Docket: T-113-16
Citation: 2018 FC 229
Ottawa, Ontario, February 28, 2018
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice McDonald
| BETWEEN:
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| RYAN FLARO, GABRIELLE BERGERON AND MAURICE FLARO
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| Plaintiffs
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| and
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| HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
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| Defendant
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1] In the underlying action, the Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant is wrongfully with holding cash of approximately $180,000.00 which was seized along with tobacco products and firearms pursuant to a warrant issued under the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 985 c. C-46 and the Excise Act, 2001 S.C. 2002, c.22 [the Act]. By motion, both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant seek to have this matter summarily determined, albeit on different grounds.
[2] For the reasons that follow, I have allowed the Defendant’s summary judgment motion against the Plaintiffs. I have concluded that the provisions of the Act apply to the seized cash, and that the Plaintiffs failed to take the available steps under the Act to object to the seizure.
I. Relevant Background
[3] The relevant factual background is largely undisputed.
[4] The Plaintiffs are a family who reside together in the residence where the seizure of the funds at issue took place.
[5] On July 6, 2010, a truck leaving the Plaintiffs’ residence was stopped by the RCMP and was found to be carrying contraband tobacco.
[6] On July 7, 2010, the RCMP executed a search warrant at the Plaintiffs’ residence. According to the search warrant, it was issued under s.487 of the Criminal Code, and the information upon which the RCMP obtained the search warrant stated that the RCMP had reasonable grounds to believe there were offences under the Act. In the course of executing the search warrant, the RCMP seized $181,183.00 in cash [the Seized Funds] along with other items.
[7] The Plaintiffs were charged with various offences under the Act and the Criminal Code.
[8] Following the seizure, pursuant to s.489.1 of the Criminal Code, the RCMP prepared a “Report to a Justice”
which itemized the Seized Funds as well as the other items seized.
[9] On July 9, 2010, the RCMP forwarded to the Plaintiffs, by registered mail, a Notice titled “Canada Revenue Agency RCMP Seizure Report Excise Act, 2001”
[Seizure Report]. The Seizure Report notes that the funds were seized pursuant to s.260 of the Act for violation of s. 32(1) of the Act.
[10] On the front page of the Seizure Report is a section titled: “Right to Request a Minister’s Decision”
. This section outlines the procedure and the timelines under the Act to request a review of the seizure by the Minister of National Revenue [Minister].
[11] On July 12, 2010, the RCMP received confirmation that the Plaintiffs received the Seizure Report by registered mail.
[12] On January 20, 2014, the criminal charges against the Plaintiffs were dropped. The items seized pursuant to the search warrant were returned to the Plaintiffs. The Seized Funds were not returned.
[13] On March 24, 2014, a lawyer acting on behalf of the Plaintiffs wrote to the Canada Revenue Agency [CRA], seeking the return of the Seized Funds.
[14] On April 25, 2014, the CRA responded that the Plaintiffs’ request for the Seized Funds, pursuant to s.272 of the Act was out of time.
[15] In the action filed in this matter, the Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Defendant is unlawfully detaining the Seized Funds. They seek restitution and/or damages in the amount of the Seized Funds.
II. Plaintiffs’ Motion
[16] The Plaintiffs seek summary judgment pursuant to Rule 215 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [the Rules]. Alternatively, they seek order for a summary trial pursuant to Rule 213; or, an order for determination of a preliminary question of law pursuant to Rule 220; or, a declaration that the Defendant is unlawfully detaining the sum of $181,183.00; or, an order for restitution/damages.
[17] The Motion relief sought by the Plaintiffs’ centres on whether the Criminal Code or the Act applies to the Seized Funds.
III. Defendant’s Motion
[18] The Defendant by motion seeks an order striking the Plaintiffs’ statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action pursuant to Rule 221, and an order summarily dismissing the Statement of Claim pursuant to Rules 213 and 215 as being outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Defendant seeks an order striking the Statement of Claim as being statute barred pursuant to the Ontario Limitations Act 2002, SO 2002, c 24 Sched B and s.39 of the Federal Courts Act.
[19] The Defendant argues that the provisions of the Act are a full answer to the Plaintiffs’ claim to the Seized Funds.
