Docket: T-381-14
Citation:
2017 FC 416
[ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, May 11, 2017
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Gagné
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BETWEEN:
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VIOLATOR NO. 10
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Appellant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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PUBLIC JUDGMENT AND REASONS
(Confidential Judgment and Reasons issued
on April 27, 2017)
I.
Nature of the matter
[1]
This is an appeal filed under the Proceeds of
Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, SC 2000, c 17 [the
Act] in which Violator no. 10 seeks to have varied, set aside or vacated a
decision rendered on January 10, 2014, by the deputy director of the Financial
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada [FINTRAC]. The deputy
director concluded that the appellant had committed three violations of the Act
and assessed a total administrative monetary penalty of $||||||||||||||.
[2]
For the following reasons, I find that the
deputy director’s conclusions as to the commission of violations are reasonable
and should not be set aside. However, the decision-making process leading to
imposition of the administrative penalties lacks justification, transparency
and intelligibility such that the penalties assessed are unreasonable and
should be subject to reassessment by FINTRAC.
II.
Facts
A.
Procedural framework
[3]
FINTRAC was established under section 41 of
the Act with the objective of facilitating the detection and prevention of
money laundering and terrorist financing. To this end, FINTRAC collects and
analyzes information concerning entities listed in the Act that perform
financial transactions. The Act imposes certain obligations on them, and
FINTRAC is responsible for overseeing compliance with these obligations.
[4]
These reporting entities, the appellant being
among them, are listed in section 5 of the Act. They are required to put
in place certain mechanisms and programs with respect to recordkeeping,
verifying identity and reporting of suspicious transactions (Part I of the
Act). Section 62 provides that FINTRAC may take measures to ensure
compliance with the Act and examine the records and activities of prescribed
entities.
[5]
Under subsection 73.13(2) of the Act,
FINTRAC may, if it believes on reasonable grounds that a violation has been
committed, issue a notice of violation setting out the facts of the violation
and the penalty that FINTRAC intends to impose. The entity examined may then
submit representations to the director concerning the facts alleged and
penalties to be assessed.
[6]
If representations are submitted, then the
director of FINTRAC determines, on a balance of probabilities, whether the Act
has been violated. If applicable, he or she then determines whether a penalty
should be assessed and sets the amount thereof.
B.
Background
[7]
Violator no. 10 is |||||||||||||||| within the meaning of
the regulations and ||||||||||||||||||||
of the Act.
[8]
In a letter dated March 15, 2012, FINTRAC
informed the violator that its establishments would be subject to a compliance
review to determine whether the program in place met legislative requirements
with respect to reporting, recordkeeping and verifying the identities of
clients.
[9]
According to the letter, the review would take
place in the appellant’s |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| between May 1
and 11, 2012, and cover the period between July 1 and December 31, 2011.
[10]
Following the review, FINTRAC conducted a
closing interview, during which any problems identified during the review were
explained to the appellant, which had the opportunity to ask questions and make
comments.
[11]
The appellant was advised of the results of the
review by letter dated November 16, 2012. Four problems were identified.
[12]
In January 2013, the appellant wrote to FINTRAC
seeking additional information and clarifications concerning two of the four
problems identified in the letter setting out the review results. FINTRAC
provided the clarifications requested.
[13]
In February 2013, the appellant submitted its
representations to FINTRAC concerning the four problems identified along with
supporting documentation and an action plan for each problem. This submission contained
59 pages.
[14]
On September 12, 2013, FINTRAC issued a notice
identifying three violations, the first of the four problems having not led to
a notice of violation. The notice also proposed total administrative monetary
penalties in the amount of $||||||||||||||. The appellant was given
30 days to submit new representations concerning the three violations
identified.
[15]
The appellant wrote to FINTRAC and submitted
that the level of detail supplied to date was insufficient to allow it to [translation] “understand
the basis of the decision.” It asked FINTRAC to provide additional
documents and grant an extension for submitting representations to the
director.
[16]
FINTRAC refused the appellant’s request in full
and reminded the appellant that it had been informed repeatedly of the problems
identified and had in its possession all information required to submit, by the
prescribed deadline, its representations concerning the violations identified
and penalties proposed.
[17]
The appellant consequently submitted its written
representations and numerous additional documents to the deputy director of
FINTRAC. The present appeal concerns the decision that ensued.
III.
Decision under review
[18]
Upon reviewing the entire file and the
appellant’s representations, the deputy director concluded, on a balance of
probabilities, that the appellant had committed the violations described in the
notice. She consequently assessed total administrative monetary penalties in
the amount of $||||||||||||||.
