Convention refugee	Définition de réfugié
96 A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion,	96 A qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui, craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions politiques :
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those countries; or	a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to return to that country.	b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut, ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner.

[28 ] In order to meet their burden and demonstrate that they meet the definition of “refugee” under section 96 of the IRPA and the Convention, refugee protection claimants must meet the applicable legal test, namely, that there is a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution in the event of a return (Alam v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 4 [Alam] at para 8).

[29 ] Persons claiming refugee status must meet the applicable legal test by demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that they “have a reasonable subjective fear of persecution and that this subjective fear is objectively well-founded” [emphasis added] (Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 [Ward]; Alvarez Contreras v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 398 [Alvarez Contreras] at para 16).

[30 ] Therefore, in order to meet the legal test under section 96 of the IRPA, persons claiming refugee status must first establish a subjective fear and then demonstrate that this subjective fear has an objective basis.

[31 ] As to the standard of proof applicable to the facts to meet the legal test for refugee status, its application may be confusing as it applies to separate issues.

[32 ] First, the balance of probabilities standard applies to the underlying facts that refugee protection claimants must prove to demonstrate their subjective fear, and to the underlying facts that they must prove to demonstrate the objective basis of that fear. Claimants must therefore demonstrate the existence of a subjective fear and the objective basis of that subjective fear, and both are established by factual evidence that is assessed on a balance of probabilities (Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR 593 at para 120 citing Adjei v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 FC 680, 1989 CanLII 9466 (FCA) [Adjei]).

[33 ] Thus, a claimant will have to demonstrate his or her subjective fear by providing facts that, assessed on the balance of probabilities standard, will establish that fear. The answers to the following questions can serve as an example of facts related to subjective fear: What events occurred in the country of origin that give rise to this subjective fear? What actions were taken by the person to protect himself or herself? Did he or she move (to the same or another city), change his or her contact information, change job, or notify the authorities to seek state protection in the country of origin? In other words, the person claiming refugee protection must demonstrate that he or she is truly afraid and has taken clear steps to protect himself or herself. This essentially means analyzing the credibility of the individual when he or she testifies, and the likelihood of the information contained in the various forms accompanying the Basis of Claim Form (Alvarez Contreras; Sanchez Molano v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1253 at para 16; Perez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1100 at para 22; Cobian Flores v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 503 at para 4).

[34 ] The objective basis of the subjective fear, on the other hand, must also be assessed on the facts presented by the person claiming refugee protection. These facts will enable the refugee protection claimant to demonstrate a “well-founded fear of persecution” under section 96 of the IRPA (Ward at page 712; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Kaaib, 2006 FC 870 at para 25 citing Williams v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 126 at paras 19–22). These underlying facts must also be proven on a balance of probabilities.

[35 ] The objective basis for a subjective fear will be established following a review of the objective evidence regarding country conditions, such as the National Documentation Package (NDP) (Alvarez Contreras at para 16). In particular, the complicity of the state or its inability to protect its citizens is relevant (Ward at 722–26; Narvaez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (FCTD), [1995] 2 FC 55, 1995 CanLII 3575 (FC) [Narvaez] at 66–67; Aguilar Soto v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1183). Thus, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward at page 712, “if a state is able to protect the claimant, then his or her fear is not, objectively speaking, well-founded” [emphasis added]. The ability and motivation of the agent of persecution to pursue the person locally or across the country, insofar as the state is not itself the agent of persecution, are intrinsically linked to the state’s ability to protect its citizens (Perez Mendoza v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 119 [Perez Mendoza] at paras 28–33; Vigueras Avila v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 359 [Vigueras Avila] at paras 4, 22, 28). This factor becomes especially important in cases where an internal flight alternative is alleged, a test related to the state’s ability to protect its citizens throughout the country, and which can also demonstrate the objective basis of the fear (Sasha Baglay & Martin Jones, Refugee Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017) [Baglay & Jones] at 156–60; Lorne Waldman, Canadian Immigration & Refugee Law Practice (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2023) [Waldman] at 924).

