Date: 20251205
Docket: IMM-21200-24
Citation: 2025 FC 1933
Montréal, Quebec, December 5, 2025
PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon
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BETWEEN: |
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OWAIS ALI MOHAMMED
FOUZIA TARANNUM
OMAIRA OWAIS
SIMRAH OWAIS
ADIBA OWAIS
FATIMA OWAIS |
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Applicants |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The applicants, Owais Ali Mohammed, his wife Fouzia Tarannum, and their children Omaira Owais, Simrah Owais, Adiba Owais, and Fatima Owais, seek judicial review of a decision rendered on November 6, 2024 [Decision] by an officer [Officer] of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC]. In the Decision, the Officer refused Mr. Mohammed’s application for a “A77”
work permit as part of the Start-up Business Class program under the International Mobility Program [IMP], which was filed pursuant to section 200 and subparagraph 205(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]. Given that refusal, the Officer also refused his spouse’s application for an accompanying spousal open work permit and his minor children’s applications for study permits.
[2] The Officer was not satisfied that Mr. Mohammed’s work permit application met the requirements of the Start-up Business Class program and the IRPR. Mr. Mohammed submits that the Officer assessed his application with an erroneous interpretation of the rules applicable to start-up visa work permits and made a selective and erroneous appraisal of the factual matrix. More specifically, Mr. Mohammed contends that the Officer showed unreasonable concerns about the geographic location of the team members, the limited documentation on their operations in India, and the absence of evidence of industry connections in Canada. Mr. Mohammed also claims that the Decision is not adequately justified and fails to grapple with the evidence showing that his contemplated business meets the requirements of the Start-up Business Class program.
[3] For the following reasons, Mr. Mohammed’s application for judicial review will be dismissed. I find that the Decision is reasonable, considering the evidence presented to the Officer, and is adequately justified. There are no grounds warranting the Court’s intervention.
II. Background
A. The factual context
[4] Mr. Mohammed currently resides in India, his country of citizenship, with his spouse and four minor children.
[5] Mr. Mohammed and his business partners are developing a mobile and online application called EQUI-COOP Inc [Equi-coop]. The application would be “the first all-in-one construction solution, empowering contractors with efficient equipment sharing, streamlined procurement, connections to skilled workforce, and enhanced collaboration through artificial intelligence.”
This start-up enterprise has received the support of Pycap Inc. / OA Pycap Venture Partners [Pycap], a business incubator and designated entity pursuant to section 98.03 of the IRPR.
[6] Equi-coop has been incorporated in Ontario since August 2023. Mr. Mohammed owns 20% of the shares and acts as the Chief Information Officer.
[7] Mr. Mohammed’s initial application for a “A77”
work permit was rejected in April 2024 and Mr. Mohammed filed for judicial review of that negative decision in Court file no. IMM-7220-24. The matter was settled by the parties and his work permit application was sent back for redetermination by a different officer. Further to a request made by IRCC in late September 2024, Mr. Mohammed provided additional documentation including written submissions, an updated business plan, and bank documents.
B. The Decision
[8] On November 6, 2024, Mr. Mohammed’s application was reopened and reassessed. The Officer again refused Mr. Mohammed’s application for a work permit pursuant to paragraph 205(a) of the IRPR. The Decision indicates that there is “[i]nsufficient information provided to establish proposed business venture meets program requirements under A77 [Start-up Business Class] category.”
[9] As is often the case for work permit applications, the Decision itself is brief and adds up to only a few lines. However, the Global Case Management System [GCMS] notes taken by the Officer — which form part of the Decision — provide further light on the analysis conducted by the Officer and on the grounds for refusing Mr. Mohammed’s application.
[10] The Officer indicated “not [being] satisfied the applicant has addressed the objective of Start-up visa under A77 category which emphasizes job creation for Canadian citizens or permanent residents, and service innovation opportunities to fully impact advancements in their targeted market industries within Canada,”
mainly for three reasons.
