Date: 20251203

Docket: IMM-1666-23

Citation: 2025 FC 1923

Ottawa, Ontario, December 3, 2025

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson

BETWEEN:

Y.Z.

Applicant

and

MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] The Applicant, Y.Z., was found by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada’s Immigration Division [ID] to be inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], the ID having found the Applicant to have been complicit in crimes against humanity committed by the Egyptian National Police [ENP].

[2] The Applicant applies under subsection 72(1) of the IRPA for judicial review of the ID’s January 11, 2023, inadmissibility decision rendered pursuant to subsection 44(2) of the IRPA, arguing the ID both erred in law and in fact, and in particular that the ID’s actual findings and treatment of the Applicant’s evidence was unreasonable. The Respondent submits the ID’s decision was reasonable.

[3] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

II. Background

[4] After graduating from the police academy, the Applicant served as a member of the ENP for approximately 11 years. The Applicant joined the ENP in the rank of Lieutenant after graduation and was promoted three times during his service, rising to the rank of Major.

[5] The Applicant reports that he was aware of corrupt police practices within the ENP, including mistreatment or abuse of those in the ENP’s custody, that the ENP had engaged in a violent response “against masses of people” demonstrating in Cairo in 2011, and that the ENP was responsible for the “massacre committed by police forces against the civilians” in clearing protestors in Cairo in 2013.

[6] Despite his awareness, the Applicant states he opposed and did not engage in corrupt police practices, in the mistreatment of those in custody, nor in the police response to protests in 2011 and 2013. He also reports that he actively refused to engage in such conduct on a number of occasions. These refusals reportedly caused his supervisors to threaten him with relocation, reassignment, arrest, or physical violence. He states that he was punished in the form of lost pay and a workplace reassignment as result of certain of his reported refusals.

[7] The Applicant states that following his refusal to participate in a group that was to be formed to influence the outcome of an upcoming constitutional referendum and direction from his superior to release a suspect from custody, he feared arrest. He departed Egypt and reports an order was subsequently issued for his arrest. He later entered Canada irregularly from the United States.

III. Legislative framework

[8] War crimes and crimes against humanity are included among the violations of human or international rights that render a person inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA:

[9] Subsection 6(1) of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24 [the Act] states that every person who commits a genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime is guilty of an indictable offence. The Act defines the term “crime against humanity” at subsection 6(3) as follows:

[10] Subsections 6(4) and 6(5) of the Act address the interpretation of the offence of “crime against humanity” as follows:

[11] Pursuant to section 33 of the IRPA, there must be “reasonable grounds to believe” that a person is described under paragraph 35(1)(a). The “reasonable grounds to believe” standard requires more than mere suspicion, but is less than the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities. There must be an objective basis for the belief that is based on compelling and credible information (Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40 at para 114 [Mugesera]).

IV. Decision under Review

[12] The ID first stated that for “acts to rise to the level of crimes against humanity, they must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against an identifiable group or civilian population.” Relying on Mugesera, the ID found that an “attack” is not limited to the use of armed force. Nor is it required to be perpetrated by a state (Sivakumar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 433, 1993 CanLII 3012(FCA)). Further, the ID found that to be “systematic,” the attack does not need to be conducted in accordance with an official policy or plan.

[13] The ID then identified the evidence that was before it. The ID found the documentary evidence, in the form of reporting from international non-governmental and governmental organizations, the Egyptian Human Rights Organization and reputable media sources, to be credible and trustworthy. The ID gave full weight to this evidence.

[14] With respect to the Applicant’s testimony, the ID found his evidence, while straightforward, minimized human rights abuses committed by the ENP, and thereby minimized and negated his knowledge and role in the abuses. Noting the persistent nature of police human rights abuses in Egypt as reported in the documentary evidence, the ID found the Applicant’s knowledge of only a single incident of torture during his service to be disingenuous. The ID preferred the documentary evidence and gave the Applicant’s testimony minimal weight.

