Docket:
A-260-13
Citation: 2014 FCA 90
CORAM:
NOËL J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
WEBB J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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VINOD KUMAR MOUDGILL
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Appellant
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and
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THE CROWN, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, IN RIGHT OF GOVERNMENT OF MANITOBA
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Respondent
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
NOËL J.A.
[1]
This is an appeal from an order of the Federal Court, whereby Annis J.
(the Federal Court judge) refused to interfere with a prior order issued by
Prothonotary Lafrenière (the prothonotary), which allowed the motion brought by
the Crown, Her Majesty the Queen, in Right of the Government of Manitoba (the respondent), to strike Mr. Vinod Kumar Moudgill’s (the appellant) application
for judicial review.
[2]
The motion to strike invokes Rule 221(1) of the Federal Courts Rules,
SOR/98-106 (the Rules). It was brought on the basis that the Federal Court
lacks jurisdiction to deal with any of the issues which are raised in the
application for judicial review. In his order, the Prothonotary described these
issues as follows (reasons, p. 2) :
[T]he [appellant]
filed a Notice of Application seeking relief in the nature of mandamus
against her Majesty in Right of Manitoba (Manitoba Crown). Although the
pleading is somewhat convoluted, it appears that the [appellant] is alleging
that the Manitoba Ombudsman failed to exercise its jurisdiction under the Manitoba
Ombudsman Act to investigate the wrongful conduct of the Manitoba Human
Rights Commission and the Manitoba Crown. The [appellant] seeks a declaration
that provisions of various provincial laws are unconstitutional and “relief and
remedy for the [appellant]’s personal and financial injuries”.
[3]
The prothonotary dismissed the appellant’s judicial review application
summarily on the basis that it was “bereft of any possibility of success”
(citing David Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc. (C.A.), [1995] 1 F.C. 588, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1629 (David Bull Laboratories)). The
prothonotary noted that pursuant to the direction given by this Court in David
Bull Laboratories, Rule 221 cannot be used to strike an application. Rather,
an objection for want of jurisdiction must be pursued by invoking the Court’s
inherent power to summarily dismiss an application that is doomed to fail.
[4]
The prothonotary took the view that this was such a case given that the
Federal Court lacks jurisdiction to review the actions and/or decisions of
provincial bodies or assess the constitutionality of provincial legislation.
[5]
The appellant’s appeal from that decision was dismissed by the Federal
Court judge. In rendering his decision, the Federal Court judge adopted the
second paragraph on page 3 of the prothonotary’s order (first full paragraph),
which laid out his reasons for holding that the Federal Court lacked
jurisdiction:
Without expressing
any opinion as to the merits of the [appellant]’s complaints against the
Manitoba Crown, it is plain and obvious that the Federal Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the application or the parties. The
Federal Court is a court of statutory jurisdiction. Sections 18.1 through 18.5
of the Federal Courts Act establish the regime for judicial review in
respect of a federal board, commission or other tribunal. In the absence of any
existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case
and which nourishes the statutory grant of jurisdiction, the Federal Court has
no jurisdiction to review decisions and actions of provincial entities, or the
constitutionality of provincial legislation.
[6]
During the hearing and in the memorandum filed in support of his appeal,
the appellant insisted on the merits of his judicial review application and the
Federal Court judge’s alleged failure to properly consider his constitutional
challenge to particular provisions of Manitoba legislation. He also argued that
the Federal Court judge erred by failing to assume jurisdiction pursuant to
section 25 of the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 and by
providing insufficient reasons for his decision (appellant’s memorandum, paras.
65 to 67).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[7]
It is well established that this Court should only interfere with the
decision of a motion judge, reviewing an order of a prothonotary, “where the
former either had no grounds to interfere with the prothonotary’s decision or,
in the event that such grounds existed, if the decision was arrived at on a
wrong basis or was plainly wrong” (Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V.,
2003 SCC 27, para. 18 (Z.I. Pompey); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex
Inc., 2003 FCA 488. para. 20). Indeed, discretionary orders of
prothonotaries should be left undisturbed, unless they are “clearly wrong, in
the sense that the exercise of discretion was based upon a wrong principle or a
misapprehension of the facts”, or rest on an improper exercise of discretion by
the prothonotary “on a question vital to the final issue of the case” (Z.I.
Pompey, para. 18).
[8]
In my view, the motion judge properly declined to interfere with the
prothonotary’s decision, as it was not “clearly” wrong, and did not amount to
an improper exercise of discretion. Beyond this, the decision reached by the prothonotary
is the only one that was open to him given the issues raised in the judicial
review application.
[9]
Section 25 of the Federal Courts Act is of no assistance to the
appellant as it has no application where the superior Court of a province has
jurisdiction to grant the relief sought such as is the case here (Powderface
v. Baptiste, (1996), 118 F.T.R. 258 (T.D.)).
[10]
Finally, the appellant’s attack on the sufficiency of the motion judge’s
reasons cannot succeed in light of this Court’s decision in Turberfield v.
Canada, 2012 FCA 170, paragraph 19, which held that “a trial judge has no
general duty to provide reasons for a decision ‘when the finding is otherwise
supportable on the evidence or where the basis of the finding is apparent from
the circumstances’” (citing R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, para. 4; see
also Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, albeit in the context of a judicial review).
Although the motion judge did not explain in his own words why the Federal
Court did not have jurisdiction, he adopted as his own the reasons given by the
prothonotary, something which he was fully entitled to do. Indeed, this is a
commendable example of restraint and efficiency in an appellate context.
[11]
I would dismiss the appeal.
"Marc Noël"
“I agree.
Eleanor R. Dawson J.A.”
“I agree.
Wyman W. Webb J.A.”
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