[11] First, the Officer noted that the contact details of Mr. Mohammed’s team indicates that the members are located across different geographical states in India and that no information was provided on how the five individuals have worked together on creating and maintaining the start‑up platform and on the location of the current operations. Second, the Officer found that insufficient evidence was provided as to the current operations of the platform, as no corporate bank statements nor operational information were provided on Equi-coop’s launch in India. The Officer observed that several links on the website were not functional and that the screenshots of the website were not legible. Overall, the operations of the platform remained unverified due to lack of documentation. Third, it was not clear for the Officer as to how the start-up venture would benefit from operating in Canada as no proof of the establishment of industry connections in Canada were presented.
C. The standard of review
[12] The Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions (Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [Pepa]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [Mason]), unless the circumstances lend themselves to the application of one of the recognized exceptions to this presumption (Canadian Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at para 28; Vavilov at paras 33–64, 69–72).
[13] The parties and I agree that the standard of reasonableness applies to decisions regarding work permits (Khan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1742 at para 3; Salkhan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1746 at para 11 [Salkhan]; Lin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 209 at para 13; Sharma v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 381 at para 10; Rehman v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1021 at paras 7, 13).
[14] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis”
and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
(Pepa at para 46; Mason at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility”
(Vavilov at para 99, citing notably Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).
[15] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first”
approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,”
seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Pepa at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process”
(Vavilov at para 13).
[16] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence (Mason at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker (Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; Doyle v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237 at para 3).
[17] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings”
(Vavilov at para 100).
III. Analysis
A. The legislative framework
[18] An immigration officer granting a temporary resident visa must generally be satisfied that an applicant meets the requirements of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] and the IRPR (subsection 11(1) of the IRPA; section 179 of the IRPR).
[19] There are numerous classes under which applicants can come to Canada as temporary residents, including economic immigration based on Canadian interests (section 205 of the IRPR). A work permit may notably be issued to a foreign national who intends to perform work that “would create or maintain significant social, cultural or economic benefits or opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents”
(subsection 205(a) of the IRPR). Applicants intending to perform such work are not required to obtain a Labour Market Impact Assessment [LMIA] prior to their work permit application and rather apply through the IMP. One stream of such work permits allows permanent resident applicants under the Start-up Business Class (sections 98.01 to 98.13 of the IRPR) to come to Canada as temporary foreign workers pending the determination of their permanent residency application. This is commonly referred to as a “A77”
work permit in reference to administrative codes for LMIA exemptions.
[20] The Respondent, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [Minister], has published publicly available guidelines for officers assessing “A77”
work permit applications. These administrative guidelines are not legally binding on officers, but they may assist decision makers in exercising their discretion. As such, they may be “useful in indicating what constitutes a reasonable interpretation”
of the applicable laws by the decision maker and thus assist reviewing courts in assessing the reasonableness of a visa officer’s decision (Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61 at para 32; Salkhan at para 20).
[21] In the present case, the IRCC guidelines indicate that a “A77”
work permit applicant must demonstrate that they (1) have a pending permanent resident application in the Start-up Business Class, (2) intend to reside in a province or territory other than Quebec, (3) have sufficient funds to support their family for 52 weeks, (4) have the language skill levels required for the employment, (5) have an offer of employment as an entrepreneur and have paid an employer compliance fee, and (6) have submitted their work permit application electronically prior to entering Canada or after if they meet the requirements of section 199 of the IRPR. Finally, and more importantly, they must have received a commitment certificate from a designated entity (i.e., an entity designated as a business incubator, angel investor group, or venture capital fund under section 98.03 of the IRPR) indicating that the applicant is “essential”
and that there are urgent business reasons for their entry to Canada prior to obtaining permanent residence.
[22] An application for a “A77”
work permit is of course tied to the objectives of the Start-up Business Class program, which, according to the Officer, emphasizes that the proposed business ventures are to result in job creation and service innovation opportunities in Canada.