IV. Relevant Statutory Provisions
[20] The relevant provisions of the Act and the Criminal Code are outlined in Annex A.
V. Issues
[21] The following issues will be addressed:
- Is summary judgment appropriate?
- Does the Excise Act apply to the Seized Funds?
- Do the Criminal Code provisions apply?
- Do the provisions of the Excise Act oust the Court’s jurisdiction?
VI. Analysis
A. Is summary judgment appropriate?
[22] As indicated above, both parties seek summary judgment on different grounds. Alternatively, the Defendant seeks an order to strike the Plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
[23] In my view, this is an appropriate case for determination by summary judgment rather than by way of a motion to strike. On a motion to strike the test is whether it is “plain and obvious”
that the claim discloses no reasonable cause of action (Hunt v Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 at 980). On a motion to strike for want of jurisdiction, it must be “plain and obvious”
and “beyond doubt”
that the Court lacks jurisdiction (Sokolowska v Canada, 2005 FCA 29 at paras 14-15; Hodgson v Ermineskin Indian Band No. 942, [2000] FCJ No 313). The motion to strike is a “tool to be used with care”
and in a case where jurisdiction is an issue there must be “no scintilla of a cause of action that this Court has jurisdiction to hear”
(Beima v Canada, 2015 FC 1367 at paras 29-30 [Beima]).
[24] In this case the motion to strike is not the appropriate mechanism because it is not “plain and obvious”
that the Court does not have jurisdiction. Further it is not clearly apparent that the Plaintiffs do not have a “scintilla”
of a cause of action, nor is it “plain and obvious”
that the pleadings should be struck without a full assessment of the legal question.
[25] There is no significant dispute between the parties on the relevant facts, and there are no credibility issues raised. These factors weigh in favor of being able to determine this matter by summary judgment.
[26] The sole legal issue is which statute applies to the Seized Funds. It is not clear that the Plaintiffs’ or Defendant’s proposed interpretation of the statute is correct. In other words, the Plaintiffs have failed to show that there is no genuine issue with the Defendant’s defence and its proposed interpretation of the legislation at issue.
[27] Therefore, the only genuine issue with respect to the Plaintiffs’ motion is the question of statutory interpretation, which the Court is empowered to determine on a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 215(2)(b) of the Rules (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Zakaria), 2014 FC 864 at paras 17-20).
[28] Here, there are similarities with Pinder v Canada, 2015 FC 1376 at para 68, aff’d at 2016 FCA 317 [Pinder] where the Court states:
I am satisfied that the first issue addressed by the Defendants raises a genuine issue for trial, involving statutory interpretation. However, in light of the Plaintiff’s response to the Defendants’ arguments and the Plaintiff’s own Motion for summary judgment and summary trial, this issue can be determined in the disposition of these motions, since the Plaintiffs raise the same issue, of interpretation and scope, albeit from a different perspective.
[29] As in Pinder, the issue of jurisdiction is tied to the Plaintiffs’ motion on the merits. Both the Plaintiffs’ and the Defendant’s motions involve issues of statutory interpretation. Therefore, like in Pinder, both parties are viewing the same issue from different perspectives.
[30] The test for summary judgment is whether there is “no genuine issue for trial”
(Manitoba v Canada, 2015 FCA 57 at para 15 [Manitoba]). This general test was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7 at para 49:
There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits of a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.
[31] Under the Rules, there is no genuine issue for trial where “there is no legal basis”
to the claim on the law or evidence presented (Manitoba, at para 15; Burns Bog Conservation Society v Canada, 2014 FCA 170 at paras 35-36).
[32] As both parties here seek a determination on the merits, summary judgment is “the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination”
of this matter within the meaning of Rule 3 of the Rules.
B. Does the Excise Act apply to the Seized Funds?
[33] The Plaintiffs argue that the Seized Funds were not seized under the Act. They argue that s. 260(1) of the Act, which authorizes inspections, and s. 260(2)(f) , which authorizes seizures, do not apply because there was never a finding of a contravention of s. 32 of the Act. Therefore they argue that without a finding of contravention, there cannot be a forfeiture of the Seized Funds under s.267 of the Act.