[15] In considering inadmissibility under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA, the ID first considered whether the ENP committed crimes against humanity as described in paragraph 6(1)(b) of the Act.

[16] The ID acknowledged that the ENP is a nation-wide police force responsible for maintaining public order, not an organization of “limited brutal purpose,” but also noted it is one with a long history of human rights abuses. Egyptian law permits human rights abuses including indefinite detention without trial and the Egyptian Penal Code defines torture in a narrow manner thereby “absolving most police perpetrators and their activities.” The ID found the police in Egypt “act with impunity,” that torture has long been a serious issue in Egypt, that the practice became institutionalized in 1981 with the state’s continued governance under emergency law, and that torture “as a policing tool has remained unabated since.”

[17] The ID concluded that the preponderance of credible evidence establishes on the reasonable grounds to believe standard, that the ENP committed crimes against humanity within the meaning of the IRPA, that the crimes were part of a widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population, and that the crimes were undertaken as a specific strategy employed by the ENP and the Egyptian government.

[18] Having found the ENP committed crimes against humanity, the ID then addressed whether the Applicant’s activities as a member of the ENP render him complicit in those crimes.

[19] In this regard, the ID first acknowledged that it is not alleged the Applicant personally committed crimes against humanity, but rather that he is complicit in the crimes of the ENP. The ID then proceeded to apply the test for complicity – whether the Applicant voluntarily, knowingly, and significantly contributed to the commission of crimes against humanity – as set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola].

[20] In applying the non-exhaustive list of factors identified in Ezokola, the ID found that the Applicant had voluntarily joined the ENP and voluntarily remained in the organization. This even after becoming aware of the human rights abuses perpetrated by the ENP in at least 2011 following the ENP’s repression of protestors in Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring.

[21] The ID found the Applicant in his role as an Investigation Police Officer “played an indispensable role in the accomplishment of abuse and torture of detainees…[and] was an integral part of the required machinery that allowed the abuse and torture to occur unimpeded.” The ID also found the Applicant continued to bring individuals into police stations despite knowing they “could become victims of abuse and torture.” In so doing, the ID concluded the Applicant knowingly and significantly contributed to the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the ENP.

[22] Citing Ramirez v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FC 306 at 327, 1992 CanLII 8540 (FC), the ID rejected the Applicant’s argument that his continued ENP service was under duress, finding he had failed to demonstrate he was “avoiding ‘grave and imminent peril’ such that the harm that would be inflicted upon [the Applicant] would be greater than the harm inflicted on the abused detainees.”

[23] The ID found that the Applicant remained in the service of the ENP beyond his reportedly mandatory ten-year service period without a reasonable explanation, that there was an absence of evidence to indicate the requirement to repay education fees prior to completing ten years of service would have caused significant hardship, and that, in any event, transfer to a civilian government position was an option. The ID acknowledged the Applicant’s reported threat of violence should he have opposed his superiors, but found the evidence did not indicate the threatened violence rose to the same level as that the ENP inflicted on the civilian population. The ID noted that despite having been threatened with violence, the Applicant only ever faced financial penalties and work placement repercussions.

V. Issues

[24] The application raises a number of issues. I have framed those issues as follows:

1. Was the ID's determination that the ENP committed crimes against humanity unreasonable?

1. Did the ID err in finding the ENP committed crimes against humanity in the absence of an animating state policy?

2. Did the ID err in finding a crime against humanity can be committed against “the” civilian population of a country?

2. Was the ID’s analysis of the Ezokola factors unreasonable?

VI. Standard of Review

[25] The Parties submit, and I agree, that the presumptive standard of reasonableness applies (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 10 [Vavilov]).

[26] In conducting a review on the reasonableness standard, a reviewing court must determine “whether a decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility – and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision” (Vavilov at para 99). The party challenging the decision bears the burden of demonstrating that a decision is unreasonable. Moreover, where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, a decision-maker’s reasons must be reflective of that impact and address why a decision best reflects the legislature’s intent (Vavilov at para 133).