[36 ] That said, there is confusion because the standard of proof applies at two levels when determining refugee status. On the one hand, the facts, if established on a balance of probabilities standard, will enable refugee protection claimants to attempt to discharge their burden of establishing their subjective fear and the objective basis for their fear. On the other hand, these factual elements, if established, will enable claimants to discharge their burden and demonstrate that there is a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of persecution if they return, which is the legal test for obtaining refugee status under section 96 (Adjei; Alam at paras 8–11; Ramanathy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 511 [Ramanathy] at paras 15–17; Paz Ospina v Canada, 2011 FC 681). A standard of proof therefore applies at two levels in the test for refugee status.

[37 ] Thus, once the underlying facts are proven on a balance of probabilities standard, it is necessary to apply these findings of fact to the legal test itself and determine whether the facts as proven demonstrate a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of persecution in the event of a return. The question in this regard is not to determine whether the claimants will actually be persecuted upon return, but whether they have discharged their burden of demonstrating that there is a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of persecution in the event of a return (Adjei at page 681; Alam at para 8; Ndjizera v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 601 at paras 25–26).

[38 ] Applying the legal test for fear of persecution therefore does not require that claimants demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that they will be persecuted if they are returned. In other words, they need not show that there is more than a 50% chance that persecution will occur (Alam at para 5). This standard of proof, normally equivalent to the balance of probabilities, is too high.

[39 ] Thus, claimants will be able to discharge their burden and demonstrate that there is a “reasonable chance” or a “serious possibility” of persecution even though, in fact, this “probability” of serious persecution may be well below 50%. Refugee status could therefore be granted even if, theoretically, the likelihood of serious persecution is low but still “serious” or “reasonable”.

[40 ] There is therefore a “special threshold” for meet the legal test (Alam at para 8, Ramanathy at para 15). Rather than having to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities standard that persecution is likely, a person claiming refugee status must instead demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a “reasonable chance” or a “serious possibility” of persecution. The legal test to be met at this stage is therefore less onerous.

[41 ] Therefore, as stated by Justice Mosley in Ramanathy, the basis for the fear is established when the applicant demonstrates that there is a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” that they will be persecuted [emphasis added]. That said, the underlying facts submitted by the person claiming refugee status will be assessed on the normal civil standard based on the balance of probabilities (therefore more than 50%):

[15] It is well established that the claimant need not prove that persecution would be more likely than not in order to meet the objective portion of the test under s 96. The claimant must establish, however, that there is more than a “mere possibility” of persecution. The applicable test has been expressed as a “reasonable chance” or a “serious possibility”: Adjei v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989 CanLII 9466 (FCA), [1989] 2 FC 680, [1989] FCJ no 67 (FCA).

[16] This test is lower than the balance of probabilities evidentiary standard. It may be confused in its application because both the existence of the subjective fear and the fact that the fear is objectively well founded must be established on a balance of probabilities: Chan v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1995 CanLII 71 (SCC), [1995] 3SCR 593 at para 120 citing Adjei, above. As Justice O’Reilly noted in Alam v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 4 at para 5, while the test is “well known and widely accepted, it is notoriously difficult to express in simple terms.” Having reviewed jurisprudence on the application of the standard, Justice O’Reilly concluded at paras 8 to 11:

8 The lesson to be taken from Adjei is that the applicable standard of proof combines both the usual civil standard and a special threshold unique to the refugee protection context. Obviously, claimants must prove the facts on which they rely, and the civil standard of proof is the appropriate means by which to measure the evidence supporting their factual contentions. Similarly, claimants must ultimately persuade the Board that they are at risk of persecution. This again connotes a civil standard of proof. However, since claimants need only demonstrate a risk of persecution, it is inappropriate to require them to prove that persecution is probable. Accordingly, they must merely prove that there is a “reasonable chance,” “more than a mere possibility” or “good grounds for believing” that they will face persecution.

…

[Emphasis added.]

