Clement,
J:—In
this
action
the
appellant
Company
claims
that
a
certificate,
given
by
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
pursuant
to
subsection
52(4)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act
(herein
called
the
Act)
as
to
the
amount
of
tax
and
penalties
payable
by
the
Company
on
transactions
going
back
to
February
1,
1972,
is
invalid
to
the
extent
that
it
includes
amounts
that
became
due
and
owing
prior
to
the
appropriate
limitation
period
prescribed
by
The
Limitations
of
Actions
Act
of
Manitoba.
The
Crown
by
its
defence
denies
that
any
period
of
limitation
exists
for
the
collection
of
excise
tax
under
the
Act,
or
if
it
does,
on
the
facts
of
the
case
the
time
has
not
yet
run
out
on
any
part
of
its
claim.
It
moved
under
Rule
474(1
)(a)
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules
for
determination
of
questions
of
law:
(1)
Is
there
a
limitation
period
applicable
to
an
action
for
collection
of
taxes
and
penalties
under
the
Excise
Tax
Act,
1970,
RSC
Cap
E-13;
(2)
If
the
answer
to
(1
)
above
is
yes,
whatis
is
the
limitation
period
applicable;
and
(3)
If
the
answer
to
(1)
above
is
yes,
what
was
the
date
from
which
the
limitation
period
commenced
for
the
taxes
and
penalties
claimed?
The
application
was
heard
by
Smith
D
J
on
an
agreed
statement
of
facts.He
concluded
that
“During
all
the
period
relevant
to
the
issues
in
this
case
there
was
no
limitation
period
applicable
to
an
action
for
the
collection
of
taxes
and
penalties”
under
the
Act.
This
answered
the
first
question
and
abrogated
the
remaining
contingent
questions.
The
Company
has
appealed.
The
Company
carries
on
a
manufacturing
business
in
Winnipeg
and
the
claim
or
cause
of
action
against
it
for
taxes
lies
in
Manitoba.
The
Department
of
National
Revenue,
Customs
and
Excise,
audited
the
business
operations
of
the
Company
and,
on
August
28,
1975,
sent
it
a
registered
notice
claiming
taxes
exigible
under
Part
V
of
the
Act
on
sales
of
its
manufactured
products,
on
a
continuing
basis
from
February
1,
1972
of
$63,127.21.
On
January
31,
1980
the
Deputy
Minister
issued
his
certificate
that
.
.
.
the
following
amounts
are
now
due,
owing
and
unpaid
by
the
said
E.H.
PRICE
LIMITED:
|
Sales
tax
due
and
accruing
for
the
period
from
February
1st,
1973
to
|
|
|
November
30th,
1974
|
$63,127.61
|
|
Penalty
accrued
to
January
31st,
1980
|
$31,988.45
|
|
$95,116.06
|
together
with
additional
penalty
at
the
rate
of
two-thirds
of
one
percent
per
month
on
the
said
sum
of
$63,127.61
from
February
1st,
1980
to
date
of
payment,
in
accordance
with
subsection
50(4)
of
the
Excise
Tax
Act.
It
was
addressed
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada,
Trial
Division,
and
filed
on
February
7,
1980.
These
two
instruments
were
authorized
as
a
procedure
for
the
recovery
of
taxes
by
subsection
52(4)
of
the
Act,
to
which
I
will
come
shortly.
The
statement
of
claim
of
the
Company
is
dated
October
22,
1979.
At
that
time
it
asserted
invalidity
in
respect
of
the
registered
notice;
and
after
the
Deputy
Minister
had
issued
his
certificate
the
statement
of
claim
was
amended
to
assert
the
invalidity
in
respect
of
any
amount
therein
certified
arising
more
than
six
years
prior
to
January
31,1980.
At
some
unstated
date
the
Company
made
an
application
to
the
Tariff
Board,
but
it
is
common
ground
that
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Board
does
not
extend
to
the
matter
in
issue
here.
Indeed,
the
application
is
held
in
abeyance
pending
final
determination
of
the
question
before
this
Court.
