Docket: A-102-20
Citation: 2021 FCA 201
Present: GLEASON J.A.
| BETWEEN:
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| AIR PASSENGER RIGHTS
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| Applicant
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| and
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| THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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| Respondent
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| and
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| THE CANADIAN TRANSPORTATION AGENCY
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| Intervener
|
REASONS FOR ORDER
GLEASON J.A.
[1]
I have before me three motions: a motion from the applicant seeking disclosure of documents from the Canadian Transportation Agency (the CTA) under Rules 317 and 318 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, or alternatively, that a subpoena be issued for their disclosure; an informal motion from the applicant made by way of letter seeking to put additional materials before the Court on the disclosure motion; and a motion from the CTA seeking leave to intervene in this application.
[2]
Before turning to each of the motions, a little background is useful.
[3]
The underlying judicial review application in this file challenges a statement on vouchers posted on the CTA’s website on March 25, 2020, shortly after the onset of the COVID‑19 pandemic. The CTA opined in the statement that airlines could issue vouchers to passengers for cancellations caused by the pandemic as opposed to reimbursements for cancelled flights. The statement provided:
The COVID‑19 pandemic has caused major disruptions in domestic and international air travel.
For flight disruptions that are outside an airline’s control, the Canada Transportation Act and Air Passenger Protection Regulations only require that the airline ensure passengers can complete their itineraries. Some airlines’ tariffs provide for refunds in certain cases, but may have clauses that airlines believe relieve them of such obligations in force majeure situations.
The legislation, regulations, and tariffs were developed in anticipation of relatively localized and short-term disruptions. None contemplated the sorts of worldwide mass flight cancellations that have taken place over recent weeks as a result of the pandemic. It’s important to consider how to strike a fair and sensible balance between passenger protection and airlines’ operational realities in these extraordinary and unprecedented circumstances.
On the one hand, passengers who have no prospect of completing their planned itineraries with an airline’s assistance should not simply be out-of-pocket for the cost of cancelled flights. On the other hand, airlines facing huge drops in passenger volumes and revenues should not be expected to take steps that could threaten their economic viability.
While any specific situation brought before the CTA will be examined on its merits, the CTA believes that, generally speaking, an appropriate approach in the current context could be for airlines to provide affected passengers with vouchers or credits for future travel, as long as these vouchers or credits do not expire in an unreasonably short period of time (24 months would be considered reasonable in most cases).
The CTA will continue to provide information, guidance, and services to passengers and airlines as we make our way through this challenging period.
[4]
In its judicial review application, the applicant seeks the following declarations: (1) that the foregoing statement does not constitute a decision of the CTA and has no force or effect at law; (2) that the issuance of the statement violates the CTA’s Code of Conduct and gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, either for the CTA, as a whole, or for any member who supported the statement; and (3) that the CTA as a whole or any member who supported the statement exceeded or lost its or their jurisdiction to rule on passenger complaints seeking reimbursements for cancelled flights. The applicant also seeks injunctive relief requiring, among other things, removal of the statement from the CTA’s website and an order enjoining the CTA as a whole or, alternatively, any member who supported the statement, from hearing passenger complaints requesting reimbursement for flights cancelled because of the pandemic.
[5]
The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction for much the same relief on an interim basis. Justice Mactavish dismissed the request for interim relief, but in so doing accepted, without specifically ruling on the point, that the applicant’s judicial review application raised a serious issue (Air Passenger Rights v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2020 FCA 92, [2020] F.C.J. No. 630 at para. 17).
[6]
The CTA then brought a motion to strike the application, which was dismissed by Justice Webb (Air Passenger Rights v. Canada (Transportation Agency), 2020 FCA 155). In so ruling, Justice Webb held that the bias issues raised by the applicant were ones that merit a hearing before a full panel of this Court (at para. 33).
