Date: 20180416

Docket: T-1813-14

Citation: 2018 FC 410

[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Ottawa, Ontario, April 16, 2018

PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Roy

BETWEEN:

LÉOPOLD CAMILLE YODJEU NTEMDE

Plaintiff

and

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Defendant

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

[1]  Léopold Yodjeu, the plaintiff, instituted an action against Her Majesty The Queen, which led to a large number of incidents that had needed decisions from the Court, which were presided over by judges other than the undersigned, and several decisions by the Federal Court of Appeal. The undersigned’s orders and reasons were all part of the motion for summary judgment. It will not be necessary to unduly review those incidents, since the only decision to be made in this case relates to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

I.  Preliminary remarks

[2]  It was no simple matter to finally hold the session on October 24, 2017, in order to hear the motion for summary judgment. The defendant had announced on May 17, 2016, that she intended to file a motion for summary judgment, well before the factum was due regarding the pre-trial conference that the plaintiff then sought to expedite. That motion was filed on July 5, 2016.

[3]  The motion had to be heard on November 16, 2016, following the instruction from the Chief Justice of this Court on August 26, 2016. However, Mr. Yodjeu was not present on November 16; he was inconvenienced during the previous evening. Moreover, on November 2, 2016, the plaintiff’s spouse, Ms. Mbakop, had filed a motion that appeared first and foremost to show a desire to intervene in the case. Ms. Mbakop was not present either on November 16. When tracked down by the Court, she was heard on her motion and an order was made by Mr. Justice Leblanc on November 18. Moreover, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was not heard due to Mr. Yodjeu’s absence.

[4]  The hearing for the motion was thus scheduled for October 4 and 5, 2017 (instruction from the Chief Justice dated June 1, 2017). In the meantime, the plaintiff had filed motions to add affidavits and to have the motion for summary judgment dismissed. Ms. Mbakop had requested that the decision by Leblanc J. be set aside, citing paragraphs 399(1)(b), 399(2)(a) and 399(2)(b) of the Federal Courts Rules (SOR/98-106).

[5]  With October 4 and 5 being designated for hearing those matters, the undersigned gave an instruction on August 4, 2017 in order to provide for the various pending motions that had to be subject to a provision before hearing the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Those motions included the addition of exhibits (motions dated June 2 and July 20, 2017), the motion from Ms. Mbakop for setting aside or amending the order from Leblanc J. and a motion to strike affidavits that supported the Crown’s motion for summary judgment, which would lead to the dismissal of said motion for summary judgment. The instruction also indicated the expectations regarding the duration of the interventions for each of the motions.

[6]  However, from all evidence, the plaintiff and his spouse refused to participate because they had filed an “application for instruction” in which they asked to postpone the hearing on October 4 and 5, 2017. A similar application had been dismissed by Mr. Justice Bell from the bench (and affirmed in writing through an order dated October 2, 2017) and the plaintiff indicated in writing on September 25, 2017, that it was not a motion, intending to appeal my colleague’s decision. My instruction dated September 29 affirmed that an intention to appeal an order did not include any stays. It also notified the parties that they were expected on October 4 and 5. Furthermore, it indicated that the allocation of time would be as flexible as possible. Ms. Mbakop was notified by another instruction dated that same day that she was expected on October 4. She was also formally notified that [translation] “if Ms. Mbakop does not appear at the designated place and on the designated date, the Court will hear the submissions from counsel for the Attorney General on the course of action”.

[7]  Neither Ms. Mbakop nor Mr. Yodjeu were present on October 4, 2017. In fact, written items had been sent to the Court informing it of their absence (letter from October 3 and email from October 4, at 7:38 a.m.).

[8]  Having chosen not to attend, Rule 38 was applied. Through an order served on October 5, the Court declared that the plaintiff’s cross-motions could undergo adjudication on the good or bad faith of the record compiled by Mr. Yodjeu. As for Ms. Mbakop’s motion, it had to be treated like a motion under Rule 369; the Court allowed Ms. Mbakop to submit a written reply. Ms. Mbakop took advantage of this possibility. Moreover, the Court believed that this was a severe sanction to proceed with adjudication of the summary judgment motion without hearing Mr. Yodjeu orally. Thus, the hearing of the main motion was postponed until October 24, 2017. That time, Mr. Yodjeu was present. He offered his apologies to the Court and they were accepted.

[9]  As for the preliminary motions, the Court disposed of them and they were the subject of orders on October 19 and 20, 2017:

• 2017 FC 929: dismissal of application to set aside order by Leblanc J. that refused Ms. Mbakop’s intervention;

• 2017 FC 939: several affidavits proposed by Mr. Yodjeu were allowed to be filed;

• 2017 FC 940: dismissal of Mr. Yodjeu’s motion (filed on May 25, 2017 and amended on July 26, 2017):

• provision for costs;

• designation of an arbitrator;

• force counsel for the defendant to produce affidavits;

• striking of defendant’s affidavits, leading to the dismissal of the summary judgment motion.

Mr. Yodjeu had also requested to add exhibits (7 in total). The Court preferred to make those exhibits accessible, even though serious doubts as to their admissibility persisted, thus requiring a rule for caution. It would be up to Mr. Yodjeu to make careful use of them.

[10]  Lastly, the proceeding before the Court had been embellished upon by independent remedies instituted by the plaintiff. In one case, he appeared to attack the refusal by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to deal with his case; in another, the Privacy Commissioner had previously found that two of the plaintiff’s complaints were founded, since the government replied to two applications after the prescribed deadlines (in one case, 63 days and in the other, 42 days). Those remedies had no relevance in relation to the question before this Court: can the action for damages withstand the motion for summary judgment?

II.  The instituted action

[11]  Léopold Camille Yodjeu Ntembe filed a statement of claim with the Federal Court on August 22, 2014. Essentially, the plaintiff complained about the processing of his sponsorship applications for his spouse and his child, who were still in Burkina Faso, while he had received permanent residence in Canada.

[12]  The plaintiff did not retain counsel, aside from some opinions that he allegedly received during certain incidents that occurred after the filing of his statement of claim. It was not clear. What follows is taken directly from the statement.

[13]  From the statement of claim, it appears that Mr. Yodjeu has been a permanent resident of Canada since February 12, 2012. He stated that he returned to Paris two weeks later to find work. It appears that there was a “breach of contract” shortly after when he said that he returned, on May 1, 2012. As of May 3, 2012, he sent the sponsorship application for his immediate family; the services of Canada Post were reportedly used.

[14]  The plaintiff said that he changed his address with the Citizenship and Immigration Canada around a month and a half later; the date was not precise and said change was reportedly done over the telephone. No clarifications were made regarding this change of address.

[15]  It appears that the question of Mr. Yodjeu’s residence arose during the processing of his sponsorship application from then on. In fact, the sponsorship application was rejected on August 7, 2012. Mr. Yodjeu claimed that he never received that notice. Whatever the case may be, he acknowledged that he received the rejection in November 2012. It was then that he sought to provide evidence of his residence in Canada using what he had in his possession (work contract, pay stub, lease).

[16]  After the sponsorship application was rejected, the processing of the file (this being the permanent residence applications for his spouse and their daughter, despite the rejection of the sponsorship applications) was given to the Embassy of Canada to Senegal. The decision was made on May 22, 2013, to deny permanent residence because the decision-maker was not satisfied with Mr. Yodjeu’s residence. Because the decision on May 22 needed changes, it was amended on June 4, 2013. Other documents that were submitted in the meantime did not change that decision.

[17]  On September 28, 2013, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission; the statement of claim indicated that the complaint was regarding [translation] “the delivery of services to my family” (para 16c).

[18]  The plaintiff had appealed the rejection of the permanent residence application as soon as he was notified of it in June 2013. In December 2013, the plaintiff was notified by Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC] that it would be recommended to the Immigration Appeal Division [IAD] that the appeal of the refusal to grant permanent residence on June 4, 2013, would be allowed. The IAD had to allow an appeal without hearing, given the concession to allow the appeal in January 2014. In July 2014, the right of the sponsored persons to permanent residence took form.

[19]  The plaintiff submits that:

• through her actions, the defendant acted without authority or exceeded it;

• a principle of procedural fairness was not followed, that being where an immigration officer must give an plaintiff the benefit of the doubt;

• the decision was tainted by an error in law. The alleged error in law is that the original rejection was based on an error regarding the residential address in Montréal, an error that was noted since the IAD found that Mr. Yodjeu’s appeal had to be allowed;

• the decision was tainted by an error in facts described as an error that was made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material available. This time, the plaintiff alleges wrongdoing by a person employed by the Canadian embassy in Dakar;

• the CIC internal file was corrupted by a CIC officer in order to prevent the plaintiff from receiving notices that his sponsorship application had been rejected on three occasions. There had allegedly been fraud and false testimonies. The plaintiff alleges incompetence by “SOW”, who was later identified as Mr. Steven Owen; he filed an affidavit in support of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in which he provides some clarification on this matter;

• Mr. Owen and an employee hired locally in Dakar engaged in conduct that contravenes the law.

