Docket: IMM-2581-17
Citation:
2018 FC 93
Ottawa, Ontario, January 30, 2018
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
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BETWEEN:
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SALMAN HERSI
ABDI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
Institutional memory and rapidly-changing
information, inherent to the knowledge of a specialized tribunal, is the very
reason for the existence of such a tribunal. An assessment of credibility,
specified in each case as based on respective country-condition information
packages and accumulated knowledge, stems from hundreds of pages in each
respective binder, public document information-requests, continuously scheduled
professional training to build and enhance an understanding of country-specific
history, ethnic groups, religion or religions, customs, traditions, geography,
politics, economics -- re the standard of living, hierarchy of government
structures, official and unofficial government associations or groupings, as
well as any other associations, military or paramilitary groups and rival
factions, if any.
Thus, a specialized knowledge of an
encyclopedia of references, a dictionary of terms and a gallery of portraits,
(in addition to an assessment of reliability of reports, originating from the
country, itself, as well as other countries, in addition to that of
non-governmental and governmental organizations), is one of gathered experience
to which jurisdiction is given for that very reason.
This Court does not pretend, nor purport, to
possess such knowledge. […] Specialized tribunals are established for cogent
practical reasons to ensure that members of an administrative tribunal entity
become a professional cadre of specialists. Such specialization or expertise is
no different than that of a trained cadre of technical safety experts for any
specialized industry for which expert tribunals exist (more often understood in
such a context than the present one but nevertheless no different).
Specialization in such areas does not lend itself to general knowledge but
rather to institutional memory, information and training in which context such
specialized tribunals are established and mandated by legislation. Judges are
not trained, nor jurisdictionally equipped for that intricate specialized,
mandated purpose for which reliance on the specialized tribunal itself is
legislated.
Therefore, all this Court can do, is
consider a judicial review and, when appropriate, dissect the matter into a
certified question from proceedings in that regard, but the whole, if requiring
reassessment, can only be returned to the expertise of the specialized tribunal
from whence it originated; thus, a judicial review consideration must, of
course, not transform itself into a specialized appeal nor render a judgment as
if it was.
(Zheng v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2007 FC 673 at para 1 [Zheng].)
[1]
The reason the Court returns this case to the
RPD for its consideration anew is due to, out of context, erroneously
considered evidence, as discussed below in the judgment.
II.
Nature of the Matter
[2]
This is an application for judicial review filed
pursuant to subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
SC 2001, c-27 [IRPA] of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of
the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada [Board], dated May 18, 2017,
in which the RPD dismissed the refugee claim by concluding that the Applicant
is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection within the
meaning of sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA.
III.
Facts
[3]
The Applicant, aged 20 years old, claims to be a
citizen of Somalia from the city of Mogadishu.
[4]
The Applicant claims to be a part of the Hawiye
sub-clan of the Murusade clan.
[5]
The Applicant lived in Mogadishu until
June 5, 2009, and then fled to Kenya with his family (parents and two
siblings) due to the civil war in Somalia. They lived in Dhadaab refugee camp
in Kenya. The Applicant then moved to Nairobi to live with his cousin.
[6]
The Applicant fears persecution in Somalia
because of the Al-Shabaab. He claims to have experienced discrimination by
certain groups and the police in Kenya both of whom disliked Somalis due to
Al-Shabaab. In June 2014, the Applicant allegedly was stabbed in the thigh by
an individual, during a Kenyan anti-Somali refugee demonstration.
[7]
On November 19, 2015, the Applicant decided
to move back to Mogadishu. His family had already returned to Mogadishu in
March 2015, following his father’s passing away on February 2, 2015. The
Applicant allegedly told his friends in Mogadishu about the incidents in Kenya
due to Al-Shabaab attacks. The next day, he claims to have received a telephone
call from an unknown person who threatened him if he continued to speak
disparagingly about the Al-Shabaab.
