Docket: IMM-9095-24
Citation: 2026 FC 743
Vancouver, British Columbia, June 5, 2026
PRESENT: Mr. Justice Sébastien Grammond
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BETWEEN:
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AKASH MAKHIJA
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
[1] Mr. Makhija is seeking judicial review of a decision of a visa officer refusing his study permit application and finding him inadmissible for misrepresentation pursuant to paragraph 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. I am dismissing his application, because the decision was reasonable based on the record before the officer.
I. Background
[2] Mr. Makhija is a citizen of India. His study permit application was accompanied by a guaranteed investment certificate [GIC] purported to be issued by Scotiabank. It was not accompanied by a use of representative form. Upon verification with the bank, the visa officer found that the GIC was fraudulent. He then sent a procedural fairness letter [PFL] to Mr. Makhija, giving him 10 days to provide an explanation. Having received no answer within this timeframe, the officer then found Mr. Makhija inadmissible for misrepresentation.
[3] In his application for judicial review, Mr. Makhija now says that he retained the services of an unlicensed immigration consultant operating in India and asked him to purchase the GIC on his behalf. Through an access to information request, he discovered that the consultant had created an email account to communicate with Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC], had forged his signature on the application, and had sent a request to withdraw the application shortly before IRCC began investigating the misrepresentation. Mr. Makhija asserts that he has been the victim of fraud and has complained to the police in India.
II. Analysis
[4] Mr. Makhija’s main ground of judicial review is that the officer made an unreasonable decision by failing to apply the “honest mistake exception”
to misrepresentation discussed in cases such as Gill v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1441. This submission fails for the simple reason that the officer was never asked to consider this exception and had no facts before them that could justify the exception. One must bear in mind that there was no answer to the PFL. This distinguishes cases such as Pandher v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 687, in which the applicant responded to the officer and asked that the exception be applied. Rather, this case is similar to Mansooryan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1718 at paragraph 32 [Mansooryan], where the applicant did not answer the PFL. At the hearing, Mr. Makhija conceded as much.
[5] Likewise, the officer did not treat a “ghost consultant”
as an authorized representative, as Mr. Makhija contends in his written submissions. Rather, the officer had no knowledge that the application had been prepared by a consultant.
[6] Nor did the officer have a duty to investigate the matter further: Malhi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 392 at paragraph 18 [Malhi]; Mansooryan at paragraph 31. Mr. Makhija did not put forward any legal basis for such a duty. It is hard to accept that the mere absence of an answer to the PFL would trigger such a duty.
[7] It is also well established that an officer may make a finding of misrepresentation even if the applicant attempts to withdraw the application: Zhang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 463 at paragraph 7; Geng v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FC 1155 at paragraphs 35–37; D’Almeida v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 870 at paragraphs 40–45; Lim v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 871 at paragraphs 25–31.
[8] Hence, the officer’s decision is reasonable. The factual scenario of this case, then, can only give rise to a procedural fairness argument.
[9] However, Mr. Makhija did not articulate such an argument. At the hearing, I suggested that his submissions were analogous to ineffective assistance of counsel, which may amount to a breach of procedural fairness. Even though he superficially agreed, he simply went on to repeat the submissions made in his memorandum of fact and law.
[10] In any event, this Court has held that there is no breach of procedural fairness where an applicant takes no steps to verify the accuracy of representations made by a consultant, even in circumstances where the consultant sets up an email account preventing the applicant from directly communicating with IRCC: Haghighat v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 598 at paragraphs 21–22; Malhi at paragraph 19; Mansooryan at paragraphs 4, 31.
[11] The application for judicial review must therefore be dismissed.
III. Certified Question
[12] Mr. Makhija is asking me to certify the following question for the consideration of the Federal Court of Appeal:
Where fraudulent or false information is submitted in a visa application by an unauthorized ‘ghost’ consultant without the knowledge, authorization, or consent of the applicant, can such conduct constitute ‘misrepresentation’ attributable to an applicant under section 40(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act?
[13] I cannot certify this question because it is not determinative of this application. It is for the officer, not for this Court, to determine if there was a misrepresentation. The officer did not have any evidence that the application was filed by a consultant, “ghost”
or otherwise, who acted without Mr. Makhija’s authorization. Hence, the proposed certified question does not arise on the facts of this case.
[14] More generally, this Court’s case law on the issue is well settled. More than ten years ago, Justice Tremblay-Lamer wrote as follows in Goudarzi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 425 at paragraph 51:
The Court acknowledges that the problem of fraudulent immigration consultants is a serious one. However, this problem does not amount to a defence against the operation of section 40(1)(a). Furthermore, subject to the narrow exception discussed above, this Court has consistently found that an applicant can be inadmissible under section 40(1)(a) for misrepresentations made by another without the applicant’s knowledge. There can thus clearly be no subjective intent or knowledge requirement to section 40: this would be contrary to the broad interpretation that the wording and purpose of the provision requires.
[15] She declined to certify a question somewhat similar to that proposed by Mr. Makhija. I will do the same, given that the Federal Court of Appeal stated that a question should not be certified where the law is well settled: Mudrak v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 178 at paragraph 36.
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