[7]
After being seized with the applicant’s disclosure motion, I issued a direction requesting submissions on the proper respondent in this matter because the applicant had named the CTA and not the Attorney General of Canada (the AGC). After receipt of submissions from the parties and the AGC, I ruled that the AGC was the proper respondent in light of the nature of the application, the requirements of the Federal Courts Rules and the nature of the allegations made in the application. However, I left open the possibility of the CTA’s bringing a motion to intervene (Air Passenger Rights v. The Attorney General of Canada, 2021 FCA 112).
[8]
The AGC subsequently advised that he relied on the CTA’s submissions in response to the applicant’s motion for disclosure and made brief submissions opposing the applicant’s informal motion to file additional materials on the disclosure motion.
[9]
Thereafter, the CTA made a motion to intervene in the application, seeking the ability to make submissions related to its jurisdiction and mandate. The applicant opposes the intervention motion, and the AGC takes no position in respect of it.
I.
The Motion for Disclosure and the Informal Motion to add an Affidavit on the Disclosure Motion
[10]
In its motion for disclosure, the applicant seeks an order requiring disclosure of unredacted copies of all CTA records from March 9 to April 8, 2020 in respect of the impugned statement, including, without restriction, emails, meeting agendas, meeting minutes, notes, draft documents, and memos.
[11]
In support of its disclosure motion, the applicant filed an affidavit from its President, Dr. Gábor Lukács, in which he attached excerpts from the transcript of the evidence given by the CTA’s Chairperson before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities on December 1, 2020. Dr. Lukács also appended an email exchange between an official at the Transport Canada and a Member of Parliament and documents obtained from the CTA through an access to information request that sought documents similar to those sought by the applicant in the present motion for disclosure. Several of the documents disclosed by the CTA in response to the access request were heavily redacted. In addition, the documents disclosed are but a few of the several thousand pages that the CTA indicated were responsive to the access request.
[12]
The materials appended to Dr. Lukács’ affidavit indicate that there were email communications between representatives from two airlines and the CTA regarding the subject matter of the impugned statement before it was issued and that there were likewise similar communications between representatives of the CTA and Transport Canada about the statement before the statement was issued. Given the redactions to these documents, it is difficult to discern the nature of what was said about the statement in them. Other documents attached as exhibits to Dr. Lukács’ affidavit indicate that the Chairperson and Vice‑Chairperson of the CTA received drafts of the impugned statement before it was posted on the CTA’s website. The fact that the Chairperson of the CTA was involved in approving the statement was confirmed in his testimony to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities on December 1, 2020 and the email exchange between officials at the Transport Canada and a Member of Parliament. The latter email exchange also suggests that other CTA members endorsed the impugned statement.
[13]
In the informal motion, the applicant seeks to add an additional affidavit from Dr. Lukács that appends three additional documents he obtained after he swore his first affidavit in support of the disclosure motion. These documents indicate that there are additional documents concerning the impugned statement that were exchanged between the CTA and Transport Canada prior to the issuance of the statement. One of the appended documents is a less redacted version of one of the emails appended to Dr. Lukács’ original affidavit.
[14]
I will deal with the informal motion first.
[15]
The AGC objects to the filing of Dr. Lukács’ additional affidavit because he says that the applicant did not follow the Federal Courts Rules in proceeding by way of informal motion and because the additional documents the applicant seeks to add to the record in respect of the disclosure motion are not relevant.
[16]
With respect, I disagree. Given the current circumstances associated with the COVID‑19 pandemic, as well as the fact that the informal motion contained an affidavit that appended the additional documents that the applicant seeks to put before the Court, there was no need for the applicant to have proceeded via way of formal motion. The AGC has suffered no prejudice due to the way the motion was brought and the Court has before it all that is necessary for disposition of the motion, including the arguments of the parties.