The
agreed
statement
of
facts
records
narrative
that
is
not
essential
to
the
adjudication
of
the
issue
and,
although
it
was
expatiated
on
in
argument,
I
will
not
review
it.
The
point
of
commencement
for
consideration
of
the
relevant
law
is
section
38
of
the
Federal
Court
Act:
(1)
Except
as
expressly
provided
by
any
other
Act,
the
laws
relating
to
prescription
and
the
limitation
of
actions
in
force
in
any
province
and
the
limitation
of
actions
in
force
in
any
province
between
subject
and
subject
apply
to
any
proceedings
in
the
Court
in
respect
of
any
cause
of
action
arising
in
such
province
(2)
Except
as
expressly
provided
by
any
other
Act,
the
laws
relating
to
prescription
and
the
limitation
of
actions
referred
to
in
subsection
(1)
apply
to
any
proceedings
brought
by
or
against
the
Crown.
It
is
subsection
(2)
that
is
of
initial
interest:
there
is
here
involved
proceedings
brought
both
by
and
against
the
Crown.
Then
the
subsection,
by
its
reference
to
subsection
(1),
applies
to
such
proceedings
the
laws
relating
to
prescription
and
the
limitations
of
actions
in
force
—
in
this
case
in
Manitoba
and
for
the
present
purposes
taken
to
be
six
years.
But
this
derogation
of
historical
Crown
prerogative
is
stated
in
subsection
(1)
to
be
limited
“to
any
proceedings
in
the
Court”
which
by
statutory
definition
is
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada;
and
it
does
not
apply
at
all
where
express
provision
in
the
premises
is
made
in
another
Act.
This
exclusion
is
also
made
in
subsection
(2).
The
second
primal
statutory
component
of
the
problem
lies
in
subsections
52(1)
and
(4)
of
the
Act:
52
(1)
All
taxes
or
sums
payable
under
this
Act
shall
be
recoverable
at
any
time
after
the
same
ought
to
have
been
accounted
for
and
paid,
and
all
such
taxes
and
sums
shall
be
recoverable,
and
all
rights
of
Her
Majesty
hereunder
enforced,
with
full
costs
of
suit,
as
a
debt
due
to
or
as
a
right
enforceable
by
Her
Majesty,
in
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
or
in
any
other
court
of
competent
jurisdiction.
(4)
Any
amount
payable
in
respect
of
taxes,
interest
and
penalties
under
Part
II
or
Parts
III
to
VI,
remaining
unpaid
whether
in
whole
or
in
part
after
fifteen
days
from
the
date
of
the
sending
by
registered
mail
of
a
notice
of
arrears
addressed
to
the
licensed
air
carrier
or
taxpayer,
as
the
case
may
be,
may
be
certified
by
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Customs
and
Excise
and
on
the
production
to
the
Federal
Court
of
Canada
or
a
judge
thereof
or
such
officer
as
the
Court
or
a
judge
thereof
may
direct,
the
certificate
shall
be
registered
in
that
Court
and
shall,
from
the
date
of
such
registration,
be
of
the
same
force
and
effect,
and
all
proceedings
may
be
taken
thereon,
as
if
the
certificate
were
a
judgment
obtained
in
that
Court
for
the
recovery
of
a
debt
of
the
amount
specified
in
the
certificate,
including
penalties
to
date
of
payment
as
provided
for
in
Part
II
or
Parts
III
to
VI,
and
entered
upon
the
date
of
such
registration,
and
all
reasonable
costs
and
charges
attendant
upon
the
registration
of
such
certificate
are
recoverable
in
like
manner
as
if
they
were
part
of
such
judgment.
I
am
here
referring
to
the
provisions
of
the
Act
as
they
stood
in
1979
at
the
time
of
commencement
by
the
Company
of
this
action.
Subsequent
amendments
to
the
Act
in
1980-81,
particularly
to
section
52,
cannot
be
applied
here
but
were
noted
by
the
learned
trial
judge
in
the
course
of
considering
the
interpretation
to
be
given
to
the
two
subsections.
The
Crown
in
its
memorandum
of
fact
and
law
anchors
its
position
to
a
progression
of
argument
to
the
following
effect:
(1)
A
certificate
issued
under
s.