[20]  Probably seeking to articulate a cause of action, the plaintiff alleges a [translation] “conflict of interest by an organized gang with international ramifications” regarding the local employee in Senegal. This person, who is of Senegalese background, allegedly processed the permanent residence files of Ms. Mbakop and the couple’s daughter, while the plaintiff had a dispute with his manager at Ecobank, a Senegalese man who allegedly harassed the plaintiff when he was an employee at Ecobank. The fact that his file was allegedly processed by a Senegalese woman, who received Mr. Yodjeu’s emails, was the result of a system of collusion (statement of claim, para C-1a). The plaintiff adds that when he was approached by Ecobank to join their ranks, he received suspicious telephone calls [translation] “in the same style as the ones I received in Canada”. That ensured that the plaintiff suspected that there had allegedly been “a disclosure of personal and confidential information by CIC with the goal of harming and affecting my family’s safety” (statement of claim, para C-1b).

[21]  The plaintiff also submits that CIC’s information had been fraudulently manipulated. To arrive at that allegation, Mr. Yodjeu focused his claims on Steven Owen, the CIC official who first processed the sponsorship application in August 2012. Since the plaintiff claimed that he had changed his address in June 2012, he refused to accept that a letter had been sent three times, according to him, between August 2012 and November 2012. Thus, he claims that Mr. Owen is likely Senegalese, like the locally hired employee at the Canadian embassy in Dakar and the Ecobank manager who allegedly harassed Mr. Yodjeu, which would explain the false pretences regarding the rejection of his application and the confusion regarding the repeated mailings of the rejections. The plaintiff states that [translation] “it is as clear as spring water that those persons are in league and in my point of view are part of a well-oiled system that is based on collusion and is able to circumvent the CIC’s control system” (statement of claim, para C-2).

[22]  Lastly, the plaintiff deals with his understanding of section 130 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (SOR/2002-227) [Regulations], which require that anyone making a sponsorship application in the family class must be a resident of Canada. Here, the plaintiff seeks to explain why an address in Paris appeared on the sponsorship application for persons living in Burkina Faso. The plaintiff said that he chose to mail the Canadian sponsorship application on May 3, 2012, two days after his arrival in Paris. The plaintiff states that he [translation] “chose to mail my application from Canada... the Paris address was temporary and I had planned to change it once I had arrived. I changed my address a month and a half after my arrival and nearly two months before the rejection decision from Mississauga (officer SOW)” (statement of claim, para C-31). In the statement of claim, we have neither the exact date of such an important measure nor the evidence other than the plaintiff’s indication that he allegedly spoke to [translation] “an officer in charge of address changes”. The plaintiff had no information in that regard.

[23]  Mr. Yodjeu claims damages of $1,444,000. Much of those “direct” damages, in fact, the vast majority, are for damages claimed to have been suffered by Mr. Yodjeu’s spouse and their daughter. In fact, the defendant had to claim that the plaintiff illegally argued for others. From the $184,000 in direct damages, only $10,000 were claimed for Mr. Yodjeu.

[24]  The indirect damages are claimed more as compensation for Mr. Yodjeu himself, but not all. They are broken down thus:

• Moral and financial stress: $200,000

• Career opportunity in teaching/researcher: $500,000

• Loss linked to deterioration of credit rating: $100,000

• Psychological stress: $250,000

• Ms. Mbakop’s membership in the Ordre québécois des médecins: $200,000

• Plaintiff’s son born in conditions that may have led to a miscarriage: $10,000

[25]  The plaintiff said without giving any explanation that he was directly and indirectly prevented from earning income, thus forcing him to spend all his savings.

III.  The defence

[26]  The defence came in the months that followed the filing of the statement of claim. The defendant essentially gave a general denial of it. The statement of defence, dated September 23, 2014, was amended on February 26, 2016. Leave to amend was granted on March 21, 2016. Mr. Prothonotary Morneau, who managed the case, wrote in his order:

[TRANSLATION]

WHEREAS the Court is satisfied that it is fair and in the interests of justice to allow the amendments sought by the defendant, since those amendments aim to correct errors in the statement of defence and the proposed amendments seek to allow this Court to answer better on the merits of the genuine issues for trial.

The amended defence is therefore the defence to the action as instituted. Thus, the statement of claim and the amended defence make up the legal framework into which the dispute must fit. However, the statement of claim and amended defence are not enough. The allegations found within them must still be proven.

[27]  The defendant argued her version of the facts. Thus, it was highlighted that the plaintiff indicated on the sponsorship undertaking form sent on May 3, 2012, that his mailing and residential address was in Courbevoie, France (Ms. Mbakop’s application for permanent residence was also filed on May 3, 2012). His sponsor survey, prepared on April 18, 2012, stated that he lived in France until May 1, 2012, but did not provide an address for after that date. Mr. Yodjeu also did not indicate the end date of his job, although he did indicate that he worked as a banking consultant in France.

[28]  According to the defendant, the plaintiff’s change of address was done on July 4, 2012. That change was reportedly entered into the Field Operations Support System [FOSS], a database used by CIC and Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] for processing immigration files in Canada. However, it was not entered into either the Global Case Management System [GCMS], which has replaced FOSS, or a system used for processing foreign immigration files [CAIPS].

[29]  On August 7, 2012, a notice that the sponsorship application had been rejected was issued by letter dated that same day.

[30]  The defendant argues that the plaintiff was ineligible because his residency obligation had not been fulfilled. The sponsorship application form indicated that Canada was not his only country of residence. Mr. Yodjeu’s sponsor survey indicated that he did not live in Canada at that time. The mailing address given by the plaintiff was in France, as was the provided telephone number. In addition, the return address for the sponsorship application mailed to Canada was in France.

[31]  The defence is specific regarding the residency obligation. A review of section 130 of the Regulations is not enough. We must also refer to section 133 of the Regulations to understand that the residency obligation in Canada extends to filing sponsorship applications until a decision is made.

[32]  The notice of decision from August 7, 2012, was returned on September 27, 2012, and indicated that the recipient was not identifiable. Thus, we learned that Mr. Yodjeu did not receive the decision dated August 7, 2012.

[33]  A change of address was sent to CIC on October 19, 2012, when the plaintiff allegedly contacted the Montréal Call Centre. A correction was made to the address thanks to the change of address and it was on November 2, 2012, that the letter from August 7 was sent to Mr. Yodjeu. The letter notifying him that his sponsorship application had been rejected bore the date November 2.

[34]  Thus, a new phase of the file began on November 9, 2012, when the plaintiff alleged in an email that he had been living in Canada since early May 2012. Documents were provided by the plaintiff on December 19, 2012, seeking to show that he had been living in Canada for some time. As we will see, this “evidence” only dates back to August 2012.

[35]  Despite the rejection on August 7, 2012 (or on November 2), the plaintiff had indicated in his sponsorship application that he wanted for the review of the permanent residence application to continue; that explains the new communications from the plaintiff starting in September 2012 and the new documents and information submitted by Mr. Yodjeu were sent by CIC to Dakar, Senegal, where the permanent residence application was processed. They were received on February 23, 2013. The permanent residence applications for Mr. Yodjeu’s spouse and daughter were rejected on May 22, 2012 (rejection letter amended on June 4, 2013, to correct an error in the sponsor’s name).

[36]  The rejection of the permanent residence application was appealed before the IAD on the same day. Moreover, a work or study permit, which allows temporary residence, was granted to Ms. Mbakop on September 5, 2013; the same day, a temporary resident visa was issued for the couple’s daughter. On September 18, 2013, Ms. Mbakop and the couple’s daughter arrived in Canada. However, the appeal before the IAD ran its course.

[37]  On December 12, 2013, the Minister, through one of his agents, consented to the appeal and the appeal was therefore allowed on December 27, 2013, ensuring that a new review by a different decision-maker was ordered by the IAD in accordance with the usual procedure. It appears that in order to complete the review, additional information and documents were requested on May 15, 19 and 23, 2014. Permanent resident status was granted to Ms. Mbakop and her daughter on or around June 30, 2014.

[38]  Thus, Her Majesty The Queen argues that her agents did not commit any actionable wrong in damages. If harm was caused, it was due to Mr. Yodjeu’s negligence in preparing his sponsorship application in which residence in Canada for the appropriate time was not established. It was also the plaintiff’s negligence as to the change of address that is one source of the difficulties encountered by the plaintiff. What is more, the timeframes for processing the file were reasonable, given the numerous sponsorship applications.

[39]  The amended defence notes at paragraph 41 that if the plaintiff had provided information and evidence in order to establish his residence from when the sponsorship application had been filed, the sponsorship application and the residence application may have succeeded earlier.

[40]  The defence also focused directly on the alleged conflict of interest of the Senegalese employee at the Canadian embassy in Dakar. It appears that Mr. Yodjeu filed a complaint on August 28, 2013, with the CIC Call Centre in Montréal. The defendant argues that said employee did not know Mr. Yodjeu. Her job at the embassy consisted, inter alia, of entering data into the Global Case Management System [GCMS]; she made two entries regarding the plaintiff’s file, one on February 19, 2013 to acknowledge receipt of documents sent by the plaintiff and one on June 4, 2013, to correct an error reported by the plaintiff after receiving the notice of rejection on May 22, 2013. The defendant argues that the plaintiff’s file was in the hands of another employee tasked with making those decisions. In fact, the locally hired employee accused of a conflict of interest had no decision-making authority of any kind whatsoever.