B. The Officer properly considered the commitment certificate and the letter of support
[23] In his written submissions, Mr. Mohammed first argues that the Officer did not properly consider the commitment certificate and the letter of support issued by Pycap, the business incubator. He maintains that section 98.04 of the IRPR “is explicit in its stating that designated entities are the ones that deem the Applicants as essential or not”
and that IRCC guidelines make it “explicit that it is the commitment certificate, and no other document, that determines certain business aspects, including urgent business needs and the essential status of each applicant.”
In other words, Mr. Mohammed submits that given the expertise held by entities like Pycap, which are designated by the Minister pursuant to section 98.03 of the IRPR, these entities should be the ones making the decision about whether an applicant’s presence in Canada is essential and thus, whether they should be granted a work permit pending determination of their permanent resident application in the Start-up Business Class. At the hearing before the Court, counsel for Mr. Mohammed appeared to tone down this argument and to acknowledge that the Minister, not the designated entity, effectively has the final authority to make such decision.
[24] In any event, Mr. Mohammed’s written argument is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Minister, it was rejected by Justice Simon Fothergill in Maghami v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 542 [Maghami], where the Court found that IRCC officers are not bound by the assessment of the designated entities and that commitment certificates and letters of support are only an expression of opinion for an officer’s consideration (Maghami at para 19). This is also consistent with the IRCC guidelines which provide the following with respect to the assessment of the commitment certificate:
The applicant has provided a Commitment Certificate – Letter of Support from the designated entity that explains the urgent business need for the applicant to enter Canada prior to the finalization of their permanent residence application.
If the processing officer is satisfied that it is reasonable for the applicant to be physically in Canada to start up their proposed business prior to permanent residence, this would align with the policy rationale.
[Emphasis added.]
[25] While the designated entity’s view is entitled to consideration, the latter does not make the decision mandated to be made by the Minister (Mourato Lopes v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 564 at para 11 [Mourato Lopes]). In fact, had the Minister delegated to those designated entities the authority to grant work permits, that would have been an illegal delegation of powers, as it is the Minister who can issue work permits to foreigners (subsection 4(1) of the IRPA).
[26] Mr. Mohammed further contends that if the Officer had any doubt regarding business‑expertise‑related questions, they should have used the peer-reviewed process provided for in section 98.09 of the IRPR. This argument was also rejected in Maghami, where the Court found that the peer review process is not mandatory and that in any case, the officer would not have been bound by the independent review (paragraph 98.09 of the IRPR; Maghami at para 21; see also Neri v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1087 at para 30; Li v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1327 at para 35; Serimbetov v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2022 FC 1130 at paras 45-47 [Serimbetov]; Ngyuen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1126 at para 24; Mourato Lopes at paras 3, 6, 8; Kwan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 92 at paras 3, 25).
[27] Moreover, as in Maghami, the Minister takes the position that the peer review process only applies to permanent residence applications, not to work permit applications. I find the Minister’s argument convincing. Assessing work permit applications is meant to be a typically faster process than assessing applications for permanent residence. Furthermore, section 98.09 of the IRPR is a provision related to permanent resident applications filed under the Start-up Business Class, whereas the “A77”
work permits are assessed pursuant to section 200 and paragraph 205(a) of the IRPR.
[28] I agree with Mr. Mohammed that “the commitment certificate, as part of the record before the Officer, should be counted as evidence in support of the application.”
Here, the Officer precisely stated having reviewed the commitment certificate. The Officer also indicated having reviewed the documents provided as part of the redetermination, and those include the representative submissions made by counsel for Mr. Mohammed on October 24, 2024.
[29] I note that all Equi-coop partners are deemed “essential”
to the business on the certificate of commitment issued by Pycap. As for the “urgent”
reasons to grant a work permit to Mr. Mohammed pending the assessment of his permanent residence application, the certificate indicates the following: “[a] work permit is needed for Owais Ali Mohammed to establish and develop product and technology of the business.”
