Docket: IMM-2512-24
Citation: 2025 FC 1967
Ottawa, Ontario, December 16, 2025
PRESENT: THE CHIEF JUSTICE (retired)
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BETWEEN: |
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IQBAL SINGH DHALIWAL |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Introduction
[1] The Applicant, Iqbal Singh Dhaliwal, is a citizen of India. He was found to be a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts of terrorism, namely, the All India Sikh Student Federation (the “AISSF”
). Based on that finding, he was determined to be inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2000, c 27 [IRPA].
[2] In the present proceeding, Mr. Dhaliwal seeks judicial review of the Respondent Minister’s rejection of his request for ministerial relief from that determination, under s. 42.1 of the IRPA.
[3] Mr. Dhaliwal maintains that the Minister’s decision (the “Decision”
) was unreasonable and that the Minister breached the duty of procedural fairness by not affording him an oral hearing.
[4] I disagree with those contentions. For the reasons set forth below, this application will be dismissed.
II. Background
[5] Mr. Dhaliwal has a long and complicated immigration history in Canada. Much of that history is summarized in Dhaliwal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 762 at paras 4-16, and in Dhaliwal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1517 at paras 7-14. It is unnecessary to repeat that history here.
[6] For the present purposes, it will suffice to note that Mr. Dhaliwal arrived in Canada in April 1992 and made a refugee claim in September of that year. That claim was based on his membership in the AISSF. However, he abandoned that claim after he married his first wife and she submitted a spousal sponsorship application for permanent residence. That application was withdrawn in 1994 following the couple’s divorce.
[7] Mr. Dhaliwal then made a second refugee application in 1996, again based on his membership in the AISSF. Once again, he abandoned that claim.
[8] Mr. Dhaliwal remarried his current spouse in 1998, who applied to sponsor him for permanent residence. That second sponsorship application was rejected in 1999 on grounds that are not relevant to the present proceeding.
[9] Mr. Dhaliwal then received many temporary residence permits (“TRPs”
), or extensions of previously issued TRPs. Some of those TRPs were granted to allow him to remain in Canada while awaiting decisions on applications discussed below. However, since 2013, he has had several TRP extension requests denied.
[10] In 2005, Mr. Dhaliwal was advised by immigration officials that he may be inadmissible to Canada based on his membership in the AISSF. Mr. Dhaliwal then submitted his first application for ministerial relief under a provision that is the predecessor of what is now section 42.1 of the IRPA.
[11] In the meantime, a third spousal sponsorship application was refused in 2006 pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA. Mr. Dhaliwal did not apply for leave and judicial review in relation to that refusal.
[12] Between 1996 and 2006, Mr. Dhaliwal reiterated his claims regarding his membership in the AISSF in multiple interviews. However, he recanted those claims in 2009, explaining that he had fabricated them to buttress his applications for refugee protection. Despite that recantation, his application for ministerial relief was refused in 2012. In late 2013, this Court set aside that decision and remitted it for redetermination, based on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 [Agraira].
[13] In 2015, the Minister once again denied Mr. Dhaliwal’s application for relief. Later that year, this Court denied Mr. Dhaliwal’s application for leave and judicial review of that decision. He then submitted a new application for ministerial relief, which was ultimately denied in the Decision discussed immediately below.
III. The Decision under review
[14] It is common ground between the parties that the reasons for the Decision are those set forth in the lengthy recommendation signed by the President of the Canada Border Services Agency (the “CBSA”
) on September 23, 2023, and accepted by the Minister on January 24, 2024: Hameed v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1353 [Hameed] at para 25.
[15] In the course of the Decision, the CBSA extensively reviewed Mr. Dhaliwal’s submissions and addressed in detail various positive and negative factors that were relevant to its recommendation to deny his request for ministerial relief.
[16] Some of those factors were summarized in the conclusion of the Decision. Regarding the positive considerations, the Decision stated as follows:
Based on the assessment above, it is in Mr. Dhaliwal’s favour that there is no evidence that he poses a danger to the safety of Canadians, and that he no longer has a criminal record here, having received a record suspension for his February 1996 conviction. Further, it is in Mr, Dhaliwal’s favour that potential separation of his family, or their moving to India, would likely result in hardship for his spouse and their adult children.
