Date:
20070503
Docket: A-243-06
Citation: 2007
FCA 176
CORAM: RICHARD
C.J.
EVANS
J.A.
RYER
J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
ENVOY
RELOCATION SERVICES
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EVANS J.A.
A. INTRODUCTION
[1]
This
is an application for judicial review by the Attorney General of Canada to set
aside a revised decision of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (“CITT”),
dated April 26, 2006. In that decision, the CITT recommended that Envoy
Relocation Services be awarded half the cost of preparing its unsuccessful bids
for two government contracts.
[2]
The
Attorney General says that a decision to recommend that any compensation should
be paid to Envoy, other than the cost of making its complaint to the Tribunal, would
be patently unreasonable. The mistake made by Public Works and Government
Services Canada (“PWGSC”) in evaluating section 2.2.4.2 of Annex “D” of Envoy’s
proposals did not result in its failing to obtain the contracts. Consequently,
since PWGSC’s breach of a contractual term in the Requirement for Proposals
(“RFP”) caused Envoy no loss, it was not entitled to compensation for the cost
of preparing its bids, an expense which unsuccessful bidders have to bear as
part of the normal cost of doing business.
[3]
In
my opinion, the CITT’s decision cannot be said to be patently unreasonable, in
light of the broad remedial discretion conferred by statute, not only to do
justice between the parties, but also to support its regulatory role in the
procurement process. Nor am I persuaded that the CITT committed any reviewable
error in its interpretation of its enabling legislation. I would dismiss the
application for judicial review.
B. BACKGROUND OF
THE APPLICATION
[4]
This
matter has a substantial history which it will be helpful to explain briefly.
The two contracts in question were for the provision of relocation services to
the Canadian Forces, and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the
Government of Canada. According to Envoy, the assessed value of these two
contracts is over $563 million, while PWGSC puts their value at only just over
$154 million. On November 2, 2004, PWGSC awarded both contracts to Royal LePage
Relocation Services Limited.
[5]
On
February 18, 2005, Envoy filed a complaint with the CITT under subsection
30.1(1) of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th
Supp.), c. 47 (“CITT Act”), alleging three errors in the bid evaluation
process. The only complaint that the CITT accepted was that PWGSC had breached
the RFP by deducting points when it evaluated section 2.2.4.2 of Envoy’s proposals,
because the information provided by Envoy in section 2.2.4.2 of its proposal for
one contract was not consistent with that which it provided in the same section
of its proposal for the other contract. Section 2.2.4.2 carried a maximum of 80
points out of a total of 1,000.
[6]
In
a decision dated May 16, 2005, the CITT upheld Envoy’s complaint, on the ground
that the RFP did not contemplate that the evaluation of proposals would be
based on a comparison of the proposals made by a bidder for the contracts. To
remedy the breach, the CITT recommended, pursuant to subsections 30.15(2) and
(3) of the CITT Act, that section 2.2.4.2 of all bidders’ proposals be
re-evaluated by a new evaluation team. It explained its rationale in its
reasons as follows.
34. In this case,
although the evidence does not indicate a lack of good faith, a serious
breach of evaluation procedures did occur, and the consequences of that breach
potentially affected the award of two contacts, thus potentially prejudicing
all parties involved in the solicitation. PWGSC, though the drafting of
the Statement of Work and the selection of the specific clauses of the RFP, is
able to determine the detailed rules that govern each procurement process
beyond the general contracting framework established by the trade agreements. When
it does not follow its own rules, it prejudices the integrity of government
procurement as a whole.
…
36. The Tribunal does
not grant Envoy’s request for costs relating to the preparation of its
proposals. In recommending the [re-evaluation of section 2.2.4.2 in all
bidders’ proposals], the Tribunal’s objective is to put Envoy in the
position where its proposals receive the benefit of the evaluation process that
it contemplated when it incurred the costs of preparing its proposals.
[Emphases
added]
[7]
Allowing
an application for judicial review by the Attorney General, this Court upheld
the CITT’s finding that there had been a breach of the RFP in the evaluation of
section 2.2.4.2 in Envoy’s proposals. However, it set aside the remedy
recommended by the CITT: Canada (Attorney General) v.
Envoy Relocation Services, 2005 FCA 13.
[8]
The
Court reasoned that, since the only error identified by the CITT was in the
evaluation of section 2.2.4.2 of Envoy’s proposals, there was no justification
for requiring the re-evaluation of this same section in other bidders’
proposals. Moreover, since a re-evaluation of this section in Envoy’s proposals
would still leave Royal LePage with more points than Envoy, a re-evaluation of
section 2.2.4.2 in Envoy’s proposals would serve no purpose. As a result, the
Court said (at para. 3):
… the scope of the
remedy must be limited to the monetary relief sought by Envoy in its complaint.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the CITT’s
order and remitted the matter for a re-determination of the remedy in accordance
with the above reasons.
[9]
The
monetary relief requested by Envoy in its complaint comprised compensation for
loss of profits, reimbursement of its bid preparation costs (including experts
and lawyers), and the costs of preparing and proceeding with the complaint.