VII. Analysis

A. The ID reasonably found the ENP committed crimes against humanity

[27] The Applicant has not persuaded me that the ID erred in finding that the ENP committed crimes against humanity within the meaning of IRPA. Having found the ENP engaged in widespread and long-established practices of mistreatment and torture and that those practices are, at best, leniently addressed and, at worst, sanctioned by Egyptian penal law, it was reasonable for the ID to conclude that the ENP engaged in widespread or systematic attacks against the civilian population, thereby committing crimes against humanity.

(1) The ID did not err in its consideration of the ENP’s crimes despite the absence of an animating state policy

[28] The Applicant argues, relying on section 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS I-38544, [2002] Can TS No 13 [Rome Statute], that where the ID relies on conventional international law to establish a widespread or systematic attack, it must be satisfied the attack was carried out in furtherance of a state or organizational policy.

[29] The Applicant acknowledges that the ID accurately noted that Mugesera at para 158 held that “there is currently no requirement in customary international law that a policy underlie the attack” (emphasis added). However, the Applicant relies on this Court’s decision in Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 [Verbanov] to argue the law has evolved.

[30] In Verbanov, Justice Sébastien Grammond found to be reasonable an IAD decision holding that, following the incorporation of the Rome Statute into domestic law by way of the Act, the existence of a policy is a mandatory element of the concept of “widespread or systematic attack.” That being so, it is argued that the ID, having acknowledged that “torture and other crimes against humanity perpetuated inside police stations may not be an official plan or strategy of the ENP or the Egyptian government,” was precluded from finding crimes against humanity under conventional international law, and the ID erred in concluding otherwise.

[31] I disagree. Verbanov was decided in a context where the IAD found the state was actively trying to combat torture through various policies and initiatives and that the torture committed by certain members of the Moldovan police was likely the result of individual motives (Verbanov at para 42). Impunity resulting from a deficient justice system in this context was insufficient to support the existence of an official plan or strategy (Verbanov at para 43).

[32] In this regard, I agree with Justice Denis Gascon who, in considering Verbanov in Akinpelu v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 400 [Akinpelu], states:

[43] I underline that the Verbanov decision does not stand for the proposition that the government’s constitution or a formal written policy specifically endorsing human rights abuses must exist before a finding of crimes against humanity can be made. In fact, Justice Grammond said quite the opposite, concluding that “this judgment should not be understood as shielding police officers from the accountability warranted by the commission of heinous crimes. Whether the torture of detainees is conducted pursuant to a State or organizational policy is an issue that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, according to the evidence” (Verbanov at para 76).

[33] In this instance, the ID relied on the independent country condition evidence in finding the ENP has a long history of human rights abuses, that Egyptian law permits the ENP to act with impunity, that torture by the police is institutionalized, that the use of torture as a policing tool continues, and that torture by the ENP is a systematic practice.

[34] None of this evidence or the conclusions the ID drew from it have been seriously disputed by the Applicant. It is on the basis of this evidence that the ID then concluded, despite the absence of an “official” policy or strategy, that “the government and the ENP know these criminal acts occur,” that “the government permits them to continue with impunity,” and that the acts of the ENP in quelling protests in 2011 and 2013 were undertaken as a specific strategy, knowingly employed, by the ENP and the Egyptian government.

[35] The ID’s finding that the ENP engaged in crimes against humanity is consistent with the evidence, and as in Akinpelu, is “reconcilable with the requirements of the Rome Statute and the jurisprudence of this Court” (at para 45).

(2) The ID did not err in its consideration of the target population of the ENP’s crimes

[36] The Applicant submits that the ID erred by conflating the concept of “any civilian population” with “civilians” more generally in finding the attacks were “directed against the civilian population of Egypt.” The Applicant relies on Mugesera at para 161 where the Supreme Court describes a civilian population as “a relatively large group of people who share distinctive features which identify them as targets of the attack.”

