Docket: T-1273-13
Citation:
2016 FC 791
Ottawa, Ontario, July 27, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Phelan
IN
THE MATTER OF 684761 B.C. LTD. and an application by the Minister of National
Revenue under section 225.2 of the Income Tax Act
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BETWEEN:
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MINISTER OF
NATIONAL REVENUE
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Applicant
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and
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684761 B.C.
LTD.
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Respondent
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AMENDED ORDER AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
This is a motion made by 684761 BC Ltd [Company]
for an order setting aside or varying the Order of Justice Martineau dated July
31, 2013 [Jeopardy Order].
[2]
The Minister of National Revenue [Minister] is
prohibited, subject to exceptions, from taking action to collect on a tax debt
(a) for the first 90 days after the Notice of Assessment is sent to the
taxpayer or (b) where the taxpayer appealed the assessment, until the
conclusion of the appeal (Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th
Supp) s 225.1 [ITA]).
[3]
An exception to that prohibition is provided for
in s 225.2 of the ITA to authorize the Minister to apply for an ex parte
order (jeopardy order) to take collection action forthwith. The ex parte
order will be granted where there are reasonable grounds to believe that
collection of all or part of the assessed amount would be jeopardized by delay.
The jeopardy order allows the Minister to take collections action usually
available only upon an unsuccessful appeal (see s 225.1 (a) to (g)).
[4]
The taxpayer may apply to the Court for a review
of the jeopardy order (s 225.2(8)), and the reviewing judge shall determine the
question of the basis for a jeopardy order summarily and shall either confirm,
set aside or vary the jeopardy order.
[5]
Of particular relevance in this case is ITA s
160(1):
160 (1) Where a person has, on or
after May 1, 1951, transferred property, either directly or indirectly, by
means of a trust or by any other means whatever, to
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160 (1)
Lorsqu’une personne a, depuis le 1er mai 1951, transféré des biens,
directement ou indirectement, au moyen d’une fiducie ou de toute autre façon
à l’une des personnes suivantes :
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(a) the person’s spouse or common-law partner or a person who has
since become the person’s spouse or common- law partner,
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a) son époux ou conjoint de fait ou une
personne devenue depuis son époux ou conjoint de fait;
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(b) a person who was under 18 years of age, or
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b) une personne qui était âgée de moins de
18 ans;
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(c) a person with whom the person was not dealing at arm’s length,
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c) une personne avec laquelle elle avait un
lien de dépendance,
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the following rules apply:
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les règles suivantes s’appliquent :
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(d) the transferee and transferor are jointly and severally, or
solidarily, liable to pay a part of the transferor’s tax under this Part for
each taxation year equal to the amount by which the tax for the year is
greater than it would have been if it were not for the operation of sections
74.1 to 75.1 of this Act and section 74 of the Income Tax Act, chapter
148 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, in respect of any income from,
or gain from the disposition of, the property so transferred or property
substituted for it, and
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d) le bénéficiaire et l’auteur du transfert
sont solidairement responsables du paiement d’une partie de l’impôt de
l’auteur du transfert en vertu de la présente partie pour chaque année
d’imposition égale à l’excédent de l’impôt pour l’année sur ce que cet impôt
aurait été sans l’application des articles 74.1 à 75.1 de la présente loi et
de l’article 74 de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, chapitre 148 des
Statuts revisés du Canada de 1952, à l’égard de tout revenu tiré des biens
ainsi transférés ou des biens y substitués ou à l’égard de tout gain tiré de
la disposition de tels biens;
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(e) the transferee and transferor are jointly and severally, or
solidarily, liable to pay under this Act an amount equal to the lesser of
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e) le bénéficiaire et l’auteur du transfert
sont solidairement responsables du paiement en vertu de la présente loi d’un
montant égal au moins élevé des montants suivants :
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(i) the amount, if any, by which the fair market value of the
property at the time it was transferred exceeds the fair market value at that
time of the consideration given for the property, and
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(i) l’excédent éventuel de la juste valeur
marchande des biens au moment du transfert sur la juste valeur marchande à ce
moment de la contrepartie donnée pour le bien,
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(ii) the total of all amounts each of which is an amount that the
transferor is liable to pay under this Act (including, for greater certainty,
an amount that the transferor is liable to pay under this section, regardless
of whether the Minister has made an assessment under subsection (2) for that
amount) in or in respect of the taxation year in which the property was
transferred or any preceding taxation year,
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(ii) le total des montants représentant chacun
un montant que l’auteur du transfert doit payer en vertu de la présente loi
(notamment un montant ayant ou non fait l’objet d’une cotisation en
application du paragraphe (2) qu’il doit payer en vertu du présent article)
au cours de l’année d’imposition où les biens ont été transférés ou d’une
année d’imposition antérieure ou pour une de ces années.
