Date: 20260504

Docket: IMM-6586-25

Citation: 2026 FC 586

Montréal, Québec, May 4, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ferron

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicant, Ms. Jiajing Zhang, is a citizen of China. She seeks the judicial review of a decision made by an officer of Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] dated January 16, 2025 [Decision], rejecting her application for a work permit and deeming her inadmissible to Canada for withholding or misrepresenting material facts based on paragraph 40(1)a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].

[2] The Applicant was nominated by the province under the Saskatchewan Immigrant Nominee Program in February 2024. She applied to IRCC for a work permit soon thereafter, with an offer of employment from a local Boston Pizza. In June 2024, IRCC requested that a new offer of employment be submitted by the Applicant’s prospective employer because the offer on file mentioned the wrong passport number. A corrected offer was submitted. In July 2024, IRCC requested that the offer of employment be updated, to confirm that the Boston Pizza was still ready and willing to employ the Applicant. A new offer dated July 26, 2024, was submitted [Last Letter of Offer]. On December 9, 2024, IRCC sent a procedural fairness letter informing the Applicant that it had reasons to believe that the offer of employment on file was no longer valid so she might have failed to abide by the duty of candour laid out by paragraph 16(1) of the IRPA and could eventually be found inadmissible under paragraph 40(1)a) of the IRPA [PF Letter]. The Applicant promptly answered with a letter indicating that she was a “little confused” by the request and recalling that further to a previous request, a new offer dated July 26, 2024, had been submitted. She further indicated that the offer was “still fully valid” [Response]. She attached to this Response a copy of an email from Boston Pizza dated July 26, 2024, to which the Last Letter of Offer was attached. The Response also indicates the following:

Additionally, I took the initiative to contact my employer directly by phone to confirm the status of the business, and I was assured that everything at their store is running smoothly and as expected.

[3] It should be noted, as will be detailed further below, that the version of the Response to the PF Letter dated December 18, 2024, that is included in the Applicant’s Record is different from the version that was submitted to IRCC. The latter can be found in the Certified Tribunal Record [CTR]. In addition to being unsigned, the version in the Applicant’s Record oddly omits the above cited paragraph.

[4] The Global Case Management System (GCMS) notes, which form part of the reasons for the Decision (El Hajj v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 2031 [El Hajj] at para 7, citing Mohammed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1933 at para 9 [Mohammed]; Al Aridi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 381 at para 13) show that the Officer’s assessment of the file was reviewed by another IRCC staffer who confirmed their findings. The reviewer and the Officer’s notes indicate that IRCC made verifications with Boston Pizza on November 16, 2024 -that is before the PF Letter- and the prospective employer “confirmed that even though the original LOO [Letter of Offer] was genuine, the job offer was no longer valid, since the company had been sold”. The GCMS also notes specifically mention that the Applicant claims she called Boston Pizza (at a date she does not disclose) to enquire about the validity of the offer and got a confirmation that it was still valid. The Officer and the IRCC staffer who verified their findings both concluded that the Applicant’s Response to the PF Letter did not alleviate their concerns and that, on a balance of probabilities, they were satisfied that the Applicant misrepresented the validity of the Last Letter of Offer. She was therefore declared inadmissible under section 40 of IRPA. The letter of Decision dated January 16, 2025, confirms the inadmissibility finding.

[5] The Applicant argues that her case falls in the narrow “innocent mistake exception” to inadmissibility for misrepresentation under s 40 of IRPA, which she contends applies when a person reasonably believed that they were stating the truth. She proposes that the Decision is unreasonable because the Officer concluded that she was inadmissible “without addressing whether the alleged representation resulted from a genuine mistake”. It is her position that given that the Last Letter of Offer was genuine and that she did not have any reason to believe that it was no longer valid, she cannot be said to have misrepresented any material fact.

[6] As a last argument, made only during the hearing, and in reply, the Applicant submitted that the Officer made a veiled credibility finding when they stated in their notes “she did not specify the date of the phone call”, so notice ought to have been given to the Applicant as a matter of procedural fairness (citing Aina v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2025 FC 1009 at para 7). This argument was never articulated in the Applicant’s written submissions, so it cannot be entertained. The Federal Court has routinely found that it is improper for a party to raise new arguments at the hearing that were not articulated in their pleadings because the opposing party is then taken by surprise (see e.g. Tehranimotamed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 548 at para 12; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1846 at para 32 citing amongst others Bineesh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1039 at paras 16−17).

