Dockets: IMM-1075-17
IMM-1076-17
Citation:
2018 FC 31
Ottawa, Ontario, January 17, 2018
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Simpson
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
RASHAD AMAL
JOLLY
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicant has applied for judicial review of
two decisions. The lead file is IMM‑1075-17. Therein the Applicant
challenges a decision given orally by the Immigration and Refugee Board,
Immigration Division, dated February 28, 2017, in which a member of the
Division [the Member] found the Applicant to be inadmissible to Canada pursuant
to section 36(1)(b) of the Immigration, Refugee and Protection Act,
SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] on the grounds of serious criminality [the Inadmissibility
Decision]. The second file is IMM-1076-17. Therein the Applicant challenges a
decision of an immigration officer, dated March 1, 2017, finding the
Applicant’s claim for protection ineligible for referral to the Refugee
Protection Division [RPD] pursuant to section 101(1)(f) of the IRPA [the
Ineligibility Decision]. The Respondent has agreed that both applications
should be considered and dealt with together. A related PRRA application is
being held in abeyance. The applications are brought pursuant to subsection
72(1) of the IRPA.
I.
Orders Sought
[2]
The Applicant seeks an order setting the Inadmissibility
Decision aside and remitting the matter back for redetermination by a different
Member of the Immigration Division. The Applicant submits and I agree that if
the Inadmissibility Decision is set aside, it follows that the Ineligibility
Decision will also be set aside.
[3]
The Respondent seeks amendments to the style of
cause to show the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration as the sole
respondent on each file.
II.
Background
[4]
The Applicant is a 31 year-old citizen of the
Bahamas. In 2007, while in the Bahamas, he was involved in a car accident in
which he hit and killed an oncoming motorcyclist. The Applicant pled guilty and
was convicted of ‘Killing in the course of dangerous driving’ [the Conviction] under
section 44(1) of the Bahamian Road Traffic Act, LRO 1/2006, Chapter 220
[the RTA]. The Applicant was initially sentenced to pay $2,500.00 (Bahamian
dollars) to the college the victim had attended. However, on appeal, the Applicant
received a final sentence of twelve days of community service.
[5]
On December 13, 2016, the Applicant entered
Canada and at the Port of Entry stated his intention to make a claim for
refugee protection based on his sexual orientation. The Applicant disclosed the
Conviction. Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] contacted the High Commission of
the Bahamas and was advised that offences under the RTA are not criminal. The
High Commission produced a copy of the Applicant’s Bahamian criminal record which
confirmed that the Applicant “has not been convicted of
a criminal offence in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.”
III.
Relevant Legislation
A.
Canada
[6]
The Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46
[the Criminal Code] :
|
249 (1) Every one
commits an offence who operates
|
249 (1) Commet
une infraction quiconque conduit, selon le
cas :
|
|
(a) a motor
vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the
circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the place at which
the motor vehicle is being operated and the amount of traffic that at the
time is or might reasonably be expected to be at that place;
|
a) un véhicule à
moteur d’une façon dangereuse pour le public, eu égard aux circonstances, y
compris la nature et l’état du lieu, l’utilisation qui en est faite ainsi que
l’intensité de la circulation à ce moment ou raisonnablement prévisible dans
ce lieu;
|
|
[…]
|
[…]
|
|
(4) Everyone who
commits an offence under subsection (1) and thereby causes the death of any
other person is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
|
(4) Quiconque
commet une infraction mentionnée au paragraphe (1) et cause ainsi la mort
d’une autre personne est coupable d’un acte criminel et passible d’un
emprisonnement maximal de quatorze ans.
|
B.
The Bahamas
[7]
The Road Traffic Act, LRO 1/2006, Chapter
220, assent September 18, 1958:
44.(1) Any person who causes the death of
another person by the driving of a motor vehicle on a road recklessly or at a
speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the
circumstances of the case, including the nature, condition and use of the road,
and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might
reasonably be expected to be, on the road, shall be guilty of an offence an
shall be liable on conviction therefor on information in the Supreme Court to a
fine not less than five thousand dollars but not exceeding ten thousand dollars
or to imprisonment for a term of four years, or to both the fine and imprisonment.
(2) Section 18 of the Coroners Act shall
apply to an offence under this section as it applies to murder, manslaughter or
infanticide.