C. DECISION UNDER
REVIEW
[10]
After
setting out the submissions of the parties, the CITT reiterated (at para. 24 of
its reasons) the finding in its earlier determination (at para. 34) that “there
had been a serious breach of evaluation procedures that prejudiced the
integrity of the government procurement system as a whole”, factors that the
CIT must consider under paragraphs 30.15(3)(a) and (c), and that
“the remedy should reflect the seriousness of the impact of PWGSC’s breach.”
[11]
In
the decision now under review, the CITT noted (at para. 25) that this Court’s
decision prevented it from recommending a remedy “that gives Envoy the benefit
of the evaluation process that it expected when it prepared these proposals …”.
Instead, the CITT stated that it would pursue “the alternative approach of
trying to put Envoy into the same position in which it would have been if it
had known how PWGSC was going to evaluate section 2.2.4.2 …”: at para. 26.
[12]
The
CITT concluded that, in view of the heavy weighting (75%) given to the technical
aspects of the proposals, including section 2.2.4.2, Envoy would reasonably
have taken this section very seriously, not knowing if the evaluation of it
would make the difference between winning or losing the contracts. Further, the
CITT held that, if Envoy had known that its bids would be compared by the
evaluators in breach of the RFP, it would still have bid on the contracts, but
would have avoided the appearance of inconsistency, either by structuring its
proposals differently or submitting only one.
[13]
The
CITT summarized its decision as follows (at para. 30):
… given the seriousness
of the breach of evaluation procedures, which deserves significant
compensation, the Tribunal considers that an amount equal to 50 percent of
Envoy’s bid preparation costs is an appropriate amount.
Reasonable costs were to be determined
after the parties had had an opportunity to file submissions with the CITT. Counsel
for Envoy indicated at the hearing before us that his client estimated that it
had spent a total of $1.4 million on its bid preparation. In addition, the CITT
awarded $500 to Envoy for the costs of preparing for the re-consideration of
the original decision.
D. LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK
[14]
The
remedial powers of the CITT relevant to this case are contained in section
30.15 of the CITT Act.
…
30.15(2) Subject to the
regulations, where the Tribunal determines that a complaint is valid, it may
recommend such remedy as it considers appropriate, including any one or more
of the following remedies:
(a)
that a new solicitation for the designated contract be issued;
(b)
that the bids be re-evaluated;
(c)
that the designated contract be terminated;
(d)
that the designated contract be awarded to the complainant; or
(e)
that the complainant be compensated by an amount specified by the Tribunal.
(3)
The Tribunal shall, in recommending an appropriate remedy under subsection
(2), consider all the circumstances relevant to the procurement of the goods
or services to which the designated contract relates, including
(a)
the seriousness of any deficiency in the procurement process found by the
Tribunal;
(b)
the degree to which the complainant and all other interested parties were
prejudiced;
(c)
the degree to which the integrity and efficiency of the competitive
procurement system was prejudiced;
(d)
whether the parties acted in good faith; and
(e)
the extent to which the contract was performed.
(4) Subject
to the regulations, the Tribunal may award to the complainant the reasonable
costs incurred by the complainant in preparing a response to the solicitation
for the designated contract.
30.16(1)
Subject to the regulations, the Tribunal may award costs of, and incidental
to, any proceedings before it in relation to a complaint on a final or
interim basis and the costs may be fixed at a sum certain or may be taxed.
…
|
[…]
30.15(2)
Sous réserve des règlements, le Tribunal peut, lorsqu’il donne gain de cause
au plaignant, recommander que soient prises des mesures correctives,
notamment les suivantes :
a) un nouvel appel d’offres;
b) la réévaluation des soumissions présentées;
c) la résiliation du contrat spécifique;
d) l’attribution du contrat spécifique au
plaignant;
e) le versement d’une indemnité, dont il
précise le montant, au plaignant.
(3)
Dans sa décision, le Tribunal tient compte de tous les facteurs qui
interviennent dans le marché de fournitures ou services visé par le contrat
spécifique, notamment des suivants :
a) la gravité des irrégularités qu’il a
constatées dans la procédure des marchés publics;
b) l’ampleur du préjudice causé au plaignant ou
à tout autre intéressé;
c) l’ampleur du préjudice causé à l’intégrité
ou à l’efficacité du mécanisme d’adjudication;
d) la bonne foi des parties;
e) le degré d’exécution du contrat.
(4)
Le Tribunal peut, sous réserve des règlements, accorder au plaignant le
remboursement des frais entraînés par la préparation d’une réponse à l’appel
d’offres.
30.16(1)
Les frais relatifs à l’enquête — même provisionnels — sont, sous réserve des
règlements, laissés à l’appréciation du Tribunal et peuvent être fixés ou
taxés.
[…]
|
E. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
1. Standard
of review
[15]
Questions
of statutory interpretation not within the CITT’s area of expertise are subject
to judicial review on a standard of correctness: Canada (Attorney
General) v. McNally Construction Inc., 2002 FCA 184 at para.
16. I shall assume for the purpose of this application that the CITT’s interpretation
of subsections 30.15(2) and (3) are reviewable on this standard.
[16]
However,
patent unreasonableness is the standard of review applicable to the CITT’s
findings of fact (Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, paragraph
18.1(4)(d)) and to other matters within its expertise: see, for example,
Siemens Westinghouse Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public
Works and Government Services), 2001 FCA 241 at para. 15.