[8]
On November 25, 2015, the Applicant returned
to Kenya. Due to the Kenyan government’s plans to return refugees to Somalia,
he felt he was now unsafe in Kenya, and, therefore obtained a false passport
and successfully arrived in the U.S.A., on November 17, 2016.
[9]
On February 28, 2017, the Applicant applied
for refugee protection at the Canada-U.S. border, claiming that he fears
President Trump’s ban on refugees. The Applicant has been residing in Canada
ever since.
IV.
Decision
[10]
On May 18, 2017, the RPD rejected the
Applicant’s refugee claim. It was not satisfied that a serious possibility
existed for the Applicant to be persecuted, or that he would be personally
subjected to a risk to his life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if he were to return to Somalia.
[11]
Specifically, the panel made determinations on
the following issues: credibility, identity and internal flight alternative
[IFA]. The RPD accepted that the Applicant is ethnically Somalian, but did not
find that the Applicant had established that he had not obtained another nationality,
such as Kenyan. The RPD noted in its reasons the Applicant had the duty to
provide acceptable documents in order to establish his identity. Although the
RPD accepted that the Applicant lived in Kenya prior to his entry into the United
States, it was not convinced that the Applicant had not received another
nationality in Kenya.
[12]
The panel made a negative inference on the
Applicant’s credibility, as he had testified during the hearing that he had no
knowledge of his status in Kenya. The Board indicated in its reasons that the
Applicant could have asked his mother about his status in Kenya, or asked the
Kenyan authorities but did not. The panel also found that the Applicant lacked
credibility and plausibility as to the incident in 2015, when an individual
allegedly contacted him by telephone and threatened him for acting as a spy for
the Somali or Kenyan government. The panel found that the Applicant embellished
the information so that his claim would have merit.
[13]
Finally, in assessing whether a viable IFA
exists, the panel considered the claimant’s membership in a majority clan, the
Hawiye clan, and did not find that he would be persecuted in Mogadishu. The
panel then noted that the Applicant has family living in Mogadishu and there
was no mention that his family members had been targeted by the Al-Shabaab in
Mogadishu. The panel did take into account that the Applicant might be
perceived as westernized upon his return to Somalia; however, the panel
concluded that the Applicant would not be a target for Al-Shabaab as a “government spy” or a youth, because it indicated that
the Al-Shabaab did not control areas such as Mogadishu; furthermore, given the
fact that the claimant’s family resides in Mogadishu, the panel did not find
that he would have difficulty in finding employment or housing in Mogadishu.
V.
Issues
[14]
This matter raises the following issues:
1.
Did the RPD breach its duty of natural justice
by failing to provide notice to the Applicant before considering the issue of
IFA?
2.
Did the RPD render a reasonable decision, in its
identity, credibility and IFA findings?
[15]
The Court finds that the applicable standard of
review with regard to the first issue is that of correctness. The right to
notice is an issue of procedural fairness in order for the Board to identify
for the applicant what it considers to be the potentially determinative issues
in a refugee hearing (Turton v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 1244 at para 25; Gomes v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2006 FC 419 at para 7).
[16]
As for the second issue, whether the Applicant
has established a well-founded fear of persecution is a question of mixed fact
and law reviewable on a standard of reasonableness. The standard of
reasonableness also applies to the RPD’s identity, credibility, as well as
available state protection findings (Csonka v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 1056 at para 56 [Csonka]; Bazelais v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 316 at para 36). Therefore, the
Court may only intervene if the RPD's reasons are not justified, transparent or
intelligible. To satisfy this standard, a decision must fall in the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008
CSC 9 at para 47 [Dunsmuir]).
VI.
Relevant Provisions
[17]
Section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the IRPA
state:
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Convention refugee
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Définition de « réfugié »
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96. A Convention refugee is a person
who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
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96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
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(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and is
unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
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a) soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et
ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de
chacun de ces pays;
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(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of
their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to return to that country.
