Docket: IMM-22065-24
Citation: 2025 FC 1846
Montréal, Quebec, November 20, 2025
PRESENT: Mr. Justice Gascon
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BETWEEN: |
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GAGANDEEP SINGH |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The applicant, Gagandeep Singh, is seeking judicial review of a decision dated November 4, 2024 [Decision] whereby the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] upheld a decision from the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] dismissing his claim for refugee protection. Mr. Singh’s claim under both sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] was rejected because the RAD identified a viable internal flight alternative [IFA] in Mumbai or New Delhi, in India.
[2] Mr. Singh submits that the RAD erred in concluding that viable IFAs exist. He argues the RAD erred in determining that his claim had no nexus to a Convention ground and in its assessment of the evidence. He contests both prongs of the IFA test: he maintains that he will be at risk in the proposed IFAs and that the IFAs are unreasonable.
[3] For the reasons that follow, Mr. Singh’s application for judicial review will be dismissed. First, Mr. Singh has brought before this Court arguments that he should have first made to the RAD but did not, which is in itself fatal to his application for judicial review. Moreover, I am satisfied that the RAD’s Decision was responsive to the evidence and that its findings have the qualities that make the RAD’s reasoning logical and consistent in relation to the relevant legal and factual constraints. In essence, Mr. Singh failed to prove that his agents of persecution would be able and motivated to harm him in Mumbai or New Delhi or that he would be unable to reside there.
II. Background
A. The factual context
[4] Mr. Singh is a Sikh citizen of India born in Jaito Sarja, in the district of Gardaspur in the state of Punjab. In 2016, he began a romantic relationship with another man [referred to as DS], the son of an influential Hindi family from Batala, another city located in Punjab. In February 2017, this same-sex relationship was discovered, and Mr. Singh was beaten and threatened by DS’s father. In November 2017, DS’s father also allegedly caused the police to raid Mr. Singh’s house and arrest him. Mr. Singh was tortured and falsely accused by the local police of working for Sikh militants and hiding DS. The Punjabi police took Mr. Singh’s fingerprints, photos, and signatures on blank papers and Mr. Singh was ultimately released upon payment of a bribe.
[5] In December 2017, Mr. Singh was beaten by “radical Sikhs”
who said that he was a “stain on the Sikh religion.”
Mr. Singh thus decided to move to Jalandhar and then Chandigarh, in the state of Punjab. In February 2018, with the help of an agent, Mr. Singh was granted a multiple-entry student visa to Canada. He left India for Canada in April 2018.
[6] More than four years later, in August 2022, Mr. Singh filed a claim for refugee protection based on his fear of (i) DS’s father based on his previous relationship with DS, (ii) the police, and (iii) Indian authorities based on his support of the Khalistan referendum in Canada.
B. The RPD’s decision
[7] In June 2024, the RPD dismissed Mr. Singh’s claim for refugee protection and found that the determinative issue was credibility. The RPD found that Mr. Singh failed to establish that he has a Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Expression, and Sex Characteristics [SOGIESC] profile; that he is, has been, or will be of interest to Indian law enforcement; or that he is a committed supporter of Khalistan.
[8] First, the RPD determined that the core of Mr. Singh’s claim — his same-sex relationship with DS in India — had not been credibly established on a balance of probabilities. The RPD found that Mr. Singh provided a testimony that “remained vague and lacked details especially when questions about DS and his relationship were posed to him outside of the scope of information provided in his [Basis of Claim] [BOC].”
Overall, the RPD was of the view that Mr. Singh had not established his attraction to men nor that his alleged relationship with DS was a romantic one.
[9] Second, the RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, that no First Information Report [FIR] exists against Mr. Singh given that none was provided to the RPD and that Mr. Singh testified that he was able to leave India as the Punjabi police did not file any charges against him. The RPD found that the level of police interest alleged by Mr. Singh, including his involvement with Sikh militants, was “implausible”
based on the objective evidence, as no formal investigation was ever initiated into him.
[10] Third, the RPD found that the evidence did not establish that Mr. Singh’s pro-Khalistan activities would come to the attention of the Indian authorities. The RPD also drew a negative inference from the fact that Mr. Singh did not disclose his pro-Khalistan involvement in his original BOC while he testified to being already active in the movement by then. Moreover, the RPD determined that Mr. Singh’s testimony regarding his commitment and understanding of the Khalistan movement was “unreasonably devoid of substance”
and that Mr. Singh demonstrated a “vague and rudimentary understanding of the Khalistan movement.”
