Date:
20070830
Docket:
A-240-05
Citation: 2007 FCA 273
CORAM: NADON
J.A.
SHARLOW
J.A.
PELLETIER
J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE MORESBY EXPLORERS LTD. and
DOUGLAS GOULD
Appellants
(Applicants)
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA and
COUNCIL OF THE HAIDA NATION
Respondents (Respondents)
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
PELLETIER
J.A.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
In
Moresby Explorers Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General) 2006 FCA 144, [2006]
F.C.J. No. 616, this Court noted that the appellants Moresby Explorers Ltd. and
Douglas Gould (collectively Moresby) had advised that their challenge to the
Haida Allocation Policy (as defined below) was based on Charter grounds only,
so that this Court did not have to dispose of Moresby's argument that the
Policy was void on grounds of administrative discrimination. Moresby
subsequently advised that, in fact, it had not abandoned its argument with
respect to administrative discrimination and requested reconsideration of that
part of the Court's decision. As a result, the parties were reconvened for
argument on the question of whether the Haida Allocation Policy was invalid on
the basis that the enabling legislation did not permit the Superintendent to
discriminate between tour operators on the basis of race or size of business.
FACTS
[2]
This
dispute arises out of the management of the Gwaii Haanas National Park Reserve
(the Park) by the Archipelago Management Board (the AMB). The AMB is a
structure adopted to permit the Government of Canada and the Council of the
Haida Nation to collaborate in the management of the Park without prejudice to
either's position in the negotiation of the Haida land claim over a territory
which includes the Park. For the details of the AMB's structure and its legal
underpinnings, see Moresby Explorers Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General),
2001 FCT 780, [2001] 4 F.C. 591 (T.D.) at paragraph 67.
[3]
In
the exercise of its mandate, the AMB has adopted a group of policies limiting
access to the Park with a view to protecting its natural and cultural
resources. The starting point for those policies was the determination that the
Park's carrying capacity was 33,000 user-day/nights per year. The AMB then
allocated those user-day/nights equally between three groups, namely,
independent users, Haida tour operators, and non-Haida tour operators. As a
result, a maximum allocation of 11,000 user-day/nights was available to each
group. The AMB also adopted a "Business caps" policy to limit the
maximum number of user-day/nights available to any tour operator: 22 client-days
per day, and 2,500 user-day/nights per year. This policy is designed to prevent
any single operator from monopolizing Park resources.
[4]
The
difficulty with the policies adopted by the AMB is that there are no Haida tour
operators, while the non-Haida quota of user-day/nights is oversubscribed. Moresby
alleges that the 11,000 user-day/nights limitation on non-Haida tour operators
is unlawfully restricting the growth of its business.
MORESBY'S SUBMISSIONS
[5]
Moresby
attacks the Haida Allocation Policy and the Business caps on the ground of
administrative discrimination, that is "delegated powers exercised by a
subordinate authority (e.g. a National Parks superintendent) must be
exercised strictly within the ambit of the empowering legislation, particularly
where they restrict employment or the right to work.": Moresby's Memorandum,
at para. 27.
[6]
This
argument is succinctly summarized at paragraph 31 of Moresby's Memorandum where
the following appears:
31. There is
nothing in either the Canada National Parks Act or Businesses Regulations
that remotely authorizes a power to discriminate based on race or business
size. The Act, in s. 4, expressly refers to all the people of Canada. The Businesses
Regulations, ss. 4.1 and 5, proscribe the licensing discretion in
relatively restrictive terms. All statutory provisions focus on the Park and
none on the personal characteristics of the licensee. The most that can be said
is that a subordinate licensing authority may, by necessary implication, assess
the merits and qualifications of individual licence applicants with respect to
their competence to carry out the purposes of the legislation. However, the
legislation nowhere indicates an intention to allow the Superintendent to fence
out or restrict a whole class of applicants on the basis of their race or the
size of their businesses. This is not within the ambit of this legislation. The
purposes of the Competition Act cannot be imported into this Act.
ANALYSIS
[7]
Some
preliminary observations are in order.
[8]
Moresby's
argument is based on administrative law concepts of even-handedness and jurisdiction
and not on human rights or equality grounds. Thus, the question of prohibited
grounds of discrimination does not arise, in the sense that Moresby's argument
is that discrimination between businesses on any basis, including race, is ultra
vires the enabling legislation, not that it is contrary to the Charter
or the Canadian Human Rights Act. Moresby's Charter arguments
were considered in our original decision. The only issue before us is whether
the AMB, acting through the authority of the Superintendent, was authorized by
the governing legislation to regulate the tour operator industry as it has.