[17]
As for relevance, the additional documents are of the same nature as those appended to Dr. Lukács’ original affidavit and are relevant to the applicant’s bias arguments, which are two‑fold in nature. On one hand, the applicant asserts that the posting of the statement, itself, gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias because it indicates that the CTA pre‑judged the merits of any complaint that might be filed in which a passenger seeks compensation for a cancelled flight. On the other hand, the applicant asserts that there was inappropriate third party interference in the CTA’s adoption of the policy reflected in the impugned statement, which the applicant says provides an additional basis for a reasonable apprehension of bias. The documents the applicant wishes to add are relevant to the second prong of its bias argument.
[18]
The second affidavit of Dr. Lukács is therefore relevant and I will consider it in support of the applicant’s disclosure request.
[19]
Turning to that request, adopting the submissions that were previously filed by the CTA, the AGC opposes the requested disclosure for several reasons. First, he says that Rule 317 of the Federal Courts Rules does not permit or require the requested disclosure because the Rule only applies to material in the possession of a tribunal whose order is the subject of an application for judicial review. According to the AGC, there is no basis for disclosure under Rule 317 or 318 because the applicant contends that the impugned statements do not have the force of an order and no order has been made. In the alternative, the AGC submits that the request for disclosure should be denied because it is overly‑broad, constitutes a fishing expedition and the materials sought are irrelevant to the issues raised in the application, which the AGC says have been impermissibly expanded by the applicant to include alleged third‑party interference in the adoption of the impugned statement.
[20]
I disagree in large part with each of these assertions.
[21]
Turning to the first of the foregoing assertions, as the applicant rightly notes, the breadth of materials that are subject to disclosure under Rules 317 and 318 of the Federal Courts Rules is broader where bias or breach of procedural fairness is alleged, particularly where, as here, relief in the nature of prohibition is sought. In such circumstances, disclosure is not limited to the materials that were before the tribunal when an order was made. Rather, where such arguments are raised, documents in the possession, control or power of a tribunal that are relevant to the allegations of bias or breach of procedural fairness are subject to disclosure. Indeed, were it otherwise, this Court would be deprived of evidence necessary for the disposition of an applicant’s claims of bias or breach of procedural fairness and the availability of relief in the nature of prohibition would be largely illusory: see, e.g., Humane Society of Canada Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue), 2018 FCA 66, 289 A.C.W.S. (3d) 875 at paras. 5-6; Gagliano v. Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program & Advertising Activities), 2006 FC 720, 293 F.T.R. 108 at para. 50, aff’d 2007 FCA 131; Majeed v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), 1997 CarswellNat 1693, [1993] F.C.J. No. 908 (F.C.T.D.) at para. 3, aff’d [1994] F.C.J. No. 1401 (F.C.A.). Thus, the first assertion advanced by the AGC as to the scope of permitted disclosure under Rules 317 and 318 is without merit.
[22]
As concerns the subsidiary arguments advanced by the AGC to resist disclosure, I do not agree that all the documents sought by the applicant are irrelevant or fall outside the scope of the claims made in the applicant’s Notice of Application. However, the requested disclosure is broader than necessary and goes beyond that which is relevant to the bias issues raised by the applicant. Disclosure should instead be limited to documents sent to or from a member of the CTA (including its Chairperson and Vice‑Chairperson), related to a meeting attended by CTA members or sent to or from a third party concerning the impugned statement between March 9 and March 25, 2020, the date the statement was posted on the CTA website. In addition, privileged documents should be exempt from disclosure.
[23]
For clarity, meetings include telephone conversations, video conferences and internet meetings as well as in‑person meetings and third parties include anyone other than a member or employee of the CTA.
[24]
As noted, the applicant’s allegations related to bias are two‑fold and concern, first, the alleged pre‑judgement by the CTA as an institution or, in the alternative, by its constituent members of passengers’ entitlement to reimbursement for flights cancelled due to the COVID‑19 pandemic and, second, alleged third‑party influence in the development of the impugned statement on vouchers. The Notice of Application and affidavits of Dr. Lukács are broad enough to encompass both aspects of the bias argument. I therefore do not accept that the bias argument has been impermissibly widened by the applicant.