As such, his sur place profile as a Khalistan supporter in Canada was not established.
[11] Fourth, the RPD noted that Mr. Singh arrived in Canada on a study permit in April 2018, but failed to enroll in any study program after his arrival and did not initiate his claim for protection until October 2022. According to the RPD, no reasonable explanation for this delay was provided and Mr. Singh’s “significant delay in claiming [refugee protection] during a four and a half years period in which he was in non-compliance with his conditions of stay in Canada undermines the allegation that he feared for his safety when he arrived here.”
For the RPD, this delay was material to Mr. Singh’s lack of credibility.
C. The RAD Decision
[12] Mr. Singh appealed the RPD’s decision to the RAD. During the appeal process, the RAD issued a notice [Notice] to Mr. Singh and the Respondent, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration [Minister], indicating that it would be considering new issues on appeal, namely, (i) whether Mr. Singh has a viable IFA in Mumbai and/or New Delhi, and (ii) whether Mr. Singh has access to adequate state protection. I pause to note that during the hearing, the RPD had also pointed to possible IFAs in Mumbai and New Delhi but decided to rule solely on credibility issues. Hence, the RAD had to issue the Notice to the parties to address the new IFA issues on appeal.
[13] Mr. Singh and his counsel did not file any submissions in response to the RAD’s Notice.
[14] In the Decision, the RAD upheld the RPD’s finding that Mr. Singh was not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection but so concluded based on the existence of viable IFAs for Mr. Singh in Mumbai and New Delhi. As such, the RAD did not address Mr. Singh’s arguments regarding the alleged errors of the RPD in assessing his credibility and, for the purpose of its analysis, assumed that Mr. Singh was credible.
[15] Regarding the first prong of the IFA test, the RAD determined that DS’s family would not have the motivation to find and harm him if he returns to India and relocates to either of the proposed IFAs. Mr. Singh did not allege that anyone other than the local Punjabi police continues to inquire about his whereabouts. As for the Punjabi police, the RAD determined that they would not have released Mr. Singh without issuing an FIR, an arrest warrant, or a summons to proceed with a formal investigation against him if they believed that he was genuinely involved with Sikh militants or anti-nationalists. There was also no evidence that the local police would be motivated to look for him outside of Punjab, including in the proposed IFAs, and to harm him.
[16] Contrary to the RPD, the RAD accepted that Mr. Singh was a genuine pro-Khalistan supporter, but rejected the argument that his level of involvement would draw the attention of Indian authorities if he were to return to India. There was no evidence that the Punjabi police authorities would genuinely consider him a pro-Khalistan supporter or would have flagged his name to Indian airport authorities. There was also no evidence that Mr. Singh planned to become engaged in high-profile activities on behalf of the Khalistan movement if he were to return to India and relocate to either IFA. The RAD further noted that, according to the National Documentation Package for India [NDP], same-sex couples find acceptance in big metropolitan cities such as Mumbai, “where LGBTQ groups have been active for decades.”
[17] Turning to the second prong of the IFA test, the RAD found that it was reasonable in the circumstances for Mr. Singh to move to either of the proposed IFAs. First, the RAD noted that Mr. Singh did not provide specific arguments or evidence with regard to the second prong. The RAD noted Mr. Singh is literate, speaks Punjabi, completed high school, and travelled abroad, and that there are sizable Sikh communities across India, including in the IFA locations.
D. Standard of review
[18] The Supreme Court of Canada’s landmark decision in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard in judicial reviews of the merits of administrative decisions (Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at para 35 [Pepa]; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 7 [Mason]), unless the circumstances lend themselves to the application of one of the recognized exceptions to this presumption (Canadian Society of Authors, Composers and Music Publishers v Entertainment Software Association, 2022 SCC 30 at para 28; Vavilov at paras 33–64, 69–72).
[19] The parties and I agree that the standard of reasonableness applies to the Decision and to findings regarding the existence of a viable IFA and that none of the Vavilov exceptions applies (Lahar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1735 at para 22 [Lahar]; Hardono v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1707 at para 17 [Hardono]; Reyes c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2025 CF 1248 at para 15; Canelas Galindo c Canada (Citoyenneté et Immigration), 2025 CF 1117 at para 14; Mba v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1098 at para 13 [Mba]; Gonzalez Vargas v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 419 at para 19; Vishist v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1908 at para 17; Sachdeva v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1522 at para 10; Valencia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 386 at para 19; Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 350 at para 17 [Singh 2020]).
