Docket: A-51-16
Citation: 2016 FCA 123
Present: STRATAS
J.A.
BETWEEN:
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BELL CANADA AND
BELL MEDIA INC.
|
Appellants
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and
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7262591 CANADA
LTD. (D.B.A. GUSTO TV), ACCESS COMMUNICATIONS CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED, ALLARCO
ENTERTAINMENT INC., ANTHEM MEDIA GROUP, BLUE ANT MEDIA INC., CANADIAN CABLE
SYSTEMS ALLIANCE INC., CBC/RADIO-CANADA, COGECO INC., COMPETITION BUREAU, DHX
MEDIA LTD., EASTLINK, GROUPE V MÉDIA INC., INDEPENDENT BROADCAST GROUP/LE
GROUPE DE DIFFUSEURS INDÉPENDANTS, L’OFFICE DES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS ÉDUCATIVES
DE LANGUE FRANÇAISE DE L’ONTARIO (GROUPE MÉDIA TFO), MEDIAMIND DIGITAL, MTS
INC., PELMOREX COMMUNICATIONS INC., PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY CENTRE, QUÉBECOR
MÉDIA INC., SASKATCHEWAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, SOGETEL INC., STINGRAY DIGITAL
GROUP INC., STORNOWAY COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, TEKSAVVY SOLUTIONS
INC. AND HASTINGS CABLE VISION LTD., TELUS, TV5 QUÉBEC CANADA, VMEDIA INC.
and ZAZEEN INC.
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Respondents
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REASONS
FOR ORDER
STRATAS J.A.
A.
Introduction
[1]
Bell Canada and Bell Media appeal to this Court
from decisions made by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission on September 24, 2015. On that date, the CRTC made Broadcasting
Order 2015-439, Broadcasting Regulatory Policy 2015-438 and Broadcasting
Information Bulletin 2015-440. The parties describe these three items together
as the 2015 Wholesale Code decision. I shall do the same.
[2]
Bell has moved to settle the contents of the
appeal book. Nine documents are in dispute. Bell says that these documents are
not admissible in this appeal and should not be included. Many of the
respondents say they are admissible and should be included.
B.
Should admissibility be determined now?
[3]
At the outset, this Court must consider whether
the issue of admissibility should be determined now or left to the panel
hearing the appeal. This is a matter of
discretion to be exercised on the basis of recognized factors: Association
of Universities and Colleges of Canada v. Access Copyright, 2012 FCA 22,
428 N.R. 297 at para. 11; Collins
v. Canada, 2014 FCA 240, 466 N.R. 127 at para. 6.
[4]
One factor is whether an admissibility ruling at
this time would allow the hearing to proceed in a more timely and orderly
fashion: Collins, above at para. 6, McConnell v. Canada (Canadian
Human Rights Commission), 2004 FC 817, aff’d 2005 FCA 389. Another factor is whether
the result of the motion is relatively clear cut or obvious: Collins at
para. 6; Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. v. P.S. Partsource Inc., 2001
FCA 8, 267 N.R. 135. If
reasonable minds might differ on the issue, the ruling should be left to the
panel hearing the appeal: McKesson Canada Corporation v. Canada,
2014 FCA 290, 466 N.R. 185 at para. 9; Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2015
FCA 27 at para. 7.
[5]
All of
the parties have argued the question of admissibility on the basis that it can
be decided now. I agree. In my view, an admissibility ruling at this time would
allow the hearing to proceed in a more timely and orderly fashion. Further, the
question of admissibility in this case is clear cut and obvious.
C.
Admissibility
[6]
For the purposes of admissibility of the nine
documents in dispute, the respondents opposing Bell regard this statutory
appeal from the CRTC as equivalent to a judicial review. This is correct. In a
statutory appeal, this Court is acting as a reviewing court assessing an
administrative decision-maker’s decision: Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 399. Thus, this motion
falls to be governed by this Court’s authorities concerning the admissibility
of documents in an application for judicial review: see, e.g., Bernard
v. Canada (Revenue Agency), 2015 FCA 263, 479 N.R. 189; Access Copyright,
above at paras. 17-19 (adopted in Connolly v. Canada (Attorney General),
2014 FCA 294, 466 N.R. 44 at para. 7); Delios v. Canada (Attorney General),
2015 FCA 117, 472 N.R. 171 at paras. 41-42.
[7]
Under these authorities, the general rule is
that only the evidence that was before the administrative decision-maker is admissible
before the reviewing court. In some cases, this general rule manifests itself
as a prohibition against the reviewing court admitting anything that could have
been placed before the administrative decision-maker but was not.