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b) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays
dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette
crainte, ne veut y retourner.
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Person in need of protection
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Personne à protéger
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97. (1) A person in need of protection
is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
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97. (1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
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(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of
torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
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a) soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire,
d’être soumise à la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention
contre la torture;
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(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment if
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b) soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou
peines cruels et inusités dans le cas suivant :
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(i) the person is unable or, because of
that risk, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country,
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(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut
se réclamer de la protection de ce pays,
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(ii) the risk would be faced by the person
in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals
in or from that country,
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(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce
pays alors que d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent
ne le sont généralement pas,
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(iii) the risk is not inherent or
incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted
international standards, and
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(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte
pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes
internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
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(iv) the risk is not caused by the
inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care.
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(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas
de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
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(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
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(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est
reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
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VII.
Submissions of the Parties
A.
Submissions of the Applicant
[18]
According to the Applicant, the RPD breached its
duty of natural justice by failing to provide notice to the Applicant that an
IFA would be considered. The Applicant did not have the opportunity to address
the issue of IFA during the course of the hearing. At the outset of the
hearing, the Applicant submits that the RPD did not identify the issue of IFA,
and the Applicant was neither asked any questions throughout the hearing
regarding IFA, nor was he asked questions about Mogadishu as a potential safe
location (Certified Tribunal Record [CTR], Transcript, pp 256-257). It is also
noted that before oral submissions, counsel was not notified either by the RPD
on the issue of state protection.
[19]
It is further submitted that the RPD erred by
stating that Mogadishu could be an IFA location for the Applicant. In fact, the
RPD ignored documentary evidence of unsafe conditions in that city. The RPD
erred by indicating in its reasons that “Al-Shabaab in
Mogadishu does not generally target the general population but targets
politicians, journalists, police and security forces” (RPD’s Reasons and
Decision, para 43). The Applicant submits that documentary evidence emanating
from the RPD that contradicted this finding does in fact, exist.
[20]
The Applicant also argues that the RPD’s
analysis was microscopic in nature. For example, the RPD did not give weight to
a letter from the Applicant’s school in Kenya because it did not have a school
identification number. Not only is this finding called into question, but the
RPD focused on minor details in finding errors. “This
Court has held that the Board should not focus on a few points of error: Attakora,
supra” (Dong v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2010 FC 55 at para 27 [Dong]), but rather view a case in its entirety. “The result is an impermissible microscopic analysis of the
evidence” (Dong, above, at para 27).
[21]
It is further submitted that the RPD’s identity
finding on expectations and assumptions regarding the Applicant’s lack of
documentation in Kenya are inconsistent with the documentary evidence,
suggesting that the Board ignored the objective evidence. The documentary
evidence clearly indicates that many Somalis in Kenya are unregistered or
undocumented, and not all refugees had access to identity documents due to
distribution problems. For these reasons, it is submitted that the Board erred
by imposing an unreasonable burden of proof on the Applicant, based on the
objective evidence, in order to determine his refugee status, not recognizing
the challenges in obtaining bona fide documents in Somalia as clearly specified
in the country conditions.
[22]
Finally, on the issue of credibility, the
Applicant argues that the Board must consider all aspects of the claim, even if
some aspects are not credible. The Board must also not reach a conclusion that
is inconsistent with the preponderance of relevant evidence (Salamat v
Canada (Immigration Appeal Board), [1989] FCJ No 213 (QL); Xu v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 810 (QL); Djama
v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 531 (QL)).
B.
Submissions of the Respondent
[23]
The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that
the RPD did not breach the duty of natural justice, as notice was not required.