52(4)
of
the
Act
and
filed
in
the
Federal
Court
is
not
a
proceeding
in
court
in
respect
of
a
cause
of
action
to
which
s
38(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
could
apply.
(2)
Alternatively,
if
it
is
held
to
be
a
proceeding
in
court
to
which
s
38(1)
applies,
then
s
52(1)
of
the
Act
by
the
words
“at
any
time”
in
its
opening
phrase
“recoverable
at
any
time
after
the
same
ought
to
have
been
accounted
for
and
paid”
is
excluded
from
the
operation
of
s
38(1)
because
those
words
expressly
provide
against
any
limitation
of
time
in
a
suit
for
excise
tax,
and
so
come
within
the
exclusion
from
operation
with
which
s
38(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
opens.
It
is
contended
that
those
words
are
plain
and
must
be
given
their
plain
meaning,
viz
without
limitation
in
time.
(3)
In
further
alternative,
if
the
certificate
is
held
to
be
a
proceeding,
and
so
a
period
of
limitation
is
applicable,
the
time
did
not
begin
to
run
under
s
52(4)
of
the
Act
until
15
days
after
the
date
of
the
registered
notice
I
have
above
referred
to,
that
is
to
say,
15
days
after
August
28,
1975.
These
propositions
seem
to
some
extent
ill
adapted
to
furnishing
an
answer
to
the
first
question
the
Crown
is
seeking
to
have
answered,
but
the
argument
at
Bar
was
wide-ranging
and
I
will
try
to
reflect
its
scope
hereunder.
It
is
clear
that
a
certificate
issued
and
filed
under
section
52(4)
is
a
proceeding
for
the
recovery
of
taxes,
interest
and
penalties
which
of
itself
is
within
the
meaning
of
that
word
in
subsection
38(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
I
adopt
the
words
of
Perdue,
J
A
in
Royce
v
Municipality
of
Macdonald,
[1909]
12
WLR
347
at
350:
The
word
“proceeding”
has
a
very
wide
meaning;
and
includes
steps
or
measures
which
are
not
in
any
way
connected
with
actions
or
suits.
The
contest
is
whether
upon
filing
it
became
a
proceeding
in
court.
This
has
been
decided
adversely
to
the
Company
in
a
series
of
judgments
in
the
Trial
Division
of
this
Court,
of
which
the
latest
is
Fl
v
T
H
Parker,
[1981]
2
CER
181.
At
182
Cattanach,
J
said:
That
certificate
is
not
a
judgment
nor
does
it
become
a
judgment
of
the
Court
when
registered
but
it
remains
merely
a
certificate
of
the
Minister
even
though
such
a
certificate
when
registered
has
the
same
force
and
effect,
and
all
proceedings
may
be
taken
thereon
as
if
the
certificate
were
a
judgment
obtained
in
the
Court
(see
MNR
v
Bolduc,
[1961]
Ex
CR
115
at
118
and
Queen
v
Star
Treck
Holdings
Limited,
[1978]
1
FC
61
at
64.
And
later
at
183:
There
is
no
action
in
this
Court.
There
is
no
judgment
of
this
Court.
There
is
a
certificate
signed
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
by
his
deputy.
I
respectfully
agree,
and
venture
only
a
little
further
elaboration.
A
proceeding
in
court
contemplates
the
assertion
of
a
cause
of
action
and
an
opportunity
to
raise
defences
against
it
in
fact
and
law,
which
could
include
a
plea
of
prescription
by
statutory
limitation.
Subsection
52(4)
of
the
Act
gives
no
such
opportunity
to
a
taxpayer
to
assert
defences
to
the
bald
claim
of
the
Deputy
Minister.
Upon
defences
being
raised,
a
court
must
hear
and
determine
the
issues
and
deliver
judgment.
Subsection
52(4)
is
antithetic
to
such
normal
court
process.
When
a
certificate
is
filed
it
is
not
in
any
respect
in
the
nature
of
a
judgment.