[41]  However, there is more. The Canadian embassy in Dakar complained about the harassment allegedly experienced by the plaintiff. In fact, following his complaint on August 28, 2013, Mr. Yodjeu was informed on September 2, 2013, that the person had no decision-making authority. Then, on September 4, 2013, the plaintiff made his allegation based on his claim that he and this person had worked for the same bank. The defendant argued that this was a mistake, with one having worked for Ecobank-Senegal and the other for Ecobank-Cameroon, two legally distinct entities. In addition, the defendant argues that the plaintiff tried various ways to contact this person outside of work, forcing this person to close her social media accounts. The allegations continued on September 30, 2013. That led to a formal response from CIC that same day when it was reiterated that the file had been processed appropriately and a suspension of communication was ordered until the appeal was decided.

[42]  As for the alleged damages, the defendant states that it is not responsible. In any case, they would be unwarranted and grossly exaggerated, in addition to being unfounded. Lastly, the plaintiff argues for others when he requests reparations for his spouse and their daughter.

IV.  The incidents that led to the motion for summary judgment

[43]  By an order on January 11, 2016, the Chief Justice of this Court noted that 360 days had passed since the issuing of the statement of claim (August 22, 2014) with no requisition for pre-trial conference being filed, which led him to appoint Mr. Prothonotary Morneau as the judge responsible for managing the proceeding.

[44]  A deadline was submitted by the parties on February 1, 2016 (a counsel to defend Mr. Yodjeu’s interests was on file at the time). The deadline approved by Prothonotary Morneau by order on February 4, 2016, stated that the defendant could amend her defence no later than February 29 and that the requisition for pre-trial conference had to be submitted no later than May 31, 2016.

[45]  The Court is not detailing the numerous incidents and skirmishes that interspersed the progression of this file in 2016, however, it may be useful to refer to an incident in May 2016.

[46]  Mr. Yodjeu wrongly believed that his action would be heard before the end of 2016. But in order to do this, a pre-trial conference still had to be held, for which the deadline of May 31, 2016, had been set, by order on February 4, 2016, for the filing of the factum related to the pre-trial conference. However, counsel for the defendant refused to provide their availabilities for such a conference as long as the plaintiff was allegedly fixated on the topic of the alleged damages regarding his spouse and their daughter.

[47]  In fact, on May 12, 2016, the plaintiff announced that he wanted to add his spouse and their daughter as plaintiffs. That led to an exchange of correspondence that led to an order by Prothonotary Morneau on May 20, 2016, in which he suspended the deadline ordered on February 4, 2016. This whole episode related to paragraphs 17 to 27 of the order from October 20, 2017 (2017 FC 940).

[48]  What is relevant to the motion for summary judgment from this exchange of correspondence is that the defendant clearly announced (and formally as of May 17, 2016) that a motion for summary judgment would be filed and that the plaintiff was not given leave to represent others.

V.  The motion for summary judgment

[49]  A notice of motion was filed on July 5, 2016; the defendant cited Rule 213 to require a summary judgment.

[50]  The defendant argues that the action in extracontractual liability cannot succeed because there is no factual basis for the action; thus, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate fault, which most definitely shows that the two other factors at the basis of the action (the damages caused and the causal link between the alleged fault and the damage caused) cannot be demonstrated.

[51]  It is submitted that all evidence that is necessary for settling the dispute is available and that the Court may find that there is not a genuine issue for trial.

[52]  Rules 213 to 216 allow a party to a trial to present a motion for summary trial or summary judgment. In this case, the defendant has chosen a summary judgment. There is no doubt that the defendant had little difficulty in filing this motion. This motion relates to the entire action and not, as may have been the case, to only a portion of the questions being asked. Authors Letarte et al. thus describe the rationale of the summary judgment or trial at paragraph 4-42 of Recours et procédures devant les Cours fédérales (Remedies and proceedings before federal courts), LexisNexis, 2013:

[TRANSLATION]

Thus, the goal of both the summary judgment and the summary trial is to bring as expeditious and economical of a resolution as possible to the proceeding. In fact, the trial of an action is very costly in both time and money for the parties and for the legal system. The motion for summary judgment or trial is often an appropriate procedural vehicle for summarily dismissing an action, a defence or a portion of them at a preliminary stage of the debate.

[53]  The burden is very clearly on whomever wants to receive summary judgment. Rule 215 establishes that the motion for summary judgment can only be granted if the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial. In this case, the parties will need to administer their evidence, done by affidavit with cross-examination on affidavit done out of court, in such a way that the Court can determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact or law for trial with respect to a claim or a defence. Ultimately, it is up to the defendant to establish the necessary facts to obtain her summary judgment. The question to be determined is knowing whether the success of Mr. Yodjeu’s application is so dubious that there is no need to hold a trial. In fact, Rule 214 specifically states that the one responding to a motion for summary judgment shall submit his or her own evidence that tends to show that there is a genuine issue for trial:

Allegations alone do not suffice; there must be evidence (Rude Native inc. v Tyrone T. Resto Lounge, 2010 FC 1278, paras 15–18; Trevor Nicholas Construction Co. Limited v Canada, 2011 FC 70, para 44).

[54]  My colleague Gagné J. used the summary of general principles in the matter made by Tremblay-Lamer J. in Granville Shipping Co. v Pegasus Lines Ltd., [1996] 2 FCR 853 [Granville Shipping]. This is a useful guide that Madam Justice Gagné reproduced at paragraph 27 of her reasons for judgment in Morin v Canada, 2013 FC 670, another case in immigration matters. The passage from Granville Shipping reads as follows:

I have considered all of the case law pertaining to summary judgment and I summarize the general principles accordingly:

1. the purpose of the provisions is to allow the Court to summarily dispense with cases which ought not proceed to trial because there is no genuine issue to be tried (Old Fish Market Restaurants Ltd. v. 1000357 Ontario Inc. et al);

2. there is no determinative test (Feoso Oil Ltd. v. Sarla (The)) but Stone J.A. seems to have adopted the reasons of Henry J. in Pizza Pizza Ltd. v. Gillespie. It is not whether a party cannot possibly succeed at trial, it is whether the case is so doubtful that it does not deserve consideration by the trier of fact at a future trial;

3. each case should be interpreted in reference to its own contextual framework (Blyth and Feoso);

4. provincial practice rules (especially Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, [R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194]) can aid in interpretation (Feoso and Collie);

5. this Court may determine questions of fact and law on the motion for summary judgment if this can be done on the material before the Court (this is broader than Rule 20 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure) (Patrick);

6. on the whole of the evidence, summary judgment cannot be granted if the necessary facts cannot be found or if it would be unjust to do so (Pallman and Sears);

7. in the case of a serious issue with respect to credibility, the case should go to trial because the parties should be cross-examined before the trial judge (Forde and Sears). The mere existence of apparent conflict in the evidence does not preclude summary judgment; the court should take a “hard look” at the merits and decide if there are issues of credibility to be resolved (Stokes).

[55]  In Canada (Attorney General) v Lameman, 2008 SCC 14; [2008] 1 S.C.R. 372 [Lameman], the Supreme Court of Canada solidly established the principles that govern summary judgments:

[11] For this reason, the bar on a motion for summary judgment is high. The defendant who seeks summary dismissal bears the evidentiary burden of showing that there is “no genuine issue of material fact requiring trial”: Guarantee Co. of North America v. Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423, par. 27. The defendant must prove this; it cannot rely on mere allegations or the pleadings: 1061590 Ontario Ltd. v. Ontario Jockey Club (1995), 21 O.R. (3d) 547 (C.A.); Tucson Properties Ltd. v. Sentry Resources Ltd. (1982), 22 Alta. L.R. (2d) 44 (Q.B. (Master)), at pp. 46-47. If the defendant does prove this, the plaintiff must either refute or counter the defendant’s evidence, or risk summary dismissal: Murphy Oil Co. v. Predator Corp. (2004), 365 A.R. 326, 2004 ABQB 688, at p. 331, aff’d (2006), 55 Alta. L.R. (4th) 1, 2006 ABCA 69. Each side must “put its best foot forward” with respect to the existence or non-existence of material issues to be tried: Transamerica Life Insurance Co. of Canada v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (1996), 28 O.R. (3d) 423 (Gen. Div.), at p. 434; Goudie v. Ottawa (City), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 141, 2003 SCC 14, par. 32. The chambers judge may make inferences of fact based on the undisputed facts before the court, as long as the inferences are strongly supported by the facts: Guarantee Co. of North America, at para. 30.

[Emphasis added. See also Buffalo v Canada, 2016 FCA 223, para 47]

[56]  The Supreme Court of Canada encouraged courts to use summary judgments in appropriate cases, and by doing so, sought a genuine culture shift (Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 87 [Hryniak], paras 28 and 32). We must definitely beware of generalizations or blind borrowing from other cases that follow rules other than our own (Manitoba v Canada, 2015 FCA 57). However, the applicable standard according to the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure (R.R.O. 1990, Rule 194), which was used in Hryniak, has a clear relationship with the standard presented in Rule 215 of the Rules. Rules 215 states that the Court must be “satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence”, while Ontario Rule 20.04 states that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if [...] (a) the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial with respect to a claim or defence”.

[57]  However, it appears that the final test proclaimed by the Supreme Court in Hryniak is the Court’s ability to provide a fair and just adjudication on a motion for summary judgment. I do not see how this test would be applicable in our case. That rule for caution seems all the more important to me, since Mr. Yodjeu is not retaining the services of counsel. This caution is thus articulated at paragraph 50 of Hryniak:

[50]  These principles are interconnected and all speak to whether summary judgment will provide a fair and just adjudication. When a summary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary facts and resolve the dispute, proceeding to trial would generally not be proportionate, timely or cost effective. Similarly, a process that does not give a judge confidence in her conclusions can never be the proportionate way to resolve a dispute. It bears reiterating that the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute.