[42 ] Thus, it is only after the person has presented his or her evidence of the facts (both for the element of subjective fear and for the objective basis of this subjective fear), and the facts have been established on a balance of probabilities standard, that the person can meet the legal test under section 96 of the IRPA. He or she will then have, in light of the evidence presented and overall, discharged his or her burden and proven that there is a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution if he or she is returned, thus deserving protection. In Gebremedhin v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2017 FC 497 [Gebremedhin] at paras 27–29, Justice McVeigh explained the distinction well (see also Aslan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1165 [Aslan] at paras 20–26):

[28] ... In order to show a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the Act, an applicant must establish that there is a “reasonable chance” or “serious possibility” of persecution (Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1989 CanLII 9466 (FCA), [1989] 2 FC 680 (FCA) at paras 5–8; Sebastiao v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 803 at paras 13–14 [Sebastiao]). The standard of proof for facts on which a claimant relies is a balance of probabilities. However, once proven, the legal threshold to demonstrate persecution is only a “serious possibility.”

[Emphasis added.]

[43 ] Once the fear of persecution is established, the refugee protection claimant must link the persecution to a Convention ground (Baglay & Jones at 156 and 175; Waldman at 808, 866, and 895). The claimant must be targeted for persecution in some way, “either personally or collectively” (Rizkallah v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCA No 412 (CA) (QL); Fi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1125 [Fi]).

[44 ] The applicant submits that in this case, although the RPD applied the correct standard of proof for section 96, that of “the serious possibility” of persecution, it misapplied it in its analysis of the prospective risk of persecution. The applicant states that the RPD instead wrongly applied a higher burden, namely, that it is “more likely than not” (the balance of probabilities standard) that she will actually be persecuted in the event of a return. She relies on parts of the RPD’s analysis, including paragraphs 38 to 40, where the RPD uses the words [translation] “more likely than not” to describe its conclusion on certain facts. We will come back to that.

B. Test applicable to definition of “person in need of protection” under IRPA, section 97

[45 ] Section 97 of the IRPA is intended to protect legitimate refugee protection claimants who cannot qualify as refugees under the test under section 96 of the IRPA, either because of they are unable to demonstrate a subjective fear and the objective basis of that fear, or because the fear of persecution is unrelated to a Convention ground. Therefore, section 96 cannot help them. Section 97 of the IRPA reads as follows:

Person in need of protection	Personne à protéger
97 (1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally	97 (1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, exposée :
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or	a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if	b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,	(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,	(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and	(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.	(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
Person in need of protection	Personne à protéger
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person in need of protection.	(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.

[46 ] Under section 97, claimants do not need to establish that they fear persecution as they do under section 96. They must instead establish, again on a balance of probabilities standard, that there are “substantial grounds to believe” or that it is “more likely than not” (i.e., the balance of probabilities standard) that they will be subjected to a danger of torture, a “risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment” [emphasis added], or a threat of death, in the event of a return (Li v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 1 [Li] at paras 9, 14, 29, 33, 36–39; Paramananthalingam v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 236 [Paramananthalingam] at paras 13, 17; Odetoyinbo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 501 at paras 7–8). They will then have to establish that this risk is personalized and different from that faced by the inhabitants of their home country.

[47 ] Thus, under section 96 and as discussed above, claimants must establish, on a balance of probabilities, a subjective fear and the objective basis of that fear, then making it possible to meet the legal test of a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution. Once again, the alleged persecution must be directed against them, either “personally” or as a “member of a community”, and be related to a Convention ground. However, under this standard, it is possible to meet the test under section 96 even if, in reality, the chances that persecution will actually occur are below 50%.

[48 ] The threshold for the test is therefore lower for section 96 than for section 97, because section 97 requires that it be “more likely than not” (therefore that there is a more than 50% chance) that a claimant will be subject to a risk of harm identified in section 97 in the event of a return. Furthermore, section 97 requires that this risk be personalized and different from that of other citizens of the country (and unlike section 96, membership in a group that is persecuted is insufficient). As Justice McVeigh explained in Paramananthalingam:

[16] The purpose of section 97 is to capture those legitimate refugee claimants who may not meet the stringent standards of a well-founded fear of persecution. Despite the lower evidentiary threshold under section 96, proving both objective and subjective fear of persecution is very difficult. Section 97 acts as a safety valve which Parliament created to protect those persons who, even if found lacking credibility, face a personalized risk of harm. It bears repeating here that well-founded fear of persecution and a personalized risk of harm require different analysis.