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but nothing in this subsection limits the liability of the
transferor under any other provision of this Act or of the transferee for the
interest that the transferee is liable to pay under this Act on an assessment
in respect of the amount that the transferee is liable to pay because of this
subsection.
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Toutefois, le présent paragraphe n’a pas pour effet de limiter la
responsabilité de l’auteur du transfert en vertu de quelque autre disposition
de la présente loi ni celle du bénéficiaire du transfert quant aux intérêts
dont il est redevable en vertu de la présente loi sur une cotisation établie
à l’égard du montant qu’il doit payer par l’effet du présent paragraphe.
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II.
Background
[6]
Mr. Onkar (Tony) Khunkhun is the sole director
and shareholder of the Respondent Company. The Respondent was in the process of
dissolution at the commencement of these proceedings, which was delayed by the
Canada Revenue Agency [CRA] until October 9, 2014.
[7]
The Respondent (Applicant on this motion) as
well as 0725353 BC Ltd (a company owned by Mr. Khunkhun’s wife) are both
holding companies that appear to have been created for the purpose of
facilitating a real estate transaction made by the Respondent in 2008 relating
to a parcel of land located at 2040 Glenmore Road in Kelowna, BC. The other
relevant company is RA Quality Homes Ltd. [RA Homes], also owned by Mr.
Khunkhun—a property development company.
[8]
The Respondent was indebted to the Minister in
the amount of $824,735.20 as of June 2013 from a CRA assessment issued December
16, 2011. The assessment resulted from an audit of the Respondent’s tax year
ending June 30, 2008. The Applicant’s position is that the Respondent is now
indebted to the Minister in an amount exceeding $929,547.39 – although precise
amounts are not in issue here.
[9]
The audit revealed that the Respondent had
disposed of an option to purchase a parcel of land located in Kelowna, BC, at a
profit of $2.6 million. The Respondent paid $1.2 million in a finder’s fee to
0725353 BC Ltd, the company wholly owned by Mr. Khunkhun’s spouse for her
services as the realtor and the finder of the property. The Respondent then
loaned $1,220,500.00 to RA Homes, which is also owned and controlled by Mr.
Khunkhun. RA Homes used the funds to purchase present and former real estate
holdings as part of its ongoing business.
0725353
BC Ltd paid the tax on its $1.2 million from that transaction, but the Respondent
made a charitable donation with its portion of the profit from the transaction.
The Respondent then claimed the charitable donation of $936,000.00, which was
subsequently disallowed and resulted in the assessment that underlies this Jeopardy
Order.
[10]
Mr. Khunkhun filed an objection to the
assessment on behalf of the Respondent on or about May 1, 2012. This
reassessment is currently before the Tax Court of Canada and has been stayed on
terms by Court order.
[11]
The Respondent has not filed tax returns
following the period ending June 30, 2009. At that time, the Respondent’s
assets were: $426.00 in cash and deposits; $32,024.00 in accounts receivables;
and $1,375,592.00 in loans due from related parties. These loans to related
parties included the RA Homes’ loan.