The three violations were:
-
Failure to establish a regulatory review
mechanism and to retain supporting documents, in violation of
subsection 9.6(1) of the Act and paragraph 71(1)(e) of the Proceeds
of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Regulations,
SOR/2002-184 [the Regulations] (violation no. 1);
-
Failure to report a suspicious transaction, in
violation of section 7 of the Act (violation no. 2);
-
Failure to report, in the prescribed manner,
transactions related to ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||,
in violation of subsection 9(1) of the Act |||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||
(violation no. 3).
IV.
Issues and standard of review
[19]
In my opinion, this appeal raises three
questions which I formulate as follows:
A.
Was the deputy director’s decision made in
breach of the principles of procedural fairness?
B.
Did the deputy director err in concluding
that the appellant had committed three violations of the Act, in light of the
appellant’s defence of due diligence?
C.
Did the deputy director err in assessing
total administrative monetary penalties of $||||||||?
[20]
The standard of review applicable in matters of
procedural fairness is correctness (Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014
SCC 24, at para. 79).
[21]
The standard of review applicable to decisions
made by the deputy director pursuant to the Act is reasonableness. An appeal
filed against a decision by FINTRAC is further treated by this Court as an
application for judicial review of said decision (Homelife/Experience Realty
Inc. v. Canada (Finance), 2014 FC 657 at para. 31; Max Realty Solutions
Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FC 656 at para. 31 [Max
Realty 2014]; Max Realty Solutions v. Canada (Financial Transactions and
Reports Analysis Centre), 2016 FC 620 at para. 4; Kabul Farms Inc.
v. Canada, 2015 FC 628 at para. 28, conf. by Canada v. Kabul Farms Inc.,
2016 FCA 143 at para. 7 [Kabul Farms FCA]).
[22]
Where the reasonableness standard applies, this
Court’s role is to determine whether the decision falls within a “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible
in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008
SCC 9 at para. 47). If the process followed was consistent with the
principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, then this Court
cannot substitute for the deputy director’s conclusions its own appreciation of
the appropriate solution (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa,
2009 SCC 12 at para. 59; Max Realty 2014, cited above at
para. 32).
V.
Analysis
A.
Was the deputy director’s decision made in
breach of the principles of procedural fairness?
[23]
The appellant argues that the decision-making
process followed in this case was faulty and inappropriate because the deputy
director did not have the necessary independence and the appellant was not
provided with all of the evidence.
[24]
The appellant submits that since the regime is
associated with the perpetration of serious criminal offences (money laundering
and terrorist financing), publicity surrounding the issuance of a notice of
violation to entities not involved in criminal activities of this nature could
unduly tarnish their reputations. According to the appellant, this requires a
high degree of procedural fairness and a strict standard with respect to
disclosure of evidence. The appellant asserts that it did not benefit from full
disclosure of the information used by the deputy director and thus did not have
the opportunity to understand the basis of the problems, violations and
penalties.
[25]
It adds that in the present case, the deputy
director did not personally review the appellant’s file but instead blindly
accepted the recommendation of the senior officer of reviews and appeals, Julie
Éthier.
[26]
With respect, I do not share the appellant’s
view.
[27]
The nature and scope of the duty of fairness
vary depending on the circumstances of the case, the statutory provisions, the
interests at stake and the nature of the matter to be decided (2747-3174
Québec Inc. v. Quebec (Régie des permis d’alcool), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 919 at
para. 22). A number of factors are to be taken into account in determining
requirements for procedural fairness: 1) the nature of the decision being made
and the process followed in making it; 2) the nature of the statutory scheme
and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; 3) the
importance of the decision to the individuals affected; 4) the legitimate
expectations of the person challenging the decision; and 5) the choices of
procedure made by the agency itself, particularly where entrusted to do so
under law (Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999]
2 SCR 817 at paras. 21-28).
[28]
In the case at hand, the Act makes a clear
distinction between criminal offences and administrative violations, which are
mutually exclusive (section 73.12 of the Act). Subsection 72.23(1) of
the Act provides that “a violation is not an offence.”
A proceeding in respect of a violation is consequently administrative rather
than criminal. With regard to the administrative category, I find that fewer
procedural safeguards are necessary since the decision does not imply that the
appellant committed or facilitated the perpetration of a penal or criminal
offence. In this respect, the facts alleged are unlikely to have the
repercussions on the appellant’s reputation that it claims.
[29]
Moreover, the process followed is more akin to
an administrative regulatory process than a judicial process, and the Act
provides for appeal before this Court. Although the present appeal is
tantamount to an application for judicial review, the associated factors
provide an argument for a lesser duty of procedural fairness.
