of
the
shares
of
which
are
owned
by
a
Canadian
municipality
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
149(1)(d).
A
further
contention
was
advanced
that
even
if
the
appellants
are
not
exempt
under
paragraph
149(1
)(d)
or
(I),
the
income
upon
which
they
have
been
assessed
does
not
belong
to
them
beneficially
but
rather
is
the
income
of
the
Pas
Indian
Band
for
whom
they
allege
that
they
were
agents
or
trustees.
Facts
The
Pas
Indian
Band
is
a
"band"
as
defined
in
subsection
2(1)
of
the
Indian
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
1-5.
On
September
14,
1992,
by
a
resolution
of
the
band
council,
it
changed
its
name
to
Opaskwayak
Cree
Nation.
The
band
consists
of
about
3,000
persons
of
whom
approximately
2,000
live
on
the
reserve
which
is
situated
adjacent
to
the
town
of
the
Pas,
Manitoba,
over
500
miles
north
of
Winnipeg.
The
band
is
a
self-governing
entity
.
It
has
passed
by-laws
for
most
of
the
purposes
contemplated
by
sections
81
and
85.1
of
the
Indian
Act.
These
purposes
include
the
regulation
of
water
supplies
and
sewers,
the
disposal
of
garbage,
the
destruction
and
control
of
weeds,
the
restriction
of
the
use
or
slingshots
and
bows
and
arrows,
the
regulation
and
control
of
domestic
animals,
the
regulation
of
beekeeping,
the
licensing
of
hawkers
and
peddlers,
the
control
of
public
games
and
amusements,
the
observance
of
law
and
order,
the
provision
of
housing,
the
control
of
intoxicants,
and
the
regulation
of
camping
and
traffic,
to
mention
only
some
of
the
multitude
of
matters
over
which
the
‘band
council
has
exercised
jurisdiction.
On
March
9,1976
the
Governor
in
Council
declared,
pursuant
to
subsection
83(1)
of
the
Indian
Act,
that
the
Pas
Indian
Band
had
reached
an
advanced
state
of
development.
The
result
of
this
declaration
was
that
the
council
of
the
band
became
entitled,
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
Minister
of
Indian
Affairs
and
Northern
Development,
to
make
by-laws
for
the
purpose
of
raising
money
from
band
members
by
means
of
taxation.
Such
a
by-law
was
passed
by
the
council
of
the
band
in
1977
and
was
approved
by
the
Minister
but
it
was
never
implemented.
It
was
said
to
be
unwieldy
and
it
was
opposed
by
a
number
of
band
members,
principally
those
living
on
the
reserve
on
leased
land.
The
band
provides
services
to
the
band
members
in
a
large
number
of
areas,
including
education,
health
care,
social
services,
including
child
and
family
services,
employment
and
training
services,
alcohol
and
drug
abuse
counselling,
and
economic
development.
The
band
has
a
complex
and
sophisticated
structure
relating
to
its
governance.
Its
chief
and
council
members
are
elected
democratically
and
hold
frequent
meetings
relating
to
all
matters
affecting
the
band
and
the
reserve.
There
are
extensive
consultations
by
the
council
with
the
band
members.
The
governmental
structure
resembles
that
of
any
municipal
body
and
includes
departments
or
committees
with
responsibility
for
such
matters
as
public
works,
community
services,
education,
economic
development,
community
planning
and
finance.
The
band
has
its
own
police
force,
which
cooperates
with
the
RCMP.
The
band
provides
schooling
for
children
from
kindergarten
to
grade
12.
It
operates
a
modern
home
for
senior
band
members.
It
has
a
sports
and
recreational
department
and
has
its
own
fire
department.
I
need
not
elaborate
further.
The
Pas
Indian
Band,
through
its
chief
and
council,
is
run
on
essentially
the
same
lines
as
any
other
municipality
and
provides
substantially
the
same
services
to
its
band
members
on
the
reserve
as
any
municipality
in
Canada
of
comparable
size.
It
has
earned,
deservedly,
the
reputation
in
Canada
of
being
a
model
of
self-government.
In
1973,
the
council
of
the
band
caused
the
appellant
Otineka
Development
Corp,
to
be
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
Manitoba.