[37] In conducting a reasonableness assessment, a reviewing court must read the decision-maker’s reasons “holistically and contextually” (Vavilov at para 97). In doing so in this case, it is evident that the ID has set out the distinctive features of the civilian population that identify them as targets of attack.

[38] Those the ID identifies as targets include members of the civilian population in “police custody,” those “involved in police investigations” or those engaged in peaceful protest, whether detained or not, by the ENP. This encompasses a broad cross section of the Egyptian population – those identified might well include any member of the civilian population in Egypt at any given time. This being so, the ID’s description of the target group as being the “civilian population in Egypt” is reflective of reality. It does not conflate civilians more generally with the concept of “civilian population.”

[39] The ID’s identification of the group targeted for attack is neither inaccurate nor inconsistent with the Mugesera description of a civilian population. The ID has not erred in this regard.

B. The ID’s analysis of the Ezokola factors was not unreasonable

[40] The Applicant argues the ID’s complicity analysis is unreasonable on a number of grounds.

[41] The Applicant asserts the ID mischaracterized the Applicant’s evidence relating to his knowledge of human rights abuses, an assertion I find amounts to nothing more than disagreement with the ID’s assessment of the evidence and a request that the Court reweigh the evidence.

[42] In finding the Applicant knew abuse and torture were common policing tools, the ID relied on the following exchange during the Applicant’s inadmissibility interview:

Interviewer: Okay. So there is extensive open source information from numerous human rights watch groups around the globe that indicate that the Egyptian national police have engaged in human rights abuses. What’s your response to that?

[Applicant]: Happened, yes. Yes, they do violate, of course they do. And the biggest proof is what I mentioned in my story, what happened at (inaudible), what happened at (inaudible) and the torture occurring at the police stations and there are possible other things which I did not witness.

[43] The ID’s finding that the Applicant knew abuse and torture were common is not inconsistent with the Applicant’s evidence, and reflects an inference that was reasonably available to the ID.

[44] The Applicant relies on Bentaher v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1187 [Bentaher], where Justice Janet Fuher held “Ezokola cannot be said to stand for the proposition that the ‘knowing contribution’ in the Canadian test for complicity includes recklessness” (at para 40), in arguing the ID incorrectly adopted recklessness as the mens rea standard in assessing complicity.

[45] While I take no issue with the finding in Bentaher, I am not persuaded that the ID adopted recklessness as the mens rea standard, as asserted by the Applicant.

[46] The Applicant relies on the ID’s single use of the term “could,” as opposed to would, to argue the ID adopted recklessness as the standard for complicity. As I have previously noted, judicial review requires the Court engage in a holistic review of the impugned decision; it is not a treasure hunt for error (Vavilov at para 102).

[47] In considering the issue of knowledge, the ID reviewed the evidence. It found that early in his career the Applicant had specific knowledge that those in police custody were subject to mistreatment, noted that he had a lengthy career working in multiple locations as a criminal investigations officer, and that the main perpetrators of abuse and torture were criminal investigations officers.

[48] In the context of this evidence, the ID found the Applicant was “fully aware that his immediate co-workers and other police officers were perpetrating human rights abuses” and that the Applicant was “directly in the midst of a crime against humanity” involving the electrocution of two detainees where he refused to comply with an order to engage in torture, but nonetheless knew others carried out this very task. The ID further found that “abuse and torture were commonly used policing tools” by the ENP and that the Applicant “knew his policing duties directly assisted those who abused and tortured detainees.”

[49] The ID did not conclude the Applicant recklessly contributed to the crimes of the ENP, but instead expressly and clearly found, citing and relying upon credible evidence, that the Applicant had specific and actual knowledge that his actions assisted those who systematically abused and tortured detainees.