[49 ] Section 97 is therefore an additional remedy for claimants who cannot demonstrate persecution on the basis of a ground under section 96 or, for example, who could not discharge their burden of demonstrating a subjective fear or its objective basis in order to meet the test under section 96 of the IRPA (Li at para 33). It is therefore possible for claimants to meet their burden of proof under section 97, while being unable to do so under section 96. Therefore, it would be erroneous to automatically conclude that claimants who are unable to meet the test under section 96 (either because of their burden of demonstrating a subjective fear and the objective basis of the fear, or because the fear is not among the grounds listed in section 96) could not satisfy the element identified in section 97 (Paramananthalingam at para 17).

C. Application to facts: RPD did not err in imposing overly onerous burden of proof in determining applicant unable to discharge her burden of proof under sections 96 and 97

[50 ] The applicant no longer challenges the RPD’s decision on her refugee protection claim under section 97 of the IRPA. The applicant therefore concedes that the RPD applied the correct burden of proof in deciding that she had not discharged her burden of demonstrating a prospective risk of personalized harm on the basis of an element identified in section 97.

[51 ] However, the applicant challenges the burden of proof that the RPD applied to her refugee protection claim under section 96 because the RPD used the words [translation] “more likely than not” in its findings of fact.

[52 ] The RPD therefore apparently erred, in the applicant’s view, because the applicable burden of proof is not whether it is “more likely than not” that she would be subject to a risk of harm in the event of a return (burden under section 97), but whether the applicant has a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of persecution (burden under section 96), such that she does not have to demonstrate that the actual chances of her being persecuted are greater than 50%.

[53 ] It is true that the RPD could have been clearer in its reasons. However, the standard of judicial review does not require perfect reasons. As explained by the Supreme Court in Vavilov at paragraphs 92 and 128, administrative decision makers cannot be expected to explain their decisions in the same way as a judge could. Administrative decision makers do not have to answer all the arguments or draw a conclusion on each item of evidence or component of the reasoning. They should only address the main arguments put forward by the parties to demonstrate that these arguments have been considered.

[54 ] While it is true that the RPD uses the words [translation] “more likely than not,” these words are used in the assessment of the evidence and not in the applicable legal test under section 96 or 97. In other words, the RPD did not err in requesting that the applicant prove, on a balance of probabilities, the underlying facts on which she relies to demonstrate a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of persecution (test under section 96), just as it did not err in applying the same standard of proof, using the words [translation] “more likely than not,” to make findings of fact on the prospective risk of personalized harm (test under section 97).

[55 ] For example, at paragraph 38 of the Decision, the RPD twice explained that it is [translation] “more likely” that if the agent of persecution had a special status because he is a member of the military, he would not have had to appear before the court to face justice. In using these terms, the RPD rejected a factual element submitted by the applicant, namely, that she could not claim state protection and that members of the military had a particular status. This is an application of the balance of probabilities standard to a factual element.

[56 ] As noted at paragraphs 38 and 39 of the Decision, the applicant filed a complaint with the authorities, who imposed conditions with which the agent of persecution had to comply. Then, after the events leading up to the last complaint to the authorities, the applicant waited only three days before leaving the country, without waiting for the results of her complaint. Consequently, the applicant could not demonstrate that the state was unable to protect her (see, a contrario, Narvaez). Since there is a presumption that the state can protect its citizens, there needs to be “clear and convincing” proof of its inability to do so (Ward at 724–26). Since the applicant was unable to discharge her burden, she was unable to demonstrate the objective basis of her fear, as it was not a “well-founded” fear under section 96 of the IRPA (Ward at 726).

[57 ] At paragraph 39 of the Decision, the RPD states that the events alleged by the applicant cannot establish that it is [translation] “more likely than not” that the agent of persecution will continue to pursue her and call her at a different telephone number. The RPD therefore concludes that the applicant did not discharge her burden of proving that she took the necessary steps to protect herself (such as moving and changing telephone numbers), but that these steps were ineffective, hence the need to claim refugee protection in another country. Again, the RPD applied the balance of probabilities standard to the factual elements that the applicant must establish in order to discharge her burden of demonstrating a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution in the event of a return. The RPD, in these words, merely concluded that the underlying facts on which the applicant based her refugee protection claim have not been established on a balance of probabilities standard.