[8]
In this motion, the parties disagree concerning
the scope of the general rule.
[9]
Bell
submits that the nine documents in dispute were not before the CRTC when it
made the 2015 Wholesale Code decision and so they
cannot be admitted into the evidentiary record. In essence, as these documents
were not physically before the CRTC, for example as exhibits, they cannot be a
part of this Court’s evidentiary record.
[10]
In my view, Bell reads the general rule too
literally and without regard to its purpose and the context in which it can be
applied.
[11]
The purpose of the general rule is two-fold:
•
To respect the role of the administrative
decision-maker. The administrative decision-maker
is the merits decider. It decides what evidence or information it should rely
upon, it considers that evidence and information, and it makes findings of
fact. That is not the role of the reviewing court. See Bernard, Access
Copyright and Delios, all above.
•
To further the role of the reviewing court. The reviewing court must assess the administrative decision-maker’s
decision against the evidence and information the administrative decision-maker
took into account. If certain of that evidence and information is withheld from
the reviewing court, the review may be artificial and lead to inaccurate
outcomes. See the discussion in Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access
Copyright) v. Alberta, 2015 FCA 268 at paras. 13-14.
[12]
As for the context in which the general rule can
be applied, one must appreciate that administrative decision-makers and the
decisions they make come in all shapes and sizes.
[13]
Some administrative decision-makers deal with
discrete matters that are unrelated to other matters. For example, a Law
Society discipline tribunal usually deals with lawyers charged with specific professional
offences at a specific time. The conduct giving rise to the charges does not
usually relate to other matters. The discipline tribunal decides the charges
strictly on the basis of the evidence before it. Previous misconduct cannot be
considered unless it is admitted into evidence by the tribunal. For these
reasons, the record before the reviewing court on judicial review should normally
be limited to the evidence that was physically before the tribunal.
[14]
But some administrative decision-makers, like
the CRTC in this case, operate in an ongoing regulatory context where multiple
issues, often more general and polycentric, interrelate and evolve over time. Administrative
decision-makers such as these continually see many of the same parties on
issues that relate to or intersect with past issues. In making decisions, these
administrative decision-makers will focus on evidence placed before them in the
specific matter but, subject to any obligations of procedural fairness and
disclosure owed to the particular parties before them, they may go further and draw
upon broader industrial, economic, regulatory or technological insights they
have gathered from past proceedings and regulatory experience.
[15]
In those circumstances, past proceedings and
regulatory experience can form part of the data the administrative
decision-maker can draw upon in making a decision. Accordingly, parts of that
data, identified by the parties as matters that the administrative
decision-maker drew upon in making its decision, can form part of the evidentiary
record before the reviewing court. The inclusion of that data in the reviewing
court’s record can often be useful in assessing reasonableness: a decision at
odds with past proceedings and regulatory experience might be suspect, while
one that is consistent with past proceedings and regulatory experience might be
more likely to be found acceptable and defensible.
[16]
When faced with a question of admissibility of
this sort of data on judicial review, the reviewing court must be persuaded
that there is at least a case for saying that the administrative decision-maker
drew upon it. And in deciding the merits of the judicial review, the reviewing
court might have to determine whether that is so to a higher degree of
likelihood.
[17]
In this case, that threshold for admissibility
of materials relating to past proceedings—here Broadcasting Decision 2013-310
and events around it—is met. The CRTC was no doubt aware of what it decided in
Broadcasting Decision 2013-310: to some extent Broadcasting Decision 2013-310
relates to issues it decided when it enacted the 2015 Wholesale Code. Also there
are concrete indications the CRTC may have actually drawn upon its
understandings of Broadcasting Decision 2013-310 and events surrounding it when
it enacted the 2015 Wholesale Code: see, e.g., Broadcasting Regulatory
Policy CRTC 2015-438 at para. 113, footnote 5 and compare sections 5(a) and 13
of the 2015 Wholesale Code with certain conditions of licence that arose as a
result of Broadcasting Decision 2013-310. In short, the 2015 Wholesale Code
seems to have some relationship with Broadcasting Decision 2013-310, decided a
couple of years previously and involving many of these same parties, including
Bell.