The onus rests on the Applicant to provide all relevant evidence to demonstrate
that an IFA would not be available, especially when the availability of an IFA
is inherent in the definition of Convention refugee or person in need of
protection. As for the reasonableness of the IFA finding, the Respondent
submits that the onus rests with the Applicant to show that he did not have an
IFA. The documentary evidence, to which reference is made by the Applicant in
his Memorandum of Argument, does not support that Al-Shabaab targeted a
specific individual with the Applicant’s profile. Therefore, the Board did not
err by finding that there was no evidence indicating that it would be
unreasonable for the Applicant to reside in Mogadishu, given his profile (age,
majority clan).
[24]
The Respondent also submits that the RPD did not
err in its credibility and identity findings. According to the IRPA and its
Regulations, the Respondent argues that a lack of acceptable documents without
a reasonable explanation for their absence, or the failure to take reasonable
steps to obtain them, is a significant factor in assessing the credibility of a
claimant.
[25]
It was also reasonable for the RPD not to give
weight to the letter from the Applicant’s school to establish his identity.
According to the Respondent, the letter simply stated that the Applicant
attended the school in Kenya.
[26]
Finally, it was reasonable for the RPD to find
that the Applicant’s failure to claim asylum in the United States and his delay
in coming to Canada undermined his subjective fear. The Applicant’s
explanations in this regard were also implausible.
C.
Reply
[27]
The Applicant reiterates that it is a requirement
to give a notice for IFA.
[T]here is an onus on the Minister and the
Board to warn the claimant if an IFA is going to be raised. […] Therefore,
neither the Minister nor the Refugee Division may spring the allegation of an
IFA upon a complainant without notice that an IFA will be in issue at the
hearing.
(Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 (QL) at para 10 [Thirunavukkarasu].)
[A] claimant is not to be expected to raise
the question of an IFA nor is an allegation that none exists simply to be
inferred from the claim itself. The question must be expressly raised at the
hearing by the refugee hearing officer or the Board and the claimant afforded
the opportunity to address it with evidence and argument. [Emphasis added
by the Applicant.]
(Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706 (QL) at para 9 [Rasaratnam].)
[28]
The Applicant also states that the Respondent
misrepresented the Applicant’s submission by claiming that the documentary
evidence did not indicate that Al-Shabaab targeted specific individuals with
the Applicant’s profile. The Applicant replies that it was simply incorrect for
the RPD, a specialized tribunal, to assert that Al-Shabaab does not target the
general population in Mogadishu, but only politicians, journalists and security
forces. If, but for this reason, by ignoring objective evidence, it clearly
contradicted the documentary evidence.
VIII.
Analysis
[29]
For the following reasons, the application for judicial
review is granted.
A.
Did the RPD breach its duty of natural justice
by failing to provide notice to the Applicant before considering the issue of
IFA?
[30]
The Court finds that the RPD breached its duty
of natural justice by failing to give the Applicant an opportunity to provide
evidence regarding the issue of IFA. The Federal Court of Appeal has held that “[a] refugee claimant enjoys the benefit of the principles of
natural justice in hearings before the Refugee Division” (Thirunavukkarasu,
above, at para 10). The Court agrees with the Applicant’s submissions in his
Reply indicating that:
[The] right to notice of the case against
the claimant is acutely important where the claimant may be called upon to
provide evidence to show that no valid IFA exists in response to an allegation
by the Minister. Therefore, neither the Minister nor the Refugee Division may
spring the allegation of an IFA upon a complainant without notice that an IFA
will be in issue at the hearing.
(Thirunavukkarasu, above, at para 10.)
[31]
Given that the RPD found that the Applicant
would not risk persecution if he returned to Somalia, the RPD neither provided
notice to the Applicant before the hearing nor did it mention the question of
an IFA during the hearing in order to give the Applicant the opportunity to
provide evidence for his refugee claim. While the onus rests on the Applicant, “a claimant is not to be expected to raise the question of an
IFA nor is an allegation that none exists simply to be inferred from the claim
itself. The question must be expressly raised at the hearing by the refugee
hearing officer or the Board and the claimant afforded the opportunity
to address it with evidence and argument.” (Rasaratnam, above,
at para 9.) [Emphasis added.]
