Docket: IMM-19096-24
Citation: 2026 FC 174
Toronto, Ontario, February 6, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Aylen
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BETWEEN: |
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SAIDUR RAHMAN |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1] The Applicant, a citizen of Bangladesh, made a claim for refugee protection based on his fear of persecution at the hands of Delwar Hossain [Delwar], a local leader of an Islamic extremist group known as Harkat-ul-Jihadi al-Islam [HJI].
[2] The Applicant claimed that, in February 2009, he was managing a store owned by his brother, where two local women, who did not wear hijabs, were employed. Delwar and his associates were offended that the women did not wear hijabs because they thought it was anti-Islamic and told the Applicant that the women must stop working or the shop must close. When the women did not stop working, Delwar returned to the shop with his associates and attacked the Applicant with a stick, told the Applicant that he was an atheist who did not deserve to live and vandalized the store. The Applicant reported the attack to the police, who stated that they would not act against HJI. On March 1, 2009, Delwar phoned the Applicant, confronted him about the police report and restated that he had no right to live. In mid-March 2009, the Applicant left Dhaka and stayed with his uncle in another town for a month while he made arrangements to leave Bangladesh. The following day, the Applicant’s mother called and reported that someone had left a letter at their front door stating that the Applicant was an atheist engaged in activities that were against Islam and should be prepared to die.
[3] The Applicant left Bangladesh in April 2009 for the United States. He remained in the United States for more than 13 years, where he lived and worked without status, until he arrived in Canada in March 2023 and made a claim for refugee protection.
[4] The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] found that the Applicant was not a Convention refugee nor person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], as the Applicant had a viable internal flight alternative [IFA] in Bangladesh. While the determinative issue before the RPD was the existence of a viable IFA, the RPD made an adverse credibility finding against the Applicant due to his failure to make an asylum claim in the United States at the earliest opportunity and continuing to work in the United States for years without authorization.
[5] By decision dated July 17, 2024, the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] confirmed the decision of the RPD and agreed that the determinative issue was the availability of a viable IFA. The RAD also agreed with the RPD that the Applicant’s failure to claim refugee protection in the United States negatively affects his credibility and his alleged fear of being harmed.
[6] The Applicant asserts that the RAD’s decision is unreasonable on the basis that the RAD: (a) failed to take into account the Applicant’s reasonable explanation for not making a refugee protection claim in the United States, which caused the RAD to err in its credibility and subjective fear determinations; (b) erred in its assessment of the first prong of the IFA test by engaging in speculative reasoning that was not supported by any evidence, improperly using the lack of corroborative documentary evidence to rebut the presumption of truth and ignoring objective country condition evidence regarding HJI; and (c) erred in its assessment of the second prong of the IFA test by failing to consider objective country condition evidence regarding the unavailability of treatment and resources available to support the Applicant’s mental health in the proposed IFA locations.
[7] The parties agree, and I concur, that the applicable standard of review is that of reasonableness. When reviewing for reasonableness, the Court must take a “reasons first”
approach and determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified [see Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at paras 8, 59]. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker [see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 15, 85]. The Court will intervene only if it is satisfied there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency [see Adeniji-Adele v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 418 at para 11].
[8] Turning to the first issue, the Applicant asserts that the RAD failed to take into account his explanation, which he asserts is reasonable, as to why he did not make a refugee claim in the United States. The Applicant’s evidence was that he was ignorant about the immigration process in the United States and naively relied on the information of others to navigate his stay in the United States, believing that if he obeyed the law and did not come to the attention of authorities, he would eventually be able to regularize his status. Moreover, the Applicant asserts that the RAD failed to consider the one-year filing deadline to advance a refugee claim in the United States and did not take this variable into account when determining that the actions of the Applicant impugned his subjective fear and overall credibility.
[9] It must be recalled that credibility determinations are part of the fact-finding process and are afforded significant deference upon review [see Fageir v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 966 at para 29; Tran v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 721 at para 35; Azenabor v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1160 at para 6]. Such determinations by the RAD should only be overturned “in the clearest of cases”
where the determination is perverse, capricious or made without regard to the evidence [see Liang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 720 at para 12; Tran, supra at para 35; Yan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 146 at para 18]. I find that the RAD’s credibility determination was entirely reasonable, as the failure of the Applicant to seek refugee protection in the United States demonstrated an absence of fear. Further, the one-year deadline to claim refugee protection does not explain the Applicant’s failure to claim protection within that one-year period such that it does not assist the Applicant in attempting to demonstrate the asserted reasonableness of his explanation. Moreover, contrary to the Applicant’s assertion, the RAD expressly considered the Applicant’s explanation at paragraphs 7 and 8 of its reasons and simply rejected them as unreasonable, which was certainly open to the RAD to do.
[10] The second and third issues require a consideration of the test applicable in the IFA context. The test to determine whether a proposed IFA is viable is two-pronged. The RAD must be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that: (a) an applicant will not be subject to a serious possibility of persecution nor to a risk of harm under sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA in the proposed IFA location; and (b) it would not be objectively unreasonable for them to seek refuge there, taking into account the circumstances particular to the applicant [see Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (CA), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 589 at 593–597]. Both prongs must be satisfied in order to find that an applicant has a viable IFA [see Bassi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 910 at para 16, citing Thirunavukkarasu, supra at 597–598].