[17]
A
specialist tribunal’s exercise of a broad grant of remedial discretion falls
directly within the area of its expertise: see Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour
Relations Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 369 at para. 58. In my opinion, this is
also true of the CITT.
[18]
It
is trite that an applicant has a heavy burden to discharge in order to satisfy
a reviewing court that the decision of a specialist administrative tribunal is
patently unreasonable. This standard of review, Iacobucci J. said in Law
Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247 at para.
52, connotes an administrative decision “so flawed that no amount of curial
deference can justify letting it stand.”
2. Was the CITT’S
decision patently unreasonable?
[19]
Counsel
for the Attorney General submitted that, because there was no causal connection
between PWGSC’s “inconsequential” breach of the RFP and any loss suffered by
Envoy, the recommendation of any compensation (other than the costs of the
complaint) would represent a windfall to Envoy. Consequently, it was patently
unreasonable for the CITT to recommend that PWGSC compensate Envoy for half of
the substantial sum that it had spent on the preparation of its bids.
[20]
The
argument, in effect, is that, as a matter of law, the CITT could only award
“compensation” under subsection 30.15(2) for any loss caused to Envoy by PWGSC
when it failed to evaluate section 2.2.4.2 of its proposals in accordance with
the RFP. Since, except for the modest cost of pursuing its complaint, Envoy had
suffered no loss attributable to PWGSC’s breach, the CITT should not have
recommended any compensation.
[21]
I
do not agree. Counsel’s argument assumes that, in recommending monetary relief,
the CITT must determine the amount payable, if any, by reference to common law
principles applicable to the award of damages for breach of contract. However,
this argument overlooks the fact that, like many other specialist tribunals,
the CITT performs a regulatory role in the administrative process. In order that
an agency may discharge the mandate entrusted to it in the public interest,
reviewing courts should not assume that the legislature intended the agency
under review to exercise its remedial powers on exactly the same bases as those
on which courts exercise analogous powers to resolve disputes governed
exclusively by private law.
[22]
Although
performing essentially adjudicative functions when it inquires into complaints
by disappointed bidders on government contracts that they were unfairly treated,
the CITT must exercise its powers with a view to, among other things,
maintaining potential bidders’ confidence in the integrity of the procurement
system. An erosion of confidence would have a detrimental impact on the
competitiveness of bidding. Hence, it should not be assumed that the CITT’s
power to recommend compensation is exercisable exclusively on the basis of
common law principles.
[23]
It
is relevant in this context that Parliament used the generic word “compensated”
in subsection 30.15(2), not the more distinctively legal term “damages”. Nor
did it specify that a complainant is only to be “compensated” for a loss caused
to it by breaches of contract, or other improper conduct, by PWGSC.
[24]
Further,
Parliament directed the CITT, when recommending the appropriate relief listed
in subsection 30.15(2), to take into consideration all the relevant
circumstances, including the non-exhaustive list of considerations in
subsection 30.15(3). In the present case, this Court had already determined
that monetary relief was the appropriate remedy. Thus, when the matter was
remitted to the CITT for a re-determination of the remedy, it only had to
quantify the award.
[25]
In
quantifying the compensation, the CITT was engaged in recommending “an
appropriate remedy under subsection 30.15(2)” and was thus obliged to consider
the factors listed in subsection 30.15(3). The “appropriate remedy” as
described in paragraph 30.15(2)(e) is that the complainant be
compensated “by an amount specified by the [CITT]”.
[26]
The
factors to be considered under subsection 30.15(3) bear little resemblance to
the principles on which courts award damages for breach of contract, in the
sense that, in recommending the appropriate remedy, the CITT must have regard,
not only to the prejudice of the complainant, but also to systemic concerns.
[27]
It
is particularly evident from paragraph (c) of subsection 30.15(3) that
the CITT must fashion its relief with a view to, among other things, ensuring
that potential bidders are not deterred from incurring the non-recoverable
costs of preparing bids in response to future RFPs. This paragraph requires the
CITT to have regard to “the degree to which the integrity and efficiency of the
competitive bidding process was prejudiced” by the deficiency in the
procurement process.
[28]
In
my view, other factors, namely the seriousness of the deficiency (paragraph 30.15(3)(a)),
prejudice to other interested parties (paragraph 30.15(3)(b)), and the
good faith of the parties (paragraph 30.15(3)(d)), also indicate an
approach to the recommendation of an appropriate remedy
different from the principles motivating
the choice of the appropriate relief at common law, including damages, for remedying
a breach of contract. This is not to say, of course, that when a complainant
alleges a loss of profit or opportunity the CITT should not also have regard to
principles familiar in the private law of contract in order to quantify the
compensation appropriate: see the CITT’s Procurement Compensation Guidelines.
[29]
Nor
was Envoy altogether unscathed by the erroneous evaluation. It had invested its
resources in preparing bids in reliance on the RFP, and had the reasonable
expectation that they would be evaluated in accordance with the terms of the
RFP. It was denied this expectation as a result of PWGSC’s error and this
Court’s decision that the CITT’s recommendation of a re-evaluation of section
2.2.4.2 in all bidders’ proposals was not appropriate. That the loss of this expectation
would not be compensable in damages at common law does not necessarily mean
that the CITT cannot recommend that Envoy be compensated. In the exercise of
its remedial powers, the CITT requires flexibility to enable it to respond to
the particular problem before it.
