Docket: T-431-24
Citation: 2024 FC 1413
Toronto, Ontario, September 9, 2024
PRESENT: Madam Justice Go
BETWEEN: |
KHALID ABDULLE |
Applicant |
and |
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA |
Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] Mr. Khalid Abdulle [The Applicant] is a retired member of the Canadian Armed Forces.
[2] In 2017, the Applicant submitted an application for benefits under the Veterans Independence Program [VIP]. The Applicant was deemed eligible to receive benefits for two of the services offered by the VIP: grounds maintenance benefits and housekeeping benefits. The Applicant sought increases to both of these benefits. While the Applicant receives the maximum grounds maintenance benefits and the regular annual adjustments to those benefits, the amount of housekeeping benefits the Applicant receives are unadjusted.
[3] The Applicant, who is self-represented, seeks to judicially review a February 23, 2024 decision of the National Second Level Appeals Unit [N2LA] of Veterans Affairs Canada [VAC], which affirmed previous decisions to deny the Applicant’s request for an increase in his housekeeping benefits [Decision].
[4] I appreciate that from the Applicant’s standpoint, it may be difficult to understand why the VAC only makes annual adjustments to the maximum amount of certain benefits, while the amount of housekeeping benefits is not subject to the same automatic increase. However, the Decision was reasonable because the N2LA properly applied the relevant legislation and the regulations. While the Applicant looks to the Pension Act (RSC 1985, c. P-6) [Pension Act] to support his argument, the Pension Act does not mandate VAC to adjust housekeeping benefits in the manner that the Applicant is seeking.
[5] I therefore dismiss the application.
II. Issues and Standard of Review
[6] The Applicant raises several arguments that can be summarized as follows:
The Decision was unreasonable as the N2LA failed to apply section 2 and section 75(1) of the Pension Act; and
The Decision failed to explain why VAC adjusts only the maximum rate of the VIP benefit, but does not adjust the maximum rate based on the Consumer Price Index [CPI] or public service wage rates.
[7] The Respondent submits that the presumptive standard of review for the Decision is reasonableness, per Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov]. I agree.
[8] A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker: Vavilov at para 85. The Applicant bears the onus of establishing the decision contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant: Vavilov at para 100.
[9] The relevant legislative and regulatory provisions can be found at Appendix A.
[10] The Applicant points to section 2 of the Pension Act that requires the provisions under the legislation be “liberally construed and interpreted”
to provide compensation to members of the forces who have been disabled.
[11] The Applicant also cites section 75(1) of the Pension Act, arguing this section is applicable in this case. The Applicant submits section 75(1) does not limit annual adjustments of pension benefits to only the maximum rate of a benefit. The Applicant further references the Decision, which states that the maximum rates are adjusted annually based on the CPI or public service wage rates, while pointing out that VAC only adjusts the maximum rate of certain VIP benefits without adjusting the housekeeping benefits based on the CPI, without any explanation.
[12] I reject the Applicant’s submissions.
[13] Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, section 75(1) of the Pension Act does not apply to the adjustment of the benefits under the VIP. An automatic annual increase to VIP benefits only applies to the maximum rates payable. There is no statutory authority for VAC to adjust annual housekeeping benefits based on the CPI.
[14] The relevant law that applies to the VIP is the Veterans Health Care Regulations (SOR/90-594) [Regulations], enabled by the Department of Veterans Affairs Act (RSC, 1985, c. V-1). The criteria for the VIP is outlined in Part 2 of the Regulations.
[15] A variety of benefits are provided to veterans under the VIP to assist them to live independently. These benefits, among others, include the housekeeping and grounds maintenance benefits under the umbrella of homecare services.
[16] Section 20(1) of the Regulations outlines the maximum rates at which the costs of certain VIP services are payable. This includes the maximum amount payable per individual for grounds maintenance services.
[17] Of note, there are no individual maximums for housekeeping services under the Regulations. Instead, the total amount of financial support a veteran receives cannot exceed the maximum for all homecare services (i.e., the sum total of housekeeping and grounds maintenance, together with health and support services, access to nutrition services, and personal care services).
[18] Under subsection 20(2) of the Regulations, the maximum rates for VIP services as outlined in subsection 20(1) are adjusted in the same manner and on the same day as pensions are adjusted under Part V of the Pension Act.
[19] However, the Pension Act does not require that an individual’s VIP benefits increase each time that the maximum rate increases. Rather, the benefit amounts received under the VIP are calculated based on need and information provided regarding each individual’s circumstances, as stipulated in the relevant VIP policies.
[20] The Applicant relies heavily on section 75(1) of the Pension Act to support his position. This provision deals with the annual adjustment of the basic pension. It does not apply to VIP benefits. Neither VAC nor the Court can read into this provision to extend the annual CPI adjustment to all other benefits that veterans receive.
[21] In other words, in the Applicant’s case, there is no authority to amend housekeeping benefits based on the CPI alone. The Applicant’s argument is based on his own interpretation of the Pension Act, whereas the VIP benefits are enabled by a different piece of legislation and governed by a different regulatory regime.
[22] However, I observe that VAC’s own materials may have caused some confusion about this issue. The Applicant included a document entitled “Maximum Rates payable for the Veterans Independence Program and Long Term Care (Effective Date: January 1, 2022)”
in the Applicant’s Record. The document listed the various services a veteran is entitled to receive, and the maximum rate per year for each service. Housekeeping was listed under homecare services, with a maximum rate noted as “up to total amount.”
The bottom of the document stated: “Rates are adjusted annually based on the Consumer Price Index or based on wage rates for the Public Service in accordance with Section 75(1)(3) of the Pension Act.”
[23] What the document omitted to mention is that, section 75(3) of the Pension Act specifically states that the adjustment to all amounts set out in Schedules I to III shall be done in the manner prescribed by regulation. Put in another way, whether an adjustment is made to a benefit and by how much, is prescribed in the relevant regulation, and not in the Pension Act.
[24] My role in a judicial review is not to assess whether a particular government policy is sound, nor whether there are better ways for the government to communicate to veterans about the various benefits schemes. My role is limited to reviewing the reasonableness of the Decision.
[25] Vavilov confirms that “the governing statutory scheme will always operate as a constraint on administrative decision makers and as a limit on their authority:”
Vavilov at para 68.
[26] In this case, the N2LA officer [Officer] carefully considered the evidence and the applicable law and policy. Since the housekeeping benefit was not a maximum amount, and since the Applicant had not provided any evidence that there had been a change in his needs or circumstances to warrant an increase in his housekeeping benefit, the Officer did not have reason nor indeed the authority to grant an increase based on the CPI alone.
[27] Similarly, the enabling legislation does not support the Applicant’s argument that he is entitled to an automatic annual increase. As such, the Officer reasonably concluded that the Applicant will continue to receive the current amount for which he is eligible, unless he experiences a change in costs, needs, or circumstances that would warrant an increase in the housekeeping benefits.
[28] As the Decision noted, the Applicant could seek an increase in the housekeeping benefits by requesting a reassessment due to a change in his personal circumstances, such as a change in health needs or costs of services. In this case, the Applicant never made any request for a reassessment. Further, as the Officer noted, at the time of the second-level review, the Applicant also provided no information to warrant a reassessment.
[29] For these reasons, I dismiss the application. The parties agree not to seek costs.
[30] The application for judicial review is dismissed.
[31] There will be no costs.
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