In the representative submissions, it is mentioned that Mr. Mohammed’s presence in Canada is essential “to ensure the successful implementation of Equi-Coop operations”
and that simple steps like opening a bank account cannot be done without the entry of one of the business partners in Canada. The submissions further state that his presence is also “necessary to oversee critical activities,”
including establishing partnerships with Canadian suppliers and contractors, customizing the platform’s technology to meet the unique needs of the Canadian construction industry, and managing compliance with Canadian regulations and standards.
[30] I observe that these reasons do not explain why Mr. Mohammed must be in Canada pending the determination of his permanent resident application and what exactly cannot wait until then. One must remember that the Start-up Business Class is first and foremost a permanent residence program (Serimbetov at paras 18, 29).
C. There are no other shortcomings in the Decision
[31] Mr. Mohammed further submits that the Officer’s concern about the geographical locations of the start-up team members is “illogical”
since it is not because team members have been able to do some work in India that there is no need for them to work on the start-up in Canada. Mr. Mohammed also claims that the Officer’s notes “omit critical context”
of the launch of the platform in India. Because it was meant to be a pilot, says Mr. Mohammed, it was unreasonable for the Officer to expect operational information, bank statements, or a full functionable website. Finally, Mr. Mohammed argues that in the absence of any status in Canada, it was not reasonable for the Officer to expect his team to have already established industry connections in Canada.
[32] At the hearing, Mr. Mohammed insisted on the fact that his application was not refused by the Officer on urgency issues but because it did not meet the Start-up Business Class program requirements and did not bring significant benefits to Canada. Mr. Mohammed argued that the Decision was silent on those benefits and is therefore incomprehensible and unjustified, contrary to the teachings of Vavilov.
[33] With respect, I am not convinced by Mr. Mohammed’s submissions. I do not dispute that it might be easier for Mr. Mohammed and his partners to set up their contemplated business in Canada while being physically here. However, that does not mean that the issuance of an exceptional “A77”
work permit is warranted on that sole basis, in the absence of “urgent”
reasons as per the guidelines. The further establishment will be possible when or if their permanent residence applications under the Start-up Business Class are approved.
[34] I pause to observe that as Chief Information Officer, Mr. Mohammed’s tasks are notably to “create and implement a technology strategy,”
“oversee the design, implementation, and maintenance of the organization’s IT infrastructure,”
“identify opportunities for digital transformation within the organization,”
and “manage the IT budget.”
No evidence was provided as to why Mr. Mohammed would not be able to continue his work from India, considering that his team was able to create a website and have allegedly “more than 20 lenders and renters tested in the platform.”
The mere assertion in the commitment certificate that his presence in Canada is essential for “urgent”
reasons related to the establishment and development of product and technology of the business did not convince the Officer. I fail to see how such an assessment can be found unreasonable.
[35] I am also satisfied that the Officer reasonably turned their mind to the claimed significant benefits that issuing a work permit to Mr. Mohammed to launch Equi-coop would bring to Canada, and that they could conclude that insufficient particularized information had been submitted to justify the issuance of the requested work permit. Despite the able submissions made by counsel for Mr. Mohammed at the hearing, I am not persuaded that there are sufficient grounds for the Court to intervene. True, the Officer could have provided more complete reasons for the refusal. But I am not persuaded that the Officer’s reasons and analysis do not support the conclusion he reached.
[36] There is a strong presumption that a decision maker has weighed and considered all the evidence, unless the contrary is established (Kanagendren v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 86 at para 36; Florea v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ no 598 (FCA) at para 1). Moreover, failure to mention a particular piece of evidence does not mean it has been ignored or discounted (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 16), and a decision maker is not required to refer to all of the evidence that supports their conclusions. It is only when the decision maker is silent on evidence that clearly supports a contrary conclusion that the Court may intervene and infer that the decision maker overlooked the contradictory evidence in making their finding of fact (Nguyen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1207 at para 23, citing Ozdemir v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 331 at paras 9–10; Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No 1425 (QL) at paras 16–17 [Cepeda-Gutierrez]).