[30]
Counsel
submitted that the CITT’s decision cannot be supported on the basis of the
statutory criteria. In particular, he said, given that the deficiency in the
procurement process was unrelated to Envoy’s failure to win the contracts,
there was no basis in the evidence for the CITT’s conclusion that the
deficiency was “serious” for the purpose of paragraph 30.15(3)(b).
[31]
I
disagree. While its reasons are not very full, the CITT maintained since its
original decision that the breach of the evaluation procedure in this case was
serious. It noted in its earlier
decision (at para. 34) that the breach was potentially
capable of affecting the award of the contracts: the wrongly evaluated section
represented 8% of the total points, a percentage which, in other situations, could
well determine the outcome of a competition. Moreover, the error occurred at
the core of the evaluation process.
[32]
In
other words, PWGSC’s failure to comply with the RFP was the kind of error
which, if left substantially uncompensated, might reasonably be regarded as deterring
bidders from responding to future RFPs. As the CITT concluded in its earlier
decision (at para. 34), the error identified in the evaluation process “prejudices
the integrity of government procurement as a whole.” In my opinion, the fact
that Envoy may not, in fact, have lost the contracts because of the breach does
not necessarily make it patently unreasonable for the CITT to have concluded
that the breach was serious.
[33]
Nor,
in the circumstances of this case, am I persuaded that it was patently
unreasonable for the CITT, when considering if it was appropriate to recommend
the reimbursement of all or part of the bid preparation expense, to ask itself
whether Envoy would have submitted a bid if it had known that the error was
going to occur.
[34]
On
the other hand, I do not accept the submission of Envoy that, when this Court
remitted the matter to the CITT on the basis that the remedy must be limited to
“the monetary relief sought by Envoy” (at para. 3), it was thereby directing
the CITT to recommend a monetary award over and beyond the costs incurred by
Envoy in making the complaint. The amount of any monetary award was not at
issue before the Court at that time: rather, the question was whether bid
re-evaluation was an appropriate remedy.
[35]
Finally,
I note that subsection 30.15(4) confers a power on the CITT to award, and not merely
to recommend, the reasonable costs incurred by a complainant in the preparation
of its response to an RFP. In exercising this power, the CITT is not required
to consider the list of factors in subsection 30.15(3). This power has been
used in the past by the CITT to award bid preparation costs to a successful
complainant when the procurement has been cancelled and the contract
re-tendered: David M. Attwater, Procurement Review: A Practitioner’s Guide,
looseleaf (Scarborough Ont.: Carswell, 2001), chap. 2.27.1.
[36]
For
reasons not apparent to me, the CITT did not base its decision in this case on
subsection 30.15(4). Nonetheless, the presence of this specific yet
unstructured discretion in the CITT’s remedial arsenal supports
me in my conclusion that it was not patently unreasonable or otherwise
erroneous in law for it to determine that partial reimbursement of Envoy’s bid
preparation costs was an appropriate remedy in the particular and, to date,
unique circumstances of this case.
F. CONCLUSION
[37]
For
these reasons, I would dismiss the application for judicial review with costs.
“John M. Evans”
“I
agree.
J.
Richard C.J.”
RYER J.A. (Dissenting)
Introduction
[38]
This
judicial review deals with the complaint provisions of the Canadian
International Trade Tribunal Act, R.S.C. 1985 (4th Supp.) c. 47 (the “CITT
Act”) that relate to the procurement process with respect to contracts for the
supply of goods or services that have been or will be awarded by certain
government institutions. The relevant provisions of the CITT Act are reproduced
in Appendix “A”. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in these
reasons are to the corresponding provisions of the CITT Act.
[39]
I have had
the benefit of reviewing the reasons of Evans J.A. and with respect, I have
come to a different conclusion. For the reasons that follow, it is my view that
Envoy should only be awarded costs in the amount of $500.
[40]
The
description of the history of Envoy’s complaint before the Tribunal and this
Court has been well summarized in the reasons of Evans J.A.
[41]
It is
important to note that the subject matter of a complaint pursuant to subsection
30.11(1), such as the complaint made by Envoy in the present circumstances, is
inherently contractual in that the complaint must concern aspects of the
procurement process that relate to “designated contracts”, as defined in
section 30.1. There is no issue as to whether the underlying contracts fell in
this case within that definition. If they did not, the complaint could not have
been considered by the Tribunal.
[42]
As a
general proposition, when the Tribunal has made a determination, pursuant to
subsection 30.15(2), that a complaint is valid and decides to recommend a
remedy, subsection 30.15(3) obligates the Tribunal, in recommending an
appropriate remedy pursuant to subsection 30.15(2), to consider all of the
circumstances relevant to the procurement that gave rise to the complaint,
including those matters discussed under paragraphs 30.15(3)(a) to (e).
[43]
In my
view, this Court determined the type of remedy that the Tribunal was permitted
to grant to Envoy when it stated, in Canada (Attorney General) v. Envoy
Relocation Services, 2006 FCA 13 (Envoy 2006), that “the remedy must
be limited to the monetary relief sought by Envoy in its complaint”.
