Docket: A-193-14
Citation:
2015 FCA 83
CORAM:
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PELLETIER J.A.
WEBB J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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KIDANE HAGOS
AND SHAMAR MAINTENANCE INC.
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Appellants
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on March
25, 2015).
BOIVIN J.A.
[1]
This is an appeal from a decision of Justice Roy
of the Federal Court (the judge) dated March 7, 2014. The judge dismissed an
application for judicial review of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights
Commission (the Commission) refusing to deal with a complaint made to it by Mr.
Kidane Hagos and Shamar Maintenance Inc. (the appellants), pursuant to s. 41 of
the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 (the Act).
[2]
The individual appellant, Mr. Kidane Hagos (Mr.
Hagos) is also the CEO of the corporate appellant, Shamar Maintenance Inc.
(Shamar). Shamar held seven maintenance contracts with Public Works and
Government Services Canada (PWGSC) from 1999 to 2011. Six of these contracts
were not renewed, and one was terminated in January 2011.
[3]
The appellants submitted a complaint to the
Commission alleging that the non-renewals and the termination are due to
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, or colour. The
complaint was received on September 28, 2011. On October 20, 2011, the
Commission requested a position statement from the appellants regarding whether
their complaint fell within the Commission’s jurisdiction, which was provided
by counsel for the appellants on November 19, 2011. On March 9, 2012, the
Commission produced a Section 40/41 Report (the Report), recommending that the
Commission decline to address the complaint as frivolous under paragraph 41(1)(d)
of the Act. The parties were invited to make further submissions on the Report
in April and May 2012. On June 13, 2012, after considering the Report, the
original complaint, and all the parties’ submissions, the Commission decided
not to deal with the complaint as recommended by the Report.
[4]
The Commission’s decision held that Shamar did
not have standing as it is a corporation and cannot be subject to
discrimination under the Act, and that Mr. Hagos’ individual complaint did not
disclose a prohibited ground of discrimination under the Act. The complaint was
therefore “frivolous” as per paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Act and would not
be pursued.
[5]
The appellants filed for judicial review before
the Federal Court in July of 2012.
[6]
The relevant provisions of the Canadian Human
Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 read as follows [Emphasis added]:
3. (1) For all purposes of this Act, the prohibited grounds of
discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability and
conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect
of which a record suspension has been ordered
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3. (1) Pour l’application de la présente loi,
les motifs de distinction illicite sont ceux qui sont fondés sur la race,
l’origine nationale ou ethnique, la couleur, la religion, l’âge, le sexe,
l’orientation sexuelle, l’état matrimonial, la situation de famille, l’état
de personne graciée ou la déficience
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…
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[…]
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7. It is a
discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly,
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7. Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il est
fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait, par des moyens directs
ou indirects :
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…
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[…]
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(b) in the
course of employment, to differentiate adversely in relation to an employee,
on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
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b) de le
défavoriser en cours d’emploi.
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…
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[…]
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14. (1) It is a
discriminatory practice,
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14. (1) Constitue un acte discriminatoire, s’il
est fondé sur un motif de distinction illicite, le fait de harceler un individu :
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…
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[…]
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(c) in
matters related to employment, to harass an individual on a
prohibited ground of discrimination.
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c) en matière d’emploi.
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…
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[…]
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40. (1) Subject to
subsections (5) and (7), any individual or group of individuals having
reasonable grounds for believing that a person is engaging or has engaged
in a discriminatory practice may file with the Commission a complaint in
a form acceptable to the Commission.
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40. (1) Sous réserve des paragraphes (5) et
(7), un individu ou un groupe d’individus ayant des motifs
raisonnables de croire qu’une personne a commis un acte
discriminatoire peut déposer une plainte devant la Commission en la forme
acceptable pour cette dernière.
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…
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[…]
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41. (1) Subject to
section 40, the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it unless
in respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that
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41. (1) Sous réserve de l’article 40, la
Commission statue sur toute plainte dont elle est saisie à moins qu’elle
estime celle-ci irrecevable pour un des motifs suivants :
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…
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[…]
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(c) the
complaint is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission;
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c) la plainte n’est pas de sa compétence ;
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(d) the
complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith[.]
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d) la plainte est frivole, vexatoire ou
entachée de mauvaise foi[.]
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[7]
On appeal from an application for judicial
review, our Court must determine whether the reviewing court appropriately
selected and properly applied the standard of review: Agraira v. Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R.
559 at paras. 45-47; Telfer v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2009 FCA 23, 386
N.R. 212 at para. 18.
[8]
Applying Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008
SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, and Alberta (Information and Privacy
Commissioner) v. Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61, [2011] 3
S.C.R. 654, the judge held that the reasonableness standard applied to the
decision of the Commission, and that its reasons were adequate as per Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),
2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708.
[9]
The judge thoroughly reviewed the facts, the
evidence and the parties’ submissions and held that the Commission’s decision
was reasonable.
[10]
In this appeal the appellants are not appealing
the judge’s finding that the Commission was not biased and that its process was
procedurally fair. Counsel for the appellants further agrees that Shamar does
not have standing to file a complaint pursuant to the Canadian Human Rights
Act. The appellants rather contend that the judge erred in finding that the
Commission’s decision to decline to deal with Mr. Hagos’ complaint pursuant to
section 41(1)(d) of the Act was reasonable.
[11]
However, and with respect, we are of the view
that the judge committed no reviewable error.
[12]
More specifically, in the circumstance, the
Commission was within the bounds of reasonableness to conclude as it did that
the complaint disclosed no discriminatory practice. The complaint does not
allege that there was an employment relationship between PWGSC and Mr. Hagos for
the purpose of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The issue of such a
relationship was raised for the first time before this Court. The Commission
was not asked to rule on this issue. It could not have been unreasonable for it
not to do so. It follows that it was therefore appropriate for the judge to
conclude that the Commission reasonably decided that it was plain and obvious
that the complaint could not succeed.
[13]
For these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed
with costs in the amount of $3 000 all inclusive.
“Richard
Boivin”