Docket: A-36-15
Citation:
2016 FCA 162
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CORAM:
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PELLETIER J.A.
NEAR J.A.
BOIVIN J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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WAEL MAGED
BADAWY
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Appellant
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and
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WALDEMAR A. IGRAS,
WALDEMAR A. IGRAS PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATION,
LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA, and
ALBERTA LAWYERS
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
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Respondents
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
BOIVIN J.A.
[1]
Mr. Wael Maged Badawy (the appellant) appeals an
Order of a Judge of the Federal Court (the Judge) dated January 20, 2015
(T-1289-14). In her Order, the Judge dismissed a motion from the appellant seeking
to set aside the Order of a Prothonotary – acting as a Case Management Judge – issued
on November 27, 2014 as well as all other Orders and Directions previously made
by the Prothonotary.
[2]
Upon hearing the submissions of the parties and
reviewing the record, I am satisfied that the Judge’s reasons addressed the
issues raised by the appellant and that the Judge was right in not interfering
with the Prothonotary’s Order. The Judge’s analysis and conclusions were
neither “arrived at on a wrong basis [n]or […] plainly
wrong” (Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V, 2003 SCC 27 at
para. 18, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450) for the following reasons.
[3]
First, although I agree with the appellant that
his statement of claim against the respondents raises causes of action under
the federal Trade-marks Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. T-13, the difficulty with
the appellant’s position is that his proposed Third Party Claim is not related
to the subject matter of the Trade-mark action. As such, it does not satisfy
Rule 193 of the Federal Courts Rules, S.O.R./98-106. Furthermore, the
appellant’s Third Party Claim arises from provisions of Alberta’s Legal
Profession Act, R.S.A., 2000, c. L-8 which is provincial legislation. His
Third Party Claim therefore falls outside this Court’s statutory jurisdiction.
[4]
The appellant’s equating the enforcement
of parallel proceedings in a provincial court – during which he was
incarcerated for contempt of court – with “torture” is, to say the least,
deprived of merit. While the inconvenience caused by the need to pursue
parallel proceedings in a provincial court may be seen by the appellant as
unfortunate, it certainly does not amount to “cruel and
unusual treatment” under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
[5]
Second, the appellant submits that he should
have been granted leave to file an affidavit of documents under Rule 223(1) of
the Federal Courts Rules (Discovery and Inspection). However, this Rule
clearly pertains to the timing of service and not to filing. This argument also
fails.
[6]
Third, the appellant alleges that the
Prothonotary demonstrated bias and that his previous Orders are void. It is
recalled that there is “a strong presumption that
judges will administer justice impartially” (Collins v. Canada,
2011 FCA 140 at para. 7, [2011] 4 C.T.C. 157) and, a review of the record does
not support the appellant’s contention that a person viewing the matter would
think that the Federal Court is prejudiced against him (Appellant’s Memorandum
of Fact and Law at para. 83). The fact that the appellant’s arguments have been
repeatedly unsuccessful before the Federal Court does not undermine the Court’s
impartiality in any way and I have not been convinced otherwise.
[7]
Finally, despite the appellant’s insistence to
the contrary and as mentioned above, this Court does not have jurisdiction to
address the allegation that the Law Society of Alberta has failed in its role
to regulate the profession in maintaining the integrity of its members and to
protect the public.
[8]
I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs at
the high end of Column III, items 14(a) and 19 of Tariff B.
“Richard Boivin”
“I agree
J.D. Denis
Pelletier J.A.”
“I agree
D.G. Near J.A.”
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