[7] In response, the Respondent, Attorney General of Canada [AGC], concedes that the “innocent mistake exception” was not considered by the Officer but adds that there was no requirements to do so in this case, given that the Applicant’s Response to the PF Letter does not suggest that she made such a mistake but instead indicates that the Last Letter of Offer is still valid. The Respondent submits that the current application for judicial review “is nothing more than a request to have this court reweigh her circumstances and her evidence in her favour” when, in fact, the record indicates that the Applicant claimed that she had spoken with her prospective employer to confirm the Last Letter of Offer’s validity. For the AGC, “[w]hile the Applicant did not specify when she spoke with the owner, it was reasonable for the Officer to find that the Applicant’s response constituted misrepresentation”.

[8] Further, regarding the Applicant’s argument that she had no reason to suspect that the Last Letter of Offer was no longer valid when she answered to the PF Letter, the Respondent submits that this argument “fails to grapple with the fact that the Applicant was told there was a concern that it was not valid and failed to either do her due diligence to seek out more information (if the phone call she references in her response occurred prior to her receiving the letter) or misrepresented the substance of her phone call with the owner given that the owner had directly advised IRCC that the offer was no longer valid”. Hence, the AGC submits that the Applicant’s reliance on the innocent mistake exception is “untenable on the evidentiary record”.

[9] This application for judicial review will be dismissed. With the record at it stands, the Officer’s finding that the Applicant had engaged in misrepresentations was reasonable.

II. Analysis

A. The standard of review

[10] The Court agrees with the parties that the appropriate standard of review that applies to the merits of administrative decisions, such as those regarding work permits, is reasonableness, the whole in accordance with the Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] (see also Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7; Mohammed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1933 [Mohammed] at paras 14-17; Salkhan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1746 at para 11 [Salkhan]). The recognized exceptions to this presumption do not apply in the present matter (Canadian Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at paras 27-28). The Federal Court has also already confirmed that the standard of reasonableness applies to decisions regarding inadmissibility made under para 40(1)a) of IRPA specifically (see e.g. Ibe-Ani v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1112 at paras 12-13).

[11] As stated by Justice Gascon in Mohammed:

[14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Pepa at para 46; Mason at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility” (Vavilov at para 99, citing notably Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).

[15] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first” approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,” seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Pepa at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process” (Vavilov at para 13).

[16] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence (Mason at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker (Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; Doyle v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237 at para 3).

[17] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings” (Vavilov at para 100).

[12] Given that visa Officers have recognized expertise in analyzing and assessing temporary resident visa [TRV] applications, including those for work permits, the Courts must give considerable deference to these decision makers when reviewing their discretionary decisions, especially since such decisions usually turn on questions of fact (Zamor v Canada (Ctizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 479 [Zamor] at para 19 citing Solopova v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 690 [Solopova] at para 12).

[13] Although the duty to provide reasons when evaluating TRV applications is typically minimal so the reasons can be brief, officers must still provide sufficient reasons demonstrating that their decisions are transparent, justified and intelligible (Vavilov at para 103; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 2019 at para 18; El Hajj at para 16 citing Ghodsi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 620 at para 7; Chera v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 733 at para 36 citing Solopova at para 32; He v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1027 at paras 18, 20). Furthermore, when the TRV decision includes a finding of inadmissibility, the decision attracts a higher degree of procedural fairness because of its harsh consequences on the affected individual (Likhi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 171 at paras 26-27 and jurisprudence cited therein).

B. The Legal framework around inadmissibility under section 40 and the innocent mistake exception

[14] The relevant sections of IRPA are the following:

[15] Applicant’s counsel mistakenly also identified section 127 of IRPA proposing its definition of misrepresentation applies to the case at bar. The Federal Court’s jurisprudence is clear that it does not, sections 40 and 127 are not to be conflated (Duarte Gomes v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1982 at para 10). Indeed, while section 127 defines an infraction and requires intent, knowledge or willful blindness (see e.g. R v Singh, 2019 ABPC 37 at paras 4-6), section 40 does not. Therefore, a person can be found inadmissible regardless of his or her intention (mens rea) (Bellido v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 452 [Bellido] at para 28; Paashazadeh c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2015 CF 327 at paras 13-19; Muniz v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 872 at para 14; Malik v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1004 [Malik] at para 22; Akinrinlola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1112 [Akinrinlola] at para 15). This is why “the lack of misrepresentation at the time of its making -even an accidental omission – may still constitute misrepresentation” in the context of section 40 (Akinrinlola at para 15).