[9]
It
is necessary at this stage to define more precisely what is at issue in the
Haida Allocation Policy. In our original decision, we drew a distinction between
the Business caps and the Haida Allocation Policy. Business caps were dealt
with separately and were found to be legitimate. The allocation of quota
between Haida and non-Haida tour operators was referred to as the Haida
Allocation Policy. It is this Policy only which we did not analyze on grounds
of administrative discrimination. Because the legitimacy of the basis of
distinction is not in issue, the question is simply whether the Superintendent
has the legislative mandate to distinguish between, or to create, classes of
businesses for licensing and regulatory purposes.
[10]
While
Moresby's arguments focus on the allocation of quota between Haida and
non-Haida tour operators, the Haida Allocation Policy deals with three groups:
independent visitors, Haida tour operators and non-Haida tour operators. Thus,
the Policy fits within a broader policy of managing tourist access to the Park
territory so as to preserve its natural and cultural heritage. The Park's
carrying capacity is not a function of the availability of tour operators. It
is the AMB's best assessment of the extent of the Park's ability to receive
visitors without suffering degradation of its natural and cultural resources. To
that extent, the fixing of the Park's carrying capacity is not a matter of the National
Parks of Canada Businesses Regulations, S.O.R./98-455 (the Regulations), but
a matter of the management of the Park itself.
[11]
The
allocation of the Park's total carrying capacity between three groups is an
allocation of Park access; in that sense, it is not an allocation of business
capacity. The one-third share of the Park access reserved for independent
tourists is clearly a reservation of park access for those who choose not to
rely upon tour operators for their access to the Park. The allocation of the
remaining two-thirds of the Park's carrying capacity between two kinds of tour
operators does draw a distinction between tour operators. It is the
Superintendent's ability to draw that type of distinction which Moresby
challenges.
[12]
Moresby's
Memorandum puts its position as follows:
8. These Appellants
do not challenge the "park use" restrictions represented by the
overall annual visitor cap of 33,000 user-day/nights, the daily visitor cap of
300 visitors, and the group size per site cap of 12 visitors. These are
rationally connected with park preservation purposes. However, the Appellants
do challenge other restrictions which are aimed at the personal characteristics
of the licensee, namely the restrictions on size of the licensee's business and
the race or ancestry of the licensee.
[13]
At
paragraph 11 of Moresby's Memorandum, the effect of the Haida Allocation Policy
is described as follows:
… In 1999,
however, Parks Canada (through the AMB) established the Haida Allocation Policy
which segregated the quota by barring access by non-Haida persons to the 11,000
user-days/nights which was reserved for Haida persons. The immediate effect of
this was that non-Haida persons were no longer permitted to grow their
business, whether by increased allotments or by pooling, until the total "non-Haida"
quota allotments fell below 11,000. As the Court below held, since the total "non-Haida"
quota allocation for 2004 was 13,778 there was no possibility for business
growth if the licensee were a "non-Haida." Haida ancestry became a
pre-condition to the allotment of new or increased quota. No sharing of Haida
quota with non-Haida persons is allowed.
[14]
In
essence, Moresby is restricted in its ability to grow to the point of utilizing
the full 2,500 user-day/nights cap by the fact that non-Haida operators must
share the 11,000 user-day/nights quota allocated to them. If all tour operators
were sharing the 22,000 user-day/nights reserved for tour operators, there
would be excess capacity and Moresby could expand up to the 2,500
user-day/nights Business cap.
[15]
The
problem raised by Moresby is simply one of competition for a limited resource. Any
quota system carries within it the seeds of the problem of which Moresby
complains. At some point, the demand for the subject of the quota system
exceeds the total available quota. This, in and of itself, does not give rise
to any remedy. If the quota system is lawful – we found that it is – then the
resulting competition for user-day/nights is simply a normal consequence of a
quota scheme.
[16]
In
this case, the problem is exacerbated by the fact that while there is unused
quota reserved for non-existent businesses (Haida tour operators), the existing
tour operators cannot expand their businesses because the quota reserved for
them is oversubscribed. The elimination of the Haida/non-Haida distinction
would provide some immediate relief for non-Haida tour operators but the same
problem will recur when demand for park access exceeds the quota allocated to
tour operators.
