SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Citation:
R. v. Cody, 2017 SCC 31
|
Appeal heard:
April 25, 2017
Judgment
rendered: June 16, 2017
Docket:
37310
|
Between:
James
Cody
Appellant
and
Her
Majesty the Queen
Respondent
-
and -
Attorney
General of Ontario, Attorney General of Quebec, Attorney General of Manitoba,
Attorney General of British Columbia, Attorney General of Alberta, Director of
Criminal and Penal Prosecutions and Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario
Interveners
Coram: Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and
Brown JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 75)
|
The Court
|
Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its
reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.
r. v.
cody
James Cody Appellant
v.
Her Majesty the Queen Respondent
and
Attorney General of Ontario,
Attorney General of Quebec,
Attorney General of Manitoba,
Attorney General of British Columbia,
Attorney General of Alberta,
Director of Criminal and Penal
Prosecutions and
Criminal Lawyers’ Association
of Ontario Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Cody
2017 SCC 31
File No.: 37310.
2017: April 25; 2017: June 16.
Present: Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Côté and
Brown JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for newfoundland and labrador
Constitutional
law — Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable
time — Pre‑Jordan delay of more than five years between charges and
anticipated end of trial — Whether accused’s right to be tried within reasonable time under
s. 11 (b) of Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms infringed — Framework for
determining s. 11 (b) infringement set out in Jordan applied.
C
was charged with drugs and weapons offences on January 12, 2010. His trial
was scheduled to conclude on January 30, 2015. Before the commencement of
his trial, C brought an application under s. 11 (b) of the Charter ,
seeking a stay of proceedings due to the delay. Because the application pre‑dated
the release of R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631, the trial
judge applied the former framework set out in R. v. Morin, [1992] 1
S.C.R. 771. He granted the application and stayed the proceedings. A majority
of the Court of Appeal applied the Jordan framework and allowed the
appeal, set aside the stay of proceedings and remitted the matter for trial.
Held:
The appeal should be allowed and the stay of proceedings restored.
The
delay in this case was unreasonable and therefore, C’s right under s. 11 (b)
of the Charter was infringed. The Court of Appeal erred in its
application of Jordan. From the time C was charged until his five‑day
trial was scheduled to begin, fully five years passed. The Crown, the defence
and the system each contributed to that delay. Under the Jordan framework,
every actor in the justice system has a responsibility to ensure that criminal
proceedings are carried out in a manner that is consistent with an accused
person’s right to a trial within a reasonable time. This framework now governs
the s. 11 (b) analysis and, like any of this Court’s precedents, it
must be followed and it cannot be lightly discarded or overruled. Properly
applied, this framework provides sufficient flexibility and accounts for the
transitional period of time that is required for the criminal justice system to
adapt.
After
the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial is
calculated under the Jordan framework, delay attributable to the defence
must be subtracted. Defence delay is divided into two components: delay waived
by the defence and delay caused by defence conduct. The only deductible defence
delay under the latter component is that which is solely or directly caused by
the accused person and flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch
as it is not taken to respond to the charges. Illegitimacy in this context does
not necessarily amount to professional or ethical misconduct, but instead takes
its meaning from the culture change demanded in Jordan. The
determination of whether defence conduct is legitimate is highly discretionary,
and appellate courts must show a correspondingly high level of deference
thereto. Defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure — the
decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it is conducted, may
attract scrutiny. To determine whether defence action is legitimately taken to
respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the action or conduct may
therefore be considered. The overall number, strength, importance, proximity to
the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice or filing requirements
and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant considerations.
Irrespective of its merit, a defence action may be deemed not legitimate if it
is designed to delay or if it exhibits marked inefficiency or marked
indifference toward delay.
Beyond
a retrospective accounting of delay, a proactive approach is required from all
participants in the justice system to prevent and minimize delay. Trial judges
should suggest ways to improve efficiency, use their case management powers and
not hesitate to summarily dismiss applications and requests the moment it
becomes apparent they are frivolous.
After
defence delay has been deducted, the net delay must be compared to the applicable
presumptive ceiling set out in Jordan. If the net delay exceeds the
ceiling, then the delay is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this
presumption, the Crown must establish the presence of exceptional
circumstances, which fall into two categories: discrete events and particularly
complex cases. Discrete events, like defence delay, result in quantitative
deductions of particular periods of time. However, case complexity requires a
qualitative assessment and cannot be used to deduct specific periods of delay.
Complexity is an exceptional circumstance only where the case as a whole is
particularly complex. The delay caused by a single isolated step that has
features of complexity should not be deducted under this category.
Transitional
considerations may be taken into account as a third form of exceptional
circumstances where the case was already in the system when Jordan was decided.
Like case complexity, the transitional exceptional circumstance assessment
involves a qualitative exercise. The exceptionality of the “transitional
exceptional circumstance” does not lie in the rarity of its application, but
rather in its temporary justification of delay that exceeds the ceiling based
on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed. The
parties’ general level of diligence, the seriousness of the offence and the
absence of prejudice are all factors that should be taken into consideration,
as appropriate in the circumstances.