[58]  In the end, the Court must consider the evidence as part of a motion for summary judgment to see whether there is a genuine issue for trial. The plaintiff must challenge or present his own evidence. However, if the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial (in French, “il n’existe pas de véritable question litigieuse”), a summary judgment is made as a result.

VI.  Analysis

[59]  Mr. Yodjeu has been in possession of the motion for summary judgment since July 2016, more than a year before the hearing was held in late October 2017. According to the Rules, the motion can only be filed at least twenty days before the hearing date and the responding record must be served and filed at least ten (10) days before the hearing date. Mr. Yodjeu had all that time to file his evidence in order to “put his best foot forward” in the words of Lameman at paragraph 11, which is reproduced at paragraph 55 of these reasons (in French, “pour présenter ses meilleurs arguments”). In fact, Mr. Yodjeu had filed his action on August 22, 2014: he had more than three years “to put his best foot forward”. What is more, the Court allowed him to submit the new evidence that it deemed relevant, despite the doubts expressed about this by the Court (order dated October 20, 2017 (2017 FC 940), para 32 et seq.). In other words, every opportunity was afforded the plaintiff to compile his responding record as he saw fit.

[60]  Indeed, this matter is simple once we trim away the diversions in which the plaintiff too often lost himself (order by Bell J. dated October 2, 2017). The final result is that the Court can only consider the evidence and arguments that are before it. The matter that is before the Court is the action undertaken by Mr. Yodjeu regarding the processing by Crown employees of his sponsorship application and of the residence applications for his spouse and their daughter. Nothing else. The disputes that the plaintiff wanted to maintain against the Canadian Human Rights Commission or the Privacy Commissioner are different from the action that he instituted in August 2014.

[61]  The defendant, who is the moving party in this case, filed four affidavits as evidence with numerous exhibits in support. Those affidavits come from the main actors. Three are from the decision-makers at each of the steps of this matter and the fourth is from the person who was responsible as an immigration program manager in Dakar (a team of around twenty employees):

·  Steven Owen is who made the initial decision regarding the sponsorship application from the plaintiff;

• Chantal Kidd is who made the decision regarding the permanent residence applications for Ms. Mbakop and the couple’s daughter. She was a temporary employee at the time at the Embassy of Canada to Senegal;

• Karine Santerre was the person who recommended that the appeal from the rejection to grant permanent residence to the spouse and the couple’s daughter be conceded;

• Isabelle Ouellet, who was responsible for the immigration program at the Embassy of Canada in Senegal.

Those four witnesses were presented to establish the facts, from the point of view of the moving party and defendant to the action, and to further explain the decisions that were made. They all responded to the written cross-examination that they underwent by Mr. Yodjeu in November 2016.

The instituted action

[62]  It seems useful for me to recall the framework in which the motion for summary judgment was brought. The action instituted by Mr. Yodjeu in August 2014 presented some facts regarding the rejections, namely the rejected granting of the sponsorship application and the rejected permanent residence applications for Ms. Mbakop and their daughter. This was followed by what Mr. Yodjeu designated “my accusations”.

[63]  Essentially, it must be understood that this is a fault alleged by the plaintiff and that he must prove it in order to hope to be given judgment in his action. This includes:

• a) the person hired locally in Dakar who allegedly process Mr. Yodjeu’s file when she was supposedly likely to be in a conflict-of-interest situation;

• b) a person named “SOW” who allegedly backdated the rejection of the sponsorship application. We now know that “SOW” is none other than Steven Owen, the official who found that the plaintiff was not admissible because Mr. Yodjeu did not show that he was a resident of Canada during the required period;

• c) Mr. Owen allegedly did not respect a principle of procedural fairness according to which the plaintiff should receive the benefit of the doubt in cases where the evidence for residency may be doubtful. The plaintiff further submits that the person hired locally in Dakar allegedly received the plaintiff’s changes of address, along with his proof of residence in Canada.

• d) Mr. Yodjeu alleges that the rejection of his sponsorship application was erroneous because he was living in Montréal. The person locally hired in Dakar allegedly motivated her decision to deny the permanent residence applications for Ms. Mbakop and their daughter based on [translation] “erroneous information and slanderous vilification by my former colleagues after I left Ecobank”;

• e) Mr. Yodjeu alleges that the person hired locally in Dakar lied about her reasons for the rejection. The plaintiff then makes a series of accusations stemming from his claims that the Minister did not have any new facts when his delegate, Ms. Santerre, agreed to Mr. Yodjeu’s appeal before the IAD, including family photos that were apparently related to the rejections;

• f) Mr. Yodjeu says that he suspects his CIC file was corrupted in order to prevent him from receiving the rejection letter from August 2012. Mr. Yodjeu says that he suspects Mr. Owen because it was he [translation] “who would have benefited from the crime”. Mr. Owen allegedly wanted to hide his error, if I understand correctly, for having rejected the sponsorship on the ground, says Mr. Yodjeu, [translation] “that [he] did not provide any proof of residence”. In fact, the entire problem lies here. As we will see, the problem is not that Mr. Yodjeu did not demonstrate his residency in Canada over a certain period in 2012. He did so for the period starting in August 2012. In fact, in the evidence, we can see from Mr. Yodjeu’s statements that he only had to establish his residence from the time of the sponsorship application. Instead, the evidence had to show that he was already a resident at the time when he made the sponsorship application and not that he had established it from the time that the application was made.

[64]  It was based on those “accusations” that in his statement of claim, Mr. Yodjeu detailed a theory of a [translation] “conflict of interest by an organized gang with international ramifications”, including the “harassment and persecution of my family by an organized gang” and the “disclosure of personal and confidential information for the purpose of harming and impacting my family’s safety”.

[65]  As noted earlier, each party to a motion for summary judgment must “put its best foot forward”. In this case, the plaintiff has in no way presented the evidence that may support his “accusations” consisting of misappropriations by Mr. Owen and the person hired locally in Dakar, which may be the faults that brought about the defendant’s civil liability. On the opposite side, the defendant filed solid evidence in the matter, for which there is no doubt. This evidence has in no way been rebutted and the plaintiff has not called evidence in reply. All things considered, this is a simple matter that has been made needlessly complex by baseless allegations.

The legal framework of a sponsorship agreement

[66]  This entire matter revolves around the time when the plaintiff, who had permanent resident status in Canada, was a resident of the country for the purpose of being qualified to act as a sponsor.

[67]  Subsection 11(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C. 2001, c. 27 [the Act]) gives an immigration officer the power to issue a visa to a foreign national who wants to enter Canada as long as the requirements of the Act are met. The power includes his or her share of discretion, but as with all discretion, it is not absolute. Among the people who can become permanent residents, those who are in the family class qualify (section 12 of the Act). There is no question that the family class was appropriate in this case.

[68]  It was Ms. Mbakop and her daughter who had to receive permanent residence beforehand, thus allowing them to enter Canada. Mr. Yodjeu, as a permanent resident, could sponsor his spouse and his daughter. Yet section 13 specifies that a “permanent resident [...] may sponsor a foreign national, subject to the regulations”. However, it is section 3 of the Regulations, titled “Sponsorship”, that applies.

[69]  It is sections 130 and 133 of the Regulations that are central to the dispute. Paragraph 130(1)(b) requires that in order to be considered a sponsor, like Mr. Yodjeu, a person must reside in Canada. That paragraph reads as follows:

If we restrict ourselves only to this provision, it would not be very clear as to when residence in Canada must exist so that a person can be considered to be a sponsor. Can we argue that it is enough for residence to be established from the time when the sponsorship application was made? Mr. Yodjeu seemed to believe that it was enough for him to establish his residence in Canada at any time, which would explain why he provided pay stubs and leases from August 2012, claiming that this was enough. Unfortunately, that is not the case. The clear answer is found at paragraph 133(1)(a); I am only reproducing the portion of it that is relevant to the dispute:

[Emphasis added.]

As we can see, Mr. Yodjeu had to establish with supporting evidence that he fit the description of a sponsor on the day that he filed his application until the time when the decision was made. We have already seen that paragraph 130(1)(b) of the Regulations requires that the sponsor reside in Canada. The pairing of paragraphs 130(1)(b) and 133(1)(a) ensures that, by the very terms of subsection 133(1), a sponsorship application shall only be approved by an officer if there is evidence that the sponsor resides in Canada on the day on which the application was filed and from that day until the day a decision is made with respect to the application. The Court notes that the French version is imperative: the officer shall only accept a sponsorship application if the conditions are met. The English version is also just as imperative, using the word “shall”. The Interpretation Act (R.S.C. (1985) ch. I-21) also confirms the imperative character of the officer’s obligation:

It is not important for the proof of residence to be produced for times during the prescribed period (from filing the application to the decision), like Mr. Yodjeu had done with leases or pay stubs, but not without ever providing anything whatsoever for the period from May to August 2012. Mr. Yodjeu’s sponsorship application and the permanent residence application for his spouse and their daughter were rejected because Mr. Steven Owen and Ms. Chantal Kidd had found that his proof of residence in Canada had not been filed within the prescribed time.