[34] They argue that the Defendant chose to proceed with the seizure under the Criminal Code, evidenced by the search warrant obtained pursuant to s. 487 of the Criminal Code. Further they point out that the report regarding the seized items including the Seized Funds was prepared pursuant to s.489.1 of the Criminal Code. Therefore they argue that s.490 of the Criminal Code applies, and once the criminal charges against the Plaintiffs were dropped, the Seized Funds should have been returned to them by operation of s.490 of the Criminal Code.
[35] The Plaintiffs argue that the RCMP cannot act simultaneously under the Criminal Code and the Act with respect to the Seized Funds. They argue that there is a distinction between their actions under the Criminal Code and their actions under a regulatory statue like the Act. They rely upon R. v Jarvis, 2002 SCC 73 [Jarvis] in support of this argument.
[36] The task for this Court, in considering the provisions of the Act, and determining if they apply to the Seized Funds, is to interpret the provisions of the Act in accordance with the modern approach of statutory interpretation, by considering the text, context, and purpose of the Act (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27). In this task, the Act needs to be considered as an organic whole, with all parts working in cooperation towards a logical goal and in support of its overall purpose (R. v L.T.H., 2008 SCC 49).
[37] Pursuant to s. 260(1) of the Act, an officer (which includes an RCMP officer under s.2 of the Act), is permitted to inspect a person’s property in order to “determine…compliance with this Act.”
Pursuant to s. 260(2)(f), the officer is entitled to “seize anything by means of or in relation to which the officer reasonably believes this Act has been contravened.”
The operative language for a seizure under the Act is a “reasonable belief”
that a contravention has occurred. Once seizure occurs, the item is forfeited under s.267. Based upon these provisions, proof of a contravention under s.32(1) is not necessary before a seizure is permitted.
[38] The wording of the Act is clear, therefore applying the ordinary meaning to the words used in the Act will play a dominant role in the Court’s interpretative role (Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 54 at para 10). Section 267 of the Act speaks to “the time of contravention”
as being when an officer has reasonable belief of a contravention. Further the context of the Act in providing a process for Ministerial review of the seizure supports this interpretation.
[39] Further, s. 275(5) provides that if a Minister decides to return a “seized thing”
it “ceases to be forfeit.”
This supports the position that forfeiture occurs, before there has been a Ministerial review, based on an officer’s reasonable belief.
[40] With respect to the overall objective of the Act, courts have long affirmed the legitimacy of seizure and forfeiture activities to secure Crown revenue in the public interest, as being in keeping with the purpose of legislation such as the Act (Canada v CC Havanos Corp. Ltd., 2004 FCA 110 at paras 11-14).
[41] The Plaintiffs’ argument that there must be a finding of a contravention under the Act before a legal forfeiture occurs is not consistent with the wording of the Act or the overall objective of the Act. Further, such an interpretation would undermine the purpose of the Act to provide a comprehensive scheme in support of the goal of revenue collection. It would also render meaningless the entire process of Ministerial review provided for in the Act.
[42] A similar statute was analyzed in Zolotow v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 816, aff’d at 2012 FCA 164 [Zolotow] where the Court was considered the seizure-forfeiture provisions under the Customs Act. The Court affirmed that, under the Customs Act, a seizure occurs when “goods are seized by an officer who believes on reasonable grounds that the Customs Act or its regulations have been contravened”
(Zolotow, at para 19). Similarly, the Court held that if it were otherwise, “it would render a Ministerial review meaningless.”
[43] Similar reasoning applies here. If there must be a finding of a contravention before a seizure occurs, then the provisions of the Act which allow the Minister to determine if a contravention was or was not justified under the Act would be meaningless.
[44] The Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jarvis is misplaced in light of this analysis. Jarvis held that where the predominant purpose of a particular inquiry is the determination of penal liability, regulatory officials must relinquish the use of regulatory powers. The Plaintiffs here argue that since the RCMP used the Act inspection provisions to conduct a search for penal purposes that the RCMP was seeking penal liability and therefore the Act cannot apply to these circumstances.