In
this case, the total delay was approximately 60.5 months, from which the delay
waived by C should be deducted (13 months). Then, two periods of time should be
deducted as defence delay: the delay resulting from C’s first change of counsel
(1 month) and the delay resulting from C’s recusal application (2.5 months). After
accounting for these deductions, the delay is 44 months, which exceeds the 30‑month
ceiling set out in Jordan and therefore, is presumptively unreasonable.
With
respect to exceptional circumstances, the following delays should be deducted
as discrete events: the appointment of C’s former counsel to the bench (4.5 months)
and part of the delay flowing from the McNeil disclosure issue that
arose (3 months). The net delay is therefore 36.5 months. Despite the
voluminous disclosure, this does not qualify as a particularly complex case.
In
light of the trial judge’s findings of real and substantial actual prejudice
and that C’s conduct was not inconsistent with the desire for a timely trial,
the Crown cannot show that the net delay was justified based on its reliance on
the previous state of the law. To the contrary, the trial judge’s findings
under the Morin framework strengthen the case for a stay of proceedings.
Where a balancing of factors under that framework would have weighed in favour
of a stay, the Crown will rarely, if ever, be successful in justifying the
delay as a transitional exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.
Cases Cited
Applied:
R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 631; referred to: R.
v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771; Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford,
2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015
SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331; R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3, [2009] 1 S.C.R.
66; R. v. Dixon, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244; R. v. Kutynec (1992), 7
O.R. (3d) 277; R. v. Vukelich (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 193; R. v.
Williamson, 2016 SCC 28, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
ss. 7 , 11 (b).
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (Welsh, White
and Hoegg JJ.A.), 2016 NLCA 57, 365 C.R.R. (2d) 111, [2016] N.J. No. 357
(QL), 2016 CarswellNfld 405 (WL Can.), setting aside the stay of proceedings
entered by Burrage J., 2014 NLTD(G) 161, 359 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 123, 1117
A.P.R. 123, [2014] N.J. No. 395 (QL), 2014 CarswellNfld 399 (WL Can.), and
remitting the matter for trial. Appeal allowed.
Michael Crystal and Frank Addario, for the appellant.
Croft Michaelson, Q.C., and Vanita Goela, for the respondent.
Tracy Kozlowski, for the intervener the
Attorney General of Ontario.
Stéphane Rochette and Abdou Thiaw, for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec.
Ami Kotler, for the intervener the
Attorney General of Manitoba.
Trevor Shaw, for the intervener the Attorney
General of British Columbia.
David A.
Labrenz, Q.C., for the intervener the
Attorney General of Alberta.
Nicolas Abran and Daniel Royer, for the intervener the
Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions.
Megan Savard, for the intervener the Criminal
Lawyers’ Association of Ontario.
The following is the judgment delivered by
The Court —
I.
Introduction
[1]
In R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1
S.C.R. 631, this Court identified a culture of complacency towards delay in the
criminal justice system. This culture was fostered by doctrinal and practical
difficulties plaguing the analytical framework then applicable to the right of
accused persons, guaranteed under s. 11 (b) of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms , to be tried within a reasonable time. This appeal is
yet another example of why change is necessary. From the time the appellant James
Cody was charged with drugs and weapons offences until his five-day trial
was scheduled to begin (prior to the release of this Court’s decision in Jordan),
fully five years passed. As we will explain, the Crown, the defence and
the system each contributed to that delay. This leads us to stress, as the
Court did in Jordan, that every actor in the justice system has a
responsibility to ensure that criminal proceedings are carried out in a manner
that is consistent with an accused person’s right to a trial within a
reasonable time.
[2]
Applying the former framework from R. v.
Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, the trial judge found a breach of Mr. Cody’s s.
11 (b) Charter right, and stayed the proceedings. A majority of
the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal reversed his decision, and
remitted the matter for trial. Mr. Cody now appeals to this Court as of right.
[3]
A number of the provincial Attorneys General who
intervened in this matter asked this Court to modify the Jordan framework
to provide for more flexibility in deducting and justifying delay. But Jordan
was released a year ago. Like any of this Court’s precedents, it must be
followed and it cannot be lightly discarded or overruled (Canada (Attorney
General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 1101, at para. 38; Carter
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, at para.
44). The Jordan framework now governs the s. 11 (b) analysis and,
properly applied, already provides sufficient flexibility and accounts for the
transitional period of time that is required for the criminal justice system to
adapt.
[4]
Applying that framework, we find that the delay
in this case was unreasonable. The Court of Appeal erred in its application of Jordan.
Accordingly, we would allow the appeal and restore the order of the trial judge
staying the proceedings against Mr. Cody.
II.
Facts
[5]
On January 12, 2010, Mr. Cody was arrested as a
part of “Operation Razorback”, a drug trafficking investigation. While Mr. Cody
was not a suspect in that investigation, he happened to be with a primary
target at the time of that target’s arrest, and he too was arrested. A search
of Mr. Cody’s vehicle uncovered half a kilogram of marijuana, a kilogram of
cocaine and a stun gun.
[6]
Mr. Cody was charged with two counts of
possession for the purpose of trafficking, one count of possessing a prohibited
weapon, and one count of possessing a weapon while being prohibited from doing
so. He was released on bail the next day. A number of other people were also
charged as a result of the investigation.
[7]
Five months after Mr. Cody’s arrest, on June 30,
2010, the Crown indicated that it was prepared to provide disclosure. Because
of the larger related investigation, disclosure was voluminous, comprising over
20,000 pages contained on two CDs. However, the Crown first required Mr. Cody’s
counsel to sign an undertaking that would have prohibited the electronic
copying of the two CDs. Mr. Cody’s counsel refused, as did other defendants’
counsel.
[8]
Three months and three court appearances later,
the parties remained at an impasse. Defence counsel applied to compel
disclosure. The issue was referred to case management where, on September 30,
2010, a consent order was entered requiring Mr. Cody to sign his own
undertaking before he could obtain a copy of the CDs. Nine months after his
arrest, disclosure was released to Mr. Cody’s counsel on October 18, 2010.
[9]
On November 29, 2010, Mr. Cody changed counsel.
This resulted in a one-month delay of his preliminary inquiry, from March 11,
2011 to April 7, 2011. A one-year period of delay extending to April 2, 2012,
was then waived by Mr. Cody.
[10]
On May 1, 2012, Mr. Cody’s five-day trial was
scheduled to begin on November 5, 2012. These dates were then reassigned for
the hearing of a Charter application to exclude the evidence found in
Mr. Cody’s vehicle at the time of his arrest.
[11]
On September 3, 2012, Mr. Cody’s second counsel
was appointed a judge of the Provincial Court. As a result, the Charter application
dates were vacated and, following three court appearances, the application was
set down for May 6, 2013. Approximately one month of this delay was waived by
the defence due to a scheduling error.
[12]
On the Friday before the Charter application
was set to be heard, the Crown advised Mr. Cody’s counsel that misconduct
allegations had been made against one of the police officers involved in
Operation Razorback. In anticipation of forthcoming disclosure
concerning these allegations, pursuant to R. v. McNeil, 2009 SCC 3,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 66, the Charter application was postponed. That
disclosure was provided in late June 2013 and the parties were prepared to
proceed by the end of that month, but the court could not accommodate a summer
hearing. Because defence counsel was unavailable for September 2013, the
hearing finally occurred in October 2013. Written reasons dismissing the Charter
application were released on December 20, 2013.
[13]
In January 2014, the Crown notified Mr. Cody’s
counsel that an agreed statement of facts used in the Charter application
to exclude evidence had contained an error. Mr. Cody’s counsel filed an
application for a stay of proceedings or a mistrial, alleging a breach of his
s. 7 Charter rights arising from the error in the agreed statement of
facts. In late April 2014, that application was dismissed, the error
struck from the trial judge’s reasons on the initial Charter ruling and
the voir dire reopened to permit Mr. Cody to cross-examine the police
officer whose notes had been used to prepare the statement. At that time, Mr.
Cody’s counsel raised the possibility of a s. 11 (b) Charter application,
alleging a breach of Mr. Cody’s right to a trial within a reasonable time. On
June 26, 2014, the court confirmed its original ruling dismissing Mr. Cody’s Charter
application to exclude evidence.
[14]
Mr. Cody’s counsel then brought a recusal
application alleging reasonable apprehension of bias. It was dismissed on
September 10, 2014. Trial dates were set for January 26, 2015, but Mr. Cody’s
s. 11 (b) Charter application was heard in late November 2014 and
granted on December 19, 2014.
III.
Judgments Below
A.
Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador —
Trial Division (Burrage J.), 2014 NLTD(G) 161, 359 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 123
[15]
Because the trial judge’s decision pre-dated the
release of this Court’s reasons in Jordan, the trial judge applied the
former Morin framework. He observed that the total delay from when Mr.
Cody was charged to his scheduled trial date amounted to approximately 60.5
months. He allocated approximately 13 months to defence waiver, 17.5 months to
inherent time requirements of the case, and 6 months to actions of Mr. Cody.
This left a total of approximately 19 months of Crown and institutional delay
which exceeded the Morin guideline of 16-18 months for a case tried in
superior court.[1]
[16]
Turning to the issue of prejudice, the trial
judge found that Mr. Cody had suffered “real and substantial actual prejudice”
(para. 191). In particular, Mr. Cody was subject to bail conditions that
affected his liberty, he experienced mental distress and anxiety, and he lost
his employment because of restrictions on his ability to travel. The trial
judge also inferred that there could be prejudice to Mr. Cody’s fair trial
interests because of the passage of time. Moreover, he found that nothing in
Mr. Cody’s conduct suggested he was deliberately delaying the proceedings.
Stressing the importance of a global assessment, the trial judge concluded that
the prejudice suffered by Mr. Cody because of the delay outweighed society’s
interest in a trial on the merits. Accordingly, he held that Mr. Cody’s right
under s. 11 (b) had been breached and ordered a stay of proceedings.
B.
Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador —
Court of Appeal (Welsh, White (dissenting) and Hoegg JJ.A.), 2016 NLCA 57, 365
C.R.R. (2d) 111
[17]
While the Crown’s appeal from the trial judge’s
stay order was under reserve, this Court released its decision in Jordan.
Written submissions on its significance were then filed by Mr. Cody and the
Crown at the Court of Appeal.
[18]
The majority allowed the appeal. Applying the Jordan
framework, it found a number of exceptional circumstances relating
primarily to disclosure, the unexpected McNeil issue and the error in
the agreed statement of facts. After accounting for these deductions, it
quantified the net delay as approximately 16 months, well below the presumptive
ceiling. Accordingly, it set aside the stay of proceedings and remitted the
matter for trial.
[19]
The dissenting judge would have upheld the stay
of proceedings. Viewing the matter globally, he noted that the five years it
took for a five-day trial was contrary to the s. 11 (b) promise of trial
within a reasonable time. He disagreed with the majority on the attribution of
several periods of delay to exceptional circumstances, and he held that the
transitional exceptional circumstance was not intended to justify delay that
would have been unreasonable under the Morin framework. Ultimately,
after considering defence delay and exceptional circumstances, he tallied the
delay at over 39 months, which significantly exceeded the presumptive ceiling
and warranted a stay.
IV.
Analysis
A.
The Jordan Framework
[20]
The new framework established in Jordan
for analyzing whether an accused person’s right to a trial within a reasonable
time has been breached centres on two presumptive ceilings: 18 months for cases
tried in provincial courts and 30 months for cases tried in superior courts (Jordan,
at para. 46).
[21]
The first step under this framework entails
“calculating the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end
of trial” (Jordan, at para. 60). In this case, an information was
sworn against Mr. Cody on January 12, 2010, and his trial was scheduled to
conclude on January 30, 2015. This makes the total delay approximately 60.5
months.
[22]
After the total delay is calculated, “delay
attributable to the defence must be subtracted” (Jordan, at para. 60).
The result, or net delay, must then be compared to the applicable presumptive
ceiling. The analysis then “depends upon whether the remaining delay — that is,
the delay which was not caused by the defence — is above or below
the presumptive ceiling” (Jordan, at para. 67 (emphasis in original)).
[23]
If the net delay falls below the ceiling:
. . . then
the onus is on the defence to show that the delay is unreasonable. To do so,
the defence must establish that (1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a
sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, and (2) the case took
markedly longer than it reasonably should have. [Emphasis in original.]
(Jordan, at para. 48)
[24]
If the net delay exceeds the ceiling:
. . . then
the delay is presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this presumption, the Crown
must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot, the
delay is unreasonable and a stay will follow.
(Jordan, at para. 47)
[25]
Where charges pre-date Jordan and the
delay remains presumptively unreasonable after deducting defence delay and
accounting for and considering exceptional circumstances, the Crown may
nevertheless demonstrate that the transitional exceptional circumstance
justifies the delay (Jordan, at paras. 95-96).
B.
Defence Delay
[26]
Defence delay is divided into two components:
(1) “delay waived by the defence”; and (2) “delay that is caused solely by the
conduct of the defence” (Jordan, at paras. 61 and 63).
(1)
Waiver
[27]
A waiver of delay by the defence may be explicit
or implicit, but must be informed, clear and unequivocal (Jordan, at
para. 61). In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Cody expressly waived 13
months of delay. Accounting for this reduces the net delay to approximately
47.5 months.
(2)
Delay Caused by Defence Conduct
(a)
Deducting Delay
[28]
In broad terms, the second component is
concerned with defence conduct and is intended to prevent the defence from
benefitting from “its own delay-causing action or inaction” (Jordan, at
para. 113). It applies to any situation where the defence conduct has “solely
or directly” caused the delay (Jordan, at para. 66).
[29]
However, not all delay caused by defence conduct
should be deducted under this component. In setting the presumptive ceilings,
this Court recognized that an accused person’s right to make full answer and
defence requires that the defence be permitted time to prepare and present its case.
To this end, the presumptive ceilings of 30 months and 18 months have “already
accounted for [the] procedural requirements” of an accused person’s case (Jordan,
at para. 65; see also paras. 53 and 83). For this reason, “defence actions
legitimately taken to respond to the charges fall outside the ambit of defence
delay” and should not be deducted (Jordan, at para. 65).
[30]
The only deductible defence delay under this
component is, therefore, that which: (1) is solely or directly caused by the
accused person; and (2) flows from defence action that is illegitimate insomuch
as it is not taken to respond to the charges. As we said in Jordan, the
most straightforward example is “[d]eliberate and calculated defence tactics
aimed at causing delay, which include frivolous applications and requests” (Jordan,
at para. 63). Similarly, where the court and Crown are ready to proceed, but
the defence is not, the resulting delay should also be deducted (Jordan,
at para. 64). These examples were, however, just that — examples. They were
not stated in Jordan, nor should they be taken now, as exhaustively
defining deductible defence delay. Again, as was made clear in Jordan,
it remains “open to trial judges to find that other defence actions or conduct
have caused delay” warranting a deduction (para. 64).
[31]
The determination of whether defence conduct is
legitimate is “by no means an exact science” and is something that “first
instance judges are uniquely positioned to gauge” (Jordan, at para.
65). It is highly discretionary, and appellate courts must show a
correspondingly high level of deference thereto. While trial judges should take
care to not second-guess steps taken by defence for the purposes of responding
to the charges, they must not be reticent about finding defence action to be
illegitimate where it is appropriate to do so.
[32]
Defence conduct encompasses both substance and
procedure — the decision to take a step, as well as the manner in which it
is conducted, may attract scrutiny. To determine whether defence action is
legitimately taken to respond to the charges, the circumstances surrounding the
action or conduct may therefore be considered. The overall number, strength,
importance, proximity to the Jordan ceilings, compliance with any notice
or filing requirements and timeliness of defence applications may be relevant
considerations. Irrespective of its merit, a defence action may be deemed not legitimate
in the context of a s. 11 (b) application if it is designed to delay or
if it exhibits marked inefficiency or marked indifference toward delay.
[33]
As well, inaction may amount to defence conduct
that is not legitimate (Jordan, at paras. 113 and 121). Illegitimacy may
extend to omissions as well as acts (see, for example in another context, R.
v. Dixon, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 244, at para. 37). Accused persons must bear in
mind that a corollary of the s. 11 (b) right “to be tried within a
reasonable time” is the responsibility to avoid causing unreasonable delay.
Defence counsel are therefore expected to “actively advanc[e] their clients’
right to a trial within a reasonable time, collaborat[e] with Crown counsel
when appropriate and . . . us[e] court time efficiently” (Jordan,
at para. 138).
[34]
This understanding of illegitimate defence
conduct should not be taken as diminishing an accused person’s right to make
full answer and defence. Defence counsel may still pursue all available
substantive and procedural means to defend their clients. What defence counsel
are not permitted to do is to engage in illegitimate conduct and then have it
count towards the Jordan ceiling. In this regard, while we recognize the
potential tension between the right to make full answer and defence and the
right to be tried within a reasonable time — and the need to balance both — in
our view, neither right is diminished by the deduction of delay caused
by illegitimate defence conduct.
[35]
We stress that illegitimacy in this context does
not necessarily amount to professional or ethical misconduct on the part of
defence counsel. A finding of illegitimate defence conduct need not be
tantamount to a finding of professional misconduct. Instead, legitimacy takes
its meaning from the culture change demanded in Jordan. All
justice system participants — defence counsel included — must now accept that
many practices which were formerly commonplace or merely tolerated are no
longer compatible with the right guaranteed by s. 11 (b) of the Charter .
(b)
Preventing Delay
[36]
To effect real change, it is necessary to do
more than engage in a retrospective accounting of delay. It is not enough to
“pick up the pieces once the delay has transpired” (Jordan, at para.
35). A proactive approach is required that prevents unnecessary delay by
targeting its root causes. All participants in the criminal justice system
share this responsibility (Jordan, at para. 137).
[37]
We reiterate the important role trial judges
play in curtailing unnecessary delay and “changing courtroom culture” (Jordan,
at para. 114). As this Court observed in Jordan, the role of the courts
in effecting real change involves
implementing more efficient procedures,
including scheduling practices. Trial courts may wish to review their case
management regimes to ensure that they provide the tools for parties to
collaborate and conduct cases efficiently. Trial judges should make reasonable
efforts to control and manage the conduct of trials. Appellate courts must
support these efforts by affording deference to case management choices made by
courts below. All courts, including this Court, must be mindful of the impact
of their decisions on the conduct of trials. [para. 139]
In scheduling, for
example, a court may deny an adjournment request on the basis that it would
result in unacceptably long delay, even where it would be deductible as defence
delay.
[38]
In addition, trial judges should use their case
management powers to minimize delay. For example, before permitting an
application to proceed, a trial judge should consider whether it has a
reasonable prospect of success. This may entail asking defence counsel to
summarize the evidence it anticipates eliciting in the voir dire and,
where that summary reveals no basis upon which the application could succeed,
dismissing the application summarily (R. v. Kutynec (1992), 7 O.R. (3d)
277 (C.A.), at pp. 287-89; R. v. Vukelich (1996), 108 C.C.C. (3d) 193
(B.C.C.A.)). And, even where an application is permitted to proceed, a trial
judge’s screening function subsists: trial judges should not hesitate to
summarily dismiss “applications and requests the moment it becomes apparent
they are frivolous” (Jordan, at para. 63). This screening function
applies equally to Crown applications and requests. As a best practice, all
counsel — Crown and defence — should take appropriate opportunities to ask
trial judges to exercise such discretion.
[39]
Trial judges should also be active in suggesting
ways to improve efficiency in the conduct of legitimate applications and
motions, such as proceeding on a documentary record alone. This responsibility
is shared with counsel.
(c)
Application
[40]
In this case, we would deduct two periods of
time as defence delay. First, it was undisputed throughout the proceedings that
the delay resulting from Mr. Cody’s first change of counsel should be deducted
as defence delay.
[41]
The second period arises from Mr. Cody’s recusal
application alleging reasonable apprehension of bias. The trial judge found
that this application did not further Mr. Cody’s right to full answer and
defence and attributed the resulting 2.5 months of delay equally to the Crown
and defence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal was unanimous in finding that the
recusal application was meritless, frivolous or illegitimate.
[42]
These latter characterizations are well founded
on the record, and we agree with them. The recusal application is a clear example
of frivolous and illegitimate defence conduct that directly causes delay.
Indeed, it was the sort of application that, henceforward, ought to be
summarily dismissed.
[43]
After accounting for these two deductions, the
net delay is approximately 44 months. Beyond that, the trial judge found that
there was “nothing in Cody’s conduct to suggest that he [was] deliberately
delaying matters so as to avoid a speedy trial” (para. 175). This finding is
entitled to deference and we would not interfere.
C.
Exceptional Circumstances
[44]
Because the net delay of approximately 44 months
exceeds the 30-month ceiling, it is presumptively unreasonable, and it falls to
the Crown to demonstrate exceptional circumstances (Jordan, at para.
68).
[45]
Exceptional
circumstances were described in Jordan as follows:
Exceptional circumstances lie
outside the Crown’s control in the sense that (1) they are reasonably
unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown counsel cannot
reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those circumstances once they
arise. [Emphasis deleted; para. 69.]
[46]
Exceptional circumstances generally fall into
two categories: discrete events and particularly complex cases (Jordan,
at para. 71). In addition, transitional considerations may be taken into
account as a third form of exceptional circumstances where, as here, the case
was already in the system when Jordan was decided (Jordan, at
paras. 94-98).
[47]
In this case, the Crown relies on each form of
exceptional circumstance to argue that the delay in this case falls below the
presumptive ceiling. Alternatively, the Crown asserts that any excess delay is
justified as reasonable.
(1)
Discrete Events
[48]
The
exceptional circumstances analysis begins with discrete events. Like defence
delay, discrete events result in quantitative deductions of particular periods
of time. The delay caused by discrete exceptional events or circumstances that
are reasonably unforeseeable or unavoidable is deducted to the extent it could
not be reasonably mitigated by the Crown and the justice system (Jordan,
at paras. 73 and 75).
[49]
Mr.
Cody concedes that his former counsel’s appointment to the bench qualifies as
an unavoidable discrete event, and that the 4.5 months of resultant delay
should be deducted. This leaves a net delay of approximately 39.5 months.
[50]
Beyond this,
there are three specific time periods in this case which the Crown submits
engage the discrete events category of exceptional circumstances.
(a)
Undertaking Dispute (July 8 to October 18, 2010)
[51]
The Crown says that the dispute over defence
counsel’s refusal to sign a disclosure undertaking was a discrete event.
Requiring disclosure undertakings has been standard practice for decades, it
says, and counsel’s refusal to sign was unforeseeable.
[52]
Even had this event been reasonably
unforeseeable, it was incumbent upon the Crown to take immediate steps to
resolve the undertaking dispute. Instead, resolution required three further
court appearances, the filing of a series of superior court applications, and
3.5 months of accrued delay. We defer to the trial judge’s finding that “it was
the Crown’s refusal to release the disclosure that pushed the delay beyond what
might otherwise be viewed as reasonable” (para. 187). The Crown cannot satisfy
the second prong of the test for exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, this
period cannot be deducted.
(b)
McNeil Disclosure (May 6 to October 8, 2013)
[53]
The next disputed period is the five months of delay flowing from the
McNeil disclosure issue that came to light on May 3, 2013, on the eve of the
defence’s scheduled Charter application to exclude evidence.
[54]
We agree with the Crown that the emergence of this new disclosure
obligation qualified as a discrete event, and would deduct a portion of the
delay that followed. It was reasonably unavoidable and unforeseeable, and the
Crown acted responsibly in making prompt disclosure, following up as the matter
proceeded, and seeking the next earliest available dates. The Crown may have
been able to take additional steps, such as disavowing any reliance on the
officer’s evidence or tendering it through an agreed statement of facts.
However, the requirement is that of reasonableness: the Crown need not exhaust
every conceivable option for redressing the event in question to satisfy the
reasonable diligence requirement.
[55]
That said, we would not deduct the entire five months for this event.
Two months, specifically the time it took for the Crown and defence to be
prepared to proceed (until late June 2013) should be deducted. However, the
court was unable to accommodate them until September — that portion of delay
was therefore a product of systemic limitations in the court system and not of
the discrete event (Jordan, at para. 81) and therefore those months should not
be deducted. Then, because defence counsel was unavailable in September, the
matter was put over until October 2013. As this one month of delay was caused
by defence counsel’s unavailability (Jordan, at para. 64), and not by the
preparation time necessary to respond to the charges (Jordan, at para. 65), it
should be deducted.
[56]
Accounting for each of these periods, we would deduct three months of
delay in connection with the McNeil discrete event, reducing the net delay to
approximately 36.5 months.
(c)
Error in Agreed Statement of Facts (January 30
to September 10, 2014)
[57]
The
final period we are urged to consider as a discrete event is the delay
resulting from the error in the agreed statement of facts. We have already
deducted the 2.5 months taken for the recusal application that flowed from this
error as defence delay. The Crown submits that the remaining five months of
delay should be deducted based on a discrete exceptional event or circumstance.
[58]
In
principle, an inadvertent oversight may well qualify as a discrete event. The
first prong of the test for exceptional circumstances requires only that the
event at issue be reasonably unforeseeable or reasonably unavoidable.
It does not impose a standard of perfection upon the Crown. As this Court
observed in Jordan, “[t]rials are not well-oiled machines” (para. 73).
Mistakes happen. Indeed, they are an inevitable reality of a human criminal
justice system and can lead to exceptional and reasonably unavoidable delay
that should be deducted for the purpose of s. 11 (b).
[59]
The question
under the second prong of the test is whether the Crown took reasonable steps
to remediate the error and minimize delay. The Crown “is not required to show
that the steps it took were ultimately successful — rather, just that it took
reasonable steps in an attempt to avoid the delay” (Jordan, at para.
70). Upon discovering the error, the Crown promptly notified defence counsel
and the court and maintained that the error was immaterial. Nevertheless, 7.5
months of delay ensued.
[60]
These events illustrate the failings of
the pre-Jordan culture under which the parties operated. We expect that
an issue of this nature could, and should, be resolved in short order — perhaps
even in a single day. For example, the source of the error could be identified
and examined to confirm that it was inadvertent and innocuous. The summary
dismissal procedure described above could then be applied to dispose of any
further baseless applications. For progress to be realized, parties and courts
must be vigilant to prevent proceedings from being derailed by discrete and
relatively minor diversions of this nature, which will inevitably continue to
arise.
[61]
On the
record before us, we are unable to conclude that the exceptional circumstances
criteria were met in this case. Because the trial judge did not turn his mind
to the issue of whether the error was reasonably unavoidable, his findings are
not helpful in this regard. In any event, the deduction of this entire period
would not reduce the net delay to below the ceiling.
(d)
Conclusion
[62]
In sum, after accounting for discrete
events, the net delay in this case of approximately 36.5 months remains above
the ceiling and presumptively unreasonable. We therefore turn to consider
whether the time this case took was justified based on case complexity or
transitional considerations.
(2)
Particularly Complex Cases
[63]
The second category of exceptional circumstances
is concerned with particularly complex cases. The presumptive ceilings set in Jordan
already reflect the “increased complexity of criminal cases since Morin”,
including the emergence of “new offences, procedures, obligations on the Crown
and police, and legal tests” (Jordan, at paras. 42 and 53).
However, particularly complex cases may still justifiably exceed the
presumptive ceilings.
[64]
Unlike defence delay and discrete events, case
complexity requires a qualitative, not quantitative, assessment. Complexity is
an exceptional circumstance only where the case as a whole is particularly
complex. Complexity cannot be used to deduct specific periods of delay.
Instead, once any applicable quantitative deductions are made, and where the
net delay still exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the case’s complexity as a
whole may be relied upon to justify the time that the case has taken and rebut
the presumption that the delay was unreasonable (Jordan, at para. 80).[2] A particularly complex case is one that “because of the nature of
the evidence or the nature of the issues, require[s] an inordinate amount of
trial or preparation time” (Jordan, at para. 77 (emphasis deleted)). When
determining whether a case’s complexity is sufficient to justify its length,
trial judges should consider whether the net delay is reasonable in view of the
case’s overall complexity. This is a determination that falls well within the
expertise of a trial judge (Jordan, at para. 79).
[65]
In this case, the Crown argues that four months
of delay should be deducted as an exceptional circumstance based on the
complexity as demonstrated by the voluminous disclosure. The majority of the
Court of Appeal agreed. This approach, however, is inconsistent with a
qualitative assessment of case complexity. The delay caused by a single
isolated step that has features of complexity should not have been deducted.
While voluminous disclosure is a hallmark of particularly complex cases, its
presence is not automatically demonstrative of complexity.[3] The question is whether the case is sufficiently complex
“such that the delay is justified” (Jordan, at para. 77). Here, there
was extensive disclosure. However, the balance of the proceedings appear to
have been relatively straightforward. In our view, even after accounting for
the voluminous disclosure, this does not qualify as a particularly complex
case.
[66]
Nevertheless, as the charges in this case
arose before this Court’s decision in Jordan, it remains to be seen
whether the transitional exceptional circumstance may justify the delay.