[17] The Decision then summarized the “many elements that weigh against a grant of relief”
, as follows:
Based on Mr. Dhaliwal’s initial account, lie [sic] joined the AISSF at the height of the organization’s engagement in terrorism, around the time when the group was officially illegal in India, and when its international wing, the ISYF, a listed terrorist entity in Canada, was formed. He admitted to being aware, while a member, of the AISSF’s engagement in violence, and has demonstrated that he was aware of other aspects linking the organization to terrorism in the 1980s. 1980s. Despite this, and in spite of lus [sic] parents' opposition to the A1SSF owing to the group's proclivity for violence, Mr. Dhaliwal remained with the organization for 6 or 7 years, elevating its needs over his own safety. Notwithstanding Mr. Dhaliwal maintaining the veracity of his initial narrative for approximately 18 years in North America, lie [sic] fully recanted this version of events once he realized that it was no longer in his interest - Le. [sic], after the CBSA disclosed its first negative draft Ministerial relief recommendation to him, in 2009. He has not provided sufficient or convincing information as to why his new story should supplant his initial account. His diametrically opposed versions of events, coupled with his admittedly “self-serving”, inconsistent and contradictory statements over the years, including on pertinent issues, such as, but not limited to, key aspects of his membership with the AISSF, have affected the reliability of portions of Mr. Dhaliwal’s narrative, such that it is difficult to determine the full extent of his involvement with the impugned organization. In the CBSA’s opinion, all these negative considerations outweigh the above -noted factors that may be in Mr. Dhaliwal’s favour.
IV. Issues
[18] Mr. Dhaliwal raises the following two issues in relation to the Decision:
1. Was it unreasonable for the Minister to conclude that it would be contrary to the national interest to grant the requested ministerial relief?
2. Did the Minister breach the duty of fairness by not affording Mr. Dhaliwal a hearing?
V. Standard of Review
[19] It is implicit in the manner that the first issue listed above has been framed that it is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness. This is not in dispute between the parties. I agree that this is the appropriate standard of review for the merits of the Minister’s Decision: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at paras 10 and 17; Agraira at paras 49-50.
[20] In reviewing the reasonableness of the Decision, the Court must approach its task with “respectful attention”
and consider the Decision “as a whole”
: Vavilov at paras 84–85. The Court’s overall focus will be upon whether the Decision is appropriately justified, transparent and intelligible. In other words, the Court will consider whether it is able to understand the basis upon which the Decision was made and then determine whether it falls “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law”
: Vavilov at paras 86 and 97, quoting Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47.
[21] A decision which is appropriately justified, transparent and intelligible is one that reflects “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis”
and “is justified in relation to the facts and the law that constrain the decision maker”
: Vavilov at para 85; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 8. The decision should also reflect that the decision maker “meaningfully grapple[d] with key issues or central arguments raised by the parties”
: Vavilov at para 128.
[22] The Minister’s interpretation of the term “national interest”
in subsection 42.1(1) of the IRPA is also reviewable on a reasonableness standard: Vavilov at para 115. Once again, the Court must examine the decision under review as a whole, while also having regard to the text, context and purpose of that statutory provision: Vavilov at paras 116-118.
[23] Turning to the procedural fairness issue raised by Mr. Dhaliwal, the Court’s task is to determine “whether the procedure was fair having regard to all of the circumstances”
: Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54.
VI. Relevant Legislation
[24] Mr. Dhaliwal’s application for ministerial relief was made pursuant to subsection 42.1(1) of the IRPA, which provides as follows:
Exception – application to Minister
42.1 (1) The Minister may, on application by a foreign national, declare that the matters referred to in section 34, paragraphs 35(1)(b) and (c) and subsection 37(1) do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of the foreign national if they satisfy the Minister that it is not contrary to the national interest.
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Exception – demande au ministre
42.1 (1) Le ministre peut, sur demande d’un étranger, déclarer que les faits visés à l’article 34, aux alinéas 35(1)b) ou c) ou au paragraphe 37(1) n’emportent pas interdiction de territoire à l’égard de l’étranger si celui-ci le convainc que cela ne serait pas contraire à l’intérêt national.