[50] The Applicant argues that the ID required evidence demonstrating the Applicant had actual knowledge that a specific and identified individual apprehended and detained by the Applicant would be tortured to satisfy the knowledge element of the Ezokola test. The Applicant cites no authority in support of this position, and I reject it.

[51] Ezokola requires individuals voluntarily make a “knowing and significant” contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the group, not that the individual have actual knowledge of a specific incident of criminal conduct.

[52] The Applicant also argues that the ID unreasonably considered the question of voluntariness because it failed to consider risks and grave repercussions the Applicant asserted could result had he attempted to resign. This argument fails to recognize that the ID did consider these very risks in addressing the Applicant’s reported interactions with superiors in the context of his reported refusals to carry out orders. I do however accept that the ID may have engaged in speculation in relying on evidence of travel for vacation purposes to then infer an ability to repay his education costs should he resign. That being so, this error alone does not render the decision unreasonable.

[53] The Applicant next argues that the ID unreasonably considered the Ezokola factors in assessing his contribution to the crimes of the ENP and cites a series of examples of the ID’s failure to assess the evidence. For example, it is submitted the ID failed to consider the ENP is a multifaceted organization, and that the Applicant was involved in pursuing legitimate purposes. This argument ignores the ID’s specific acknowledgement that ENP is a nation-wide police force that is not limited to a brutal purpose. The ID also clearly set out the Applicant’s position that he performed only legitimate policing duties. Having done so, it was then open to the ID to assess evidence and render conclusions grounded in the evidence, which it did.

[54] These arguments and the issues with the ID’s consideration and assessment of the objective documentary evidence, highlighted by way of an appendix attached to the Applicant’s Memorandum of Fact and Law and additional arguments taking issue with the weight given to the Applicant’s testimony, all generally reflect areas of disagreement with the ID’s decision or advance the view that the evidence could have been weighed differently. Neither justifies intervention on judicial review.

[55] For the above reasons, I am not persuaded that the ID’s consideration of the Ezokola factors was unreasonable.

VIII. Proposed question for certification

[56] By letter submitted in advance of the hearing of this matter, the Respondent proposed the following question of general importance for certification:

Does a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population or any identifiable group need to be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to satisfy the elements of the offence of crimes against humanity such that it would render a person inadmissible on grounds of violating human or international rights pursuant to paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act?

[57] Subject to section 87.01 of the IRPA, section 74(d) provides that an appeal from a judicial review determination is only available to the Federal Court of Appeal where the applications judge certifies that a serious question of general importance arises and sets out the question.

[58] A properly certified question is one that is dispositive of the appeal, transcends the interests of the parties, and raises an issue of broad significance or general importance. The question must be one that has been dealt with by the Federal Court and arises from the case itself (Lunyamila v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 FCA 22 at para 46; Lewis v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 130 at para 36, Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Zazai, 2004 FCA 89 at paras 11–12).

[59] The above proposed question was also proposed by the respondent in Akinpelu. The Court in Akinpelu acknowledged the question raises a broad issue of significance or general application and that it transcends the interests of the parties. However, the Court declined certification on the basis that the question would not be determinative of the issues in the case or dispositive of the appeal.

[60] This is also so in this matter, and for this reason the proposed question will not be certified.

IX. Conclusion

[61] The Applicant not having identified any reviewable errors warranting the intervention of this Court, the application for judicial review is dismissed for the reasons set out above.

[62] No question of general importance is certified.

 

JUDGMENT IN IMM-1666-23

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. No question is certified.

blank	“Patrick Gleeson”
blank	Judge

 

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-1666-23
STYLE OF CAUSE:	Y.Z. v MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	BY VIDEOCONFERENCE
DATE OF HEARING:	January 21, 2025
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	GLEESON J.
DATED:	december 3, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Jared Will	For The Applicant
Judy Michaely	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Jared Will & Associates Barrister and Solicitor Toronto, Ontario	For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario	For The Respondent