[45] In determining whether a matter is penal, one must look to all the relevant circumstances (Jarvis, at para 94). In this case, the real question is whether the evidence obtained under the RCMP’s inspection could be used to support a penal investigation, either under the Act or the Criminal Code. This is how the question was put in R. v Ling, 2002 SCC 74 at para 5 [Ling] in respect of tax matters: “Evidence gathered by the CCRA….in proper exercise of its audit function, may be used in a subsequent investigation or prosecution under s.239(1).”
In that case, s.239(1) carried penal consequences.
[46] In this case, the Seized Funds were seized pursuant to a search warrant for the predominant purpose of verifying compliance with the Act. This was identified as the foundational basis upon which the warrant was obtained and was confirmed with the Notices of Seizure. Therefore there is no discrepancy between the terms upon which the warrant was issued and the grounds upon which the Seized Funds were held. The original purpose of the warrant was to determine compliance with the Act, and it was only on a reasonable belief of a violation of the Act that an officer had grounds to seize according to the Act.
[47] Further, the relevance of an investigation crossing into the penal context is the imposition of greater requirements under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms [the Charter] (Jarvis, at para 2; Ling, at para 5). For example, evidence improperly obtained under regulatory powers when the predominant purpose is penal (involving search and seizure powers) may be excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. Here, the Plaintiffs do not seek the exclusion of evidence and no Charter arguments are made.
[48] Instead, the Plaintiffs essentially seek to impugn the propriety of reliance by the RCMP on the Act under authority of a Criminal Code warrant. They seek to attack the original warrant. The Court cannot consider the validity of the original warrant in this proceeding.
[49] Accordingly in the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Act applies in this case, and the Plaintiffs’ proposed interpretation would undermine the text, context, and purpose of the Act (Williams v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 FCA 252 at para 52).
C. Do the Criminal Code provisions apply?
[50] The Plaintiffs argue that because the Defendant proceeded on the basis of a Criminal Code warrant, it was obligated to return the Seized Funds to the Plaintiffs when the criminal charges against them were dropped. Having concluded that the Act applies to the Seized Funds, I must now consider if the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code and the Act are in conflict.
[51] In considering these two statutes, in addition to considering the text, context and purpose, the Court must also adopt an approach which promotes the harmonization of two statutes. The Supreme Court explained this in R. v Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56 at paras 28-30 [Ulybel] as follows:
… in considering the “entire context” of s. 72(1) and the intent of Parliament, it is important to keep in mind the principles for harmonizing different statutes. Professor Ruth Sullivan expressed these principles as follows, in Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 288:
The meaning of words in legislation depends not only on their immediate context but also on a larger context which includes the Act as a whole and the statute book as a whole. The presumptions of coherence and consistency apply not only to Acts dealing with the same subject but also, albeit with lesser force, to the entire body of statute law produced by a legislature. . . . Therefore, other things being equal, interpretations that minimize the possibility of conflict or incoherence among different enactments are preferred.
[52] Based on the principle in Ulybel, two related statutes should not be interpreted so as to cancel each other out, but they should be interpreted to interact coherently (Point-Claire (City) v Quebec (Labour Court), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 1015; see also Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed, 2014 at 416).
[53] Accordingly in this case, an interpretation which ensures a coherent and consistent approach between the Criminal Code and the Act should prevail. It would not promote a harmonious interpretation of the statutes to find that a warrant under the Criminal Code automatically transforms a seizure-forfeiture under the Act into a matter for the Criminal Code. This would render the processes outlined in the Act inapplicable in any situation where there is a related Criminal Code investigation.
[54] Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by the Plaintiffs, it is well-established that a warrant under the Criminal Code is still valid even if a seizure occurs under another statute. In R. v Multiform Manufacturing Co., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 624 at 631 [Multiform], the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that, because the Criminal Code search warrant provisions (now s.487) indicate that they apply to the Criminal Code or “any Act of Parliament”
, a search warrant under the Criminal Code could authorize the RCMP to search and seize material under the Bankruptcy Act, even where the Bankruptcy Act had relevant inspection provisions, like the Act here.
[55] Accordingly here, the fact that the RCMP exercised a warrant under the Criminal Code does not mean that the seizure could not be authorized under the Act. Section 487 of the Criminal Code specifically provides that a warrant to enforce any Act of Parliament may be issued to an officer. The warrant obtained in this case was issued on the reasonable belief that the Plaintiffs had contravened s.32 of the Act. The warrant issued in respect of this reasonable belief was under s.487 of the Criminal Code. According to Multiform, this is proper.