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[25] For the present purposes, subsection 42.1(3) is also relevant. It states as follows:
Considerations
42.1 (3) In determining whether to make a declaration, the Minister may only take into account national security and public safety considerations, but, in his or her analysis, is not limited to considering the danger that the foreign national presents to the public or the security of Canada.
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Considérations
42.1 (3) Pour décider s’il fait la déclaration, le ministre ne tient compte que de considérations relatives à la sécurité nationale et à la sécurité publique sans toutefois limiter son analyse au fait que l’étranger constitue ou non un danger pour le public ou la sécurité du Canada.
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[26] By way of background, the provision of the IRPA under which Mr. Dhaliwal was found to be inadmissible in 2006 is paragraph 34(1)(f). That provision contemplates that a permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts that include terrorism.
VII. Analysis
A. Was it unreasonable for the Minister to conclude that it would be contrary to the national interest to grant the requested ministerial relief?
[27] Mr. Dhaliwal asserts that the Decision was unreasonable for several reasons. In essence, he advances the three broad arguments addressed below.
(1) The negative elements considered by the Minister
[28] First, Mr. Dhaliwal maintains that the Decision erred in stating that there were “many elements that weigh against a grant of relief,”
because the only element addressed in the Decision was his membership in the AISSF.
[29] I disagree. As reflected in the quote at paragraph 17 above, there were at least five distinct elements identified as weighing against a grant of ministerial relief. The first of those elements concerned the timing of when he joined the AISSF, based on his initial account. Among other things, the Decision states that he became a member when the AISSF was at the height of its involvement in terrorism, and when its international wing was a listed terrorist entity in Canada. The second negative consideration was that he admitted to being aware of the AISSF’s engagement in violence at the time he was a member of that organization, at least according to his initial narrative. Thirdly, he remained with that organization for six or seven years. Fourthly, he did not establish why his recantation and “new story should supplant his initial account”
regarding his involvement in the AISSF. Finally, the Decision stated that, as a result of the “diametrically opposed version of events”
Mr. Dhaliwal had advanced, it was “difficult to determine the full extent of his involvement with the”
AISSF.
[30] In my view, each of the five above-mentioned elements identified in the Decision were distinct and it was not unreasonable to give each of them negative weight: Steves v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FC 247 at para 54.
[31] If Mr. Dhaliwal wanted the Minister to believe that his second version of events was the truthful one, the onus was upon him to establish this on a balance of probabilities. Contrary to Mr. Dhaliwal’s submissions, the Minister did not bear the onus to establish that the initial narrative advanced by him was more likely than the subsequent version of events that he advanced.
(2) Alleged failure to meaningfully grapple with the relevant considerations
[32] The second broad argument advanced by Mr. Dhaliwal is that the Decision fails to meaningfully grapple with the relevant considerations identified in Hameed, at paragraph 26. There, following the teachings in Agraira at para 87, the Court observed that, in general, the Minister should be guided by the following factors when considering an application under what is now section 42.1 of the IRPA:
1. Will the applicant’s presence in Canada be offensive to the Canadian public?
2. Have all ties with the regime/organization been completely severed?
3. Is there any indication that the applicant might be benefiting from assets obtained while a member of the organization?
4. Is there any indication that the applicant may be benefiting from previous membership in the regime/organization?
5. Has the person adopted the democratic values of Canadian society?
[33] Mr. Dhaliwal maintains that each of these factors weighs in his favour, and that therefore his application for ministerial relief ought to have been granted. In brief, he asserts that his conduct in this country over the past three decades establishes that it would not be contrary to the national interest for him to remain here. He adds that (i) he has had no involvement with the AISSF during that period, (ii) he has not benefitted from any assets that he may have obtained during his alleged involvement with the AISSF, (iii) there is no indication that he may be befitting from any previous membership in the AISSF, and (iv) his record in Canada demonstrates that he has adopted the democratic values of our country. He further maintains that there is no evidence to the contrary.
[34] I disagree with Mr. Dhaliwal’s contention that the factors listed above all weigh in his favour and that those are the only factors relevant to the Minister’s exercise of discretion under section 42.1 of the IRPA.