Accordingly, I disagree with Evans J.A. when he states that in making the
decision that is the subject of this application for judicial review the
Tribunal was “still engaged in recommending an appropriate remedy for the
purposes of subsection 30.15(2)”. It follows, in my view, that because the
“appropriate remedy” had already been determined, no further consideration of
subsection 30.15(3) was warranted.
[44]
The remedy
of compensation is contained in paragraph 30.15(2)(e). Evans J.A.
appears to agree that paragraph 30.15(2)(e) is applicable to the
circumstances under review. However, we appear to disagree as to how the amount
of compensation is to be determined.
[45]
With
respect, I do not agree with Evans J.A. when he states that the term
“compensated”, as used in relation to paragraph 30.15(2)(e), is a
generic word. In my view, compensated means given compensation and compensation
is a term with an established legal meaning. The principles of compensation are
well understood in the law relating to damages for breach of contract. In my
view, it is appropriate to have general reliance on those principles, since,
after all, the procurement process that underlies the complaint in issue is
essentially contractual in nature and the complaint at issue relates to
“designated contracts”.
[46]
Paragraph
1.2 of the Canadian International Trade Tribunal Procurement Compensation
Guidelines (the “Compensation Guidelines”), which have been adopted by the
Tribunal, states that where the Tribunal has decided to recommend the payment
of compensation, neither the CITT Act nor the regulations thereunder provide
guidance as to how the precise amount of compensation is to be determined. For
that reason, the Tribunal adopted the Compensation Guidelines to inform parties
as to the principles that it will adopt in making an award of compensation.
While not so stated, the Compensation Guidelines adopt a number of
long-standing principles of law that have been developed in the area of
contractual damages. Notably absent from the Compensation Guidelines is any
indication that the provisions of subsection 30.15(3) are to be relied upon in
the determination of the amount of any award of compensation.
[47]
While the
Compensation Guidelines are not binding upon this Court, in my view, they are a
useful tool in the determination of the proper interpretation of the term
compensation for the purposes of paragraph 30.15(2)(e), which is the
essential issue to be determined in this application for judicial review.
Standard of Review
[48]
Although
Evans J.A. agrees that the construction of subsections 30.15(2) and (3) is
reviewable on a correctness standard, he indicates that at issue in this case
is a specialist tribunal’s exercise of a broad grant of remedial discretion. He
consequently finds that the decision of the Tribunal should be reviewed on a
standard of patent unreasonableness.
[49]
In my
view, the issue in this appeal is the legal characterization of the amount that
can be provided under paragraph 30.15(2)(e) to a complainant whose
complaint has been found to be valid. This preliminary
determination is an extricable question of law that is neither scientific, nor
technical and is intrinsic to the general law of remedies. This determination
does not fall within the specialized expertise of the Tribunal and is one that
has traditionally fallen within the province of the Courts. Consequently, in my
view, this determination is reviewable on the standard of correctness (Canada (Deputy Minister of National
Revenue) v. Mattel Canada Inc., [2001] 2 S.C.R. 100 at paragraph 33).
Analysis
[50]
It is trite law that statutory interpretation
should be done according to the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Rizzo
& Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, namely that:
the words of an Act are to be
read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament.
[51]
Paragraph
30.15(2)(e) provides the remedy of compensation to a complainant whose
complaint has been found to be valid. In paragraph 23 of his reasons, Evans
J.A. states:
It is relevant in this
context that Parliament used the generic word “compensated” in subsection
30.15(2), not the more distinctively legal term “damages”. Nor did it specify
that a complainant is only to be “compensated” for a loss caused to it by
breaches of contract, or other improper conduct, by PWGSC.
With respect, the suggested interpretation of the term
“compensation” ignores the well established meaning of that term at common law.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines compensation as follows:
Payment of damages, or
any other act that a Court orders to be done by a person who has caused injury
to another. In theory, compensation makes the injured person whole.
It is clear from this definition that an amount will not
constitute a payment of compensation unless the amount can be shown to have
been made by the payor to the payee to make the payee whole in relation to an
injury that the payor caused the payee to suffer.
[52]
This
interpretation of the term compensation is consistent with the approach that
would be taken by a Court where damages were determined to be the appropriate
remedy for a breach of contract at common law. (See Waddams, S.M. The Law of
Damages 2nd ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc., 1991).) This interpretation
is also consistent with the Compensation Guidelines, in particular Guidelines
3.1.2 and 3.2.2, which read as follows:
3.1.2 In determining the
amount of compensation to recommend, the Tribunal will attempt, insofar as is
appropriate in the circumstances and bearing in mind any other relief that it
recommended, to place the complainant in the position in which it would have
been, but for the government’s breaches.
3.2.2. Remoteness of
Damages – A complainant may not receive compensation for a loss that is
considered too remote by the Tribunal. A breach may cause the complainant to
lose some anticipated gain which is not the immediate result of the breach and
which arises from a separate transaction. In general, a loss may be considered
too remote where it does not flow naturally from the government’s breach or
breaches or where the government could not reasonably have been expected to
know that a loss of that kind would be suffered by the complainant in the event
of the government’s breach of its obligations.