[16] First, a finding of inadmissibility under paragraph 40(1)(a) of IRPA requires that the visa officer be satisfied that (1) a direct or indirect misrepresentation has occurred; and (2) the misrepresentation could induce an error in the administration of the IRPA (Bellido at para 27 cited in Li v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2018 FC 87 at para 10).

[17] The Applicant refers to Justice Strickland’s summary of the law surrounding misrepresentation under section 40 of the IRPA and the innocent mistake exception, in Wang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 368 at paragraphs 15-19:

[15] I have previously summarized the general principles concerning misrepresentation in Goburdhun v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 971 at para 28. For the purposes of this application they include that s 40 is to be given a broad interpretation in order to promote its underlying purpose (Khan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 512 at para 25 (“Khan”)), its objective being to deter misrepresentation and maintain the integrity of the immigration process. To accomplish this, the onus is placed on the applicant to ensure the completeness and accuracy of their application (Oloumi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 428 at para 23 (“Oloumi”); Jiang at para 35; Wang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1059 at paras 55-56 (“Wang”)).

[16] In this regard an applicant has a duty of candour to provide complete, honest and truthful information in every manner when applying for entry into Canada (Bodine v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 848 at paras 41-42 (“Bodine”); Baro v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1299 at para 15 (“Baro”); Haque v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 315 at para 11 (“Haque”)). Section 40 is intentionally broadly worded and applied and encompasses even misrepresentations made by another party, including an immigration consultant, without the knowledge of the applicant (Jiang at para 35; Wang at paras 55-56).

[17] The exception to s 40 is narrow and applies only to truly extraordinary circumstances where an applicant honestly and reasonably believed that they were not misrepresenting a material fact and knowledge of the misrepresentation was beyond the applicant’s control (Masoud v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 422 at paras 33-37 (“Masoud”); Goudarzi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 425 at para 40 (“Goudarzi”)). That is, the applicant was subjectively unaware that he or she was withholding information (Medel v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 2 FC 345 (FCA) (“Medel”); Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Singh Sidhu, 2018 FC 306 at para 55 (“Singh Sidhu”)).

[18] In determining whether a misrepresentation is material, regard must be had for the wording of the provision and its underlying purpose (Oloumi at para 22). It is necessary, in each case, to look at the surrounding circumstances to decide whether the withholding of information constitutes a misrepresentation (Baro at para 17; Bodine at paras 41-42; Singh Sidhu at paras 59-61). Further, a misrepresentation need not be decisive or determinative. It is material if it is important enough to affect the process (Oloumi at para 25).

[19] Nor can an applicant take advantage of the fact that the misrepresentation is caught by the immigration authorities before the final assessment of the application. The materiality analysis is not limited to a particular point in time in the processing of the application (Haque at paras 12, 17; Khan at paras 25, 27, 29; Shahin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 423 at para 29 (“Shahin”)).

(See also Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 747 [Singh] at paragraphs 27-29, and the caselaw therein cited)

C. The Decision is reasonable

[18] First, it is worth noting that the version of the Response to the PF Letter which is attached as Exhibit J to the Applicant’s affidavit in her record is simply not the same as the Response that was sent to IRCC and that appears in the CTR. A key paragraph is missing, namely the paragraph in which the Applicant claimed that she had called her prospective employer and “was assured that everything at their store is running smoothly and as expected.” The version attached to the Applicant’s affidavit also adds certain elements, including the following phrases: “To ensure full transparency, I am happy to provide a copy of the updated employment letter to further confirm my employment status” and “If there has been any misunderstanding or if further clarification is needed, please do not hesitate to let me know”. This invitation to inquire if there were any further clarifications needed is not in the letter that was sent to the Officer.