[37] However, Cepeda-Gutierrez does not support the proposition that the mere failure to refer to important evidence that runs contrary to the decision maker’s conclusion automatically renders the decision unreasonable and causes it to be set aside. On the contrary, Cepeda‑Gutierrez states that only when the evidence omitted is critical and squarely contradicts the decision maker’s conclusion on key elements of its reasons that the reviewing court may determine that the decision maker unreasonably disregarded material before it (Gonzalez Vargas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 419 at para 53). This is not the case here, and Mr. Mohammed has not referred the Court to any such evidence in the record.
[38] It was not clear for the Officer how Equi-coop would benefit from operating in Canada given that the team members are currently operating the start-up venture virtually from different geographical locations in India. As submitted by the Minister, it was open to the Officer to find that the different geographical locations of the business partners did not appear to have impeded their ability to advance and develop their proposed business venture in India. In a detailed assessment of the evidence, the Officer noted the existence of the company website, but found that overall, the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of ongoing operations given the absence of corporate bank statements or operational information. These were all pertinent considerations in the assessment of how the start-up venture would benefit from operating in Canada prior to a decision being rendered on Mr. Mohammed’s permanent residency application. These were also relevant to assess whether grounds existed to grant the exceptional work permit sought by Mr. Mohammed.
[39] I am not convinced that the Officer ignored the proposed business’ potential for job creation and innovation. The Officer was simply not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support a positive conclusion in that respect and to find that Equi-coop itself would benefit Canada. There was indeed limited information about any significant benefits to be brought, whether in terms of job creation or innovation, as Mr. Mohammed’s submissions to IRCC mostly focused on his interest to come to Canada as soon as possible.
[40] Administrative decision-makers are presumed to have considered all the evidence before them, and Mr. Mohammed has not identified any specific evidence ignored by the Officer that would have been sufficient to render the Decision unreasonable. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that it was reasonable for the Officer to conclude that Mr. Mohammed was not eligible for a “A77”
work permit considering the insufficiency of the evidence provided to support the benefits expected from his business proposal and the necessity of his presence in Canada pending the final determination of his permanent resident application. I detect no shortcoming in those conclusions that would warrant the Court’s intervention.
[41] It is well recognized that the onus is on permit and visa applicants to put together applications that are convincing, to anticipate adverse inferences contained in their evidence and address them, and to demonstrate that they have a right to enter Canada (Salkhan at para 31). This was not done here. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by counsel for the Minister, the factual findings of visa officers are entitled to significant deference, given their expertise in assessing work permits and in reviewing compliance with the various immigration programs available to foreign nationals.
[42] The issue before the Court is not whether the interpretation of the evidence proposed by Mr. Mohammed might be defendable, acceptable, or reasonable. Rather, the Court must examine this issue in respect of the interpretation made by the Officer in the Decision (Vavilov at para 86). The fact that there may be other reasonable interpretations of the facts does not mean that the Officer’s reading and assessment was unreasonable. The purpose of judicial review on a reasonableness standard is to understand the basis on which the decision is made, and to identify whether there are sufficiently central or significant deficiencies or whether the decision reveals an unreasonable analysis (Vavilov at paras 96–97, 101). Here, Mr. Mohammed has not convinced me that “any shortcomings or flaws relied on [...] are sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable”
(Vavilov at para 100).
IV. Conclusion
[43] For all these reasons, this application for judicial review is dismissed. The Decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness, namely, justification, transparency, and intelligibility, in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear upon the decision maker (Vavilov at para 99). In my view, the Officer’s reasoning can be followed without a decisive flaw in rationality or logic.
[44] There are no questions of general importance to be certified.
JUDGMENT in IMM-21200-24
THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:
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This application for judicial review is dismissed, without costs.
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There is no question of general importance to be certified.
“Denis Gascon”
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