[25]
Documents received by and sent from CTA members or sent to or by anyone at the CTA from third parties about the subject matter of the statement that were sent or received prior to the date the statement was posted are relevant to the applicant’s bias allegations because they are relevant to the involvement of decision‑makers and third parties in the adoption of the impugned statement. Such involvement is central to the applicant’s bias allegations. Likewise, documents related to meetings attended by CTA members during which the impugned statement was discussed before its adoption are similarly relevant.
[26]
The evidence filed to date by Dr. Lukács shows that there were communications between third parties and the CTA about the subject matter of the impugned statement, prior to its adoption. Such evidence also suggests that the CTA’s Chair, and possibly other CTA members, were involved in the decision to adopt and post the impugned statement. There is therefore a factual grounding for the requested disclosure, which cannot be said to constitute an impermissible fishing expedition.
[27]
However, the applicant has provided no evidence to substantiate disclosure of documents post‑dating the date the impugned statement was posted. Similarly, the applicant has failed to establish that documents that were purely internal to the CTA and which were not shared with its members are relevant. In short, there is no basis to suggest that such documents would contain information about whether CTA members or third parties were involved in making the decision to post the impugned statement, which is the essence of the applicant’s bias allegations. Thus, these additional documents need not be disclosed.
[28]
The AGC, in adopting the submissions of the CTA, has requested that if disclosure is ordered, privileged documents be exempt from disclosure and that a process be established for ruling on privilege claims. I agree that this is necessary, and believe that the most expeditious process for advancing any claims of privilege would be for the CTA to submit any documents over which it claims privilege to the Court on a confidential basis for a ruling.
[29]
I would accordingly order that, within 60 days from the date of the Order in these matters, all non‑privileged documents sent to or by a member of the CTA (including its Chairperson or Vice‑Chairperson) between March 9 and March 25, 2020 or sent to a third party by the CTA or received from a third party by the CTA between the same dates concerning the impugned statement or related to a meeting attended by a CTA member (including its Chairperson or Vice‑Chairperson) between March 9 and March 25, 2020 where the impugned statement was discussed shall be provided electronically to the applicant. I would also order that, within the same period, the AGC shall provide the Court, on a confidential basis, copies of any document over which the CTA claims privilege, that would otherwise be subject to disclosure, along with submissions outlining the basis for the privilege claim. Such filing may be made via way of informal motion and should be supported by an affidavit attaching copies of the documents over which privilege is claimed. A redacted version of the AGC’s submissions, from which all details regarding the contents of the documents are deleted, shall be served and filed. The applicant shall have 30 days from receipt to make responding submissions, if it wishes. These materials shall then be forwarded to the undersigned for a ruling on privilege.
[30]
Should a 60‑day period be too short to accomplish the foregoing, the AGC may apply for an extension, via way of informal motion supported by affidavit evidence, if the time provided is inadequate by reason of complexities flowing from the COVID‑19 pandemic or the number of documents involved.
[31]
The applicant will have 30 days from receipt of this Court’s ruling on the privilege claims to serve any additional affidavits it intends to rely on in support of its application. Subsequent time limits for completion of the remaining steps to perfect the application will thereafter be governed by the Federal Courts Rules.
II.
The Motion for Intervention
[32]
I turn now to the CTA’s motion for intervention. It seeks leave to intervene to provide a brief affidavit, a memorandum of fact and law and oral submissions on its jurisdiction and, more specifically, on the scope of its regulatory and adjudicative functions. The CTA proposes that such affidavit would be limited to attaching a sample of six resource, informational and guidance tools it says it has issued and posted on its website and the submissions limited to explaining the scope of the CTA’s jurisdiction and practice of publishing guidance materials on its website.