It
remains
a
certificate
of
the
Deputy
Minister
which
serves
to
invoke
and
take
advantage
of
some
subsequent
administrative
processes
adjunct
to
the
court
for
the
collection
of
a
judgment.
But
the
foregoing
only
clears
away
some
underbrush
in
coming
to
an
answer
to
the
first
question
posed
in
the
Crown’s
application.
The
decisive
matters
lie
in
the
interpretation
to
be
put
on
the
phrase
“at
any
time”,
in
subsection
52(1)
of
the
Act,
and
whether
a
proceeding
under
that
subsection
is
distinguishable
from
a
proceeding
under
subsection
(4)
for
the
purposes
of
prescription.
Counsel
for
the
Crown
very
fairly,
and
in
my
view
quite
rightly,
observed
that
it
would
be
incongruous,
even
ridiculous,
to
have
such
a
distinction
drawn.
This
in
effect
is
also
the
position
of
the
Company:
the
divergence
is
in
the
interpretation
and
application
of
the
phrase.
Indeed,
the
first
question
posed
for
this
Court
refers
to
an
action,
but
we
are
here
dealing
with
a
certificate.
I
will
turn
first
to
the
matter
of
comity
between
the
two
subsections.
I
have
noted
above
that
a
proceeding
to
which
subsection
38(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act
refers,
is
equally
a
proceeding
to
which
subsection
(2)
refers;
so
that
a
proceeding
under
subsection
52(4)
of
the
Act
comes
within
the
phrase
“any
proceedings”
used
in
both
subsections.
But
subsection
(1)
limits
the
availability
of
the
laws
there
described
to
“any
proceedings
in
court”.
No
such
limitation
is
expressed
on
their
availability
for
the
purposes
of
subsection
(2),
and
I
am
of
opinion
that
this
clearly
discloses
the
legislative
intent
of
Parliament.
Subsection
(2)
does
not
limit
the
nature
of
the
proceedings
in
which
such
laws
are
made
available,
and
specifically
makes
them
available
to
any
proceedings
brought
by
or
against
the
Crown.
Subject
to
other
considerations,
such
laws
are,
in
my
view,
made
as
fully
available
to
a
taxpayer
in
respect
of
an
amount
certified
by
the
Deputy
Minister
under
subsection
52(4)
of
the
Act
as
they
are
in
proceedings
in
the
Court.
The
difference
is
that
subsection
52(4)
provides
the
taxpayer
with
no
means
of
asserting
such
laws
against
the
Crown:
he
is
obliged
to
come
to
court
to
pray
for
relief
as
is
done
here.
In
analogous
circumstances
in
Twinriver
Timber
Ltd
v
R
in
Right
of
British
Columbia
(1890),
15
BCLR
38,
Taylor,
J
approved
such
a
course,
and
his
opinion
was
affirmed
by
the
British
Columbia
Court
of
Appeal
in
(1981),
25
BCLR
175
at
180.
The
phrase
in
contention,
“at
any
time”,
occurs
in
subsection
52(1)
of
the
Act
and
must
be
construed
before
turning
to
subsection
(4)
in
which
it
does
not
appear.
In
argument
the
Court
was
urged
to
view
subsection
52(1)
historically
as
an
aid
to
interpretation
of
the
subsection
as
it
stood
in
1979.
It
is
right
to
take
this
into
account
in
the
present
circumstances
for
that
purpose.
It
was,
for
example,
taken
into
account
in
similar
circumstances
by
Sankey,
J
in
Attorney-General
v
Brown,
[1920]
1
KB
773
where
he
said
in
part
at
791:
The
case
turns
upon
the
construction
of
s.
43,
and
in
construing
an
Act
of
Parliament
it
is,
in
my
view,
legitimate
to
consider
the
state
of
law
at
the
time
the
Act
of
Parliament
was
passed,
and
the
changes
it
was
passed
to
effect;
the
sections
and
structure
of
the
Act
of
Parliament
as
a
whole;
The
antecedent
of
subsection
52(1)
of
the
Act
for
this
purpose
is
found
in
subsection
20(1)
of
the
Special
War
Revenue
Act,
1915
which
is
in
identical
terms
to
subsection
52(1)
of
the
Act
save
for
reference
to
the
Exchequer
Court
which
was
the
predecessor
of
this
Court.