[35] In Agraira, the Supreme Court of Canada characterized the factors listed above as being “
[p]erhaps the best illustration of the wide variety of factors which may be validly considered”
(emphasis added) in exercising the discretion contemplated by the former subsection 34(2) of the IRPA, the predecessor of what is now section 42.1: Agraira at para 87. The Court added that “a broad range of factors may be relevant to the determination of what is in the ‘national interest’,”
and that “[u]ltimately, which factors are relevant to the analysis in any given case will depend on the particular circumstances of the application before the Minister”
: Agraira at para 87.
[36] The Decision reflects that the Minister considered a very broad range of factors in considerable detail. These included the main factors identified by Mr. Dhaliwal in his application. They also included other factors that were in the record before the Minister, namely, the negative factors discussed at paragraph 29 above. Mr. Dhaliwal has not identified any important consideration in his favour that he put forth in support of his application and that the Minister failed to properly consider.
[37] On the particular facts of this case, it was unnecessary for the Minister to specifically address each and every one of the five “
Hameed factors”
listed at paragraph 32 above.
[38] Given that the Minister considered and weighed all the relevant factors, it is not open to the Court to set the decision aside on the basis that it is unreasonable: Agraira at para 91. To the extent that Mr. Dhaliwal appears to believe that the positive considerations he advanced in his application ought to have led the Minister to grant his request, he is essentially asking the Court to reweigh the relevant factors in his favour. That is not the Court’s role: Agraira at para 91; Hameed at para 34.
[39] I will pause to make the following observations.
[40] As emphasized in Agraira, humanitarian and compassionate considerations are not relevant to a determination of what is in the national interest, although “personal factors”
might be relevant in the assessment contemplated by section 42.1: Agraira at paras 84 and 87; Abdulimiti v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 1960 [Abdulimiti] at para 21.
[41] Moreover, I consider that providing diametrically opposed versions of events in support of immigration status in this country is inconsistent with the fifth Hameed factor, which contemplates the applicant’s adoption of democratic values of Canadian society.
[42] In any event, it is not unreasonable for the Minister to place decisive weight on untruthfulness by an applicant, when weighing the various factors that are relevant to an application under section 42.1 of the IRPA. This includes untruthfulness in the form of advancing diametrically opposing or inconsistent narratives or other facts in support of status in this country: Selvakumaran v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2025 FC 1223 [Selvakumaran] at paras 49-50 and 55; Abdulimiti at para 28.
[43] In support of his position, Mr. Dhaliwal states that the many TRPs he received, as well as the long delays by the IRCC, the CBSA and the Minister in processing his various applications for status in Canada since the early 1990s, all lead to the inescapable inference that his continued presence in Canada would not be contrary to the national interest.
[44] Once again, I disagree. As explained in the Decision, a TRP assessment is very different from a determination on an application under section 42.1 for ministerial relief. A positive determination on one or more TRP requests does not necessarily lead to or infer a positive determination under section 42.1. Among other things, by its very nature, a TRP is intended to be transitory and may be subject to extensive conditions. In Mr. Dhaliwal’s particular circumstances, the Decision explained that his first ten TRPs were issued to allow him to remain in Canada while his successive applications for permanent residence were being processed or until he could get a record suspension with respect to his criminal conviction in this country. Once it was determined that he was inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA, five subsequent TRP extensions were issued to allow him to await the outcome of his first request for ministerial relief.
[45] It bears emphasizing that even if the granting of a large number of successive TRPs or TRP extensions reflected a view that Mr. Dhaliwal’s continued presence in Canada did not pose a risk to public safety or national security, that does not imply that such presence is not contrary to the “national interest.”
As explained above, the Minister may consider a broad range of factors in considering an application for ministerial relief under section 42.1. Those factors include the factors discussed at paragraph 29 above.
(3) Alleged unintelligibility of the Decision
[46] The third broad argument advanced by Mr. Dhaliwal is that the Decision is unintelligible and unsubstantiated. In this regard, Mr. Dhaliwal asserts that it is unclear what facts the Minister accepted regarding his alleged association/involvement with the AISSF. Consequently, he states that the Decision does not provide an internally coherent, rational, chain of analysis.