[19] When these differences were raised at the hearing, Applicant’s counsel simply stated they were aware of them but could not explain them. However, these are not small discrepancies. Given that the version in the Applicant’s record is attached to her affidavit, this raises the question of whether this is the product of an “honest mistake” or reveal an attempt to mislead the Court. Although someone else from the same firm appeared on Ms. Zhang’s behalf at the hearing, it should be noted that her affidavit was sworn before one of the Applicant’s solicitors, specifically the person who signed the written representations filed in chief and the further memorandum of argument. That said, it is not necessary for the Court to decide on this issue given that it does not change the fact that the version actually received by IRCC was itself misleading.

[20] The Court agrees with the Respondent that the Applicant’s reliance on the innocent mistake exception is “untenable on the evidentiary record”. The Response to the PF Letter explicitly states that the Last Letter of Offer was still valid and that she talked to someone at Boston Pizza (without stating who and when) and that this person confirmed “that everything at their store is running smoothly and as expected”. Based on these statements, it was reasonable for the Officer to conclude that the Applicant was claiming to have obtained a confirmation that the Last Letter of Offer was still valid. Given that this contradicted the information that IRCC obtained, when they contacted her employer and got confirmation that Last Letter of Offer was, in fact, no longer valid, this was enough to find that the Applicant made misrepresentations, without having to consider whether the innocent mistake exception applied.

[21] Even if the Court was to assume that the Applicant meant that she had called Boston Pizza prior to receiving the PF Letter, then the Respondent is correct in stating that the Applicant would, at best, have failed to exercise due diligence. The Applicant cannot claim that she had no reasons to believe that the Last Letter of Offer was no longer valid. The PF Letter was precisely sent to make her aware that IRCC had reasons to believe it had expired. In this context, her failure to make any further enquiry would also have been fatal. In such context, the Officer did not need to address the innocent mistake explicitly (Falsafi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1458 [Falsafi] at para 32; Batta v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1976 [Batta] at para 13).

[22] As Justice Ngo explained in Falsafi at paragraph 34:

As such, the innocent mistake expectation can only be considered when the Applicant reviewed diligently the application and acted in accordance with his duty of candour but a mistake was still found in the application. The Court has held that only where an error has been deemed unintentional must the decision-maker consider whether or not the error was not only honest but reasonable in order to determine if the innocent error exception applies (Ahmed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2020 FC 107, at para 25 citing Alalami at para 16; Takhar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 420 at para 21).

(this statement was cited approvingly in Ali v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1747 at para 33; Rouamba v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1680 at para 45; Batta at para 13)

[23] The above is in line with the Applicant’s contention that “when the potential for an innocent mistake arises, it is contingent upon the Respondent to consider whether the alleged misrepresentation is the result of a genuine mistake on the part of the Applicant” (citing Singh at paras 27-30) [underlining added]. However, in the circumstances of the present matter, the potential for an innocent mistake had not arisen. Given the above, the Applicant has not discharged her burden of proving that the Decision suffers from a fatal flaw (Vavilov at para 100). Instead, its reasoning appears inherently rational and compatible with applicable the legal and factual constraints (Vavilov at paras 101).

[24] Regarding the argument of veiled credibility finding, raised in extremis during the hearing, not only does it constitute an inadmissible new argument, but even if the Court was to entertain it, it would not change the outcome of this matter. The Officer did not make a veiled credibility finding, he simply noted, in between parenthesis, that this information was not provided.

[25] Last, although this has no bearing on the outcome of this application, because both parties made written submissions on this point, the Court notes that the Applicant’s allegation that “[i]t also has to be said that it is somewhat unclear who and how the Respondent made the verifications with the company” is meritless. As the Respondent correctly points out, the GCMS notes clearly explain how the verification was conducted. It is stated that an IRCC staffer called the owner of the Boston Pizza restaurant, who is identified by her name -which corresponds to the signature found on the letters of offer-, using the phone number specified on these letters.

III. Conclusion

[26] The application for judicial review will be dismissed. The Decision rests on a reasonable analysis of the Applicant’s Response to IRCC’s PF Letter, and their own verifications with the Applicant’s proposed employer.

[27] There are no questions of general importance to be certified.

JUDGMENT in IMM-6586-25

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. This application for judicial review is dismissed, without costs.

2. There is no question of general importance to be certified.

“Danielle Ferron”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: