Dockets: A-46-14
A-47-14
Citation:
2015 FCA 41
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CORAM:
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DAWSON J.A.
STRATAS J.A.
NEAR J.A.
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Docket: A-46-14
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BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Appellant
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and
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TERIKA DAVIS
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Respondent
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Docket: A-47-14
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AND BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Appellant
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and
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LANCIA DAVIS
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Respondent
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
DAWSON J.A.
[1]
Lancia and Terika Davis, the respondents to
these appeals, are sisters and citizens of Jamaica. On July 22, 2008, they
arrived in Canada as visitors for a six-week stay with their grandmother, Ida
Brown. While visiting, they decided that they would like to remain in Canada permanently. An immigration officer is said to have advised their grandmother to
adopt them so that they could legally remain in Canada. Mrs. Brown adopted both
sisters in April of 2009. At the time of the adoption Lancia was 19.5 years of
age and Terika was 17.5. In June of 2009, the respondents applied for Canadian
citizenship.
[2]
On March 22, 2013, a Citizenship Officer refused
their citizenship applications. The officer was not satisfied that there was a
genuine parent-child relationship between the sisters and their grandmother.
The officer noted that each girl’s relationship with their birth parents
appeared to have remained unchanged. As well, the officer was not satisfied
that the adoptive relationship was not entered into primarily for the purpose
of acquiring citizenship.
[3]
Each respondent commenced an application for
judicial review in the Federal Court of the refusal of her application for
citizenship. For substantially the same reasons in each application, a judge of
the Federal Court allowed each application for judicial review and remitted
each citizenship application to a different officer on the direction that the
redetermination was to be in accordance with the Court’s reasons (2013 FC 1243
and 2013 FC 1244).
[4]
These are appeals from those decisions. These
reasons dispose of both appeals, and a copy of these reasons shall be placed on
each file.
[5]
In allowing the applications for judicial
review, the Judge stated that the officer’s decisions were reviewable on the
standard of reasonableness. I agree.
[6]
The sole issue raised on these appeals is
whether the Judge properly applied the reasonableness standard. For the reasons
that follow, I have concluded that the Judge did not. Accordingly, I would
allow these appeals.
[7]
In order to assess whether the appropriate
standard of review has been applied correctly, it is necessary for a reviewing
court to “step into the shoes” of the lower court
and so focus on the administrative decision at issue (Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559, at
paragraph 46).
[8]
It is now well-settled law that on judicial
review reasonableness requires justification, transparency and intelligibility
within the decision-making process. It is also well-settled that reasonableness
also requires the outcome to fall within the range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[9]
The range of acceptable outcomes varies with the
context in which the administrative decision is made. In the present case, the
task of the officer was to interview the respondents and their grandmother, to
make findings of fact based on those interviews, and then to apply those facts
to the applicable legislation. In this factually laden context, deference is
owed to the expertise of the immigration officer both in finding facts and in
applying those facts to the relevant provisions of the Citizenship Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29. Put another way, this context broadens the range of
possible, acceptable and defensible outcomes.
[10]
In my view, on the record before her, the
officer could reasonably conclude that no genuine parent-child relationship
existed between the respondents and their grandmother at the relevant times.
The respondents maintained regular contact with their birth parents and their
birth father continued to provide guidance and some financial support (for
example, he contributed some funds for the adoption procedure). Mrs. Brown and
Terika told the officer that Terika’s birth father continued to be involved in
discussing decisions about her future.
[11]
While the respondents argue that the officer
placed undue weight on the level of contact between them and their birth
parents, subparagraph 5.1(3)(a)(ii) of the Citizenship Regulations,
SOR/93-246 requires an officer to consider whether the pre-existing legal
parent-child relationship was permanently severed by the adoption.
[12]
Similarly, in my view, the record before the
officer allowed her to reasonably conclude that the respondents failed to demonstrate
that the adoptions were not primarily for the purposes of obtaining Canadian
citizenship.
[13]
Lancia told the officer that an immigration
officer had advised her grandmother that the only way she and her sister could
remain in Canada was through adoption. Terika told the officer that Mrs. Brown
said that she did not want to see the girls marry for the purpose of remaining
in Canada legally.
[14]
The respondents also argue that the officer
failed to consider Terika’s best interests. I disagree. Read with deference,
the officer’s reasons set out concerns regarding the safety of both respondents
in Jamaica and the lack of parental support. The officer was therefore aware of
these factors, and her decision was not unreasonable in the context of the
record as a whole.
[15]
Finally, the respondents argue that the officer
ignored evidence or considered irrelevant factors. Again, I disagree. In my
view, these submissions amount to a request that we substitute our view of the
evidence for the officer’s appreciation of the evidence. This is not permitted
on reasonableness review.
[16]
To summarize, on the records before her, the
officer’s decisions fell within the range of possible, acceptable and
defensible outcomes.
[17]
For these reasons, I would allow both appeals
and set aside the decisions of the Federal Court. Pronouncing the judgments
that the Federal Court ought to have pronounced, I would dismiss the
applications for judicial review. The Minister does not seek costs, and I would
not award costs.
“Eleanor R. Dawson”
“I agree.
David
Stratas J.A.”
“I agree.
D.
G. Near J.A.”
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