[30]
Additionally, the economic consequences on a
corporation of a decision by a regulatory body do not have the same potential
impact as a decision on the reputation of an individual. In this sense, “corporations are not entitled to the same level of
procedural fairness as individuals” (Mega International Commercial
Bank (Canada) v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 407 at para. 35).
[31]
However, since the Act imposes a relatively
significant maximum penalty, I would classify the duty of procedural fairness
as moderate in the circumstances (Kabul Farms FCA).
[32]
I do not find that the appellant has
successfully demonstrated that the deputy director lacked independence in the
process of reviewing the file.
[33]
In administrative law, it is widely recognized
that a decision-maker may delegate certain tasks to subordinates as long as he
or she reserves the right to make the final decision.
[34]
The appellant cites the fact that
Ms. Éthier’s analysis and recommendations constitute the crux of the
reasons for the deputy director’s decision and that the latter did not even
bother to check the designated box to indicate that she accepted the
recommendations before signing the report. According to the appellant, this
shows a lack of independence.
[35]
I do not believe that this fact alone
demonstrates that the deputy director did not conduct an independent review of
the file to determine the appellant’s responsibility. In her decision, the
deputy director states the following:
[translation]
I have carefully reviewed the file in light of the observations you submitted
and find on a balance of probabilities that [violator no. 10] has
committed the violations described in the notice.
[36]
She also states why she accepted the
recommendations as submitted. There is nothing to lead me to conclude that she
did not personally examine the appellant’s file or that the resulting
conclusions were not her own.
[37]
I find that simple delegation of tasks, such as
preparing a summary of collected evidence, evaluating material facts or
formulating a recommendation, is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of
independence.
[38]
I also find that disclosure was adequate.
[39]
The appellant submits that with respect to
violation no. 2, FINTRAC failed to disclose all of the facts upon which
the deputy director based her decision. The appellant claims that the details
of the suspicious transaction ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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were not provided, preventing it from making an adequate defence.
[40]
First, at the closing interview for the review,
the problems identified were explained to the appellant, which had the
opportunity to clarify certain points, ask questions and make comments. At this
interview, violation no. 2 was discussed, and |||||||||||||||||||||||||| was
identified as the subject of the missing suspicious transaction report. The
facts of the appellant’s violation were documented, and it was noted that the
appellant was [translation] “aware that a client is suspected of participating in illicit
activities,” ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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FINTRAC listed its supporting information, including media coverage linking the
client to an investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
indicating that it had cooperated with the police in an investigation of this
client.
[41]
Following the closing interview, the appellant
received a letter dated November 16, 2012, documenting the results of the
review. In this letter, the facts of violation no. 2 were set out once
again.
[42]
On January 7, 2013, the appellant requested
additional information and clarifications concerning the problems identified in
the letter setting out the review results. FINTRAC responded to this letter to
explain the facts on which its conclusions were based.
[43]
The appellant then provided a written response
to FINTRAC providing its representations addressing the four problems as well
as significant documentation and action plans for each problem. On reading the
appellant’s response, it is clear that it had the opportunity to provide a full
and complete response concerning the problems identified by FINTRAC.
[44]
With respect to violation no. 2 and the
suspicious transaction involving the client identified by FINTRAC, the
appellant had the opportunity to submit arguments against the evidence
collected, which it did.
[45]
Therefore, I do not see how a process that
offered the appellant multiple opportunities to obtain information about the
allegations against it, to ask questions about them and to make representations
could have violated the right to procedural fairness. Consequently, I find that
disclosure was sufficient in this case.
B.
Did the deputy director err in concluding that
the appellant had committed three violations of the Act, in light of the
appellant’s defence of due diligence?
[46]
The appellant submits that it showed due
diligence in fulfilling its obligations with respect to reporting,
recordkeeping, ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
and assessing and mitigating risks. It consequently alleges that the deputy
director’s findings of non-compliance with the Act and Regulations are
unfounded and unreasonable.
[47]
With respect to violation no. 1, the
appellant states that a compliance program was in place and that although
certain aspects of the process were not fully documented, the appellant had
developed an a posteriori action plan to ensure the documentation
of all future review and revision mechanisms.
[48]
With respect to violation no. 2, the
appellant maintains that the responsibility to report suspicious transactions
had been delegated to ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.
[49]
Lastly, with respect to violation no. 3,
the appellant submits that it had measures in place designed specifically to
ensure ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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all of this supplemented by a monitoring and verification mechanism.