Steven Owen

[70]  Mr. Owen and Ms. Kidd testified by affidavit and explained their decisions. Mr. Owen made his decision on August 7, 2012. The decision was sent to Mr. Yodjeu Ntembe in Courbevoie, France, but with the note “Chez Ngansop Ntembe Marie Claude”. Thus, it was decided that under subsection 130(1) of the Regulations, Mr. Yodjeu had not demonstrated that he had been residing in Canada since the application was filed. Attached to the decision are the provisions of the Regulations, including sections 130 and 133. Section 133 is unequivocal and Mr. Yodjeu had to prove that he was residing in Canada as of the day that he filed his application.

[71]  Mr. Owen clearly explained in his affidavit what brought him to find that his residence was lacking when the sponsorship application was filed on May 3, 2012. In fact, the documentary evidence submitted by Mr. Yodjeu and consulted by Mr. Owen did not in any way establish residence in Canada and the plaintiff therefore did not prove his residence in Canada. On the contrary, he had instead implied in his supporting documents for his sponsorship application that he resided in France:

• on the sponsorship application, his residential and mailing addresses were in France. A telephone number in France was provided;

• on the question “Is Canada your only country of residence?”, Mr. Yodjeu answered “no”, even though a note on the questionnaire related to this question clearly states that a negative response to that question means that the plaintiff is not eligible to be a sponsor;

• on the sponsor survey, the plaintiff indicated that his employer was in France; he did not specify an end of employment date;

• the form titled “Additional family information” showed the plaintiff’s current address as being in Paris;

• while the sponsorship application was mailed in Canada and was in fact received in Canada, the return address was in France.

I reviewed each of the documents to which Mr. Owen referred. In my view, we can easily understand why the immigration officer would have found that the sponsor did not establish his residence in Canada during the prescribed period. As the witness himself notes, even though there was a change of address in July 2012, that does not in any way change the necessity of establishing residence before that change.

[72]  Therefore, officer Owen was justified in finding that the evidence had not shown that, on the day on which the application was filed until the day a decision is made with respect to the application, Mr. Yodjeu resided in Canada as required by law. This is evidence that must be submitted by the person filing the sponsorship application. That being the case, the officer did not accept the application, as required by law.

[73]  Mr. Owen also testified that he did not know the person who was hired locally in Senegal. He is also not Senegalese and has never been to Senegal. He said that he only applied the criteria from the Regulations on the sole basis of the documents submitted by the plaintiff; on August 7, 2012, he did not have before him any documents that satisfied him that the plaintiff resided in Canada at the time when the application was filed.

[74]  The cross-examination to which Mr. Owen replied did not in any way inquire into the evidence provided in the affidavit. For one reason that remains unexplained, the plaintiff seized upon the fact that the rejection letter from August 7, 2012, was sent back to Canada with the note [translation] “recipient cannot be identified”. Indeed, the issue was instead to determine residence at the time of the sponsorship and the evidence for it. It was only when the plaintiff changed his address on October 19, 2012 that the initial rejection letter could be sent again on November 2, 2012. In addition, the letter is not “backdated”, as the plaintiff claims. On it is the last date when the rejection letter was sent. The question has always been the absence of proof of residence in early May 2012. Not only did the available evidence not positively establish residence on the day on which the sponsorship application was filed, since it was the plaintiff’s burden, but the documentation led to the opposite finding.

[75]  There is no need to question Mr. Owen’s credibility. The documents submitted by Mr. Yodjeu speak for themselves.

Chantal Kidd

[76]  Chantal Kidd was the immigration officer who processed the permanent residence application in Dakar. As is highlighted by the decision letter from August 7, 2012 (received in November 2012 after the plaintiff’s change of address on October 19, 2012), the sponsorship application indicates that Mr. Yodjeu wanted to go ahead with the permanent residence application no matter the result of the sponsorship application. Thus, the permanent residence applications for the plaintiff’s spouse and their daughter were sent to Dakar as of August 7, 2012. We learned that the reference was done automatically. The fact that there was a delay in sending the letter did not in any way delay the process. The plaintiff was informed that the evaluation of his permanent residence application was done overseas (at the Embassy of Canada to Senegal) and that because Mr. Yodjeu did not meet the eligibility requirements for being a sponsor, [translation] “this will be considered in the evaluation of the permanent residence application of a family member or members”.

[77]  The plaintiff was clearly notified that he should continue the process because the Act allows for an appeal from a refusal to issue a permanent resident visa (section 63 of the Act) and that humanitarian and compassionate considerations may have criteria and obligations for the plaintiff.

[78]  Ms. Kidd was on temporary assignment in Dakar for a period of six weeks, between April 29 and June 7, 2013; she has more than 18 years of experience as an immigration officer. She was the one who, inter alia, evaluated the permanent residence applications in the family class. She was also the one who made the decision on May 22, 2013.

[79]  She attested that on September 14, 2012, the plaintiff inquired about the next steps: he was informed that the time for processing a permanent residence application in the family class at that time was 25 months. As we have seen, Mr. Yodjeu was impatient and had excessive expectations. That only heightened the plaintiff’s enthusiasm. He contacted Dakar several times, providing them with documents on occasion.

[80]  The witness attached documents sent to Dakar to her affidavit. The plaintiff appeared to believe that those documents would demonstrate his residence during the prescribed period. Those were leases and pay stubs. None of those documents allow us to establish or even infer residence in Canada during the first months of the prescribed period either at the time of or in the weeks following when the sponsorship application was filed.

[81]  Thus, on May 22, 2013, Ms. Kidd read all the documents, including those sent after Mr. Owen’s decision. She found that the plaintiff had not shown that he resided in Canada in May 2012. The only documents were pay stubs from August 2012 and a lease for a period starting on December 1, 2012. It is nevertheless paradoxical that the plaintiff was not able to improve upon his record, contenting himself with documents that in no way proved his residence in May 2012. Indeed, the rejection letter (August or November 2012) was explicit. That would have certainly confirmed Ms. Kidd’s opinion that proof of residence for the period prior to August 2012 had not been shown because nothing relevant was offered by the plaintiff.

[82]  In my view, Ms. Kidd sought to favour Ms. Mbakop and the couple’s daughter and so she examined the exemption for humanitarian and compassionate grounds in order to consider the best interests of the child. Given the lack of evidence, the best interest of the child was for her to stay with her mother while awaiting a better permanent residence application.

[83]  Lastly, the witness categorically denies any influence from the locally hired employee whom Mr. Yodjeu accused of conspiring with her. She does not know this person and in no way did she have any discussions with locally hired employees during the six weeks that she spent in Dakar.

[84]  The rejection letter that was sent following Ms. Kidd’s decision explains the reasons for her decision.

[85]  Regarding both Ms. Kidd and Mr. Owen, the plaintiff loses himself in conjecture on questions that have no bearing on the outcome of the trial. Thus, the plaintiff questioned the returned rejection letter from August 7, 2012, and how the address used on November 2, 2012, to send the rejection was sent to the authorities. In addition, we do not understand the discussion about Ms. Kidd, whom Mr. Yodjeu acknowledges as having made the decision on May 22, 2013, yet doubts that she was behind the June 4 decision (which was instead the locally hired employee), which is only a correction of the first one. Mr. Yodjeu’s income tax returns for 2012 or documents relating to employment insurance or certain tax credits that were submitted between May 22 and June 4 are also meaningless with respect to the uninterrupted residence period that is required by law. They do not in any way prove residence during the prescribed period. Those are nothing more than meaningless or unimportant diversions with respect to the question raised by the plaintiff in his action: was there a wrong that gave rise to the civil liability of Crown employees when determining the plaintiff’s residence at the start of the prescribed period, which began on May 2, 2012 and which ended with the final decision. Those diversions are not genuine issues for trial.

Isabelle Ouellet

[86]  The evidence submitted by the Attorney General dealt with the role played by the locally hired person. That evidence in some way corroborates Ms. Kidd’s evidence, according to which the decision on May 22, 2013, was made by her without the assistance of local staff. Ms. Ouellet testified that when the sponsorship stage is completed in Canada, those for permanent residence are sent to a processing office, like the one in Dakar, which takes over. Earlier, we saw that the referral to Dakar was made on the day of Mr. Owen’s decision, August 7, 2012. Ms. Isabelle Ouellet confirms that local staff were not assigned with making decisions for immigration files that were processed in Dakar.

[87]  Ms. Kidd’s decision, which was made on May 22, 2013, was sent to the plaintiff and his spouse on May 28. That same day, Mr. Yodjeu replied in an email that there had been a mistake on said rejection letter: the wrong sponsor was identified. It was this error that was corrected thanks to the letter from June 4. The rest of the letter remained the same and the decision was unchanged. Mr. Yodjeu then sought to file other items, including his [translation] “income statement for 2012, an employment insurance document and a federal tax credit document (Affidavit from Isabelle Ouellet, para 10)”. He then claimed to have established that his residence existed. Those documents in no way changed the decision made on May 22, 2013. The notes clearly indicate that Ms. Kidd was informed of them and that she found that they changed nothing. After everything, those were the plaintiff’s statements and nothing more. The Court consulted those documents. It would be reasonable to find that they prove nothing with respect to the issue in dispute, that being the plaintiff’s residence at the appropriate time. No one doubts that the plaintiff resided in Canada during a period in 2012, since he earned income here. But that is not the issue.

