ABBOTT,
J.
(all
concurring)
:—The
issue
in
this
appeal
is
whether
the
appellant
company
was
‘‘associated’’
during
the
1961
and
1962
taxation
years
with
a
second
company,
Strad-
wick’s
Limited,
within
the
meaning
‘of
Section
39
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
as
such
not
entitled
to
the
lower
tax
rate
on
the
first
$35,000
of
taxable
income
provided
for
in
the
section.
Paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
(4)
of
Section
39
provides
that
two
corporations
are
associated
with
each
other
in
a
taxation
year
if
they
are
controlled
by
the
same
group
of
‘persons.
That
subsection
reads
as
follows
:
39.
(4)
For
the
purpose
of
this
section,
one
corporation
is
associated
with
another
in
a
taxation
year,
if,
at
any
time
in
the
year,
(b)
both
of:
the
corporations
v
were
controlled
by
the
same
person
or
group
of
persons.
In
the
relevant
periods,
the
shareholders
of
Stradwick’s
Lim-
ited
and
their
respective
shareholdings
were:
John
Stradwick,
Sr.
|
12
|
John
Stradwick,
Jr.
|
10
|
W.
L.
Stradwick
|
10
|
H.
D.
MeGilvery
|
8
|
Total
issued
Shares
|
40
|
The
shareholders
of
the
appellant
company
and.
the
respective
shareholdings
were:
John
Stradwick,
Jr.
|
6,133
|
W.
L.
Stradwick
|
6,133
|
H.
D.
McGilvery
|
6,133
|
Stradwick’s
Limited
|
5,250
|
Others
|
16,351
|
Total
issued
shares
|
40,000
|
The
position
of
the
respondent
is
that
the
group
consisting
of
John
Stradwick,
Jr.,
W.
L.
Stradwick
and
H.
D.
McGilvery
controlled
Stradwick
8
Limited
and
it
is
common
ground
between
the
parties
to
the
appeal
that
if
this
group
controlled
Stradwick’s
Limited,
then
it
also
controlled
the
appellant
company.
The
appellant
contends
however
that
the
said
group
did
not
control
Stradwick’s
Limited
and
that
Stradwick’s
Limited
was
controlled
by
a
group
consisting
of
John
Stradwick,
‘Sr.
John
Stradwick,
Jr.,
and
W.
L.
Stradwick.
John
Stradwick,
Sr.,
is
the
father
of
John
Stradwick,
Jr.,
and
W.
L.
Stradwick;
H.
D.
McGilvery
is
a
stranger
in
the
tax
sense.
McGilvery
became
a
shareholder
in
Stradwick’s
Limited
in
1950,
but,
prior
to
that
time,
had
become
a
shareholder,
with
the
Stradwicks,
in
two
other
companies
the
tax
status
of
which
is
not
in
issue
in
this
appeal.
All
three
companies
were
engaged
in
the
manufacture,
wholesaling
er
retailing
of
floor
and
wall
tile.
In
1956,
John
Stradwick,
Jr.,
W.
L.
Stradwick,
H.
D.
McGilvery
and
Stradwick’s
Limited
acquired
control
of
a
fourth
company—the
appellant
Vina-Rug
(Canada)
Limited—which
also
manufactured
floor
coverings.
During
the
1961
and
1962
taxation
years,
there
was
a
common
management
and
administration
for
all
'the
four
companies
referred
to,
and
in
each
of
those
years
the
appellant
company
paid
Stradwick’
s
Limited
$5,000
for
administrative
services
performed
on
its
behalf.
John
Stradwick,
Jr.,
testified
that
the
group
of
shareholders
consisting
of
himself,
his
brother
and
his
father
in
fact
controlled
Stradwick’s
Limited.
It
is
perhaps
not
without
significance
that
McGilvery
attended
and
voted
at
all
shareholders’
and
directors’
meetings
of
Stradwick’s
Limited,
during
the
relevant
periods,
at
which
all
resolutions
were
passed
unanimously.
However,
in
the
view
which
I
take
of
the
issue
in
this
appeal
these
facts
are
irrelevant.
The
learned
trial
judge
held
that
John
Stradwick,
Jr.,
W.
L:
Stradwick
and
H.
D.
McGilvery,
who
collectively
owned
more
than
50%
of
the
shares
of
Stradwick’s
Limited,
had
at
all
material
times
a
sufficient
common
connection
as
to
be
in
a
position
to
exercise
control
over
Stradwick’s
Limited
and
therefore
constituted
a
“‘group
of
persons’’
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
(4)
of
Section
39
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
I
am
in
agreement
with
that
finding.
This
Court
considered
the
concept
of
‘‘control’’
in
M.N.R.
v.
Dworkin
Furs
Limited,
[1967]
S.C.R.
228;
[1967]
C.T.C.
50.
Hall,
J.
in
delivering
the
judgment
of
the
Court
said
at
p.
227
[p.
52]
:
The
word
controlled
as
used
in
this
subsection
was
held
by
Jackett,
P.
to
mean
de
jure
control
and
not
de
facto
control
and
with
this
I
agree.
He
said
in
Buckerfield’s
Limited
et
al.
v.
M.N.R.:
“Many
approaches
might
conceivably
be
adopted
in
applying
the
word
‘control’
in
a
statute
such
as
the
Income
Tax
Act
to
a
corporation.
It
might,
for
example,
refer
to
control
by
‘management’,
where
management
and
the
Board
of
Directors
are
separate,
or
it
might
refer
to
control
by
the
Board
of
Directors.
The
kind
of
control
exercised
by
management
officials
or
the
Board
of
Directors
is,
however,
clearly
not
intended
by
Section
39
when
it
contemplates
control
of
one
corporation
by
another
as
well
as
control
of
a
corporation
by
individuals
(see
subsection
(6)
of
Section
39).
The
word
‘control’
might
conceivably
refer
to
de
facto
control
by
one
or
more
shareholders
whether
or
not
they
hold
a
majority
of
shares.
I
am
of
the
view,
however,
that
in
Section
39
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
the
word
‘controlled’
contemplates
the
right
of
control
that
rests
in
ownership
of
such
a
number
of
shares
as
carries
with
it
the
right
to
a
majority
of
the
votes
in
the
election
of
the
Board
of
Directors.
See
British
American
Tobacco
Co.
v.
C.I.R.,
[1943]
1
All
E.R.
18
where
Viscount
Simon,
L.C.,
at
p.
15
says:
‘The
owners
of
the
majority
of
the
voting
power
in
a
company
are
the
persons
who
are
in
effective
control
of
its
affairs
and
fortunes.’
”
Applying
these
principles,
once
it
is
established
that
a
group
of
shareholders
owns
a
majority
of
the
voting
shares
of
a
company,
and
the
same
group
a
majority
of
the
voting
shares
of
a
second
company,
that
fact
is
sufficient,
in
my
opinion,
to
constitute
the
two
companies
associated
within
the
provisions
of
Section
39
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Moreover,
in
determining
de
jure
control
more
than
one
group
of
persons
can
be
aptly
described
as
a
“group
of
persons’?
within
the
meaning
of
Section
39(4)(b).
In
my
view,
it
is
immaterial
whether
or
not
other
combinations
of
shareholders
may
own
a
majority
of
voting
shares
in
either
company,
provided
each
combination
is
in
a
position
to
control
at
least
a
majority
of
votes
to
be
cast
at
a
general
meeting
of
shareholders.
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.