Although not binding or determinative in and of themselves,
the Compensation Guidelines form part of the legal context in which the
subsection operates and therefore are an important factor to consider. In Nowegijick
v. R., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 29, Dickson J. of the Supreme Court of Canada
stated, at page 37:
Administrative policy
and interpretation are not determinative but are entitled to weight and can be
an “important factor” in case of doubt about the meaning of interpretation.
[53]
The case
law also supports an interpretation of subsection 30.15(2)(e) that
adopts the common law principles with respect to the determination of
compensation. The application of the common law principles for remedying a
breach of contract can be found throughout the Tribunal’s jurisprudence. For
example, the following passage from Conair Aviation, a division of Conair
Aviation Ltd. (Re) [1991] C.I.T.T. No. 8, is often included in the
Tribunal’s reasons for judgment:
In considering what principles should
guide the Tribunal in assessing compensation, reference will be made to those
which govern the assessment of damages in the common law. It is evident that
damages may be assessed in cases involving tenders, which of course parallel
the procurement process at issue in this case.
(See
also. Mechron Energy Ltd. C.I.T.T. File No. PR-95-001 and Spacesaver
Corporation C.I.T.T. File No. PR-98-028.)
[54]
Further,
in Cougar Aviation Ltd v. Canada (Minister of Public Works and Government
Services), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1946, a decision of this Court in an
application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal, Evans J.A.
stated, at paragraph 27 of the decision, that the tendering process for federal
government procurement contracts remains in part governed by the private law of
contract. At paragraph 42 of that decision, he states the following:
In my opinion,
therefore, there is nothing in the nature of the decision-making context to
exclude the normal requirement of the common law that those to whom the duty of
fairness applies must avoid conduct that gives rise to a reasonable
apprehension of bias. And, since the text of the Agreement is capable of being
interpreted in a manner consistent with the common law, it should be so construed.
[55]
In my
view, this reasoning is as applicable to the issue under consideration namely,
the appropriate interpretation of the term compensation, as it was in relation
to the application of the common law duty of fairness in Cougar Aviation. While
the Tribunal may well perform a regulatory role in the overall procurement
process, there is nothing in subsection 30.15(2)(e) that suggests that
the Tribunal has the power to go beyond the provision of the remedy of
compensation, as understood in the context of its well understood meaning at
common law. Moreover, because the term compensation, the remedy provided by
paragraph 30.15(2)(e), is capable of being interpreted in a manner consistent
with the common law, as Evans J.A. points out in Cougar Aviation, it
should be so construed. Accordingly, it would be a reviewable error on the part
of the Tribunal to order the payment of an amount as compensation, pursuant to
paragraph 30.15(2)(e), unless all of the common law elements of that
term were present. In particular, it would be an error to order a party to pay
the amount to a complainant for something other than an actual injury caused by
that party to the complainant.
[56]
In Envoy
2006, this Court held that while PWGSC had breached one of its obligations
in the procurement process, the breach could not possibly have affected the
outcome of the bidding process. In other words, the breach by PWGSC did not
cause Envoy to lose the contracts that it sought. As a result of its failure to
obtain those contracts Envoy, like all the other unsuccessful bidders, was left
with nothing to show for the bid costs that it had incurred. However, the award
by the Tribunal of half of those bid costs, resulted in Envoy being in a better
position than it would have been in if the breach by PWGSC had not occurred.
Accordingly, this award went beyond the provision of compensation and was
therefore beyond the power of the Tribunal.
[57]
The
decision of the Supreme Court in Her Majesty the Queen v. The Martel
Building Ltd., 2000 S.C.C. 60, is supportive of my conclusion. In that
case, the Court held that even though the particular government department, in
the course of a tendering process, had breached its duty to treat all bidders
fairly, the unsuccessful bidder, Martel, was not entitled to damages. At
paragraph 102, the Court stated:
[t]o be recoverable, a
loss must be caused by the contractual breach in question. As noted above, the
only breach of Contract A is limited to the addition of the security system
costs to Martel's bid. However, we conclude that damages for this breach of
Contract A are precluded for want of causation. We also find that the
Department's breach did not cause Martel to lose a reasonable expectation of
receiving Contract B. Even if the costs for a security system were deducted
from Martel's bid (or also added to the Standard Life bid), the difference
between the two bids would remain significant.
It will be recalled that the Tribunal, in Conair Aviation,
concluded that tendering cases were similar and relevant to procurement cases
that came before the Tribunal. (See paragraph 15 infra.)
[58]
A
conclusion similar to Martel was reached more recently by Sharlow J.A.
in Med-Emerg International Inc. v. Canada (Public Works and Government
Services) 2006 FCA 147, which was also a judicial review of a
decision of the Tribunal. In that case, the Tribunal found that PWGSC
had breached an obligation relating to the procurement process. However, the
Tribunal did not grant the complainant a remedy because it concluded that the
complainant would not have been able to overcome the successful bidder in any
event and therefore would not have been awarded the contract.