B.
Did the RPD render a reasonable decision, in its
identity, credibility and IFA findings?
Institutional memory and rapidly-changing
information, inherent to the knowledge of a specialized tribunal, is the very
reason for the existence of such a tribunal. An assessment of credibility,
specified in each case as based on respective country-condition information
packages and accumulated knowledge, stems from hundreds of pages in each
respective binder, public document information-requests, continuously scheduled
professional training to build and enhance an understanding of country-specific
history, ethnic groups, religion or religions, customs, traditions, geography,
politics, economics -- re the standard of living, hierarchy of government
structures, official and unofficial government associations or groupings, as
well as any other associations, military or paramilitary groups and rival
factions, if any.
Thus, a specialized knowledge of an
encyclopedia of references, a dictionary of terms and a gallery of portraits,
(in addition to an assessment of reliability of reports, originating from the
country, itself, as well as other countries, in addition to that of
non-governmental and governmental organizations), is one of gathered experience
to which jurisdiction is given for that very reason.
This Court does not pretend, nor purport, to
possess such knowledge. […] Specialized tribunals are established for cogent
practical reasons to ensure that members of an administrative tribunal entity
become a professional cadre of specialists. Such specialization or expertise is
no different than that of a trained cadre of technical safety experts for any
specialized industry for which expert tribunals exist (more often understood in
such a context than the present one but nevertheless no different). Specialization
in such areas does not lend itself to general knowledge but rather to
institutional memory, information and training in which context such
specialized tribunals are established and mandated by legislation. Judges are
not trained, nor jurisdictionally equipped for that intricate specialized,
mandated purpose for which reliance on the specialized tribunal itself is
legislated.
Therefore, all this Court can do, is
consider a judicial review and, when appropriate, dissect the matter into a
certified question from proceedings in that regard, but the whole, if requiring
reassessment, can only be returned to the expertise of the specialized tribunal
from whence it originated; thus, a judicial review consideration must, of
course, not transform itself into a specialized appeal nor render a judgment as
if it was.
(Zheng, above, at para 1.)
[32]
The Court finds that the RPD’s decision is
unreasonable on its credibility, identity and IFA findings because the panel
ignored the objective evidence and did not assess the evidence correctly. In
order to establish if a well-founded fear of persecution exists, the RPD must
consider the subjective and objective elements. “Both
subjective fear and objective fear are components in respect of a valid claim
for refugee status” (Csonka, above, at para 3). Although the
decision may very well be the same if it is remitted for redetermination, the
RPD, a specialized and knowledgeable tribunal, had to make an appropriate
assessment of the objective evidence and evaluate the evidence before it as a
whole and in depth. The RPD gave a poor assessment of the country condition
evidence that was before the panel and thus failed to view the Applicant’s
story in the context of the relevant background situation.
38. To the element of fear – a state of mind
and a subjective condition – is added the qualification “well-founded”. This
implies that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned that
determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by
an objective situation. The term “well-founded fear” therefore contains a
subjective and an objective element, and in determining whether well-founded
fear exists, both elements must be taken into consideration.
42. As regards the objective element, it is
necessary to evaluate the statements made by the applicant. The competent
authorities that are called upon to determine refugee status are not required
to pass judgement on conditions in the applicant’s country of origin. The
applicant’s statements cannot, however, be considered in the abstract, and must
be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation. A
knowledge of conditions in the applicant’s country of origin –while not a
primary objective – is an important element in assessing the applicant’s
credibility. In general, the applicant’s fear should be considered
well-founded if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that his continued
stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons
stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be intolerable if he
returned there.
(Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and
Criteria for determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR 1979 [Handbook].) [Emphasis
added.]