Since
that
time
all
of
its
issued
shares
have
been
owned
beneficially
by
the
band.
In
the
years
in
question
the
appellant
Otineka
owned
and
operated
on
the
reserve
a
shopping
mall
known
as
the
Otineka
Shopping
Centre,
which
contained
a
number
of
retail
outlets,
including
an
IGA
grocery
store.
The
property
on
which
the
mall
is
situated
is
leased
from
the
Government
of
Canada
under
a
procedure
whereby
land
on
the
reserve
is
"surrendered"
to
the
Crown
and
is
then
leased
to
individuals
or
corporations.
Rentals
received
from
the
leasing
of
the
land
are
paid
to
the
band.
Otineka
in
turn
subleases
portions
thereof
to
the
various
tenants
who
operate
businesses
in
the
mall.
The
band
itself
pays
rent
to
Otineka
for
premises
that
it
occupies
there.
Witnesses
called
for
the
appellant
testified
that
Otineka
was
incorporated
on
the
basis
of
advice
from
the
Department
of
Indian
Affairs
and
Northern
Development,
because
lending
institutions
would
not
deal
directly
with
the
band
since
it
was
not
an
incorporated
entity
and
it
was
believed
that
it
did
not
have
the
capacity
to
contract
or
to
give
security.
Otineka
had
its
own
staff
and
payroll.
Its
officers
and
directors
are
band
members.
Financial
statements
were
prepared
and
the
ear’s
profit
or
loss
was
shown
as
that
of
Otineka.
Any
excess
cash
not
needed
for
operations
or
repairs
was
loaned
to
the
band,
and
in
most
cases
it
appears
that
when
the
money
was
not
repaid
it
was
simply
written
off
and
the
amount
treated
as
a
“contribution”.
Presumably
the
money
was
used
by
the
band
to
assist
in
paying
for
the
services
that
it
provided
to
its
members.
72902
Manitoba
Ltd.
was
incorporated
in
1986
to
own
and
operate
the
Chi
mo
Building
Centre,
a
building
supply
business
located
on
the
reserve.
It
also
leased
from
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
Canada
land
surrendered
to
her
by
the
band.
72902
had
its
own
staff
and
payroll
and
kept
separate
financial
statements.
Its
officers
and
directors
were
band
members.
Analysis
One
of
the
appellants’
contentions
is
that
they
were
agents
or
trustees
of
the
band
and
that
therefore
the
income
on
which
they
were
assessed
belongs
to
the
band
and
is
not
taxable
in
their
hands.
The
evidence
does
not
justify
this
conclusion.
There
is
no
written
trust
or
agency
agreement
and
the
evidence
relied
on
to
support
an
oral
trust
arrangement,
although
credible,
does
not
go
far
enough
to
establish
the
legal
relationship
of
trust
or
agency
contended
for
here.
It
is
true
that
the
witnesses
for
the
appellants
said
that
they
viewed
the
business
and
property
as
well
as
the
income
of
the
two
corporations
as
belonging
to
the
band
but
I
see
this
as
nothing
more
than
the
familiar
and
colloquial
way
in
which
persons
sometimes
describe
property
owned
by
a
corporation
of
which
they
are
substantial
shareholders.
Such
assertions
do
not
establish
a
legal
relationship
of
trust
or
agency.
The
band
council
admittedly
exercised
substantial
control
over
the
business
of
the
mall
and
the
building
centre,
but
this
in
itself
does
not
establish
that
the
business
and
property
belonged
to
the
band.
Many
sole
shareholders
exercise
extremely
close
control
over
the
business
of
their
corporations.
This
in
itself
does
not
warrant
ignoring
the
separate
corporate
identity.
Where
a
corporation
holds
itself
out
to
third
parties
as
owning
its
property
and
business,
keeps
separate
financial
records,
files
its
own
corporate
income
tax
returns
and
acts
like
any
other
corporation
that
is
independent
of
its
shareholders,
it
would
require
extremely
cogent
evidence
to
establish
that
all
along
it
was
really
just
an
agent
or
trustee
for
its
shareholders
on
the
basis
of
an
unwritten
oral
understanding
or
assumption
on
the
part
of
some
of
the
shareholders
or
directors.