Throughout
the
years
from
1915
to
1980-81
there
has
been
no
other
change
in
this
subsection.
At
the
time
of
its
enactment
there
was,
as
is
noted
at
page
39
in
Twinriver
Timber
Ltd
v
R
in
Right
of
British
Columbia,
supra,
a
“common
law
presumption
of
Crown
exemption
from
statutory
burdens
and
disabilities”.
More
imperative
is
the
provision
in
the
Interpretation
Act
(Can.)
which
by
section
16
provided
then,
and
still
provides:
16
No
enactment
is
binding
on
Her
Majesty
or
affects
Her
Majesty
or
Her
Majesty’s
rights
or
prerogatives
in
any
manner,
except
only
as
therein
mentioned
or
referred
to.
From
this
premise
the
Crown
urges,
in
effect,
that
the
phrase
“at
any
time”
as
used
in
subsection
20(1)
of
the
1915
statute
is
couched
in
plain
words
and
has
the
plain
meaning
set
out
in
its
alternative
argument
(2),
supra.
Of
the
authorities
cited
in
support
of
such
an
interpretative
approach
it
is
sufficient
to
refer
only
to
The
Canadian
Northern
Railway
Co
et
al
v
The
King
(1922),
44
SCR
264
wherein
at
270
Duff,
J
(later
CJC)
adopted
the
familiar
canon
of
construction
enunciated
by
Lord
Wensleydale
in
Grey
v
Pearson
(1857),
6
HL
Cas
61
at
106:
In
construing
wills,
and,
indeed,
statutes
and
all
written
instruments,
the
grammatical
and
ordinary
sense
of
the
words
is
to
be
adhered
to,
unless
that
would
lead
to
absurdity
or
some
repugnance
or
inconsistency
with
the
rest
of
the
instrument;
in
which
case
the
grammatical
and
ordinary
sense
of
the
words
may
be
modified
so
as
to
avoid
that
absurdity,
repugnancy,
or
inconsistency,
but
no
further.
Further
on
he
says:
There
might
of
course
be
something
in
the
context
excluding
that
meaning;
to
attribute
such
meaning
to
the
words
might
give
rise
to
some
repugnancy
to
the
declared
or
apparent
object
of
the
statute
and
if
so,
then
the
literal
meaning
would
give
way
to
an
interpretation
more
in
harmony
with
the
ascertained
purpose
of
the
legislature.
For
the
Company
it
is
pointed
out
that
since
prescription
did
not
then
apply
to
the
Crown,
the
phrase
“at
any
time”
should
not
be
given
a
meaning
that
would
be
merely
a
vague
affirmation
of
the
Crown’s
prerogative
—
that
would
be
an
absurdity
—
but
should
be
assigned
a
meaning
that
would
give
it
some
reasonable
function
in
the
operation
of
the
1915
statute.
That
statute,
as
does
the
Act,
imposed
taxes
on
various
operations
and
products
and
in
each
case
makes
provision
for
payment
or
collection.
It
is
submitted
that
in
such
context
the
phrase
is
designed
to
affirm
the
specific
due
date
designated
for
payment
of
the
various
imposts,
and
should
be
so
interpreted
both
then
and
now.
If
this
interpretation
is
applied
to
subsection
52(1)
of
the
Act,
it
provides
no
ground
for
the
operation
of
the
exclusion
in
subsection
38(1)
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
As
I
have
noted,
the
phrase
does
not
appear
at
all
in
subsection
52(4):
but
there
is
imposed
a
time
lapse
on
a
further
administrative
step
that
is
not
relevant
to
the
present
point
although
it
will
require
comment
later.
The
purpose
of
the
1915
statute
was
to
raise
revenue,
a
purpose
which
the
Act
continues
in
an
expanded
and
more
detailed
way.
Thus,
it
will
be
more
to
the
point
to
deal
with
the
contention
of
the
Company
on
the
basis
of
the
Act.
