Citation: 2004TCC619
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Date: 20040909
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Docket: 2004-263(IT)I
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BETWEEN:
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DWIGHT WEBB,
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Appellant,
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
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Respondent.
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____________________________________________________________________
Agent for the Appellant: Bob Rogers
Counsel for the Respondent: Gavin Laird
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered orally from the Bench on
July 16, 2004, at Vancouver, British Columbia)
Bowie J.
[1] These appeals are brought from
reassessments for income tax for the 1997 and 1998 taxation
years. The issue in each appeal is whether the Appellant is
entitled to a tax credit in respect of a charitable donation, as
claimed by him in his income tax returns for those years. The
Minister of National Revenue initially allowed the credits as
claimed by the Appellant, but subsequently reassessed him to
disallow those credits in their entirety.
[2] The Appellant's claims were
for credits based on $7,069 of a $30,000 donation said to have
been made in 1997, and $17,097 carried forward to 1998. He
claimed to have donated $30,000 in 1997 to an organization known
as the Association for the Betterment of Literacy and Education,
which I shall call ABLE, during the year 1997.
[3] The Appellant testified that he
gave $30,000 to ABLE because he wished to do something to promote
literacy in British Columbia and that organization was, he said,
dedicated to that purpose. He himself was not a very quick
reader, he said, and he regretted that. He had met a person by
the name of Stuart MacPherson through Montecristo Jewellers where
he, the Appellant, was employed. Mr. MacPherson recommended ABLE
to him as an organization through which he could make a donation
to help the cause of literacy, and he did so. First, however, he
telephoned the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency to ensure that
ABLE was indeed a registered charity, and he was assured that it
was. At the time that was true, although a short time after he
made his donation ABLE was deregistered.
[4] Mr. Webb also testified that he
was not offered any inducement or reward for making the donation
that he made to ABLE, nor any receipt for an amount in excess of
the $30,000 that he gave. This was the substance of his evidence
in chief. He produced a copy of a cancelled cheque drawn by him,
payable to ABLE, and a receipt in that amount made out in his
name and signed on behalf of ABLE. Both of these documents are
dated January 30, 1998. Mr. Webb testified that he gave the
cheque to Mr. MacPherson in the Montecristo jewellery store and
received the receipt from him.
[5] It is obvious that the appeal for
1997 must fail. Tax credits may be claimed in respect of a
donation made in the year to a registered charity; a donation or
part of one may be carried forward to a later year if it has not
been claimed in the year in which it was made; but there is no
provision for a carryback to an earlier year of the unused
portion of a donation. The appeal for the 1997 taxation year is
therefore dismissed, as the gift, if there was one at all, was
not made before the end of 1997.
[6] At the conclusion of the
Appellant's evidence in chief, he and his agent sought to
stay these proceedings on the curious basis that by his evidence
he had proved his case. Clearly he did not wish to be subjected
to cross-examination. That cross-examination took place, however,
and it, together with the evidence of Mr. Larry Kuhn, satisfy me
that the Appellant did not tell the truth when he testified that
he had donated $30,000 to ABLE in January 1998 without any
incentive offered to him, and without anticipation of receiving
any payment in return from ABLE, or from a related third
party.
[7] Mr. Webb admitted reluctantly
under cross-examination that his charitable donations in the
years 1992 to 2002, exclusive of the $30,000 cheque to ABLE and a
$150 cheque to something called Taxman, which the evidence
suggests is an organization related to ABLE, amounted to $100 in
1994, $50 in 1997, $30 in 1998, $100 in 2000, and $100 in 2002.
That is to say less than $400 in a period of 11 years or an
average of approximately $35 per year.
[8] Mr. Webb was questioned about his
prior relationship with Mr. Stuart MacPherson and he denied
having had any business dealings with him. However it became
clear during Mr. Kuhn's evidence that the Appellant and Mr.
MacPherson had been involved together in a number of business
ventures over a period of years, all in the form of corporations
subscribed by only a few investors. It seems highly unlikely that
they did not know each other, and know on those occasions that
the other was also an investor.
[9] Mr. Larry Kuhn is a chartered
accountant and has a degree in business administration. He has
been a Revenue Canada, or Canada Customs and Revenue Agency,
assessor since 1992. He was personally and extensively involved
in audits arising out of numerous claims for charitable donations
to ABLE during the period from 1993 to 1996. He investigated the
operations of ABLE and is familiar with its history and its mode
of operation.
[10] He testified that ABLE was a creation
of a Mr. Henry Thill, who brought it into existence and ran it
during its early years. He identified a number of promotional
brochures that explained its operations. At different times, he
said, it operated in different ways. Two of the principal methods
of operation were these. An arrangement under which a person
could make a donation for which he would receive a receipt for
four times the amount donated, that he would then use to claim
tax credits, which generally speaking could be expected to exceed
the amount of the so-called donation. In the later period,
beginning around 1995, donors would receive a gift in return for
their donations of 75% of the amount of the gift. These gifts
would come from either ABLE or some related source. This method
of operating has essentially the same effect as the first. A
person who purports to donate $1,000 and receives a receipt for
$1,000 and $750 returned in cash, then has in fact only
transferred $250 to the organization but has a $1,000 receipt
which can be used then to claim a spurious tax credit.
[11] Mr. Kuhn testified that during his time
investigating the operations of ABLE and assessing donors to it
he had disallowed the tax credits claimed by each and every one
of 550 so-called donors whom he had audited. In no case did he
find a donor to ABLE who had paid more than 25% of the value of
the receipt obtained. Either they paid 25% of the face amount of
the receipt, or they paid 100% of the face amount of the receipt
and received a 75% rebate in one form or another.