One
of
the
reasons
for
the
incorporation
of
the
appellants
was
that
the
council
believed
that
the
banks
would
not
deal
directly
with
the
band
because
of
its
perceived
lack
of
capacity
to
contract
or
to
give
security.
Whether
this
view
was
correct
or
not,
it
was
a
reason
for
creating
an
entity
that
it
was
believed
could
contract
and
give
security
in
its
own
right
and
not
as
agent
for
someone
else.
As
Cattanach,
J.
said
in
Denison
Mines
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1971]
C.T.C.
640,
71
D.T.C.
5375
(F.C.T.D.)
at
page
661
(D.T.C.
5388):
It
is
a
principle
of
agency
that
a
person
cannot
do
by
an
agent
what
he
cannot
do
himself.
If
the
band
believed
that
it
could
not
have
borrowed
the
money
and
embarked
on
these
commercial
enterprises
itself
it
could
not
have
assumed
that
it
could
do
so
through
an
agent.
The
principles
to
be
applied
where
it
is
sought
to
treat
a
corporation
as
an
agent
of
its
shareholders
are
discussed
fully
by
Cattanach,
J.
in
Denison
Mines,
supra.
It
is
unnecessary
to
set
them
out
again.
I
am
in
complete
and
respectful
agreement
with
them.
It
is
clear
that
the
business,
property
and
profits
of
the
shopping
mall
and
the
building
centre
belonged
both
legally
and
beneficially
to
Otineka
and
72902
respectively.
They
acted
as
principals
throughout.
The
second
contention
is
that
the
appellants
are
exempt
as
organizations
of
the
type
described
in
paragraph
149(1
)(l).
That
paragraph
reads
as
follows:
149
(1)(1)
a
club,
society
or
association
that,
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister,
was
not
a
charity
within
the
meaning
assigned
by
subsection
149.1(1)
and
that
was
organized
and
operated
exclusively
for
social
welfare,
civic
improvement,
pleasure
or
recreation
or
for
any
other
purpose
except
profit,
no
part
of
the
income
of
which
was
payable
to,
or
was
otherwise
available
for
the
personal
benefit
of,
any
proprietor,
member
or
shareholder
thereof
unless
the
proprietor,
member
or
shareholder
was
a
club,
society
or
association
the
primary
purpose
and
function
of
which
was
the
promotion
of
amateur
athletics
in
Canada;
There
are
at
least
two
reasons
why
the
paragraph
does
not
apply.
In
the
first
place
the
income
was
certainly
available
for
the
benefit
of
the
shareholder,
the
band.
Indeed
it
paid
it
to
the
band
as
a
"contribution".
In
the
second
place,
it
cannot
be
said
that
the
appellants
were
"organized
and
operated"
exclusively
for
any
of
the
purposes
enumerated
in
paragraph
149(1
)(l),
or
that
it
was
organized
and
operated
"for
any
other
purpose
except
profit".
Their
sole
raison
d’être
was
to
own
and
run
a
business
for
profit.
The
fact
that
their
profits,
when
distributed
to
the
band,
whether
by
way
of
dividend
or
as
a
"contribution",
might
ultimately
be
used
for
the
social
or
civic
welfare
of
the
band
does
not
mean
that
the
corporate
objectives
and
operations
are
something
other
than
what
they
obviously
are,
the
pursuit
of
profit,
however
worthy
may
be
the
ultimate
use
to
which
that
profit
is
put.
Counsel
for
the
appellants
relied
upon
the
decision
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
in
Gull
Bay
Development
Corp.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
C.T.C.
159,
84
D.T.C.
6040,
in
which
Walsh,
J.
held
that
the
profits
from
a
logging
operation
carried
on
by
a
corporation
were
exempt
from
tax
both
because
the
corporation
was
a
Charitable
organization
under
paragraph
149(1
)(f)
or
because
it
was
a
nonprofit
organization
under
paragraph
149(1
)(l).
The
case
does
not
assist
the
appellants.