There
are
six
categories
of
tax
specified.
Part
I
makes
special
provisions
in
respect
of
designated
insurances
and
has
no
application
here.
Part
II
imposes
a
tax
on
air
transportation
payable
(section
12)
when
the
transportation
is
paid
for
“and
in
any
case
prior
to
the
provision
of
the
transportation”.
Part
III
imposes
excise
on
cosmetics,
jewellery
or
radios
and
other
designated
goods
both
imported
and
manufactured
or
produced
in
Canada.
The
duty
is
made
payable,
generally
speaking,
when
imported
goods
are
taken
out
of
bond
for
consumption,
or
when
Canadian
goods
are
delivered
to
the
purchaser.
Part
IV
levies
a
tax
on
playing
cards
and
wine,
payable
at
times
analogous
to
those
stipulated
under
Part
III.
Part
IV.I
imposes
natural
gas
and
gas
liquids
taxes
as
an
element
of
the
National
Energy
Programme.
They
are
made
payable
also
at
varying
times,
dependent
upon
the
stage
of
production
or
distribution.
Part
V
exacts
a
consumption
or
sales
tax,
under
which
the
Company
is
taxed.
In
respect
of
the
goods
it
refers
to
that
are
produced
or
manufactured
in
Canada,
the
tax
is,
broadly
speaking,
payable
at
the
time
of
delivery
to
the
purchaser,
or
when
title
passes,
whichever
is
earlier;
and
on
imported
goods
when
they
are
taken
out
of
bond.
There
follows
Part
VI
which
bears
the
rubric
“General”,
and
it
is
in
this
part
that
section
52
occurs.
It
is
directed
to
procedures
for
the
recovery
of
taxes
and
other
sums
payable
under
the
Act.
In
the
context
in
which
the
phrase
“at
any
time”
is
used
in
subsection
(1)
I
am
of
opinion
that
the
contention
of
the
Crown
is
right.
The
subsection
has
two
operative
parts,
both
general
in
nature.
The
first
contains
the
phrase
in
question:
All
taxes
or
sums
payable
under
this
Act
shall
be
recoverable
at
any
time
after
the
same
ought
to
have
been
accounted
for
and
paid.
The
application
of
this
provision
is
comprehensive:
the
opening
words
embrace
all
amounts
made
exigible
by
the
Act,
by
whatever
means
are
provided
for
their
recovery
by
the
Crown.
One
of
the
means
for
recovery
is
provided
by
subsection
52(4).
Linked
inseparably
to
this
inclusive
opening
are
the
words
“shall
be
recoverable
at
any
time
after
the
same
ought
to
have
been
accounted
for
and
paid”.
Here
is
found
a
clear
recognition
of
the
various
times
at
which
the
obligations
to
pay
the
imposts
arise.
In
my
opinion
it
would
put
too
severe
a
strain
on
the
normal
canons
of
construction
to
say,
as
contended
by
the
company,
that
the
phrase
“at
any
time”
draws
its
meaning
only
as
an
emphasis
of
the
words
following
which
deal
with
a
different
matter,
namely,
the
due
dates
for
payment
of
the
imposts.
Grammatically,
it
is
an
adjectival
phrase
giving
dimension
to
the
word
“recoverable”.
Understood
in
this
sense,
its
operation
makes
clear
the
intent
of
Parliament
that
time
shall
not
run
against
a
claim
of
the
Crown
for
any
excise
taxes
imposed
by
the
Act.
I
am
of
opinion
that
this
amounts
to
an
express
provision
within
the
exceptions
contemplated
by
section
38
of
the
Federal
Court
Act.
The
second
operative
part
of
the
subsection
gives
the
Crown
generally
a
cause
of
action
in
debt
for
the
recovery
of
all
taxes
and
sums,
in
addition
to
such
other
remedies
as
the
Act
provides.
To
all
such
proceedings
the
first
operative
part
of
the
subsection
has
application.
In
the
result,
I
respectfully
agree
with
the
learned
trial
judge
that
no
statute
of
limitation
bars
any
claim
for
taxes
involved
in
these
proceedings.
There
are
two
further
points
which
must
be
disposed
of,
both
relating
to
interpretation
of
statutory
provisions.
Both
counsel
referred
to
a
wide
assortment
of
statutes
that
employ
the
phrase
“at
any
time”
in
a
variety
of
contexts.
Construing
the
phrase
in
the
context
of
its
use
in
other
statutes
is
merely
an
exercise
in
the
production
of
irrelevancies
unless
the
project
can
be
fairly
said
to
come
within
the
canon
of
construction
known
as
in
pari
materia.
I
accept
the
following
passage
in
Craies
on
Statute
Law,
7th
Edition,
page
134:
Where
Acts
of
Parliament
are
in
pari
materia,
that
is
to
say,
are
so
far
related
as
to
form
a
system
or
code
of
legislation,
the
rule
as
laid
down
by
the
twelve
judges
in
Palmer’s
Case,
is
that
such
Acts
“are
to
be
taken
together
as
forming
one
system,
and
as
interpreting
and
enforcing
each
other”.
If
such
relation
does
not
exist
between
the
statutes,
then
the
passage
at
page
133
is
applicable:
In
the
interpretation
of
statutes
the
courts
decline
to
consider
other
statutes
proceeding
on
different
lines
and
including
different
provisions,
or
the
judicial
decisions
thereon.
There
has
been
no
discernible
effort
at
Bar
to
show
that
the
assortment
of
statutes
brought
to
the
notice
of
this
Court
are
in
pari
materia,
nor
do
their
disparate
titles
and
legislative
sources
inspire
hope
that
such
an
effort
would
avail.
Then
it
is
urged
that
the
learned
trial
judge
was
right
in
looking
at
the
1980-81
amendment
to
subsection
52(1)
of
the
Act
as
an
aid
to
interpreting
its
meaning
as
it
stood
in
1979.
The
canon
of
construction
which
appears
to
arise
on
this
submission
is
established
authoritatively
in
Heydon’s
Case
76
ER
637:
That
for
the
sure
and
true
interpretation
of
all
statutes
in
general
(be
they
penal
or
beneficial,
restrictive
or
enlarging
of
the
common
law),
four
things
are
to
be
discerned
and
considered:
(1)
What
was
the
common
law
before
the
making
of
the
Act
(2)
What
was
the
mischief
and
defect
for
which
the
common
law
did
not
provide
(3)
What
remedy
the
Parliament
hath
resolved
and
appointed
to
cure
the
disease
of
the
commonwealth
(4)
The
true
reason
of
the
remedy.
And
then
the
office
of
all
the
judges
is
always
to
make
such
construction
as
shall
suppress
the
mischief
and
advance
the
remedy,
and
to
suppress
subtle
inventions
and
evasions
for
the
continuance
of
the
mischief
and
pro
private
commodo,
and
to
add
force
and
life
to
the
cure
and
remedy
according
to
the
true
intent
of
the
makers
of
the
Act
pro
bono
publico.
I
am
of
opinion
that
it
would
amount
to
an
inversion
of
the
canon
to
apply
it
backwards
as
is
here
proposed.
It
would
apply
if
a
dispute
should
arise
as
to
the
interpretation
of
the
1980-81
amendment:
but
I
would
not
wish
to
venture
on
obiter
dicta
as
to
the
interpretation
and
operation
of
the
amendments
to
section
52,
in
order
to
determine
what
was
the
law
before
their
enactment.
Those
amendments
are
complex
and
deserve
full
argument
and
their
own
chapter
when
they
are
themselves
properly
before
the
Court
for
construction.
I
conclude
that
the
appeal
must
be
dismissed
and
the
answer
given
by
the
learned
trial
judge
to
the
first
question
is
affirmed
namely:
During
all
the
period
relevant
to
the
issues
in
this
case
there
was
no
limitation
period
applicable
to
an
action
for
the
collection
of
taxes
and
penalties
under
the
Excise
Tax
Act.
Questions
2
and
3,
based
on
a
contingency
that
has
not
arisen,
are
not
answerable.
The
respondent
will
have
his
costs
of
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.
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