[33]
The RPD gave an incomplete assessment of the
country condition evidence that was before the panel, and therefore, failed to
view the Applicant’s narrative in the context of the relevant background
situation as per the documentary evidence when read in its entirety for nuances
which states the opposite of that which was stated by the RPD, in its decision,
wherein it cannot be said that the Al-Shabaab are non-existent in Mogadishu:
1.2.8 These operations have caused
hundreds of civilian casualties, including women and children and foreigners.
1.2.11 Al-Shabaab also reportedly continues
to commit grave abuses against civilians such as killings of prominent peace
activists, community leaders, clan elders, and their family members for their
role in peace-building, and beheadings of people accused of-spying for” and
collaborating with Somali national forces and affiliated militias.
1.2.40 […] However, killings take place
from time to time in Mogadishu, and the overall context in Somalia is still
fragile, in spite of the security improvements and progresses that have been
made since August 2011.
(CTR, in the NDP for Somalia (31 March
2017), item 1.3, United Kingdom. Home Office, Country Information and Guidance:
Somalia, April 2014, pp 122-123 and 133.)
[34]
The RPD erred by finding that “Al Shabaab in Mogadishu does not generally target the
general population but targets politicians, journalists, police and security
forces” (RPD’s Reasons and Decision, para 43). This finding is erroneous
to the objective evidence on country conditions on file:
Al-Shabaab carried out indiscriminate and
lethal attacks in heavily guarded areas of Mogadishu and other towns, killing
or injuring hundreds of civilians. High-profile targets remained vulnerable to
such attacks.
[…]
Targeting of civilians
Civilians were also directly targeted in
attacks, especially by al-Shabaab fighters and clan militias. On 15 June,
al-Shabaab fighters fired mortars into densely populated areas of Mogadishu;
[…]
In addition, al-Shabaab continued to torture
and extrajudicially kill people they accused of spying or not conforming to its
interpretation of Islamic law. The group killed people in public, including
beheading and stoning, and carried out amputations and floggings, especially in
areas from which AMISOM had withdrawn.
(CTR, in the National Documentation Package
for Somalia [NDP] (31 March 2017), Amnesty International Report 2016/17 on
Somalia, p 239.)
Al-Shabaab continued to kill civilians. The
killings included al-Shabaab’s execution of persons it accused of spying for
and collaborating with the FGS, Somali national forces, and affiliated
militias.
(CTR, in the NDP for Somalia (31 March
2017), item 2.1, United States. Department of State, Somalia. Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices for 2016, 3 March 2017, p 168.)
[35]
The RPD also made a negative inference on the
Applicant’s identity:
Identity was identified at the outset as a
critical issue in the hearing. Identity is a determinative issue. The onus is
on a claimant to prove his identity. This claimant has failed to establish his
identity and failed to produce his passport. The panel finds, on a balance of
probabilities, that it does not establish his personal identity, nor his
identity as a citizen of Somalia. The panel finds that the claimant has not established,
on a balance of probabilities, that he is not a citizen of Kenya.
(RPD’s Reasons and Decision, para 37.)
[36]
The objective evidence mentions that Somali
refugees staying in Dadaab camp in Kenya feared to return to Somalia after the
Kenyan government announced a repatriation program. The Applicant claimed not to
know his status in Kenya because Somalis faced involuntary return to Somalia:
Kenya’s repatriation program for Somali
refugees, fueled by fear and misinformation, does not meet international standards
for voluntary refugee return. Many refugees living in Kenya’s sprawling Dadaab
camp, home to at least 263,000 Somalis, say they have agreed to return home
because they fear Kenya will force them out if they stay.
[…]
Some Somalis who agreed to return to Somalia
after spending years as refugees in Dadaab have fled back to Kenya a second
time because of ongoing violence and lack of basic services in Somalia. Human
Rights Watch found that newly arrived Somali asylum seekers and refugees who
were not able to re-establish themselves in Somalia are being denied access to
refugee registration or asylum procedures in Dadaab. This leaves them without
legal status and food rations.