[18]
Seven of the nine disputed documents relate to
Broadcasting Decision 2013-310. Exhibits Z, AA, BB, CC and DD to the Affidavit
of Sonia Atwell are written submissions made by or on behalf of Bell in the
course of the proceedings that led to Broadcasting Decision 2013-310 concerning
Bell’s acquisition of Astral Media. Paragraphs 260-429 of Exhibit EE to the
Affidavit of Sonia Atwell is a transcript of Bell’s submissions to the CRTC
during the hearings of that matter. Exhibit N to the Affidavit of Sonia Atwell
is a broadcasting procedural letter from the CRTC that confirms and implements
Broadcasting Decision 2013-310 to impose certain conditions of license on Bell
following its acquisition of Astral Media. On the record before me, for the
purposes of admissibility, all of these predate the CRTC’s decision to enact
the 2015 Wholesale Code and are related to a context that the CRTC may well
have taken into account when it made its decision. I am fortified in my conclusion
on admissibility by the parties’ agreement that Broadcasting Decision 2013-310
is itself admissible, no doubt because it forms part of the relevant context
surrounding the CRTC’s decision to enact the 2015 Wholesale Code.
[19]
I am concerned that if these seven documents are
not admitted into the record before this Court in this appeal, this Court will
not be able to assess the CRTC’s decision against all of the evidence and
information the CRTC may have drawn upon when making its decision.
[20]
Put another way, I am satisfied on this record
that admitting these documents does not violate the CRTC’s role as merits
decider, as explained above, and that it will further the role of this Court as
a reviewing court.
[21]
Therefore, these seven documents are admissible
and should be included in the appeal book.
[22]
Two of the nine disputed documents, Exhibits O
and Y to the Affidavit of Sonia Atwell, postdate the CRTC’s decision to enact
the 2015 Wholesale Code. It is argued that the two documents show that the CRTC
had a regulatory agenda or policies concerning the television wholesale market,
an agenda or policies that underlie its decision to enact the 2015 Wholesale
Code. However, I am not satisfied that these post-decision documents show that the
agenda or policies existed before the CRTC’s decision. Normally, review must
take place only against the documents and information the administrative
decision-maker took into account at the time of the decision. In the
circumstances of this case, only documents predating or contemporaneous with
the CRTC’s decision can show that a regulatory agenda or policies prompted it.
[23]
As an alternative submission, the respondents
represented by Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP also invoke one of the exceptions
to the general rule in support of their submission that certain documents must
be included in the record before this Court. They wish to rely upon certain
documents to establish in this case that certain discretionary bars applied by
reviewing courts should stop this Court from reviewing the CRTC’s decision.
[24]
I have already ruled admissible the documents
that appear to be relevant to this submission, namely Exhibits Z, AA, BB, CC
and DD and paragraphs 260-429 of Exhibit EE to the Affidavit of Sonia Atwell.
The documents that postdate the CRTC’s decision that I have ruled inadmissible,
namely Exhibits O and Y to the Affidavit of Sonia Atwell, do not support any of
the discretionary bars the Fasken respondents wish to invoke. Exhibit N to the
Affidavit of Sonia Atwell, ruled admissible, is also not relevant to this
submission. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the Fasken respondents’
alternative submission.
[25]
I want to emphasize that I am only deciding an
issue of admissibility. There are indications that the CRTC may have drawn upon
seven of the documents or the information in them when it made its decision.
This is enough to meet the threshold for admissibility. It is for the panel
hearing the appeal to decide whether in fact the CRTC drew upon these seven
documents or the information contained in them when it made its decision, and
to decide what weight or significance should be accorded to them. It is also
for that panel to assess the significance of these documents on the issue of
whether any discretionary bars apply.
D.
Disposition
[26]
An order shall go in accordance with these
reasons. The respondents represented by Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP and
Norton Rose Fulbright Canada LLP (who filed substantial submissions in
opposition to Bell) shall have their costs of the motion in any event of the
cause.
“David Stratas”