[11] On the first prong of the test, an applicant bears the onus of demonstrating that the proposed IFA is unreasonable because they fear a possibility of persecution throughout their entire country. In order to discharge their burden, the applicant must demonstrate that they will remain at risk in the proposed IFA from the same individual or agents of persecution that originally put them at risk. In such cases, the risk assessment considers whether the agents of persecution have both the “means”
and “motivation”
to cause harm to the applicant in the proposed IFA [see Chatrath v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 958 at para 20, citing Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 996 at para 8].
[12] This assessment is a prospective analysis and is considered from the perspective of the agents of persecution, not from the perspective of the applicant [see Vartia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1426 at para 29, citing Adeleye v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 81 at para 21; see also Aragon Caicedo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 485 at para 12]. The onus is therefore on an applicant to adduce sufficient evidence or facts to discharge their burden of proof and demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the agents of persecution have the means and motivation to locate them in the proposed IFA location [see Chatrath, supra at para 20].
[13] Here, the Applicant asserts that, in relation to the motivation of the agents of persecution to locate him in the proposed IFA locations, the RAD erred by engaging in speculative reasoning that was not supported by any evidence. The Applicant asserts that it cannot be deduced that, because his agents of persecution did not track or trace his family members, the agents of persecution would not have been motivated to track and trace the Applicant.
[14] I find that there is no merit to this assertion. It is reasonable for the RAD to infer that an agent of persecution does not have an ongoing interest in an applicant where they do not approach or threaten family members for information about the applicant [see Leon v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 428 at paras 16, 18; Chavez Perez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1021 at para 10]. In this case, the Applicant has had no contact with the agents of persecution since March 2009, there was no evidence of any recent phone calls to the Applicant’s family from the agents of persecution attempting to locate the Applicant, no one had recently come to his family’s home looking for him and his brother has not had any issues with the agents of persecution since closing his store. Based on the evidence before it, I find that it was reasonably open to the RAD to conclude that the agents of persecution lacked the motivation to locate the Applicant in the proposed IFA locations.
[15] The Applicant asserts that the RAD improperly rebutted the presumption of truth by using the lack of corroborative, documentary evidence to establish that the agents of persecution were motivated to locate the Applicant in the proposed IFAs. The Applicant asserts that the presumption of truth cannot be rebutted in such circumstances unless credibility issues not tied to the lack of corroborating evidence arose. However, contrary to the Applicant’s assertions, I find that the RAD did not rebut the presumption of truthfulness. Rather, the RAD found that the Applicant had provided insufficient evidence to establish the motivation of the agents of persecution to pursue him in the proposed IFA locations. The RAD reasonably found that the Applicant’s belief and presumption of truth, on their own, were insufficient to meet his evidentiary burden [see Huang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 940 at para 43].
[16] Finally, the Applicant asserts that, with respect to the means of the agents of persecution to locate the Applicant in the proposed IFAs, the RAD ignored objective country condition evidence regarding HJI. The Applicant points to statements in Item 4.1 of the National Documentation Package [NDP] for Bangladesh that, as of 2019, HJI operates sleeper cells throughout the country and were reorganizing and raising funds to support families of imprisoned or dead HJI men. However, the RAD considered the NDP, noted that HJI currently operates in small, independent cells and found that none of the information in the NDP suggests that HJI currently has sufficient ties or connections throughout Bangladesh to assist Delwar in locating the Applicant. I find that this conclusion was reasonable and supported by the information in the NDP, including the information now relied upon by the Applicant.
[17] Accordingly, I find that there is nothing in the RAD’s analysis of the first prong of the IFA test that warrants this Court’s intervention.
[18] On the second prong of the test, once a viable IFA is established, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that the proposed IFA is inadequate, which requires more than undue hardship resulting from, among others, loss of employment, separation from family and friends, or a reduction in the quality of life. It is a high threshold to meet [see Manzoor-Ul-Haq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1077 at para 24; Perez Islas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1354 at para 33; Olori v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1308 at para 40; Haastrup v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 141 at para 30].
[19] The Applicant asserts that the RAD erred in finding that he had not established that his anxiety and depression could make living in the proposed IFA locations unreasonable. The Applicant argues that if he is forced to return to Bangladesh, his mental health will suffer and he will not be able to receive required care. He relies on evidence from the NDP to argue that the RAD failed to consider the objective country condition evidence which stated that there is no provision of social insurance to cover expenses for mental healthcare, funding is low, there are few mental health workers and mental health facilities are inadequate to meet demand.
[20] However, the evidence that was before the RAD regarding the Applicant’s mental health needs indicated that the Applicant has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety, does not taken any medication for his condition and was prescribed 10 sessions of psychotherapy, which have all been completed. There was no evidence of any ongoing treatment being received by the Applicant for his mental health, nor any evidence regarding any potential future treatment. This evidence was considered by the RAD and reasonably led the RAD to conclude that the Applicant had failed to establish that his anxiety and depression could make living in the proposed IFA locations unreasonable to the extent that his life or safety would be in jeopardy.
[21] As the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the RAD’s decision was unreasonable, the application for judicial review shall be dismissed.
[22] Neither party raised a question for certification and I agree that none arises.
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