[12] Mr. Kuhn also identified a series of
purchase orders by which ABLE purchased what may be called
"reading kits", or packages to be distributed by it to
various schools in British Columbia, as well as the invoices by
which its supplier obtained these packages. Without going into
all the details of these transactions, it is obvious from the
magnitude of the markups that these are not normal business
transactions, but that, as Mr. Kuhn testified was the usual case,
much of the money simply was circulated through the printing and
distributing companies before being returned to the original
donors.
[13] Mr. Webb's employer, Pasquale
Cusano, was one of the individuals who participated in this
operation, as was Stuart MacPherson, who apparently became a
director of ABLE in or about April 1997. As I mentioned earlier,
as a result of the evidence that came to light during Mr.
Kuhn's investigations of ABLE, it was deregistered in 1999.
Mr. Laird said quite candidly, in the course of argument, that
there was, as he put it, no smoking gun in the evidence to show
that Mr. Webb's cheque payable to ABLE for $30,000 was not a
gift. He could offer no concrete evidence of a payback to Mr.
Webb of $22,500, or any other amount.
[14] Despite the lack of any such conclusive
proof, I find that Mr. Webb either received such a payment, or at
the least, wrote his cheque and gave it to Mr. MacPherson in
anticipation of such a payment in return for it. I base my
conclusion as to Mr. Webb's lack of credibility on a number
of factors. First, he was dishonest as to the date of his cheque
when filing his income tax return in 1997. He made a claim for a
credit in 1997, although he must have known that the payment was
in fact not made, if it was made at all, until 1998. Secondly, he
was extremely evasive when cross-examined about his business
dealings with Stuart MacPherson and Pasquale Cusano. At first he
denied having had business dealings with Mr. MacPherson, although
quite clearly he did. Third, it is inherently improbable that a
man who made virtually no charitable gifts during a period of
more than ten years, would suddenly in one year only make a gift
of the magnitude of this one, being something close to the amount
of his after-tax income for the year, and do so without any
apparent investigation of the charities that exist to promote
literacy. Mr. Webb spoke from time to time of due diligence in
the course of his evidence, but he was unable to name even one
other organization in British Columbia, or for that matter in the
world, whose aims and objects included the promotion of literacy.
One might expect a person suddenly moved to make such a
magnanimous donation to have at least considered other possible,
and perhaps more worthy, donees. Fourthly, it would be a
remarkable coincidence if on the occasion of that $30,000
transaction, it turned out also to be the one occasion on which
ABLE was soliciting donations without offering the inducement of
cash back or inflated receipts that would turn what was intended
to appear on the face of it as a donation into the purchase of
tax credits at a favourable price. I am hard pressed to believe
that on this one occasion, ABLE accepted a gift and gave nothing
in return, or promised nothing in return. On several occasions
throughout the hearing Mr. Webb and his agent both referred to
the purported donation as a purchase. I am sure when they did, it
was unconscious on their part, but "purchase" is, of
course, a word quite inapt to describe a gift. It was, I thought,
a telling slip of the tongue. Sixthly, neither Mr. Thill nor
Mr. MacPherson was called to testify as to the use of the funds
donated by ABLE, or as to the genuineness of ABLE's
operations, or with respect to this specific transaction,
although it was clearly put in issue by the Reply that the
Minister would advance the position that this purported gift was
in fact not a gift but a transaction of a kind intended to confer
a tax advantage greater than the amount paid. As Mr. Laird
conceded, there is no smoking gun. Nevertheless the evidence
satisfies me that Mr. Webb made the payment of $30,000, as I have
already said, at least in anticipation of the future return of a
large portion of his gift back to him, either from ABLE or
through an indirect channel, in addition to the receipt
itself.
[16] Much has been written on the subject of
charitable donations over the years. The law, however, is in my
view quite clear. I am bound by the decision of the Federal Court
of Appeal in The Queen v. Friedberg,[1] among others. These
cases make it clear that in order for an amount to be a gift to
charity, the amount must be paid without benefit or consideration
flowing back to the donor, either directly or indirectly, or
anticipation of that. The intent of the donor must, in other
words, be entirely donative.
[17] The circumstances that I have referred
to lead me to conclude that there was nothing donative at all
about Mr. Webb's payment to ABLE. His intention was to
receive a tax credit for a charitable donation, as well as a
substantial refund of the amount he had given, such that when the
two were aggregated they would exceed the $30,000 for which he
wrote the cheque.
[18] I was referred in argument to the
recent decision of Madam Justice Campbell in Doubinin v. The
Queen[2]
and her statement in the first sentence of paragraph 18 where she
said:
He is not part of a tax evasion scheme, and although he may have
been motivated by potential tax benefits, I do not believe that
this can be equated to consideration for a gift because tax
benefits are not considered a benefit. ...
I do not read Madam Justice Campbell as purporting there to
extend what was said by Mr. Justice Linden in Friedberg[3] to
suggest that a scheme entered into whereby a person would be put
in a position to claim tax credits for charitable donations in
excess of the donations actually made, by the issuing of false
receipts or by the kickback of part of the donation, to be a
normal transaction and something that would not be considered a
benefit within the context of the definition of what constitutes
a gift. As Mr. Justice Linden put it in Friedberg:
A gift is a voluntary transfer of property owned by a donee,
owned by donor to a donee, in return for which no benefit or
consideration flows to the donor.
I am bound, of course, by that definition and, I do not
consider it to be qualified by what was said by Madam Justice
Campbell in Doubinin. Clearly the amount paid in this case
does not fall within that definition, and the appeal for 1998
will also be dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 9th day of September, 2004.
Bowie J.