[47] However, this argument misses the mark. As Mr. Dhaliwal acknowledges, due to the conflicting nature of the versions of events that he had advanced regarding his association with the AISSF, the Minister was unable to make any conclusive finding regarding the extent of his involvement with the AISSF. This was clearly stated to be an important negative consideration, in and of itself. In my view, the reasons supporting this determination were internally coherent, appropriately justified, transparent and intelligible. They allowed the Court to understand the basis upon which the decision was made, and to determine that it fell “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law”
: see paragraph 20 above.
(4) Conclusion regarding the reasonableness of the Minister’s decision
[48] For the reasons set forth above, the Decision was not unreasonable on any of the grounds advanced by Mr. Dhaliwal.
[49] The onus was on Mr. Dhaliwal to satisfy the Minister that it would not be contrary to the national interest to declare that the matters referred to in the underlying determination that he is inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 34(1)(f) of the IRPA do not constitute inadmissibility in respect of him: Abdulimiti at para 21; Rizvi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 FC 565 [Rizvi] at para 29; Siddique v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 192, at para 42.
[50] Mr. Dhaliwal failed to satisfy that onus, largely because of the inconsistent versions of events that he advanced regarding his association with the AISSF. As a result of those inconsistencies, the Minister was unable to determine the full extent of his involvement with that organization. It was not unreasonable for the Minister to rely on these considerations in rejecting Mr. Dhaliwal’s application: Agraira at paras 89-90; Selvakumaran at paras 55; Khalil v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014 FCA 213 at para 37; and Puvanenthiram v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2016 FC 587 at para 26. See also Rizvi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2019 FC 565; Rizvi at paras 17 and 30.
[51] It bears underscoring that, in an application for ministerial relief under section 42.1 of the IRPA, the extent of the applicant’s inadmissible conduct is a relevant consideration: Selvakumaran at para 51. Where, due to inconsistencies in the versions of events put forth by the applicant, the Minister is unable to determine the extent of their inadmissible conduct, this can provide a reasonable basis for the Minister to reject the application.
B. Was the Decision procedurally fair?
[52] Mr. Dhaliwal asserts that the Decision was not procedurally fair because he was not afforded an interview to canvass his alleged membership in the AISSF, subsequent to his recantation of involvement with that organization.
[53] I disagree.
[54] As discussed at length in the Decision, Mr. Dhaliwal was interviewed on multiple occasions, including in 1993, 1996 1999, 2001 and 2006. On those occasions, he was given a full opportunity to address his involvement with the AISSF.
[55] After Mr. Dhaliwal recanted the evolving version of events that he provided throughout that period, he availed himself of numerous opportunities to make written submissions. This included responding to the CBSA’s procedural fairness disclosures in 2009, 2012 and 2014. He also made extensive written submissions in July 2023, after having received the CBSA’s draft recommendation to the Minister.
[56] Based on the foregoing, I agree with the determination in the Decision that he had ample opportunity to meaningfully participate in the process of considering his various applications for status in this country, including his applications for ministerial relief that post-dated his 2009 recantation. The requirements of procedural fairness did not require the CBSA or the Minister to afford Mr. Dhaliwal a hearing in connection with his most recent application for ministerial relief: Sellathurai v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 1264 at paras 29-30. Put differently, the Minister did not breach Mr. Dhaliwal’s right to procedural fairness by failing to afford him a hearing in connection with that application.
VIII. Conclusion
[57] For the reasons set forth above. This application will be dismissed.
[58] At the end of the hearing of this application, the parties stated that the facts and legal issues raised do not give rise to a serious question of general importance for certification, as contemplated by paragraph 74(d) of the IRPA. I agree.
IX. Authority to Issue this Judgment and Reasons
[59] Pursuant to subsection 45(1) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, a judge of this Court who resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office may, at the request of the Chief Justice of this Court, and at any time within eight weeks after ceasing to hold office, give judgment in any cause, action or matter previously tried by or heard before the judge as if he or she had continued in office.
[60] On October 31, 2025, the day after the undersigned ceased to be a member of this Court, Acting Chief Justice St-Louis made the request described immediately above.
[61] As this is my final act as a member of this Court, I would like to add that it has been a great honour and privilege, and the most rewarding highlight of my professional career, to have had such a wonderful opportunity to serve the Court and the Canadian public.
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