[…]
“The Kenyan authorities are not giving
Somali refugees a real choice between staying and leaving, and the UN refugee
agency isn’t giving people accurate information about security conditions in
Somalia”, said Bill Frelick, refugee rights director at Human Rights Watch.
“There is no way these returns can be considered voluntary”.
[…]
Intimidation by Kenyan Government
Officials
Refugees and asylum seekers consistently
told Human Rights Watch that the Kenyan government officials are putting direct
and indirect pressure on them to return to Somalia.
(CTR, in the NDP for Somalia (31 March
2017), Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to Somalia, April 17, 2017, pp
242-243, 247.)
[37]
The RPD did not find it would be objectively
unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect the claimant to return to Mogadishu
because Al Shabaab did not control Mogadishu. The documentary evidence,
however, indicates the following:
1.2.23 […] Regardless of the recent gains
of the government, al-Shabab remains in control of large parts of rural areas,
and of much of south and central Somalia.
1.2.28 In a June 2013 bulletin, UNOCHA
reported that the security situation in southern and central Somalia remained
volatile and unpredictable.
1.2.42 Amnesty considered in a September
2013 briefing that:
Security improvements in Mogadishu have been
extremely limited in scope. The security situation is volatile with varying
intensity between areas and times of day, and has deteriorated during the
course of 2013 … In Mogadishu there is ongoing violence through both
indiscriminate and targeted attacks. Civilians continue to face extreme insecurity,
characterized by physical violence, killings, rape and extortion.
(CTR, in the NDP for Somalia (31 March
2017), item 1.3, United Kingdom. Home Office, Country Information and Guidance:
Somalia, April 2014, pp 127-128 and 134.)
6.2.12 The UNHCR further considered in its
position paper of January 2014 with regards to Southern and Central Somalia
that
[…]
‘In relation to consideration of IFA/IRA for
Somalis fleeing persecution or serious harm by Al-Shabaab, protection from the
State is generally not available in Mogadishu even though the city is under
control of government forces supported by AMISOM troops. This applies in
particular to Somalis who can be presumed to be on Al-Shabaab‘s hit list‘
(Supplementary Tribunal Record, in the NDP
for Somalia (31 March 2017), item 1.3, United Kingdom. Home Office, Country
Information and Guidance: Somalia, April 2014, pp 81-82.)
[38]
The Court concludes that the RPD failed to give
a complete assessment of the Applicant’s fear of persecution in Somalia, given
the country condition binder before the Board, which, in fact emanates from the
Board.
53. In addition, an applicant may have been
subjected to various measures not in themselves amounting to persecution (e.g.
discrimination in different forms), in some cases combined with other adverse
factors (e.g. general atmosphere of insecurity in the country of origin). In
such situations, the various elements involved may, if taken together, produce
an effect on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to
well-founded fear of persecution on “cumulative grounds”. Needless to say, it
is not possible to lay down a general rule as to what cumulative reasons can
give rise to a valid claim to refugee status. This will necessarily depend
on all the circumstances, including the particular geographical, historical and
ethnological context. [Emphasis added.]
(Handbook.)
[39]
Finally, in the alternative, even if the RPD did
not find that the claimant would be at risk if he were to return to Somalia, it
also considered whether a viable IFA exists in order to relocate the Applicant to
Mogadishu. The RPD indicated the following in its reasons:
Thus, the only thing is that the claimant
lived outside of Somalia could be perceived as westernized. Again, the
documents indicate that in Al Shabaab controlled areas this would be a problem,
however this is not the issue in Mogadishu. Thus, the panel finds the claim
would not be targeted either by Al Shabaab as a “government spy” as he alleged
or for other reasons, such as being “westernized” or a youth.
(RPD’s Reasons and Decision, para 43.)
[40]
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the
RPD’s decision does not fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law (Dunsmuir, above, at
para 47).
IX.
Conclusion
[41]
The Application for judicial review is granted.