[12]
The RA Homes’ loan did not appear to be repaid
at the time the Applicant made her motion. Although the Minister initially
characterized this loan as a demand loan, the Respondent eventually produced a
loan agreement dated April 1, 2008, which indicated that the loan was due on
March 31, 2011. The Respondent also produced a Request for Extension which
extended the payment date for the loan until March 31, 2016.
[13]
The Applicant filed an affidavit sworn by
Michael Sundstrom, a Collections Officer, to support the ex parte
motion. This affidavit detailed the debt owed by the Respondent as well as the “unorthodox” financial conduct of the Respondent and
Mr. Khunkhun, which is set out below. Two further affidavits were filed on
behalf of Mr. Sundstrom for this proceeding.
[14]
On or about June 30, 2006, Mr. Khunkhun
purchased property from Mrs. Surjit Aujla. The CRA inquired into the
transaction as the fair market value of the property was $475,000.00 but the
actual amount paid was $448,750.00. Although the transaction resulted in a
pre-assessment letter being sent to Mr. Khunkhun pursuant to section 160 of the
ITA and s 325 of the Excise Tax Act for a non-arm’s length transfer made
for no or inadequate consideration when the transferor is indebted to the
Minister, the issue was not pursued after the CRA received Mr. Khunkhun’s
explanation. Mr. Khunkhun advised the CRA that the remaining balance was paid
in the form of loan forgiveness relevant to a debt owed by Mr. Aujla to Mr.
Khunkhun.
[15]
On December 26, 2007, the Respondent acquired a
call option to purchase shares in OSE Corp (later called Petro Basin Energy Corp),
purportedly as a payment for undocumented real estate consultant services. The
Respondent exercised this option to purchase the shares at $0.11 a share on
June 10, 2008. At that time, shares were valued at $2.08 a share. On June 26,
2008, the Respondent donated 450,000 of its 600,000 shares to Skyway Foundation
of Canada and received a charitable donation receipt for $936,000.00. This
charitable donation was ultimately disallowed by the CRA in the assessment
noted above, the tax from which is the subject of this Jeopardy Order.
[16]
These and related transactions were the subject
of an Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada investigation. It
was alleged that the trading activities were orchestrated by a third party,
Thalbinder Poonian, to artificially raise the price of OSE Corp shares. The
British Columbia Securities Commission has since found that Mr. Poonian engaged
in conduct that contributed to a misleading appearance of trading activity in,
or an artificial price for, OSE Corp shares (see Singh Poonian (Re),
2014 BCSECCOM 318). However, such claims were never made against the
Respondent or Mr. Khunkhun.
[17]
In 2012, CRA learned that Mrs. Aujla transferred
$88,500.00 to RA Homes. CRA expressed concerns that the payment for the
property was returned to Mr. Khunkhun through RA Homes. Mr. Khunkhun advised
the CRA that Mrs. Aujla and her husband had been indebted to him prior to the
purchase of the property and the $88,500.00 was a partial payment.
[18]
In October 2012, an assessment was issued
against RA Homes pursuant to section 325 of the Excise Tax Act relating
to the transactions with Mrs. Aujla, who was originally suspected by Mr.
Sundstrom to be related to Mr. Khunkhun (though this suspicion was without
basis). Mr. Sundstrom subsequently filed certificates against the title of
several properties owned by RA Homes collectively valued at $4.3 million. The
assessment was appealed and the amount owing was reduced by 80% (from
$87,656.00 to $17,000.00) by the CRA Appeals Division.
[19]
Between May 2012 and April 2013, the Respondent,
Mr. Khunkhun, and RA Homes each made a formal complaint against Mr. Sundstrom.
This was not disclosed by the Minister at the time of the initial ex parte
motion.
[20]
Since obtaining the Jeopardy Order, the Minister
has issued a Requirement to Pay pursuant to s 224 of the ITA to RA Homes. No
other collection action has been taken. As of September 13, 2013, RA Homes had
not paid any funds pursuant to the Requirement to Pay.