[58 ] Finally, at paragraph 40 of the Decision, the RPD makes a finding of fact that the applicant could not establish that it is [translation] “more likely than not” that the agent of persecution is still motivated to find, persecute, and harm her. Again, this conclusion is based on the evidence as a whole, because the agent of persecution did not attempt to contact her, her family members or her friends in Colombia (at paragraph 37), the applicant did not move to another dwelling or town (the apartment where she was staying was rented by her agent of persecution), and she did not change her telephone number (paragraph 39). Furthermore, by leaving the country only three days after the last complaint, the applicant could not demonstrate that the state was unable to protect her and thus rebut the presumption of state protection.

[59 ] In addition, the applicant has sufficient financial means (a widow’s pension) to live independently in Colombia, with another address and a different telephone number, and the agent of persecution has no obvious reason to cross paths with the applicant again because, for example, they have no children together or property in common (see the Decision at paras 37–‍41). These are all findings of fact reached on the balance of probabilities standard.

[60 ] The RPD’s overall reasons support its conclusion at paragraph 36 of the Decision, where the RPD accepts that the applicant is afraid but rejects that fear as prospective. Thus, in the RPD’s opinion, the applicant’s fear cannot establish a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of persecution in the event of a return to Colombia, a conclusion that is also justified at paragraphs 5 and 41 of the Decision.

[61 ] Therefore, and contrary to the applicant’s argument, the RPD did not err in its application of the standard of proof. The RPD’s findings regarding these facts were reached on a balance of probabilities standard, and none of these findings of fact, taken individually, are determinative.

[62 ] Collectively, the findings of fact justify the RPD’s decision that the applicant did not discharge her burden of proof with respect to the applicable legal test. Since she failed to prove the factual elements required to support her refugee protection claim, the applicant was unable to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities standard, a “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” of persecution under section 96, or a prospective risk of personalized harm on the basis of an element identified in section 97.

[63 ] Therefore, the reasons for the RPD’s decision need to be read as a whole. Where the legal test of “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance” has been applied, decision makers cannot be criticized for making their findings of fact on a balance of probabilities. As Justice McVeigh explained in Gebremedhin at paragraph 29:

[29] The RAD assessed whether the Applicant’s activities in Canada would come to the attention of the Ethiopian authorities . This is a factual determination which the RAD made on a balance of probabilities. This is not the same as replacing the legal threshold of “serious possibility” of persecution (Sebastiao, above, at paras 14–15). Once the RAD made its factual determinations on a balance of probabilities, it then looked at the totality of evidence and determined that the Applicant did not face a serious possibility of persecution. When the decision is assessed as a whole, the RAD did not impose a higher legal threshold than was required. The RAD found there was no basis for a sur place claim.

[Emphasis added.]

[64 ] In this case, the facts are similar to those in Aslan, where Justice Brown explained that the decision maker applied the correct legal test and assessed the application overall but concluded that the evidence did not support the conclusion that the person would be subjected to a risk. In doing so, the decision maker did not impose an unnecessarily heavy burden of proof on the applicant.

[24] That said, in my view the Decision is read as a whole, demonstrates the Officer did not misunderstand the allegations about the ship or apply the wrong test for that part of the claim. The Officer assessed the claim on the entirety of the Applicant’s circumstances, as well as political opinion, and concluded he did not have the profile of someone whose political opinion would put him at risk. Ultimately, the Officer’s findings in relation to the comments on the ship turned on the fact there was a lack of sufficient evidence to show the crewmates had actually reported his comments.

[65 ] Where the RPD uses the words “more likely than not”, it is not confusing the standard of proof of a balance of probabilities applicable to findings of fact with the legal test of “serious possibility” or “reasonable chance”. The RPD is clearly alluding to the standard of proof it is applying to the facts, not the legal test (as also explained by Justice Russell in Jeyaratnam v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1244 at para 45).

[66 ] Finally, relying on Gomez Dominguez v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1098 [Gomez Dominguez], the applicant submits that instead of asking whether the motivation and ability of her agent of persecution had been proven on a balance of probabilities (“more likely than not”), the RPD should have conducted an overall risk assessment and determined whether it posed a “serious possibility” or a “reasonable chance” of future persecution, as directed by Adjei at paragraph 31.