[33]
The applicant objects to the intervention, arguing that it is an impermissible attempt by the CTA to indirectly argue the merits of the bias issue. The applicant further submits that the AGC is the only party who should be heard and says that the AGC is able to adequately defend against the bias claims. The applicant in the alternative submits that, if it is allowed to intervene, the CTA should not be allowed to file additional evidence as an intervener is bound by the record the parties put before the Court and may not file new evidence or raise new arguments. The applicant also says that two of the six examples the CTA wishes to submit are bootstrapping as they were issued by the CTA after this application was commenced.
[34]
The test for intervention applied by this Court involves the consideration of several factors such as whether: (1) the intervener is directly affected by the outcome; (2) there is a justiciable issue and a public interest raised by the intervention; (3) there is another efficient means to put the issue before the Court; (4) the position of the proposed intervener is adequately defended by one of the parties; (5) the interests of justice are better served by the intervention; and (6) the Court can effectively decide the case without the participation of the intervener: Rothmans Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] F.C.J. No. 446, 1989 CarswellNat 594, at para. 12; Sport Maska v. Bauer Hockey Corp., 2016 FCA 44, [2016] 4 F.C.R. 3 at para. 37-39[Sport Maska]. However, as noted at paragraph 42 of Sport Maska, the test is a flexible one as each case is different and, ultimately, the most important question for the Court is whether the interests of justice are best served by granting the intervention.
[35]
Here, I believe the interests of justice would be best served by granting the CTA the right to intervene as the Court may well benefit from some of the background information the CTA seeks to put before the Court, which will set out the relevant context. The CTA is uniquely placed to provide such information to the Court, and such information might be important for the Court to understand in order to appreciate the relevant backdrop and scope of the CTA’s jurisdiction in regulatory and adjudicative matters. Administrative tribunals have often been granted leave to intervene to explain their jurisdiction as was noted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation, 2015 SCC 44, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 147 at paras. 42 and 48.
[36]
That said, it is vital that the CTA’s intervention not impair its ability to function as an independent administrative tribunal. Its submissions must therefore be factual and go no further than explaining its role and setting out the examples the CTA wishes to put before the Court that pre‑date March 25, 2020. I do not believe it appropriate that the CTA refer to more recent examples because they are not directly relevant to what transpired in this application and may be perceived as an attempt to bootstrap the approach taken by the CTA in issuing the impugned statement. It is not the role of the CTA in intervening to act as an advocate or in any way defend the propriety of issuing the impugned statement. The CTA should rather behave as an amicus, who is allowed to intervene solely to ensure the Court possesses relevant background information.
[37]
The examples the CTA will be allowed to put before the Court are not the sort of evidence that it is impermissible for an intervener to add to the record, if they indeed even constitute evidence as opposed to something more akin to a decision that may simply be filed or referred to in submissions. They do not expand the factual record or points in issue.
[38]
I would accordingly allow the CTA to submit an affidavit that attaches the four examples appended as exhibits to the affidavit of Meredith Desnoyers, sworn July 14, 2021, which pre‑date March 25, 2020. The applicant may submit such affidavit at the same time as the AGC submits its affidavits in response to those of the applicant. I would also allow the CTA to file a memorandum of fact and law of no more than 10 pages, explaining its jurisdiction and practice of publishing guidance materials on its website, as exemplified by the examples attached to the affidavit it will file. I would further grant the CTA’s request that the style of cause be amended to add it as an intervener and that the other parties be ordered to serve the CTA with all further materials filed in this application.
[39]
I would leave the issue of whether the CTA will be allowed to make oral submissions during the hearing to the panel seized with the application on the merits and would remit to such panel the issue of whether costs should be awarded in respect of the intervention.
[40]
These three motions will therefore be granted on the foregoing terms. I make no order as to costs as none were sought in respect of the motion for intervention and success was divided on the motion for disclosure.
"Mary J.L. Gleason"
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