[21]
On July 31, 2013, Justice Martineau made an ex
parte order pursuant to s 225.2(2) of the ITA authorizing the Minister to
take the actions described in paragraphs 225.1(1)(a) through 225.1(1)(g) of the
ITA with respect to the amounts assessed against the Respondent.
[22]
On August 16, 2013, the Respondent filed a
Notice of Motion seeking that the Order of Justice Martineau be set aside or
varied. The scheduled hearing of this Motion was delayed and adjourned several
times to accommodate settlement discussions between the parties and changes in
the Respondent’s representation. Later it was extended to permit the filing of
further affidavits.
[23]
The Applicant contends that the Respondent owes
the Minister at least $929,547.
[24]
The issues to be resolved are:
•
has the Respondent established reasonable
grounds to doubt that collection of the amount owing would be jeopardized by
delay (Part 1 of the relevant test)?;
•
has the Applicant Minister demonstrated on the
balance of probabilities that it is more likely than not that the collection
would be jeopardized by the delay (Part 1 of the relevant test)?; and
•
should the Respondent’s motion be dismissed
pursuant to Rules 58 and 59?
III.
Analysis
[25]
The legal framework, as described in such cases
as Canada (National Revenue) v Reddy, 2008 FC 208 at paras 6-8, 329 FTR
13 [Reddy] and Danielson v Canada (Deputy Attorney General),
[1987] 1 FC 335 at para 7 [Danielson], is that the reviewing judge is to
address a two-part test:
1.
The Respondent bears the burden of establishing
that there are reasonable grounds to doubt that the collection of the amounts
assessed would be jeopardized by delay; and
2.
Having established Part 1, the onus shifts to
the Minister to justify the Jeopardy Order by demonstrating on a balance of
probabilities that it is more likely than not that collection would be
jeopardized by delay.
[26]
The focus of the Court’s inquiry is not only on
whether the taxpayer has the assets to pay the debt but whether the collection
itself is at risk from the delay in collection (see Danielson at
para 7). Mere suspicion or concern that delay may jeopardize collection is
not sufficient. As noted in Danielson at para 8:
Cogent evidence on the part of the Minister
as to the dissipation of the taxpayer's assets or the movement of assets out of
the jurisdiction beyond the reach of the Department of National Revenue and other
potential creditors could be very persuasive and compelling. A more difficult
borderline case might be the situation where the taxpayer's assets are of a
wasting nature, or likely to decline in value with the mere passage of time.
A.
Part 1
[27]
The Applicant, in written and oral argument, put
considerable stress on the transfers of property out of RA Homes. This is a
matter to be addressed in the context of “unorthodox
transactions” - “unorthodox behaviour” (the terms are used
interchangeably).
[28]
The burden on the Respondent is to raise
reasonable grounds that delay (passage of time) will not jeopardize collection.
It requires evidence to establish this test; however “reasonable
grounds to believe” falls short of balance of probabilities but connotes
a bona fide belief in a serious possibility (see Reddy at para
11).
[29]
As of October 2015, the Company owed the
Minister approximately $1,166,000. RA Homes and Mr. and Mrs. Khunkhun also owed
approximately $129,000 and $985,000 respectively.
The
Respondent contends that all tax debts are in dispute and that neither Mrs.
Khunkhun nor her company have any outstanding tax debts.
[30]
The Applicant’s position is that there is not
enough collective equity to provide adequate security for the debts.
[31]
In any event, I accept the evidence that Mr. and
Mrs. Khunkhun have in excess of $2.8 million in equity in their family home
alone. Further, there is no evidence that Mr. Khunkhun has attempted to evade
payment of taxes or moved assets outside of the jurisdiction.
[32]
Given those circumstances, the Respondent has
established that there are reasonable grounds to doubt that the collection of
the amounts assessed would be jeopardized by delay.