[20] Where the applicable standard of review is reasonableness, the role of a reviewing court is to examine the reasons given by the administrative decision maker and to determine whether the decision is based on “an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis”
and is “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
(Pepa at para 46; Mason at para 64; Vavilov at para 85). The reviewing court must therefore ask whether the “decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness — justification, transparency and intelligibility”
(Vavilov at para 99, citing notably Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 47, 74).
[21] Such a review must include a rigorous evaluation of administrative decisions. However, as part of its analysis of the reasonableness of a decision, the reviewing court must take a “reasons first”
approach and begin its inquiry by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention,”
seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion (Pepa at paras 46–47; Mason at paras 58, 60; Vavilov at para 84). The reviewing court must adopt an attitude of restraint and intervene “only where it is truly necessary to do so in order to safeguard the legality, rationality and fairness of the administrative process”
(Vavilov at para 13).
[22] The standard of reasonableness is rooted in the principle of judicial restraint and deference, and it requires reviewing courts to show respect for the distinct role that the legislature has chosen to give to administrative decision makers, more particularly on findings of fact and the weighing of evidence (Mason at para 57; Vavilov at paras 13, 24, 46, 75). Absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with the factual findings of an administrative decision maker (Vavilov at paras 125–126, citing Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55; Doyle v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 237 at para 3).
[23] The onus is on the party challenging the decision to prove that it is unreasonable. Flaws must be more than superficial for the reviewing court to overturn an administrative decision. The court must be satisfied that there are “sufficiently serious shortcomings”
(Vavilov at para 100).
III. Analysis
A. Preliminary issues: no submission in response to the Notice, inadmissible evidence and inadmissible argument
[24] I first need to address three issues arising from Mr. Singh’s submissions before this Court.
[25] First, in his application for judicial review, Mr. Singh argues that the RAD erred in its analysis of the viability of the two proposed IFAs. However, Mr. Singh does not appear to have made any submissions to the RAD in response to the Notice with respect to either prong of the IFA test. In fact, at the hearing, counsel for Mr. Singh admitted that no submissions were made to the RAD on the IFA issue. I note that Mr. Singh was then represented by the other lawyer practicing with his current counsel at their firm.
[26] This is generally fatal. The Court has the discretionary power to consider a new issue in the context of a judicial review, but it is generally not appropriate to do so when the issue could have been raised before the decision maker, as is clearly the case here (Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at paras 22–25 [Alberta Teachers]; Zoghbi v Air Canada, 2024 FCA 123 at para 26, application for leave to the Supreme Court dismissed, no 41471 (April 17, 2025) [Zoghbi]; Klos v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FCA 205 at para 8 [Klos]).
[27] Mr. Singh’s application for judicial review could therefore be dismissed entirely on that basis. The arguments put forward by Mr. Singh before this Court should have been presented to the administrative decision maker first — i.e., the RAD — but they were not.
[28] The second issue is with respect to additional evidence counsel for Mr. Singh tried to file in written submissions. Mr. Singh’s counsel refers to a Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC] online article dated November 29, 2023, titled U.S. indictment alleges multiple Indian assassination plots across North America [CBC Article], and to a statement from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP] dated October 14, 2024, titled RCMP statement on violent criminal activity occurring in Canada with connections to agents of the Government of India [RCMP Statement]. Both documents, in brief, explain the involvement of Indian authorities on Canadian soil with respect to Sikhs and/or Khalistan supporters.
[29] The CBC Article is dated before the RPD decision but was never filed before the RPD or the RAD. The RCMP Statement is also dated before the RAD Decision. There is no explanation provided as to why those documents were never filed with the RAD for assessment. As a general rule, the evidentiary record before this Court on judicial review is restricted to the evidentiary record that was before the administrative decision maker (Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22 at para 19 [Access Copyright]). There are a few recognized exceptions to this general rule, but it is clear that none applies here. Judicial review is not a trial de novo and accepting this new evidence would be inconsistent with the differing roles devolved to the judicial review court and the administrative decision-maker (Access Copyright at para 19–20). I have consequently disregarded these documents in my decision.
[30] Moreover, and as mentioned during the hearing, I underline that counsel only cited excerpts of the CBC Article and the RCMP Statement in the written submissions. Those documents — notwithstanding the fact that they are inadmissible on judicial review — should have been filed in their entirety and as exhibits to a supporting affidavit. It is highly improper to refer to unfiled evidence in submissions and to assume that the Court will consider this.