D.
The Transitional Exceptional Circumstance
[67]
The new framework in Jordan applies to
cases already in the system (Jordan, at para. 95). However, in some
cases, the transitional exceptional circumstance may justify a presumptively
unreasonable delay where the charges were brought prior to the release of Jordan
(Jordan, at para. 96). This should be the final step in the
analysis, taken only where, as here, the deduction of discrete events does not
reduce the delay below the presumptive ceiling and excess delay cannot be
justified based on case complexity.
[68]
Like case complexity, the transitional
exceptional circumstance assessment involves a qualitative exercise. It
recognizes “the fact that the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly,
against a standard of which they had no notice” and that “change takes time” (Jordan,
at paras. 96-97). The Crown may rely on the transitional exceptional
circumstance if it can show that “the time the case has taken is justified
based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed”
(Jordan, at para. 96). Put another way, the Crown may show that
it cannot be faulted for failing to take further steps, because it would have
understood the delay to be reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan
and the way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness of the
offence and prejudice would have been assessed under Morin.
[69]
To be clear, it is presumed that the Crown and
defence relied on the previous law until Jordan was released. In this
regard, the exceptionality of the “transitional exceptional circumstance” does
not lie in the rarity of its application, but rather in its temporary
justification of delay that exceeds the ceiling based on the parties’
reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed (Jordan, at
para. 96). The transitional exceptional circumstance should be considered in
cases that were in the system before Jordan. The determination of
whether delay in excess of the presumptive ceiling is justified on the basis of
reliance on the law as it previously existed must be undertaken contextually
and with due “sensitiv[ity] to the manner in which the previous framework was
applied” (Jordan, at paras. 96 and 98). Under the Morin
framework, prejudice and seriousness of the offence “often played a decisive
role in whether delay was unreasonable” (Jordan, at para. 96).
Additionally, some jurisdictions are plagued with significant and notorious
institutional delays, which was considered under Morin as well (Jordan,
at para. 97; Morin, at pp. 799-800). For cases currently in the system,
these considerations can inform whether any excess delay may be justified as
reasonable (Jordan, at para. 96).
[70]
It is important to clarify one aspect of these
considerations. This Court’s decision in R. v. Williamson, 2016
SCC 28, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 741, should not be read as discounting the
important role that the seriousness of the offence and prejudice play under the
transitional exceptional circumstance. The facts of Williamson were
unusual, in that it involved a straightforward case and an accused person who
made repeated efforts to expedite the proceedings, which efforts stood in
contrast with the Crown’s indifference (paras. 26-29). Therefore, despite the
seriousness of the offence and the absence of prejudice, the delay exceeding
the ceiling could not be justified under the transitional exceptional
circumstance. This highlights that the parties’ general level of diligence may
also be an important transitional consideration. But the bottom line is that
all of these factors should be taken into consideration as appropriate in the
circumstances.
[71]
When considering the transitional exceptional
circumstance, trial judges should be mindful of what portion of the proceedings
took place before or after Jordan was released. For aspects of the case
that pre-dated Jordan, the focus should be on reliance on factors that
were relevant under the Morin framework, including the seriousness of
the offence and prejudice. For delay that accrues after Jordan was
released, the focus should instead be on the extent to which the parties and
the courts had sufficient time to adapt (Jordan, at para. 96).
[72]
In this case, the entire proceedings at trial
pre-dated the release of Jordan. The Crown must therefore show that the
36.5 months of net delay was justified in light of its reliance on the previous
state of the law under Morin.
[73]
The charges in this case were serious. In our
view, however, this consideration is overcome by the trial judge’s findings of
“real and substantial actual prejudice” (para. 191). The trial judge also made
an express finding that Mr. Cody’s conduct was not “inconsistent with the
desire for a timely trial” (para. 175).
[74]
In light of these findings, the Crown cannot
show that the 36.5 months of net delay in this case was justified based on its
reliance on the previous state of the law. To the contrary, the trial judge’s
findings under the previous law strengthen the case for a stay of proceedings.
Where a balancing of the factors under the Morin analysis, such as
seriousness of the offence and prejudice, would have weighed in favour
of a stay, we expect that the Crown will rarely, if ever, be
successful in justifying the delay as a transitional exceptional circumstance under
the Jordan framework. We therefore find that the
delay in this case was unreasonable.
V.
Conclusion
[75]
We would allow the appeal and restore the order
made by the trial judge for a stay of proceedings.
Appeal allowed.
Solicitors
for the appellant: Spiteri & Ursulak, Ottawa; Addario Law Group, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the respondent: Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario: Attorney General of
Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Quebec: Attorney General of
Quebec, Québec.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of Manitoba: Attorney General of
Manitoba, Winnipeg.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia: Attorney
General of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Solicitor
for the intervener Attorney General of Alberta: Attorney General of
Alberta, Calgary.
Solicitor
for the intervener the Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions: Director
of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions, Québec.
Solicitors for the
intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario: Addario Law
Group, Toronto.