In
Gull
Bay
the
decision
was
based
upon
the
activities
that
the
corporation
itself
carried
on
using
funds
generated
by
its
commercial
operation.
Here
the
corporations
carried
on
commercial
activities
and
distributed
their
funds
to
their
shareholders.
For
this
argument
to
have
any
chance
of
success
there
would
have
had
to
be
a
virtual
identity
between
the
corporations
and
the
band.
That
conclusion
is
not
open
to
me
on
the
evidence.
The
conditions
that
existed
in
L.I.U.N.A.
Local
527
Members’
Training
Trust
Fund
v.
Canada,
[1992]
2
C.T.C.
2410,
92
D.T.C.
2365
(T.C.C.),
in
which
the
provisions
of
paragraph
149(1
)(d)
were
analyzed
in
somewhat
greater
detail
are
simply
not
present
here.
The
third
contention
is
that
the
corporations
are
exempt
under
paragraph
149(1)(d).
Although
paragraph
149(1
)(c)
was
not
relied
upon
and
has
no
application,
I
set
it
out
along
with
paragraph
149(1
)(d):
(c)
a
municipality
in
Canada,
or
a
municipal
or
public
body
performing
a
function
of
government
in
Canada;
(d)
a
corporation,
commission
or
association
not
less
than
90
per
cent
of
the
shares
or
capital
of
which
was
owned
by
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
Canada
or
a
province
or
by
a
Canadian
municipality,
or
a
wholly-owned
corporation
subsidiary
to
such
a
corporation,
commission
or
association
but
this
paragraph
does
not
apply
(i)
to
such
corporation,
commission
or
association
if
a
person
other
than
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
Canada
or
a
province
or
a
Canadian
municipality
had,
during
the
period,
a
right
under
a
contract,
in
equity
or
otherwise
either
immediately
or
in
the
future
and
either
absolutely
or
contingently,
to,
or
to
acquire,
shares
or
capital
of
that
corporation,
commission
or
association,
and
(ii)
to
such
wholly-owned
subsidiary
corporation
if
a
person
other
than
Her
Majesty
in
right
of
Canada
or
a
province
or
a
Canadian
municipality
had,
during
the
period,
a
right
under
a
contract,
in
equity
or
otherwise
either
immediately
or
in
the
future
and
either
absolutely
or
contingently,
to,
or
to
acquire,
shares
or
capital
of
that
wholly-owned
subsidiary
corporation
or
of
the
corporation,
commission
or
association
of
which
it
is
a
wholly-owned
subsidiary
corporation;
The
conditions
in
subparagraphs
149(1
)(d)(i)
and
(ii)
do
not
apply.
The
appellants
are
100
per
cent
owned
by
the
band
and
no
one
else
has
the
right
to
acquire
the
shares.
The
sole
question
is
therefore
whether
The
Pas
Indian
Band
is
a
"municipality"
within
paragraph
149(1
)(l).
The
term
"municipality"
is
not
defined
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
unless
there
is
a
reason
to
do
otherwise
it
must
be
given
its
ordinary
meaning
of
a
community
having
and
exercising
the
powers
of
self
government
and
providing
the
type
of
services
customarily
provided
by
such
a
body.
If
its
ordinary
meaning
is
to
apply,
it
is
not
necessary
that
it
be
incorporated.
The
definition
of
municipality
that
was
accepted
by
the
Ontario
Court
of
Appeal
is
one
that
was
contained
in
the
Shorter
Oxford
Dictionary
and
is
set
out
in
the
following
passage
from
the
judgment
of
Robertson,
C.J.O.
in
Gagnon
v.
Studer,
[1948]
O.R.
634,
[1948]
4
D.L.R.
379,
at
page
640
(D.L.R.
382-83):
The
Municipal
Act,
R.S.O.
1937,
c.
266,
in
paragraph
1(m),
defines
a
municipality
as
"a
locality,
the
inhabitants
of
which
are
incorporated".
It
is
beyond
dispute
that
the
Township
of
Norman
is
unorganized
territory,
and
that
its
inhabitants
are
not
incorporated.
The
Interpretation
Act,
R.S.O.
1937,
c.