[56] Further the provisions of the Act and the Criminal Code support this view. Although the Plaintiffs argue that the RCMP did not have a warrant under the Act to enter their dwelling, s. 260(4)(a) of the Act provides that a judge may issue a warrant authorizing an officer to enter a dwelling house if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the house is a place referred to in s.260(2)(a). Section 260(2)(a) provides that an officer may enter any place if there is a reasonable belief that there are items in the place “to which this Act applies.”
As noted above, the information upon which the warrant was obtained in this case disclosed a reasonable belief with respect to the Plaintiffs’ dwelling. Therefore, the process followed here met the requirements of ss. 260(2)(a) and 260(4)(a).
[57] Importantly, these provisions do not stipulate that the warrant must be issued under the Act warrant provisions. Rather, these provisions speak of a “warrant.”
Here, where the warrant discloses the reasonable belief under the Act, it authorizes the officer to enter the dwelling house. This interpretation is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s holding in Multiform.
[58] Additionally, section 489.1 of the Criminal Code provides that, on a filing of a report under that provision, the “thing”
seized is to be dealt with according to s.490, which generally provides that any seized items are preserved until the end of a proceeding or investigation. However, s.490 is expressly subject to any Act of Parliament, which makes it subject to the inspection, seizure, and forfeiture proceedings in the Excise Act. Accordingly, in this case, the provisions of the Act prevail.
[59] Based upon this analysis, I agree with the Defendant’s position that the Act applies to the Seized Funds and the Criminal Code warrant does not change this conclusion.
D. Do the provisions of the Excise Act oust the Court’s jurisdiction?
[60] Given my finding that the Act applies to the Seized Funds, the next consideration is whether the provisions of the Act, which provide a process for objections to seizures, operates so as to oust the jurisdiction of this Court to consider the Plaintiffs’ claim in this case.
[61] The evidence shows that the Plaintiffs received the Seizure Report which identified how they could file an objection to the seizure of the funds at issue. The Defendant filed evidence confirming that the Seizure Report was forwarded by registered mail to the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs do not dispute receiving the Seizure Report.
[62] The Seizure Report, titled “RCMP Seizure Report Excise Act, 2001”
states as follows:
If you wish to file an objection to this seizure and request a decision of the Minister of National Revenue, you must give notice in writing to the officer who seized the thing. This request must be filed within ninety days after the date of the seizure.
If you are past the ninety days for requesting a decision of the Minister, the Minister may, in exceptional circumstances, extend this time limit up to an additional year pursuant to section 272. In this respect, you must apply in writing to the Minister, outlining the reasons why your request for a decision was not filed within the ninety days set out in subsection 271.
[63] As indicated on the Seizure Report itself, the time frame for the Plaintiffs to object to the seizure was within 90 days of the seizure (being 2010-07-06). There is also the ability to request an extension of the objection time of up to one year in exceptional circumstances. In any event, the Plaintiffs did not avail themselves of the objection provisions within either the 90 day or 1 year timeframe.
[64] The question then is whether the existence of these objection provisions in the Act ousts this Court’s ability to consider the Plaintiffs’ claim for return of the Seized Funds outside of those provisions.
[65] Here in this action, the Plaintiffs rely upon s.17 of the Federal Courts Act. However s. 17(1) contains the language “[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament”
and confirms that Parliament has the ability through statutory language to oust the jurisdiction of the Court over certain matters.
[66] It is accepted that Parliament can also oust the jurisdiction of the courts in favour of an administrative decision-maker or tribunal (Bron v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ONCA 71 at para 29; Regina Police Assn. Inc. v Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14 at para 34 [Regina Police]).
[67] In determining whether Parliament intended another forum to resolve disputes, the Supreme Court in Regina Police, at para 39 said:
“[T]he key question in each case is whether the essential character of a dispute…arises either expressly or inferentially from a statutory scheme. In determining this question, a liberal interpretation of the legislation is required to ensure that a scheme is not offended by the conferral of jurisdiction on a forum not intended by the legislature.