[59]
Of
particular note are the comments of Sharlow J.A. with respect to the
alternative remedies that were claimed in Med-Emerg, namely, lost
profits and bid preparation costs, which are the remedies that are presently
under consideration. At paragraph 29 of her reasons, Sharlow J.A. stated that:
given the CITT’s
determination that Med-Emerg was not prejudiced by any of the errors in the
procurement process, there would have been no foundation for any of the
alternative remedies sought by Med-Emerg.
[60]
The
decisions in Martel and Med-Emerg are supportive of my view that
compensation for a breach of a requirement in the procurement process should
not be awarded to a complainant who has not suffered a loss as a result of that
breach.
[61]
In the
decision under review, the Tribunal reiterated its belief that the breach of
evaluation procedures by PWGSC prejudiced (which I will assume to mean caused
harm to) the “integrity of the government procurement system as a whole”. The
Tribunal then went on, in paragraph 32 of its decision, to “compensate Envoy”,
not for any harm that was done by PWGSC to Envoy, but apparently for the harm
that was done by PWGSC to the “integrity of the government procurement system
as a whole”. In my view, it is incongruous and therefore patently unreasonable,
to provide money to Envoy, a party uninjured by a breach, to redress an injury
that the breach apparently caused to the “integrity of the government
procurement system as a whole”.
[62]
In
paragraph 22 of his reasons, Evans J.A. justifies the award on the basis that
in so doing, the Tribunal was exercising its powers
with a view to, among
other things, maintaining potential bidders confidence in the integrity of the
procurement system. An erosion of confidence would have a detrimental impact on
the competitiveness of bidding. Hence, it should not be assumed that the CITT’s
power to recommend compensation is exercisable exclusively on the basis of
common law principles.
With respect, this appears to say that the compensation is
awarded to Envoy to redress a harm to “potential bidders”. To that extent, I
disagree that such an award could be properly considered to be an award of
compensation.
[63]
In my
view, the award made by the Tribunal provides Envoy with an amount which
exceeds the amount of any loss that Envoy suffered as a result of the breach of
bid evaluation procedures that PWGSC was found to have committed. Such an award
is, therefore, tantamount to an award of punitive damages.
[64]
The nature
of punitive damages has been described by McIntyre J. of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Vorvis v. Insurance Corporation of British Columbia, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1085. At pages 1104 and 1105 he stated:
Problems arise for the
common law wherever the concept of punitive damages is posed. The award of
punitive damages requires that:
… a civil court … impose
what is in effect a fine for conduct it finds worthy of punishment, and then to
remit the fine, not to the State Treasury, but to the individual plaintiff who
will, by definition, be over-compensated. [Waddams, p. 563.]
…
But all authorities
accept the proposition that an award of punitive damages should always receive
the most careful consideration and the discretion to award them should be most
cautiously exercised. As has been mentioned earlier, punitive damages are not
compensatory in nature.
And
at pages 1107 and 1108, he further stated:
Moreover, punitive
damages may only be awarded in respect of conduct which is of such nature as to
be deserving of punishment because of its harsh, vindictive, reprehensible and
malicious nature. I do not suggest that I have exhausted the adjectives which
could describe the conduct capable of characterizing a punitive award, but in
any case where such an award is made the conduct must be extreme in its nature
and such that by any reasonable standard it is deserving of full condemnation
and punishment.
[65]
Whether or
not the Tribunal is empowered to award punitive damages, in my view, the
Tribunal did not, in fact, attempt to do so in its decision, and such an award
would not have been appropriate in any event. This is so for several reasons.
First, as indicated in Vorvis, punitive damages are not “compensatory in
nature” and therefore an award of “compensation” could not be said to encompass
punitive damages. Secondly, Vorvis illustrates that punitive damages are
to be awarded only in relation to conduct that is harsh, vindictive,
reprehensible and malicious in nature. In the present circumstances, while the
Tribunal indicated that the breach was serious, there was no indication of bad
faith on the part of the PWGSC. Accordingly, it would be incongruous to
conclude that conduct that did not amount to bad faith was nonetheless harsh,
vindictive, reprehensible and malicious in nature. It follows, in my view, that
the decision of the Tribunal to award what can only be characterized as
punitive damages to Envoy, in the absence of conduct on the part of PWGSC that
is worthy of punishment or otherwise harsh, vindictive, reprehensible or
malicious in nature, must be patently unreasonable and therefore unsustainable.
[66]
Where the
Tribunal has concerns with respect to the integrity of the procurement system
as a result of what it may believe to be inappropriate conduct on the part of
any government procurement agency, the Tribunal is specifically mandated by
section 30.19 to express its concerns to a senior official of the applicable
government department. That provision reads as follows:
30.19(1) The Tribunal
may provide the deputy head of a government institution with its comments and
observations on any matter that the Tribunal considers should be brought to the
attention of the deputy head in connection with the procurement process.
(2) In subsection (1)
“deputy head” means
(a) where the
government institution is a department or ministry
of state, the person
having by law the status of deputy head;
and
(b) where the
government institution is any other body or an
office, the chief
executive officer of that body or the person
holding that office.
In my view, in the circumstances under review, it would have
been far more appropriate for the Tribunal to express its concerns with respect
to the breach of the procurement procedures by PWGSC through the mechanism
provided by section 30.19, rather than by awarding an amount to Envoy as
compensation for a loss that it did not suffer as a result of that breach.