1,
says,
in
section
34,
"the
interpretation
section
of
the
Municipal
Act
shall
extend
to
all
Acts
relating
to
municipal
matters."
It
seems
to
me
that
the
interpretation
section
of
the
Municipal
Act
should
be
an
excellent
place
in
which
to
look
for
the
meaning
of
"municipality"
as
it
is
used
in
the
several
Acts
relating
to
schools.
However,
appellants'
counsel
submits
that
the
School
Acts
deal
not
with
municipal
matters,
but
with
matters
of
education.
I
have
not
found
any
decision
on
the
precise
point
whether
section
34
of
the
Interpretation
Act
has
the
effect
of
extending
the
interpretation
section
of
the
Municipal
Act
to
the
Separate
Schools
Act.
I
take,
therefore,
the
meaning
of
the
word
“municipality”
apart
from
any
statutory
definition.
The
word
is
derived
from
the
Latin
"municipalis".
The
Oxford
English
Dictionary
gives
as
its
meaning:
"(1)
A
town,
city
or
district
possessed
of
privileges
of
local
self-
government,
also
applied
to
its
inhabitants
collectively;
(2)
The
governing
body
of
a
town
or
district
having
municipal
institutions."
As
part
of
an
unorganized
district,
and
itself
unorganized,
the
Township
of
Norman
is
without
the
privilege
of
local
self-government,
or
any
governing
body
to
administer
it.
It
may
have
school
boards
to
govern
and
administer
the
schools
formed
under
the
various
School
Acts,
but
it
has
no
municipal
organization.
It
has
not
even
a
municipal
clerk
to
whom
its
residents,
who
are
separate
school
supporters,
can
give
a
notice
under
section
55
of
the
Separate
Schools
Act.
Similarly,
the
definition
of
"municipalité",
the
word
appearing
in
the
French
version,
in
Robert,
Dictionnaire
de
la
Langue
Française
is
as
follows:
municipalité
.
.
.
Le
corps
municipal;
l'ensemble
des
personnes
qui
administrent
une
commune.
.
.
.
It
has
been
overwhelmingly
demonstrated
on
the
evidence
that
the
Pas
Indian
Band,
through
its
chief
and
council
both
in
the
powers
that
it
exercises
under
the
authority
of
the
Indian
Act
and
the
services
that
it
provides
to
its
members,
is
a
municipality
within
the
definition
quoted
above.
The
very
factors
whose
absence
militated
against
the
Township
of
Norman’s
being
a
municipality
are
here
in
abundance.
Counsel
for
the
respondent,
however,
urges
a
more
restrictive
interpretation.
Her
argument,
which
was
presented
with
skill
and
persuasiveness,
is
premised
initially
upon
the
distribution
of
legislative
competence
between
the
federal
and
provincial
governments.
She
points
out
that,
whereas
the
power
to
legislate
with
respect
to
Indians
and
lands
reserved
for
the
Indians
lies
within
federal
competence,
the
power
to
legislate
in
relation
to
"Municipal
Institutions
in
the
Province”
is
conferred
upon
the
provinces
under
subsection
92(8)
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867.
From
this
she
reasons
that
the
federal
government
would
not
have
the
power
to
create
a
“municipality”
within
an
Indian
reserve
located
in
a
province.
She
accepts
that
it
is
within
the
legislative
competence
of
the
federal
government
to
confer
upon
the
band
the
powers
enumerated
under
sections
81,
83
and
85.1
of
the
Indian
Act,
and
that
the
conferral
of
such
powers
gives
to
the
band
the
attributes
normally
associated
with
conventional
municipalities.
This
does
not,
however,
in
her
submission,
lead
to
the
conclusion
that
the
federal
government
has
created
a
municipality
but
rather
that
it
has
created
something
analogous
or
similar
to
a
municipality.
Her
position
is
that
in
Canada
we
have
generally
three
levels
of
government—federal,
provincial
and
municipal—and
that
in
constituting
an
Indian
band
a
self-governing
body
the
federal
government,
within
its
constitutional
powers,
is
creating
a
fourth
category
and
that
fourth
category
is
not
within
the
meaning
of
municipality
in
paragraph
149(1
)(d).