45.(1) If any person drives a motor vehicle
on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the
public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the
nature, condition and use of the road, and to the amount of traffic which
actually is at the time, or which might reasonably be expected to be on the
highway, he shall be liable on summary conviction therefor to a fine of five
thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term of one year, or to both the fine
and imprisonment.
(2) Where a person is convicted of aiding,
abetting, counselling or procuring, or inciting the commission of an offence
under this section, and it is proved that he was present in the vehicle at the
time of the commission of the offence, the offence of which he is convicted
shall, for the purpose of the provisions of this Act relating to
disqualification for holding or obtaining licences, be deemed to be an offence
in connection with the driving of a motor vehicle.
46. If any person drives a vehicle on a road
without due care and attention or without reasonable consideration for other
persons using the road, he shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary
conviction therefor to a fine of two hundred dollars.
C.
Mens Rea
[8]
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the
requirement for mens rea in section 249(4) of the Criminal Code is
elevated in the sense that the section only applies in situations where there
is a marked departure from the standard of care which a reasonable person would
have exercised in the same circumstances; see R v Roy, 2012 SCC 26 at
para 36.
[9]
In Canada, the fact that section 249(4) of the
Criminal Code has an elevated requirement for mens rea is not apparent
from the wording of the section. It is necessary to look at the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decisions to discover the nature of the mens rea element of
the offence. Regarding the Bahamas, the Minister did not offer the Member any
case law or expert testimony about the mens rea required for a
conviction under s 44 of the RTA. All the Member was given was the text of
sections 44 – 47 of the RTA.
IV.
The Inadmissibility Decision
[10]
The issue before the Member was whether the Conviction
was equivalent to “Dangerous operation causing death”
under section 249(4) of the Criminal Code.
[11]
The Member noted that in Hill v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1987), 73 NR 315, [1987] FCJ No
47, the Federal Court of Appeal explained there are three ways to assess the
equivalence of an offence:
[…] first, by a comparison of the precise
wording in each statute both through documents and, if available, through the
evidence of an expert or experts in the foreign law and determining therefrom
the essential ingredients of the respective offences. Two, by examining the
evidence adduced before the adjudicator, both oral and documentary, to
ascertain whether or not that evidence was sufficient to establish that the
essential ingredients of the offence in Canada had been proven in the foreign
proceedings, whether precisely described in the initiating documents or in the
statutory provisions in the same words or not. Third, by a combination of one
and two. [my emphasis]
[12]
The Member compared the wording of the offence
in section 44(1) of the RTA with the wording of section 249(4) of the Criminal
Code. The Member found that the wording is almost identical, and then
concluded:
I find that if comparing statute to statute
that these are indeed equal and all of the same elements or ingredients are in
both, that none is broader than another and that therefore the two are equal
for the purpose of this case.
[13]
Later the Member repeated this conclusion in the
following terms:
In this case, given that the wording is
almost identical, both statutes cover the same areas, elements, or ingredients.
Neither is broader than the other and I do
not read the case law in such a way to show that if there are tests required
beyond the statutes in a different level of court or different grounds to be
met based on the court system or previous case law that these need all be taken
into consideration, otherwise simple statute to statute which is number one
would not be one of the standard methods of equivalency.
[14]
Finally the Member concluded that:
There was an option for the authorities [in
the Bahamas] to downgrade the charge but they proceeded with section 44.
Therefore, I must find that deducing
equivalency from the wording of the statute from country to country is the most
suitable and adequate method.
[15]
The Member appears to have understood that the
case law in Canada establishes an elevated standard for mens rea in
cases of dangerous driving causing death under the Criminal Code section 249(4).
However she seems to indicate that the case law is not relevant to her analysis
because it can be based solely on the wording of the statutes.
[16]
In spite of concluding the elevated mens rea
requirement established by the Supreme Court of Canada was not relevant, the
Member appears to have inferred that a comparable requirement existed under
section 44 of the RTA because a lesser charge was available and was not laid.
In my view, this inference is not reasonable and the Member should have been
provided with case law or expert evidence to show how mens rea is
treated under section 44 of the RTA.
V.
Conclusion
[17]
The Member’s failure to identify the essential
elements of the offences, the inference she drew about the degree of mens
rea required under the RTA and her rejection of the relevance of Canadian
case law make the Inadmissibility Decision unreasonable.
[18]
For these reasons the application will be
allowed.
VI.
Certified Question
[19]
Neither party posed a question for certification
for appeal.