[31] Finally, during the hearing, counsel for Mr. Singh raised a new oral argument not otherwise mentioned in the written memorandum. She argued that the RAD failed to rule on whether it agreed or not with the RPD’s credibility findings with respect to Mr. Singh when it ought to as per its appellate function.
[32] As I mentioned during the hearing, it is ¾ again ¾ improper to raise during oral submissions arguments not otherwise made in writing, both for the Minister and for the Court (Portillo de Jurado v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1108 at paras 4-5; Bineesh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1039 at paras 16-17; Zhou v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 182 at para 6). In any event, I reject the argument. The RAD does not need to address the RPD’s credibility findings when it finds the existence of a viable IFA as this is determinative of an appeal (Lahar at paras 27-37).
B. The RAD’s IFA determination is reasonable
[33] Even if I was not dismissing Mr. Singh’s application for judicial review for the simple reason that he waived his right to make representations with respect to the viability of the proposed IFAs when he and his counsel failed to make submissions in response to the Notice, I would have found the RAD’s Decision to be reasonable.
[34] I am of the view that the RAD correctly applied the two-prong IFA test and reasonably concluded that Mr. Singh may avail himself of a viable IFA in Mumbai or New Delhi. Mr. Singh failed to discharge his onus to convince the RAD that DS’s father, the Punjabi police, or the Indian authorities in general had both the means and motivation to pursue him in Mumbai or New Delhi. Likewise, Mr. Singh has not convincingly demonstrated that the RAD erred in its analysis of the reasonableness of his relocation to Mumbai or New Delhi.
(1) The applicable test on IFA determinations
[35] I have recently summarized and reiterated the applicable test on IFA determinations in Lahar at paragraphs 39–43, Hardono at paragraphs 24–26, and Mba at paragraphs 21–25. This remains applicable, and I will reiterate these principles for convenience purposes.
[36] In Singh 2020, the Court reminded that “the analysis of an IFA is based on the principle that international protection can only be offered to refugee protection claimants in cases where the country of origin is unable to provide to the person requesting refugee protection adequate protection everywhere within their territory”
[emphasis added] (Singh 2020 at para 26). If a refugee claimant has a viable IFA, this will negate a claim for refugee protection under either section 96 or 97 of the IRPA, regardless of the merits of other aspects of the claim (Olusola at para 7).
[37] The test to determine the existence of a viable IFA comes from Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1991 CanLII 13517 (FCA), [1992] 1 FC 706 (FCA) and Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 589 (FCA) [Thirunavukkarasu]. These decisions from the Federal Court of Appeal state that two criteria must be established, on a balance of probabilities, in order to find that a proposed IFA is reasonable: (i) there must be no serious possibility of the claimant being subject to persecution or harm in the part of the country in which the IFA exists; and (ii) it must not be unreasonable for the claimant to seek refuge in the IFA, upon consideration of all their particular circumstances.
[38] The threshold to satisfy the second prong of the IFA test and determine that an IFA is unreasonable is very high: there must be actual and concrete evidence of conditions that would jeopardize an applicant’s life and safety in travelling or temporarily relocating to the proposed safe area (Ranganathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164 (FCA) at para 15 [Ranganathan]; Verma v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 693 at para 13).
[39] When an IFA is established, the onus is on the refugee claimant to demonstrate that the IFA is inadequate (Thirunavukkarasu at para 12; Salaudeen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 39 at para 26; Manzoor-Ul-Haq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1077 at para 24; Feboke v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 155 at paras 43–44).
(2) The RAD reasonably concluded that there is no serious possibility of persecution in the suggested IFAs
[40] Mr. Singh wholly disagrees with the RAD’s assessment of the evidence about the means and motivation of his agents of persecution. He submits that “[b]ecause of being suspected as pro-Khalistan and Sikh, [he] would be harassed by any local law enforcement and could possibly be located in any Indian city he relocates to through the Tenant Registration System”
[my emphasis]. Mr. Singh argues that it was erroneous for the RAD to conclude that the lack of a FIR against him meant that the police did not have the motivation to seek him out. Then, Mr. Singh argues that “a simple phone call by anyone will easily give away [his] location should he be relocated to any of the IFAs, thus alerting the agents of persecution.”