[88]  In her affidavit, Ms. Ouellet later detailed the events surrounding the allegation made after the decision from May 22/June 4, 2013, according to which the locally hired person allegedly had a conflict of interest. On August 28, September 4, September 30 and October 15, 2013, emails were sent by Mr. Yodjeu and replies were sent by Ms. Ouellet on September 2 and 30, 2013. Those last emails stated that this employee had no influence over the decision, which had to be made by a visa officer.

[89]  Because the plaintiff continues to present the same allegation, the affiant filed on the role played by the locally hired employee. We learned that this employee did clerical work for 75% of her time, with the remaining 25% being dedicated to cases that dealt with a file type other than files that are said to be in the “family/spouse/child class”. I am repeating paragraph 17 of the affidavit, which describes what clerical work involves:

[translation]

17.  Clerical work on files consisted of following-up on emails from plaintiffs and sending medical forms and document requests as needed by visa officer, preparing files for finalization of receiving passport(s), printing received documents on file, printing rejection letters created by the GCMS at the request of a visa officer, having visa officers follow up on files for review when receiving documents or other information, and communicating with applicants as needed regarding the processing of their file.

Entering data into databases, which interested the plaintiff, is definitely one clerical job, but it is not the clerical job. The lack of entries made by the locally hired employee is unimportant. What is clearly important is the decision-making authority.

[90]  Ms. Kidd was on temporary assignment to Dakar to help reduce the processing times there for family class applications. As someone who is responsible for clerical work, the locally hired employee would have received documents from Mr. Yodjeu for filing. She made two entries in the GCMS, including one on June 4 for the correction to the letter from May 22. Nothing more. The locally hired employee had no decision-making authority. Lastly, it appears that Mr. Yodjeu had difficulties with a person who had the same surname as the locally hired employee when he was working for Ecobank-Cameroon. The affiant reported that her investigation into the complaint made by Mr. Yodjeu revealed that the employee did not know her homonymous counterpart at Ecobank-Cameroon and that this employee worked for Ecobank-Senegal and never for Ecobank-Cameroon. It appears that Mr. Yodjeu’s attempts to communicate directly with the employee through his personal social media accounts led to a formal warning from the embassy to stop those attempts at communication.

[91]  What is important is that the conspiracy theory put forward by the plaintiff is not only a diversion with respect to his inability to prove his residence in Canada at the prescribed time, but is also not supported by the evidence. It is nothing more than unlikely and unproven speculation. We cannot see what role the employee would have played in the decision on May 22, 2013; Ms. Kidd was the visa officer who was empowered with making the decision and the Court has no doubt that she did so. In fact, Mr. Yodjeu appeared to concede that such is the case. Following the error that was reported by the plaintiff, a new letter was sent. Aside from the corrected error, the June 4 letter is identical. Granted that the locally hired employee did the clerical work to correct the letter from June 4, 2013 (which appears to have fed the plaintiff’s suspicions), from all evidence, she could not have had any role to play in the decision made on May 22. Even though she knew Mr. Yodjeu, that would not in any way change the fact that the decision was made by Ms. Kidd, the person empowered to do so. In that sense, the efforts made by the plaintiff surrounding the letter of June 4 are only an unfortunate distraction. The employee’s clerical work on the June 4 letter changes nothing about the fact that this letter is the same as the one from May 22, which details Ms. Kidd’s decision.

[92]  Despite the difficulties that emerged between the plaintiff and the embassy in Dakar regarding the role of the locally hired employee, the embassy processed a study permit application that had been filed by Ms. Mbakop. Thus, a related approval was sent by the embassy as of September 5, 2013, three months after the permanent residence application was rejected. A temporary resident visa was issued for the couple’s child that same day. Ms. Mbakop and the couple’s daughter headed to Canada as temporary residents on September 18, 2013.

[93]  The involvement of the embassy to Senegal did not stop there. As we will see, the Minister consented to the appeal before the IAD. On May 15, 19 and 24, 2014, Dakar asked Mr. Yodjeu and his spouse to provide documents and information in order to process the permanent residence applications. On June 30, 2014, Dakar notified them that a permanent residence visa would be valid until August 7, 2014. In the meantime, the embassy would complete its review. Permanent residence visas were issued for Ms. Mbakop and her daughter on July 22, 2014.

Karine Santerre

[94]  That brings us to the IAD’s decision to allow the appeal of the decision to reject permanent residence on June 4, 2013 (with the original decision on May 22).

[95]  It was Karine Santerre who testified on this third decision, which is relevant to the dispute. She is a hearings officer at the Appeals Division, Hearings and Detention. She is an employee of the CBSA. While Mr. Owen, Ms. Kidd and Ms. Ouellet are CIC employees, Ms. Santerre is not.

[96]  Ms. Santerre told a brief history of the letters that were sent as was typical of Mr. Yodjeu after his notice of appeal dated June 4, 2013. On September 24, he complained about, inter alia, the processing of his sponsorship application by the Embassy of Canada to Senegal, while he claimed that he satisfied the requirements by using pay stubs and statements of income, etc. On October 21, 2013, the IAD determined that it had no jurisdiction for dealing with such a complaint. The Court also noted an application for priority processing of his appeal, in which the plaintiff puts forward what he himself calls [translation] “suspicions of conspiracy theories, conflict of interests and harassment” to justify his application” (exhibit K-9).

[97]  It was on December 12, 2013 that Ms. Santerre recommended that the IAD allow the appeal. The [translation] “response to a written request” containing that recommendation warrants us pausing there.

[98]  Ms. Santerre stated in her affidavit that she believed that the decisions on August 7, 2012 and on May 22, 2013 (paragraph 13 of the affidavit indicates March 22, 2013, which is clearly an error), are proper, since the evidence did not allow her to find that the plaintiff fit the description of a sponsor.

[99]  In her affidavit, she explained that an address in France was presented by the plaintiff as being the mailing address for his application. That is mentioned in his [translation] “response to a written request” (para 2). In said “response”, Ms. Santerre notes that the plaintiff did not submit any formal evidence showing residence in Canada after his arrival: no lease or rent receipts were submitted. Evidence of this kind was certainly provided, but they are all for periods that are well after his arrival. Thus, Ms. Santerre recalled that the burden is on the plaintiff to show that he resided in Canada.

[100]  What tipped the balance in the plaintiff’s favour is the search conducted by Ms. Santerre in the Integrated Customs System [ICS], a database that is only accessible to CBSA employees who are cataloguing entries into Canada. It noted an entry at Pierre Elliott Trudeau Airport on May 1, 2012. The affidavit stated that the database that is only accessible by employees of the CBSA (and not CIC) allowed her to see an entry on May 1, 2012, but also entries into Canada on February 12, 2012 and July 17, 2013. Having no entries into Canada between May 1, 2012 and July 17, 2013, Ms. Santerre apparently chose to [translation] “give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt and I found that he did indeed reside in Canada as of the filing of his sponsorship application in May 2012” (para 21). Paragraph 10 of the “response to written request” is essentially in the same regard. Thus, the cross-checks of the plaintiff’s entries into Canada, thanks to privileged access to the database that is only accessible by CBSA employees, allowed Ms. Santerre to make an inference in favour of the plaintiff.

[101]  While Mr. Yodjeu claimed to have changed his address with CIC a month and a half after his arrival, Ms. Santerre noted a change of address by the plaintiff on July 4, 2012. Exhibit K-11 indicates a change of address that took effect on July 4, 2012, and nothing more.

[102]  Contrary to what the plaintiff claimed, there definitely was new information, gleaned from Ms. Santerre’s initiatives. She had enough doubt to make an inference in favour of the plaintiff. That inference is certainly not flawless, but it was the finding that she made. She found that because the database had not recorded any new entries into Canada, that suggested that Mr. Yodjeu had not left Canada in order to come back much later. Such an inference, while generous, could clearly not have been made without that information, which is not accessible to CIC employees.

[103]  The appeal to which the Minister consented on December 12, 2013, was allowed on December 27, 2013. The appeal under section 63 of the Act is by nature a de novo appeal in which the IAD considers the new evidence in the case. The decision to reject issuing a permanent residence visa was overturned because the Minister consented to the appeal. The matter was thus returned to a different visa officer to once again process the application. Therefore, it is in no way striking that the new review of the file took place in Dakar. As we have seen, new information was required from the plaintiff and permanent residence was granted on June 2014. As counsel for the defendant noted, it was announced that it would take 25 months to process the application for permanent residence. Despite the events, 26 months passed between the sponsorship application and the final decision.

[104]  The evidence filed on behalf of Her Majesty, in my view, clearly explains the factual framework. In his action, the plaintiff had to prove an actionable wrong in civil liability. The evidence from the Crown, if it is not rebutted (and it certainly was not under cross-examination) seems to rule out any wrong. The plaintiff submitted his sponsorship documents, which warranted a reasonable inference: at the time that he filed his sponsorship application, he did not reside in Canada. He may be disdainful and he may try to explain his disdain after the fact, but nevertheless, the defendant’s employees had to examine the sponsorship application forms and the submitted documents. The plaintiff submitted leases and pay stubs that only establish residence in Canada as of August 2012. Like Ms. Santerre, I find that the plaintiff [translation] “did not file any formal proof of residence showing that he immediately established his residence in Canada after his arrival” (response to written request, exhibit K-10, para 5). Since he did so later, the lease, rent receipts, pay stub and invoices may have been able to cast a certain light. That was not done by the plaintiff. When he sent his tax return between May 22, 2014 and June 4, 2014, it was indeed received by Ms. Kidd, who found that it did not change the decision from May 22; we can easily understand this because a tax return is not independent proof of continuous residence.