[33]
Before turning to the 2nd test, it is
necessary to address the allegation that the Minister did not make the
requisite “full and frank disclosure” to the
Court required to obtain the ex parte order. The core of the matter is
the three complaints made by Mr. Khunkhun against the CRA official, Mr.
Sundstrom. The allegation of Sundstrom’s conduct is that he acted in bad faith
or had “it in for” Mr. Khunkhun in part by
expressing the view (possibly to third parties) that the Respondent (and its
principal) engaged in unorthodox financial behaviour and that it was possible
money was being spirited away to avoid collection efforts. There was also a
suggestion of securities fraud.
[34]
The complaints are not relevant to whether
collection will be jeopardized by delay; however, if there was a basis for the
complaints, they might have been relevant to the credibility of some of the
Minister’s allegations and therefore the need for the Jeopardy Order.
Given
this Court’s finding in respect of the 2nd test, there is no need to
make a finding on this point.
B.
Part 2
[35]
The Applicant’s position is that there are
reasonable grounds to conclude that there is a serious possibility that delay
will jeopardize collection efforts.
[36]
More specifically, the Minister is concerned
that RA Homes’ loan will be called when the Minister is subject to collection
restrictions and the funds will be beyond the Minister’s reach. The Minister is
also concerned that RA Homes will spirit away its assets and be unable to pay
its own tax liabilities.
The
concern is that RA Homes is selling its assets or transferring those assets
between related companies.
[37]
There is concern that Mr. Khunkhun has
transferred his half interest in the family home to his wife.
[38]
On a more general note, the Applicant contends
that Mr. Khunkhun has engaged in “unorthodox
transactions” and that he has admitted that the companies were structured
to avoid creditors or potential creditors – such as creating specific purpose
or project companies.
The
suggestion of an “admission” is overblown and a
mischaracterization. Companies are structured to limit liability against
claims, one of the usual and legitimate purposes for incorporation. There is
nothing nefarious about specific purpose companies per se.
[39]
In my view, the Applicant’s position is based on
suspicion which is insufficient to warrant the continuation of a jeopardy
order.
The
sale of real estate alone does not constitute grounds for the Order. More
importantly, RA Homes’ sales of real estate are the ordinary course of business
for a real estate development company. There is no evidence that RA Homes is
depleting assets or placing funds outside of the Minister’s jurisdiction. The
sale of property simply changes the type of asset – real estate for cash.
[40]
The Minister’s position that it was unorthodox
from a collections perspective for companies to be structured in a way so as to
legally minimize liability is untenable. It would be suspicious if a successful
business had not done so.
[41]
The allegation of “unorthodox
transactions” (or sometimes called “unorthodox
behaviour”) and the cases relied upon by the Applicant are overblown and
distinguishable on their specific facts. The phrase “unorthodox”
in terms of taxpayer behaviour is not set out in the ITA.
[42]
The jurisprudence does not define that term but
this Court in Canada (National Revenue) v Robarts, 2010 FC 875, 374 FTR
87, outlined the types of situations which fall within the term. At
paragraph 61, the Court said:
[61] The jurisprudence has not given a
definition to the phrase “unorthodox behaviour”, although it has given many
examples of what it considers to be unorthodox behaviour. A few examples are as
follows:
(a) Keeping
large amounts of cash in places such as one’s apartment, safety deposit boxes
and a cold storage depot locker (Minister of National Revenue v. Rouleau,
[1995] 2 C.T.C. 442, 101 F.T.R. 57 at para. 6);
(b) Keeping
large amounts of cash, untraceable through normal banking records, in the trunk
of an automobile (Minister of National Revenue v. Arab, 2005 FC 264,
[2005] 2 C.T.C. 107 at para. 20);
(c) Keeping
double accounts for a restaurant, with one being for entries in the sales journal,
the general ledger and income tax returns, and the other being for additional
sales not reported by the holding company of the restaurant (Delaunière, re,
2007 FC 636, 2008 D.T.C. 6274 (Eng.) at para. 4);
(d) Keeping
large amounts of cash in a safety deposit box, a filing cabinet in one’s house
and in the pocket of a housecoat (Mann v. Minister of National Revenue,
2006 FC 1358, [2007] 1 C.T.C. 243 at para. 43); and
(e) Advancing funds to a company about to be
dissolved in order to avoid paying income tax (Laquerre, re, 2008 FC
459, 2009 D.T.C. 5596 (Eng.) at para. 11).