[41] I am not convinced by Mr. Singh’s arguments. These were all addressed by the RAD in its thorough assessment of the record. The RAD found that Mr. Singh was never issued a FIR and as such, there was no evidence that Mr. Singh was ever entered into a database. Mr. Singh did not provide any non-speculative evidence that the Punjabi police would be interested in him upon his return, or that he could be traced to the IFAs through the coordinated efforts of the Punjabi police and local police authorities in the IFAs (Singh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1449 at para 33). The mere assertion that Mr. Singh “could possibly be located”
through the Tenant Registration System without actual evidence in that regard falls very short of the burden of proof of a refugee claimant, even more so to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the RAD’s findings. In short, I cannot detect any shortcomings in the RAD’s conclusion that the alleged agents of persecution of Mr. Singh would not be interested and able to find him in Mumbai or New Delhi.
[42] Mr. Singh had the onus of convincing the RAD that DS’s family, the Punjabi police, or the Indian authorities had both the means and the motivation to persecute him in Mumbai or New Delhi. Considering the evidence — or rather, the lack of, I find that the RAD reasonably found that Mr. Singh had failed to discharge his onus.
(3) The Decision is reasonable in concluding that a viable IFA exists in Mumbai or New Delhi
[43] Turning to the second prong of the IFA test, Mr. Singh argues that his relocation to either Mumbai or New Delhi would be “an extremely heavy burden.”
Once again, I am not persuaded by Mr. Singh’s arguments.
[44] In his submissions, Mr. Singh first claims that he only speaks Haryanvi and Hindi, and that these languages are not spoken in Mumbai. This is simply inaccurate. In his BOC, Mr. Singh indicated speaking Punjabi only. He took Punjabi classes in India. Mr. Singh and his counsel requested a Punjabi interpreter for the hearing before the RPD. Mr. Singh testified before the RPD to speaking Punjabi and a little English. Mr. Singh and his counsel requested that if the RAD decided to hold a hearing, it would be in Punjabi. Overall, the RAD found that the NDP explains that there are strong Sikh communities across India, including in the proposed IFAs and Mr. Singh did not submit evidence to the contrary.
[45] Second, Mr. Singh argues that he is a member of the 2SLGBTQI+ community and that India is a “highly religious and conservative country”
, while also admitting that in 2018, “a decisive state action sprung in favor of homosexuals.”
He claims that “there is [a] vast amount of objective evidence attesting to the hardships, discrimination, and persecution of gay men face in India in virtually all aspects of life.”
He also contends that the RAD did not appropriately take his profile as a gay man into account in its analysis of the viability of the IFAs.
[46] I note that the RPD found that Mr. Singh had not established that he was a member of the 2SLGBTQI+ community and that the RAD did not specifically make a finding on that issue. Nevertheless, it is clear from the Decision that the RAD took into account the alleged profile of Mr. Singh as a gay man. In that regard, the RAD noted that, according to the NDP, same-sex couples find acceptance in big metropolitan cities such as Mumbai. The RAD accepted that same-sex oriented males may suffer ill treatment, extortion, harassment, and discrimination from the state but concluded that the prevalence of such incidents was not sufficient to constitute persecution. Mr. Singh did not identify any evidence that squarely contradicts this RAD’s finding and this Court has previously found such a finding to be reasonable (Basra v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 707 at paras 25-29).
[47] Overall, I am satisfied that the RAD reasonably concluded that Mr. Singh could relocate to either of the proposed IFAs. The threshold to determine that an IFA is unreasonable is very high, and it was clearly not met here (Ranganathan at para 15). Mr. Singh failed to provide any actual and concrete evidence regarding his own personal circumstances and how he would be personally at risk in the IFAs. I find that it was open to the RAD, based on the evidence in the record, to conclude that Mr. Singh had failed to establish that his life or safety would be at risk in relocating to Mumbai or New Delhi.
[48] Absent exceptional circumstances, it is not the task of a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence on the record or to overturn findings of fact (Vavilov at para 125). Rather, I must consider the reasons as a whole, together with the record (Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para 53), and limit myself to determining whether they are irrational or arbitrary. In the present case, I find no irrational or arbitrary conclusions.
IV. Conclusion
[49] For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Singh’s application for judicial review is dismissed. I am satisfied that the Decision was responsive to the evidence, and that its findings regarding the IFA in Mumbai and/or New Delhi have the qualities that make the RAD’s reasoning logical and consistent in relation to the relevant legal and factual constraints. Mr. Singh has failed to discharge his onus of demonstrating that there are fundamental flaws in the RAD’s analysis.
[50] There are no questions of general importance to be certified.
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