[50]
The appellant consequently argues that it was
diligent in its efforts to comply with its obligations under the Act and that
in this context, the deputy director’s conclusions are not reasonable and her
decision should be vacated.
[51]
Like the respondent, I do not find that the
appellant has shown that it took every precaution to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the Act.
[52]
In R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299 at page 1326,
the Supreme Court of Canada describes the due diligence defence as follows:
The defence will be available if the accused
reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would render the
act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid the
particular event.
[53]
The burden of establishing this defence is
significant and is entirely upon the invoking party. That party “must establish that he or she has taken all reasonable steps
to ensure that the declarations are accurate. . . This is a difficult burden to
discharge.” (Cata International Inc. v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue), 2004 FC 663 at para. 22).
[54]
In Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy
v. MacLeod, 2011 FCA 4, the Federal Court of Appeal discusses the scope of
this defence and the criteria applicable to the appellant:
The appellant had to establish that all
reasonable steps were taken to avoid committing the specific infractions listed
(MacLeod, cited above, at para. 37);
Evidence presented to support due diligence
must relate specifically to each of the three violations in question rather
than the appellant’s conduct in a larger sense (MacLeod, cited above, at
para. 33);
The fact that the infractions related to a
small portion of the appellant’s overall business is not relevant (MacLeod,
cited above, at para. 31);
Innocent good faith in the making of
unintentional errors is not tantamount to due diligence (MacLeod, cited
above, at para. 34);
The fact that the infractions may have resulted
from administrative errors on the part of the appellant’s staff is not relevant
(MacLeod, cited above, at para. 35); and
The fact that prejudice was not caused to
third parties is not relevant (MacLeod, cited above, at para. 36).
[55]
These criteria are applicable mutatis
mutandis to the appellant and are not met.
[56]
With regard to violation no. 1, the
appellant concedes that it had not fully documented its last compliance review.
Even if a significant part of the process is documented and even if the
appellant put an action plan in place for the future, a violation of the Act
was committed.
[57]
As the Federal Court of Appeal states in MacLeod,
it is not enough to claim to have met the majority of requirements; due
diligence must be established in relation to the specific offence in question (MacLeod,
cited above, at para. 33). Compliance with the Act in a broad sense is not
sufficient to show that the appellant took reasonable steps to avoid committing
the violation with which it is charged (R. v. Raham, 2010 ONCA 206,
cited in MacLeod, cited above, at para. 33). As a result, I am of the
view that the deputy director concluded reasonably that the appellant had
committed violation no. 1.
[58]
I arrive at the same conclusion with respect to
violation no. 2.
[59]
The client identified by FINTRAC appears to be ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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[60]
In its representations, the appellant reported
that prior to August 31, 2011, it did not know that this client was ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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In her decision, the deputy director cites the fact that ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||,
a suspicious transaction report should have been filed concerning this client ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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[61]
I agree with the appellant that it is entirely
appropriate to question what FINTRAC did during all these years with ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.
[62]
However, I do not find that this excuses the
appellant from submitting one or more suspicious transaction reports concerning
this client. I also do not find that it was unreasonable for the deputy
director to conclude that in addition to large cash transaction reports, a
suspicious transaction report should have been filed concerning this client ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.
[63]
Lastly, with regard to violation no. 3, the
appellant acknowledges that concerning ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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[64]
The appellant argues that it had put measures in
place specifically intended to ensure that ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||.
In its letter/action plan dated February 15, 2013, the appellant alleges that a
large percentage of the reports analyzed were compliant and that the small
number of deficient reports was the result of oversight or human error on the
part of certain employees. This argument fails to meet the high standard for
establishing a due diligence defence.
[65]
I consequently find that it was open to the
deputy director to conclude as to the occurrence of this violation.
C.
Did the deputy director err in assessing total
administrative monetary penalties of $||||||||?
[66]
The appellant argues essentially that the
administrative monetary penalty imposed in this case was unfounded and
arbitrary. It observes that the methodology FINTRAC used to determine the
penalties has been roundly criticized in multiple decisions of this Court and,
recently, by the Federal Court of Appeal in Kabul Farms FCA. According
to the appellant, the deputy director’s decision exhibits the same
shortcomings.
[67]
In particular, the appellant submits that the
entire process was not sufficiently justified and that the deputy director’s
explanations were brief and vague.
[68]
Due to these shortcomings, it is impossible to
determine how the deputy director arrived at the penalty amounts assessed, just
as it is impossible to understand the source of the percentage increases and
decreases applied.