The plaintiff’s evidence

[105]  Therefore, it is up to the plaintiff to present his version of the facts. However, very unfortunately, the plaintiff did not, in either his written submissions or his oral arguments, try to show how the actions of Mr. Owen and Ms. Kidd, the two decision-makers, could have been an actionable wrong in civil liability. The Court reminded the plaintiff during the hearing that he had to pay attention to the demonstration of the wrong. Not once did he deal with the fundamental problem: the forms that he sent in May 2012 in support of his sponsorship application gave every indication that his residence was in France. Throughout this dispute, he has never tried to explain his situation in Canada in May and June. That, in my view, is fatal to the instituted action. In addition, his speculations of a conspiracy hatched by CIC employees are unlikely, since the evidence clearly did not show this.

[106]  The plaintiff’s entire statement of claim revolves around two decisions: that of Mr. Owen rejecting sponsorship and that of Ms. Kidd rejecting permanent residence, since Ms. Mbakop and the couple’s daughter were not validly sponsored. The evidence presented by the defendant established the benign circumstances in which the decisions were made: the plaintiff did not prove his residence and, to date, we still do not know where he resided in May and June 2012. In any case, what is important is that this evidence was not before the decision-makers.

[107]  Nevertheless, the Court would prefer to examine Mr. Yodjeu’s arguments, even though they have very little to do with the focal point of events in May 2012.

[108]  The affidavit of Mr. Owen remained untainted after both the written submissions and the hearing. Furthermore, Mr. Yodjeu contrasted Mr. Owen’s decision with Ms. Santerre’s recommendation, refusing to accept that Ms. Santerre had new information. That being done, it was not so much that he was attacking Mr. Owen’s credibility as he did not try to present a different narrative. In summary, he said that Ms. Santerre made a recommendation based on the same facts that Mr. Owen had at his disposal, but arrived at a different result. He appears to infer that Mr. Owen had to be in error. That is imprecise, since the evidence differs. Thus, he ignored the finding by Ms. Santerre in which Mr. Owen and Ms. Kidd were right based on the information that they had and which came from the plaintiff himself. What is more, Ms. Santerre said that she gave the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt that she had after she consulted the database to which only she had access as a CBSA employee, a database to which CIC employees do not have access.

[109]  The plaintiff submits that Ms. Kidd apparently had to “overturn” Mr. Owen’s decision. The plaintiff is confusing Ms. Kidd’s and Mr. Owen’s duties, since he believes that Ms. Kidd can “overturn” Mr. Owen’s decision. This is not understanding that Mr. Owen processed the sponsorship and Ms. Kidd the permanent residence. Mr. Yodjeu knew that applying for permanent residence without sponsorship would, so to speak, be headed for failure. He did not submit any additional evidence Mr. Owen’s finding could be set aside, aside from documents prior to the change of address on July 4, 2012.

[110]  This is probably why Ms. Kidd also chose to examine whether there were humanitarian and compassionate grounds that would allow her to grant permanent residence by lifting the Act’s criteria and obligations. Mr. Yodjeu wanted to complain about it. We do not understand how he can complain when we are seeking to apply a remedial provision. Ms. Kidd’s credibility was never in danger. On the contrary.

[111]  In his memorandum of facts and law, the plaintiff also mentioned the person who was hired locally in Dakar. Without any evidence, the plaintiff made accusations that he was no more able to support in his oral arguments. However, there is more. As we have just seen, Ms. Kidd’s decision in Dakar, apart from being able to have Ms. Mbakop or her daughter benefit from an exception on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, was largely predetermined by section 120 of the Regulations. I am repeating it here:

As we can see, a sponsorship undertaking must be in effect. It was not in the view of decision-makers Owen and Kidd. All told, not only did the locally hired person have no influence in fact, but she also had no jurisdiction.

[112]  It is not that the stage of the process that deals specifically with the permanent residence application is useless. We may think that evidence that establishes residence during the prescribed period, and therefore as of when the sponsorship application is filed, would have been able to have an effect on the review stage of the permanent residence application. We recall that Mr. Owen’s decision letter (August 7 and November 2, 2012) stated that he apparently considered the fact that Mr. Yodjeu did not meet the eligibility conditions for being a sponsor when assessing the permanent residence application. Yet no such evidence was filed, since the plaintiff only submitted documents that establish residence in Canada after his change of address on July 4, 2012. The other advantage of continuing the process was, as we have seen, being allowed an appeal under section 63 of the Act before the IAD.

[113]  Grasping at straws, the plaintiff complained that the processing of his application was too slow following the IAD’s decision. We do not know what he means by too slow. There is no basis for such an assertion other than Mr. Yodjeu being impatient. We may think that Mr. Yodjeu believed that his file had to receive absolute priority attention. Indeed, his spouse and daughters had already been in Canada since September 2013 and he had benefited from the work of a CBSA officer who had discovered useful information. In fact, in the statement of claim, we do not find what constitutes the framework in which this dispute must be handled, what the wrong is or who committed it. The “accusations” deal with SOW (Steven Owen) and the locally hired employee who was allegedly at the source of the difficulties encountered by Mr. Yodjeu (and his family) in Dakar. At para 19e, the statement cites the plaintiff’s hope of having permanent residence granted in shortest time, but nothing more. Indeed, it had been announced that the process typically takes 25 months.

[114]  All things considered, there is no genuine cause of action that is articulated other than the claimed activities of Mr. Owen and the locally hired employee, which were never proven. Once the base of this house of cards is removed, the whole house collapses. Without any wrong by Mr. Owen and a non-existent conspiracy, the plaintiff finds himself with a baseless statement. He cannot try to improve it after the fact by making new allegations (Cabral v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1040).

[115]  There are two arguments remaining from Mr. Yodjeu that must briefly be dealt with: an alleged admission in the defendant’s original defence and an alleged spoliation.

The admission

[116]  First, the admission. If I understand correctly, the plaintiff submits that the Crown would have made an admission in her initial defence by saying that [translation] “if the plaintiff had made his change in a timely manner with CIC and not the CBSA, he would not have been excluded as a sponsor on the ground that he did not reside in Canada at the time of filing” (para 41). However, as was stated earlier, the defence was amended after leave was granted by the judge tasked with managing this case; the paragraph is no longer before the Court.

[117]  Several reasons are in favour of rejecting such an argument. First, it should be established what an admission means in this sentence. There does not seem to be any doubt for me that if the plaintiff had changed his address in a timely manner, his residence in Canada would have been established. The new version of the amended defence is less definitive regarding the legal result of a timely change of address, but the idea, to me, seems to converge. But what does ‘timely manner’ mean? And what should then be proven in order to establish the reality of the new address? Which leads me to my second concern: an admission can only be about a fact and not about a question of law or a mixed question of fact and law (Fiducie Charbonneau v Québec (Deputy Minister of Revenue), 2010 QCCA 400). In the evidence, paragraph 41 deals with the legal consequence of a change of address: that is a mixed question of fact and law, and cannot be the subject of an admission. In addition, what is the effect of an amendment on leave from the Court? The retraction of an admission (if it is in fact an admission) has been more generous since Andersen Consulting v Canada, [1998] 1 FCR 605. Moreover, [translation] “[w]hen the amendment of an argument is requested and given leave, the new passage replaces the passage to be amended, which makes it so that there is no contradiction between the two findings” (para 9). In other words, paragraph 41 was replaced in the amended defence. It disappeared because it was replaced. Lastly, the argument on the admission does not lead the plaintiff anywhere. As with other arguments made on the motion for summary judgment, this question has no impact on what was argued in the statement and must be determined in this case. Even if it is true that a change that was made in a timely manner would have been able to change the situation, what still needed to be done to establish the new address at the time that the sponsorship application was presented and afterwards, that was not done. This “admission”, if it is in fact an admission and it was not retracted, does not advance the plaintiff’s cause. As for other allegations of admissions in the plaintiff’s memorandum of facts and law, they have no value even on the face of it.

Spoliation

[118]  The argument for spoliation does not go much further that the one for the admission. All things considered, Mr. Yodjeu complains that some items of information would have been useful to him, but they no longer exist. First and foremost, he seized on the recording of the conversation that he said he had with a clerk a few weeks before his arrival on May 1, 2012, to make a change of address. This lack of clarity is partially remedied by the affidavit from Ms. Santerre, to which exhibit K-11 is attached. In it, we find an indication of a change of address on July 4, 2012. According to Ms. Santerre’s affidavit, [translation] “I consulted additional evidence, in particular the information in the Field Operations Support System (“FOSS”) and in the Integrated Customs Enforcement System (“ICES”) through the CBSA’s Integrated Customs System (“ICS”)” (para 17). This exhibit comes from that.

[119]  According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have had to conserve this recording and others between August and November 2012. Using mainly the obligation to act in good faith (article 1375 of the Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991) and the clean hands doctrine (equitable doctrine, which states that whomever appears before the Court for equitable relief, such as an injunction or judicial review, must do so having respected the obligations for good faith and not committing any wrongdoing).

