Date: 20030429
Docket: A-333-02
Citation: 2003 FCA 194
CORAM: STONE J.A.
EVANS J.A.
MALONE J.A.
BETWEEN:
ERIC SCHEUNEMAN
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 29, 2003.
Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on April 29, 2003.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: THE COURT
Date: 20030429
Docket: A-333-02
Citation: 2003 FCA 194
CORAM: STONE J.A.
EVANS J.A.
MALONE J.A.
BETWEEN:
ERIC SCHEUNEMAN
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
[1] Mr. Scheuneman, the appellant, did not appear for the appeal and was not represented. Counsel for the Crown advised the Court that she has several files with Mr. Scheuneman and that he often does not appear for hearings. The panel adjourned for fifteen minutes in case Mr. Scheuneman had been prevented from appearing at the scheduled time of 10 o'clock. When he did not appear, the panel proceeded to consider Mr. Scheuneman's written request for an adjournment, on which counsel for the Crown took no position.
[2] We decided to dismiss Mr. Scheuneman's request that the hearing of his appeal be adjourned pending the disposition by the Supreme Court of Canada of his application for leave to appeal an order of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Canada. That order dismissed a motion by Mr. Scheuneman that this appeal be conducted entirely on the basis of written materials.
[3] In our opinion, Mr. Scheuneman's appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on this issue has very little prospect of success. Moreover, even if Mr. Scheuneman were successful, and the Supreme Court of Canada reversed the order of the Chief Justice, he would not be prejudiced by our hearing the current appeal. Mr Scheuneman could always seek leave to appeal an unfavourable decision in this appeal to the Supreme Court, or ask this Court to reconsider its decision in the light of a Supreme Court decision holding that his motion for a "paper hearing" should have been granted.
[4] We would also note that, before he filed his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the Chief Justice's order, he had made requests to two Judges of this Court to adjourn his appeal on the ground that he intended to seek leave to appeal. They refused his requests. The fact that he has now applied for leave is not a reason for our granting a request that has already been refused twice.
[5] We now turn to the merits of the appeal. This is an appeal by Eric Scheuneman from a decision of Pinard J. of the Trial Division, dated May 22, 2002, granting a motion by the Attorney General to strike an application for judicial review brought by Mr. Scheuneman. The application for judicial review concerns a dismissal by the Supreme Court of Canada, dated June 21, 2001, of Mr. Scheuneman's application for leave to appeal a decision of this Court, dated December 1, 2000, and the Supreme Court's dismissal of his motion to reconsider its refusal of leave, dated November 1, 2001.
[6] Mr. Scheuneman maintains that his reconsideration motion and his leave application were improperly denied, and he asks this Court to set aside the refusal to reconsider and to order the Supreme Court to reconsider according to law its refusal to grant him leave to appeal.
[7] After carefully considering the written materials filed by the parties, we are all of the view that this appeal should be dismissed. Since Mr. Scheuneman's application for judicial review is bereft of any possibility of success it was appropriate for Pinard J. to strike the application for judicial review: David Bull Laboratories (Can.) Inc. v. Pharmacia Inc., [1995] 1 F.C. 588 (C.A.). The application was bound to fail because the Supreme Court of Canada is not a "federal board, commission or other tribunal" within the meaning of sections 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. Therefore, its decisions or orders cannot be the subject of an application for judicial review in the Federal Court.
[8] In his written submissions in support of his appeal, Mr. Scheuneman argues that the Supreme Court of Canada derives its jurisdiction from the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. c. S-19, a federal statute, and therefore falls within the definition of "federal board, commission or other tribunal" in subsection 2(1) of the Federal Court Act: "any body or any person or persons having, exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of Parliament". He further submits that, while persons appointed as judges under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 are specifically excluded by subsection 2(1) from the definition of "federal board, commission or other tribunal", no such exclusion applies to Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada who are appointed under section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
[9] He goes on to argue that, if it had not been for the specific exemption, section 96 judges would have fallen within the statutory definition in subsection 2(1) of the Federal Court Act. Accordingly, in the absence of such an exclusion applying to them, Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada comprise a "federal board, commission or other tribunal". Furthermore, Mr. Scheuneman maintains that it is contrary to the rule of law that any tribunal or court, including the Supreme Court of Canada, should be able to render decisions, including the dismissal of a motion to reconsider, that unlawfully deny individuals their legal or constitutional rights without any right of appeal or review.
[10] We are all satisfied that this argument must fail. In our view, it would be so absurd to interpret "federal board, commission or other tribunal" as including the Supreme Court of Canada that Parliament did not think it necessary specifically to exclude the Judges of that Court from the definition. The court system in Canada, and elsewhere, is hierarchical in nature. In Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada sits at the apex of our judicial system. Subject to a residual discretion to reconsider its own decisions (R. v. Hinse, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 3), the Supreme Court's judgments (including decisions not to reconsider a leave application) are final and conclusive: Supreme Court of Canada Act, section 52. They are not subject to appeal. To interpret "federal board, commission or other tribunal" as including the Supreme Court of Canada, and as thus permitting the Federal Court to review judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, would undermine the finality of the Supreme Court's decisions and subvert the judicial hierarchy.
[11] If, as Mr. Scheuneman maintains, the Federal Court could review a decision or order of the Supreme Court of Canada, the decision of the Federal Court would itself be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. Moreover, if the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal, that refusal could itself potentially be the subject of a further application for judicial review to the Federal Court. It would be absurd to construe the Federal Court Act as conferring on the Court jurisdiction to review the decision of a body when the result of the review could then be appealed to the very body that made the decision under review. There would be no finality to litigation.
[12] Mr. Scheuneman unsuccessfully contested his dismissal from employment by the Crown before an Adjudicator, whose decision was reviewed by both Divisions of the Federal Court. And, he was unable to persuade the Supreme Court to hear his appeal or to reconsider its decision to refuse him leave to appeal. Even though he may not agree with any of the decisions rendered in this matter, Mr. Scheuneman cannot credibly claim not to have had it fully considered. No one has a right to consume scarce public resources indefinitely in the endless pursuit of a dispute, no matter how important the issues may seem to the individual concerned. Finality is an indispensable aspect of any system of justice.
[13] For these reasons the appeal will be dismissed with costs fixed in the amount of $1,000 inclusive of disbursements.
"A.J. Stone"
J.A.
"John M. Evans"
J.A.
"B. Malone"
J.A.
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-333-02
STYLE OF CAUSE: ERIC SCHEUNEMAN
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 29, 2003
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT STONE J.A.
BY THE COURT: EVANS J.A.
MALONE J.A.
DATED: APRIL 29, 2003
APPEARANCES:
MARIE-JOSÉE MONTREUIL FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
ERIC SCHEUNEMAN APPELLANT ON HIS OWN BEHALF
MORRIS ROSENBURG
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF CANADA FOR THE RESPONDENT