[67]
The action
taken by the Tribunal is unfair to other unsuccessful bidders who participated
in the same process as Envoy. Moreover, such action may well serve to encourage
litigation on the part of unsuccessful bidders who will be motivated to try to
demonstrate some slight imperfection in the procurement process, in an attempt
to salvage some or all of the costs incurred in the preparation of their
unsuccessful bids.
[68]
I agree
with Evans J.A. that the amount awarded by the Tribunal to Envoy was not an
amount determined under subsection 30.15(4). This is apparent from paragraph 32
of the Tribunal’s decision in which the Tribunal states its recommendation “as
a remedy, that PWGSC compensate Envoy” for one half of its bid
preparation costs. Accordingly, the proper interpretation of subsection
30.15(4) is not a matter that is relevant to this judicial review. However, in
my view, the power that is conferred upon the Tribunal under that particular
provision does not provide a justification for an interpretation of the term
compensation that is inconsistent with the ordinary legal meaning of that term
that is discernible from the jurisprudence under the applicable provisions of
the CITT Act, the relevant administrative practices of the Tribunal and the
common principles with respect to damages for breach of contract.
Conclusion
[69]
By
awarding Envoy half of its bid preparation costs, the Tribunal erred in law and
exceeded the discretion granted to it under subsection 30.15(2)(e).
Moreover, if the standard of review of the decision of the Tribunal is not
correctness, I conclude that the decision of the Tribunal to award Envoy half
of its bid preparation costs is patently unreasonable. Accordingly, I would set
aside the decision of the Tribunal and refer the matter back to the Tribunal
for a new determination on the basis of these reasons, that is to say, that
Envoy should only be awarded the amount of $500 for costs incurred in relation
to the submissions made to the Tribunal after the decision of this Court in Envoy
2006.
“C. Michael Ryer”
APPENDIX “A”
30.1 In this section and in
sections 30.11 to 30.19,
"complaint"
means a complaint filed with the Tribunal under subsection 30.11(1);
"designated
contract" means a contract for the supply of goods or services that has
been or is proposed to be awarded by a government institution and that is
designated or of a class of contracts designated by the regulations;
"government
institution" means any department or ministry of state of the Government
of Canada, or any other body or office, that is designated by the
regulations.
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30.1 Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent article et aux articles 30.11
à 30.19.
«contrat
spécifique » Contrat relatif à un marché de fournitures ou services qui a été
accordé par une institution fédérale — ou pourrait l’être — , et qui soit est
précisé par règlement, soit fait partie d’une catégorie réglementaire.
«institution
fédérale » Ministère ou département d’État fédéral, ainsi que tout autre
organisme, désigné par règlement.
«plainte
» Plainte déposée auprès du Tribunal en vertu du paragraphe 30.11(1).
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30.11 (1) Subject to the regulations, a potential
supplier may file a complaint with the Tribunal concerning any aspect of
the procurement process that relates to a designated contract and request
the Tribunal to conduct an inquiry into the complaint.
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30.11
(1)
Tout fournisseur potentiel peut, sous réserve des règlements, déposer une
plainte auprès du Tribunal concernant la procédure des marchés publics suivie
relativement à un contrat spécifique et lui demander d’enquêter sur cette
plainte.
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30.15(2) Subject to
the regulations, where the Tribunal determines that a complaint is valid, it
may recommend such remedy as it considers appropriate, including any one or
more of the following remedies:
(a)
that a new solicitation for the designated contract be issued;
(b)
that the bids be re-evaluated;
(c)
that the designated contract be terminated;
(d)
that the designated contract be awarded to the complainant; or
(e)
that the complainant be compensated by an amount specified by the
Tribunal.
(3) The
Tribunal shall, in recommending an appropriate remedy under subsection
(2), consider all the circumstances relevant to the procurement of the goods
or services to which the designated contract relates, including
(a)
the seriousness of any deficiency in the procurement process found by the
Tribunal;
(b)
the degree to which the complainant and all other interested parties were
prejudiced;
(c)
the degree to which the integrity and efficiency of the competitive
procurement system was prejudiced;
(d)
whether the parties acted in good faith; and
(e)
the extent to which the contract was performed.
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30.15(2) Sous
réserve des règlements, le Tribunal peut, lorsqu’il donne gain de cause au
plaignant, recommander que soient prises des mesures correctives, notamment
les suivantes :
a) un nouvel
appel d’offres;
b) la
réévaluation des soumissions présentées;
c) la
résiliation du contrat spécifique;
d)
l’attribution du contrat spécifique au plaignant;
e) le
versement d’une indemnité, dont il précise le montant, au plaignant.
(3) Dans sa
décision, le Tribunal tient compte de tous les facteurs qui interviennent
dans le marché de fournitures ou services visé par le contrat spécifique,
notamment des suivants :
a) la gravité
des irrégularités qu’il a constatées dans la procédure des marchés publics;
b) l’ampleur
du préjudice causé au plaignant ou à tout autre intéressé;
c) l’ampleur
du préjudice causé à l’intégrité ou à l’efficacité du mécanisme
d’adjudication;
d) la bonne
foi des parties;
e) le degré
d’exécution du contrat.
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