[68] Although Regina Police related to labour arbitration, the need to determine the essential character of the dispute applies here nonetheless.
[69] Various provisions of the Act demonstrate that it is intended to provide a complete statutory code for the return of seized funds under the statute. The starting point is s.269 of the Act, which provides that a forfeiture under s.267 of the Act is not subject to review or “to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside, or otherwise dealt with except to the extent and in the manner provided under this Act.”
[70] This explicit language is tied to the multi-step statutory procedure outlined in the Act. Under that procedure, an individual who seeks to set aside a forfeiture must file a request to the Minister. The Minister then has the power to confirm the seizure.
[71] Taken together, s.269 and the Ministerial review provisions stand strongly against judicial interference.
[72] This conclusion is supported by Canada (Border Services Agency) v C.B. Powell Limited, 2010 FCA 61 at paras 28 and 29 [C.B. Powell] where the Federal Court of Appeal held that an aggrieved party must exhaust the administrative process before seeking judicial review. Justice Stratas wrote that:
[28] Under the Act, Parliament has established an administrative process of adjudications and appeals in this area. This administrative process consists of initial CBSA decisions or deemed assessments under section 58, further determinations by CBSA officials under section 59, additional determinations by the President of the CBSA under section 60 and appeals to the CITT under subsection 67(1). The courts are no part of this. Allowing the courts to become involved in this administrative process before it is completed would inject an alien element into Parliament’s design.
[29] In addition to designing an administrative process without courts, Parliament, for good measure, has gone further and has forbidden any judicial interference. At every stage of this administrative process, in subsections 58(3), 59(6) and 62, Parliament has specified that the only permissible reviews, re-determinations or appeals are found in the administrative process described in the Act….(emphasis added).
[73] In C.B. Powell, the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction because of the statutory provisions which “forbid judicial interference.”
In both the Customs Act provisions in C.B. Powell and the Act here, almost identical language is used by Parliament; namely, decisions under both statutes are not “subject to be restrained, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with.”
In C.B. Powell, that was enough for the Court to determine that the applicants, before seeking judicial review, should exhaust the administrative regime set up by Parliament. In C.B. Powell, the applicants did not directly challenge the jurisdiction of the Court. In this case, where the Defendant directly challenges the jurisdiction of the Court, the same considerations apply.
[74] Furthermore, the wording of s. 276(1) of the Act outlines the narrow conditions under which judicial review is permitted. Under that provision, subject to time limits, an applicant may appeal the Minister’s decision under the Act “by way of an action in the Federal Court in which the person is the plaintiff and the Minister is the defendant.”
[75] Section 276(1) coupled with the ouster language and the statutory process of review expressly provide when recourse to the Federal Court is permitted. The statutory interpretation maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (implied exclusion) applies here: that is, by including this limited right of appeal, and the ouster clause, the Court can conclude that Parliament did not intend aggrieved individuals under the Act to bypass Ministerial review by bringing a civil action in the Federal Court. While the implied exclusion rule cannot be the sole basis for interpreting a statute (Green v Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20 at para 37), here, the rule is consistent with a purposive interpretation of the Act and Parliament’s intent in establishing a statutory code for Ministerial review in light of the nature of forfeiture statutes outlined above.
[76] On these facts, these Plaintiffs seek the same remedy that they may have received had they followed the statutory process for review by the Minister. Considering that they failed to take recourse under those provisions, it would undermine Parliament’s intent to now allow the Plaintiffs to wait out the time-limits in the Act and seek the same remedy in the Federal Court they should have sought from the Minister.
[77] For these reasons, I find that the Act is a full answer to the Plaintiffs’ claim and by failing to take steps under the Act to object to the seizure within the timeframes outlined there is no genuine issue for trial respecting the Plaintiffs’ claim.
[78] Accordingly I am granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
VII. Other Relief Requested
[79] Given my findings above, it is not necessary that I address the other relief claimed by the parties.
VIII. Conclusion and Costs
[80] In the circumstances I am satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial. I therefore grant summary judgment in favour of the Defendant and dismiss the Plaintiffs’ action with costs payable by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant in the agreed upon amount of $3,000.00.
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