[43]
As noted in Canada (National Revenue) v
Grenon, 2015 FC 1050, 256 ACWS (3d) 986, where jeopardy orders have been
upheld, the factual circumstances often contain elements of criminality, and
questionable or nefarious behaviour. I would add that in most of the cases
there is a taint of impropriety, duplicity and/or questionable conduct.
[44]
In the cases relied upon by the Applicant, one
or more of these elements was present. Such is not the case here. In the cases
relied on by the Minister:
•
the controlling shareholder was involved in an
offshore company which held the assigned asset (Minister of National Revenue
v Services ML Marengère Inc, 1999 CarswellNat 2310 (Fed TD));
•
there was a criminal overtone to the undisclosed
source of the taxpayer’s net worth (Deputy Minister of National Revenue
(Taxation) v Quesnel, 2001 BCSC 267);
•
the way in which the assets were held was
unusable and the taxpayer’s practices made spiriting away assets easy (Rouleau
(A) v Canada, 1995 CarswellNat 426 (Fed TD));
•
assets were being liquidated and transferred
into other companies and trusts to hide them from the Crown (Laquerre (Re),
2008 FC 459, 333 FTR 36);
•
multifaceted liquidation, liquid assets,
transfers out of Canada (National Revenue) v Accredited Home Lenders Canada
Inc, 2012 FC 461, 408 FTR 151); and
•
untraceable funds in third party hands (Laframboise
v R, 1986 CarswellNat 377 (Fed TD)).
[45]
In addition to RA Homes conducting business as
usual, there is no evidence to suggest that the Respondent or its principal is
engaged in the questionable conduct described above.
[46]
With respect to the transfer of the matrimonial
home to the wife, there is no meaningful challenge to the Respondent’s evidence
of significant equity in the home. A drive-by evaluation by CRA is no match for
the opinion of a certified appraiser presented by Mr. Khunkhun.
[47]
The Respondent has provided evidence in November
2015 and January 2016 that it would be able to pay the Minister. The Applicant
chose not to cross-examine that evidence. It is therefore accepted as true.
[48]
Lastly, the Applicant has not made out that its
ability to perform a derivative assessment under ITA s 160 (non-arm’s length
transactions) is insufficient to offset the need for a jeopardy order.
[49]
In Minister of National Revenue v Steele,
1995 CarswellSask 449 (SKQB), a jeopardy order was set aside because s 160
could be used to effect collection. That principle has been cited with approval
recently in Canada (National Revenue) v Park, 2011 FC 263, 385 FTR 240.
[50]
In addition to all the other factors indicating
that the Jeopardy Order is unnecessary, the availability of this remedy
overcomes the claimed need for such Order.
[51]
In summary, the Minister has failed to justify
the continued need for a jeopardy order. The emphasis on unorthodox behaviour
which was a cornerstone of the claim for such an order is not supported in fact
or law. On that grounds alone, the Jeopardy Order should be lifted. The
availability of alternate relief via s 160 compounds the Applicant’s difficulty
in maintaining the Order.
C.
Rule 58/59
[52]
This technical issue of the breach of the Rules
related to service of and contents of a motion record is of insufficient
importance to justify the need for a remedy at this stage.
IV.
Conclusion
[53]
For these reasons, the Order of July 31, 2013,
shall be vacated. The Respondent is entitled to costs at the usual scale.