She
contends
therefore
that
we
must
look
to
a
definition
in
the
laws
of
the
province
having
legislative
competence
over
municipal
institutions,
in
this
case
the
Manitoba
Municipal
Act,
R.S.M.
1988,
c.
M.-225.
Subsection
1(1)
of
that
Act
defines
“municipality”
as
follows:
“municipality”
means,
subject
to
section
3,
(a)
a
corporation
comprising
the
inhabitants
of
an
area
in
the
province
who
are
incorporated
and
continued
under
the
authority
of
this
Act
or
of
another
Act
of
the
Legislature;
or
(b)
the
area
the
inhabitants
of
which
are
incorporated
as
stated
in
clause
(a):
but
does
not
include
a
local
government
district.
She
contends
further
that
in
the
absence
of
a
definition
of
municipality
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
we
should
look
to
a
definition
in
a
statute
that
is
in
pari
materia,
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1985,
c.
E-15,
subsection
2(1).
The
definition
of
municipality
in
that
act
is
as
follows:
2
(1)
“municipality”
means
(a)
an
incorporated
city,
metropolitan
authority,
town,
village,
township,
district
or
rural
municipality
or
other
incorporated
municipal
body
however
designated,
or
(b)
such
other
local
authority
as
the
Governor
in
Council
may
determine
to
be
a
municipality
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act;
Notwithstanding
Ms.
Shield's
able
argument
I
am
unable
to
accept
it.
In
the
first
place
it
would
clearly
be
within
the
legislative
competence
of
Parliament
to
create
a
municipality
on
lands
reserved
for
Indians
in
the
exercise
of
its
power
under
subsection
91(24)
of
the
Constitution
Act,
1867.
Although
it
has
not
expressly
purported
to
create
a
municipality,
it
has
conferred
powers
upon
the
band
under
sections
81,
83
and
85.1
of
the
Indian
Act.
The
result
of
that
conferral
of
powers
by
the
Government
of
Canada,
and
the
exercise
thereof
by
the
band,
has
been
to
create
a
form
of
self-government
that
is
an
essential
attribute
of
a
municipality.
It
follows
therefore
that
the
entity
exercising
that
form
of
self-
government
is
a
municipality
within
the
ordinary
understanding
of
that
word.
The
question
is
not
the
nature
of
the
authority
that
created
the
governmental
body
but
rather
the
nature
of
the
body
that
is
created
The
Excise
Tax
Act
is
not
in
my
view
in
pari
materia.
Indeed,
I
think
it
is
more
reasonable
to
infer
from
the
absence
of
a
definition
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
the
presence
of
one
in
the
Excise
Tax
Act
that
Parliament
did
not
intend
the
more
restrictive
definition
to
apply
to
the
Income
Tax
Act
.
Nor
can
I
find
any
legal
justification
for
looking
to
the
definition
of
municipality
in
the
Manitoba
Municipal
Act
.
It
must
be
recognized
that
paragraph
149(1
)(d)
has
as
its
purpose
the
exemption
from
tax
on
corporations
owned
by
Canadian
municipalities.
The
rationale
I
presume
is
that
the
profits
from
businesses
carried
on
by
such
corporations
will
be
used
for
the
public
purposes
of
the
municipalities,
who
will
nonetheless
have
the
protection
of
limited
liability.
There
can
be
no
justification
for
interpreting
the
paragraph
to
deny
the
exemption
to
corporations
owned
by
a
band
of
Indians
that
as
all
the
attributes
of
a
municipality
on
the
ground
that
it
derives
those
attributes
from
the
Indian
Act
rather
than
from
one
of
the
provincial
statutes
that
regulate
municipal
institutions.
In
my
opinion
The
Pas
Indian
Band
was
a
Canadian
municipality
within
the
meaning
or
paragraph
149(1
)(d)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
accordingly
the
two
companies
that
it
owned,
Otineka
Development
Corp.
and
72902
Manitoba
Ltd.
were
exempt
from
tax
under
paragraph
149(1
)(d).
The
appeals
are
therefore
allowed
with
costs
and
the
assessments
vacated.
There
should
be
only
one
counsel
fee
for
both
appellants.
Appeals
allowed.
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