[120]  The plaintiff had difficulty with the affidavit from James Hogue. He is a “Specialist – Virtual Contact Centre” for the CIC Call Centre; he has extensive experience since he has been working at the CIC Call Centre since February 2006. He explained that before September 22, 2014, the system being used was Avaya CCMA, which has since been replaced by the Virtual Contact Centre. Server capacity before September 2014 was more limited than what is now available with the new system; only six to seven months of recordings could be conserved before being destroyed in chronological order. Any failure to destroy would cause outages, therefore, the destruction was systematic.

[121]  That is explained by the number of calls answered every day by between 150 and 175 officers. Mr. Hogue testified that on average, 1.6 million calls are handled annually, which on average last a bit longer than 7 minutes.

[122]  Calls are recorded for quality assessment and officer training purposes. They are not recorded to conserve evidence of conversations.

[123]  For reasons that remain mysterious, as part of the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff was involved in trying to use Mr. Hogue’s affidavit (which, moreover, he is not challenging) to discuss another dispute: the one involving the Canadian Human Rights Commission. That matter is not before the Court on a motion for summary judgment. With respect to this dispute, the plaintiff also appears interested in an appeal that he allegedly filed on December 9, 2012, regarding the fact that the decision (made by Mr. Owen) on August 7, 2012, which had been sent to France in accordance with the contents of the sponsorship application, only eventually reached him in November 2012, after Mr. Owen apparently noted the change of address in October 2012, according to his affidavit and the cross-examination that he received. We do not learn, nor does the plaintiff explain, how one or more letters that were returned between August 2012 and November 2012 may have any impact on the dispute. This “delay” in receiving the decision in no way harmed him, since the decision on August 7, 2012, was automatically sent to Dakar that same day. If the plaintiff sought the evidence of a change of address that likely occurred on July 4, 2012 (and not a month or six weeks after his arrival in Canada), the recording of the telephone conversation had been destroyed in accordance with standard practice at the time. The other calls that were made in 2012 would have likely also been destroyed, following the policy of only keeping recording for 6 or 7 months. Where would the spoliation be?

[124]  It is not necessary to give a report on the spoliation. As the Court of Appeal of Alberta noted in McDougall v Black & Decker Canada Inc., 2008 ABCA 353 [Black & Decker], a landmark decision on the issue, the problem presented by lost or destroyed evidence is not new. However, not all destroyed evidence is spoliation. For the restricted purposes of this case, we can take from Black & Decker, which is authoritative, that the state of law is as follows:

1. spoliation refers to the intentional destruction of relevant evidence when litigation is existing or pending;

2. the typical remedy is a presumption of fact that the lost or destroyed evidence would not assist the spoliator;

3. although the law does not allow for independent remedy, the law may be heading in that direction.

[125]  Quebec law does not appear to set aside the principles stated by the Court of Appeal of Alberta. In Jacques v Ultramar Ltée, 2011 QCCS 6020 [Ultramar], Madam Justice Bélanger, as she then was, thus summarized the state of law:

[TRANSLATION]

[26] Therefore, the state of law in Quebec is as follows:

1. There is no explicit obligation to preserve the evidence in a contentious record, nor is there an obligation to produce for the adversary a list of documents that are relevant to the dispute.

2. The implicit obligation to preserve the evidence exists and flows from a general obligation of good faith; consequently, that obligation only covers the most serious cases of spoliation.

3. The maxim omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem (all things are presumed against the spoliator) has had highly limited application up to now.

4. The consequence of the implicit obligation to conserve evidence, based on good faith, is that when a party disposes of evidence by mistake or in good faith, no negative inference can result from it.

5. Good faith is presumed and there is a heavy burden for laying evidence of bad faith.

6. The consequence of spoliation is a negative inference and this negative inference has not up to now led to a dismissal of a remedy or a defence after a hearing on merits.

7. In the absence of a formal obligation to conserve evidence and in the presence of an implicit obligation for doing so, if a person desires to obtain a formal order to conserve evidence, the person must proceed with an injunction order or an application for safeguard and in accordance with the specific criteria for those remedies.

[Emphasis added.]

The destruction of recordings in 2012, the purpose of which was not to compile evidence but in fact for educational and assessment purposes, was according to a conservation policy that was not challenged by the plaintiff and which appears to be reasonable, given the number of conversations and the limited server capacity. It was impossible for the destruction of recordings over time to have been done in order to frustrate a possible litigation that only materialized in August 2014. The plaintiff had to file evidence of bad faith in a case where it would be one of the most serious cases of spoliation. He did not do so. In any matter, [translation] “the only sanction for spoliation in civil matters is the adverse presumption” (Ultramar, para 22). If it could be applied in this case, such a presumption would at best apply to situations that were unimportant to the disposal of the litigation as circumscribed by the plaintiff’s statement. The fact that the decision on August 7, 2012 was returned by Canada Post because the recipient in France was not identified has no real impact. The dispute involving the Canadian Human Rights Commission (T-1617-14) is not before this Court.

[126]  There was no spoliation. The destruction of conversations was part of a normal and typical procedure from which we cannot deduce any bad faith.

VII.  Conclusion

[127]  It seems useful to recall that a simple administrative error does not necessarily constitute an actionable wrong in civil liability (Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc., 2010 SCC 62, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 585, paras 28–31). As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Communauté urbaine de Montréal, 2004 SCC 30; [2004] 1 S.C.R. 789, “if upon judicial review an administrative decision is found to be unlawful, it does not necessarily follow that there is a fault giving rise to recourse in civil liability” (para 23). In this case, there has not even been a judicial review. The administrative process was enough to obtain permanent residence for Ms. Mbakop and the plaintiff’s daughter. That same process allowed for temporary residence to be granted while even an appeal was pending before the IAD.

[128]  By presenting his case, the plaintiff had to demonstrate a civil wrong, even though the administrative process ultimately led to the granting of the permanent residence that was sought. The fact that additional information generated by the defendant allowed for a favourable finding for the plaintiff at the IAD stage does not in any way show that there was fault in the two other previous stages. The plaintiff had to show that Mr. Owen and Ms. Kidd committed a civil wrong and not an administrative error (I add that even an administrative error was not demonstrated, since the decision-makers reviewed the documentation provided by the plaintiff, which led to the finding that his residence in Canada in May and June 2012 was not established). He never did so, seeking instead to report problems or advance a mythical conspiracy theory, in which the co-conspirators were all Senegalese and which acted more as a diversion than anything else. The plaintiff even insinuated that vandalism on his automobile may have been linked to [translation] “his complaint that is in progress against certain CIC officers”. Those claimed problems came to a dead end. I repeat: the decisions to reject sponsorship and permanent residence proceeded from the documentation provided by Mr. Yodjeu, which led us to believe that he lived somewhere other than Canada for a portion of the prescribed period, from the filing of his application until the decision.

[129]  It is rather striking that the plaintiff chose not to speak about the documentation that he himself produced. He instead tried to make a big deal of the fact that Mr. Owen’s decision on August 7, 2012, was only sent in November. As for Ms. Kidd’s decision, she proceeded using the same logic as that of Mr. Owen. However, the plaintiff claimed that there was a conspiracy led by a locally hired employee, who had the misfortune of doing the clerical work that allowed for the correct letter to be sent on June 4, 2013. It is also striking that the plaintiff could not produce any proof of residence before August 2012 when he had to know that his real problem was the period from May-June 2012.

[130]  The action can only fail if no civil wrong has been demonstrated. The plaintiff has not proven this in a positive manner. In fact, the allegations of a civil wrong were attacked head-on by the ones who made those decisions whose credibility is not at issue. This dispute is in no way dependent on the credibility of one of the decision-makers or the assessment of contradictory evidence, which legitimately falls to the trial judge. Instead, it seems to be that all necessary evidence for an equitable decision is before the Court, since every opportunity was offered to put forward the existence of a wrong.

[131]  On the contrary, the defendant satisfied me that there is no genuine issue for trial. The facts are simple and harmless: it would not be useful to hold a trial. The defendant was not content to make allegations or to rely on pleadings – she submitted evidence. Therefore, it was up to the plaintiff, Mr. Yodjeu, to rebut this evidence that dealt with the absence of any wrong or to present rebuttal evidence. He did not do so. He did not prove the allegations that he argued in his statement. Once the version of the facts was known, he did not provide any rebuttal evidence. Instead, he tried to attack issues that can at best be described as peripheral and was unsuccessful. I have found that these were diversions, thus diverting us from the fundamental issue. The plaintiff has put what he considers to be his best foot forward regarding the existence of questions to debate. All considered, the Court can only find that the action is so unsound that a trial is not justified. Mr. Yodjeu has not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue for trial and there is no evidence to demonstrate the existence of a “wrong”. The motion for summary judgment must therefore be allowed, with costs.

JUDGMENT in T-1813-14

THE COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES that:

1. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is allowed;

2. The action instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant dated August 22, 2014 is dismissed;

3. Costs are awarded in favour of the defendant.

“Yvan Roy”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:		T-1813-14
STYLE OF CAUSE:		LÉOPOLD CAMILLE YODJEU NTEMDE v HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
PLACE OF HEARING:	QUÉBEC CITY, QUEBEC
DATE OF HEARING:	OCTOBER 24, 2017
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	ROY J.
DATED:	APRIL 16, 2018

APPEARANCES:

Léopold Camille Yodjeu Ntemde	For the Plaintiff (SELF-REPRESENTED)
Sébastien Dasylva	For the Defendant

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Attorney General of Canada Montréal, Quebec

For the Defendant