[69]
The respondent argues, meanwhile, that the
process followed in this case should be evaluated in light of the reasons given
by the deputy director rather than based on the position expressed by the
Federal Court of Appeal in Kabul Farms FCA, since the FINTRAC decision
under review in that judgment was rendered nearly three years prior to the
decision presently under review. As for the rest, the respondent cites the
percentage decreases and increases applied by the deputy director without a
detailed explanation of their underlying logic.
[70]
I share the appellant’s opinion concerning this
matter and do not see how the decision under review might be distinguished from
that roundly criticized in Kabul Farms FCA.
[71]
The criteria that the deputy director was
supposed to consider in evaluating the advisability of assessing a penalty for
each violation observed and, where applicable, the amount of these penalties,
are set out in section 73.11 of the Act and in the Proceeds of Crime (Money
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Administrative Monetary Penalties
Regulations, SOR/2007-292 [Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations].
[72]
First, the amount of any penalty is determined
taking into account that penalties have as their purpose to encourage
compliance with the Act rather than to punish and are based on the harm done by
the violation and any other criteria prescribed by regulation. The
Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations prescribe taking into account the
history of compliance, list violations considered minor, serious or very
serious and set the maximum penalties that can be assessed for each violation
of the Act.
[73]
In the case of each violation observed by the
deputy director, she used as a starting point for her calculation of the
penalty to be assessed against the appellant the maximum penalty set by the
Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations. However, all that is known is
that violation no. 1 is, according to the scale, classified as serious,
violation no. 2 as very serious and violation no. 3 as minor.
[74]
With respect to violation no. 1, although
she takes into account the fact that the majority of the review done by the
appellant was documented and that the appellant had implemented an action plan
for the future, the deputy director assesses a penalty of $||||||||||||
(out of a maximum of $100,000). There is no way to understand the reasoning
followed other than to consider that the starting point is simply the
regulatory maximum.
[75]
With respect to violation no. 2, the deputy
director indicates that [translation]
“the general purpose of the penalty, which is to
encourage compliance with the Act, must be associated with the requirement also
expressed in section 73.11 that the penalty not be punitive in nature.”
However, she concludes that the action plan implemented by the appellant
following the FINTRAC review cannot be considered for the purposes of assessing
a penalty. I find this to be highly contradictory. She concludes further that
she does not have to explain or individualize the notion of harm caused by the
violation and, without further explanation, imposes the maximum regulatory
penalty of $||||||||||||||.
[76]
Determination of the penalty associated with
violation no. 3, although classified as minor, is just as surprising. The
deputy director indicates that since this violation was nonetheless
predetermined as having considerable impact, the penalty [translation] “was
adjusted to the lowest level corresponding to 50% of the maximum penalty.”
Where is this minimum prescribed? The Court does not have the least idea. What
is certain is that it is prescribed neither by the Act nor by the
Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations. It must therefore come from some
secret internal FINTRAC guide or scale. In any event, this criterion is totally
extraneous to the Act and the Administrative Monetary Penalties Regulations.
[77]
At no time did the deputy director consider the
possibility of not imposing any administrative monetary penalty, although she
had the discretion to do so.
[78]
Moreover, it is impossible to know what the
justification was for adjusting the penalty amounts based on the impact of the
violation, increasing the overall penalty to take into account the history of
compliance and decreasing the overall penalty amount to take into account the
appellant’s ability to pay. As noted by Justice David Stratas in Kabul Farms
FCA, at paragraph 32, “for all we know
[those] percentages might have been plucked out of the air or adopted for
reasons extraneous to the legislation.”
[79]
The total amount established for the penalties
calculated by the deputy director was $||||||||||||||. This amount was
increased by 5 per cent to reflect the appellant’s history of compliance and
then decreased by 10 per cent to reflect its ability to pay. The decision does
not indicate whatsoever how the deputy director arrived at these percentage
increases and decreases or what factors or criteria she took into
consideration. It is consequently impossible to determine whether an intelligible,
transparent and justifiable decision-making process preceded the assessment of
the penalties.
[80]
For these reasons, I find that the assessment of
an administrative monetary penalty of $|||||||||||||| for the three violations
identified was unreasonable under the circumstances.
VI.
Conclusion
[81]
Therefore, the appeal is allowed in part, and
the penalty assessed by the deputy director is vacated essentially for the same
reasons as those expressed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Kabul Farms FCA.
The file will be returned to the deputy director of FINTRAC for redetermination
of the advisability of assessing an administrative monetary penalty against the
appellant for each of the violations observed and, where applicable, to set
their quantum in accordance with the Act and the Administrative Monetary
Penalties Regulations.
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