[17]
Furthermore,
once Moresby reaches the individual Business cap of 2,500 user-day/nights per
year, it will not benefit from the availability of additional quota for
non-Haida tour operators. Its growth will be constrained by the 2,500
user-day/nights Business cap which we have also found to be valid.
[18]
Seen
in this light, Moresby's complaint about discrimination on the basis of
business size is without merit. The 2,500 user-day/nights Business cap ensures
that all businesses will remain small businesses even though some will be
larger and more successful than others. Every successful tour operator business
in the Park will eventually run up against the 2,500 user-day/nights Business
cap. There is no discrimination on the basis of business size. The growth of
all tour operators, Haida and non-Haida alike, is constrained by the 2,500
user-day/nights Business cap.
[19]
The
only question remaining is whether the Superintendent has the legislative
authority to distinguish between, or to create, different classes of
businesses. An analogous issue was raised in Sunshine Village Corp. v.
Canada (Parks) (F.C.A.), 2004 FCA 166, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 600 (Sunshine
Village Corp.), where Sunshine Village argued that setting building permit
fees in Banff and Jasper National Parks at a higher rate than in other national
parks was unlawful discrimination as it was ultra vires the Governor in
Council. The Trial Division of the Federal Court of Canada (as it then was)
accepted Sunshine Village's argument and held that the differential setting of
business fees was discriminatory (in the administrative law sense) and was not
authorized expressly or by necessary implication by the governing legislation:
see Sunshine Village Corp. v. Canada (Parks) (T.D.), 2003 FCT 546,[2003]
4 F.C. 459.
[20]
This
Court allowed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the legislation authorizing
the making of the Regulations which were allegedly discriminatory was broad
enough to permit the Governor in Council to draw distinctions between users of
different national parks. The Court distinguished the situation before it from
the usual rule in municipal law cases, where discriminatory by-laws are
prohibited, as follows:
18. Unlike the historic practice of the provinces granting specific
powers to municipalities, these words, on their face, confer broad authority on
the Governor in Council. There is no indication that they are subject to any
limitation. The Court must take the statute as it finds it. In the absence of
limiting words in the statute, the Court will not read in limitations.
…
22. The
courts have historically required express or necessarily implied authorization
in municipalities' governing statutes before the municipalities will be allowed
to enact discriminatory by-laws. Conversely, when Parliament confers
regulation-making authority on the Governor in Council in general terms, in
respect of fees for Crown services, the courts approach the review of such
regulations in a deferential manner. That is simply a matter of interpreting,
in context, the words Parliament has used in accordance with their ordinary and
grammatical meaning.
[Sunshine
Village Corp. v. Canada (Parks) (F.C.A.), at para. 18
and 22.]
[21]
Since
there was no limitation in the governing legislation restricting the Governor
in Council's power to set different scales for building fees in different
parks, the Court was not prepared to read them in. The situation is therefore
the exact opposite of that which prevails in municipal law where discrimination
is prohibited unless it is expressly allowed. In the context of legislation
conferring broad regulation making power on the Governor in Council,
discrimination (in the administrative law sense) is permitted unless it is
expressly prohibited.
[22]
Similar
views were expressed in Aerlinte Eireann Teoranta v. Canada
(Minister of Transport), [1990] F.C.J. No. 170
(F.C.A.), (1990) 68 D.L.R. (4th) 220 (Aerlinte Eireann
Teoranta) where the issue was landing fees at airports. Higher fees were
charged at some airports than at others. This Court upheld the Governor in
Council's right to charge different fees at different airports. In the course
of upholding the trial judge's decision, Heald J.A. said:
…
I also agree with him that: The power to make regulations prescribing charges
for use of facilities and services without further fetter, is the power to
establish categories of users.
[Aerlinte
Eireann Teoranta (F.C.A.), at p. 228.]
[23]
In
this case, we are
not dealing with a challenge to the Governor in Council's regulation making
power, but rather with the exercise of the power conferred upon the
Superintendent by those Regulations. The respondent
alleges (at para. 46 of the Attorney General's factum) that because the object
of Moresby's challenge is a policy adopted pursuant to the Regulations rather
than the Regulations themselves, the application cannot succeed, since mere
policies (as opposed to decisions based on policies) are not subject to review.
[24]
The
grounds on which a policy may be challenged are limited. Policies are normally
afforded much deference; one cannot, for example, mount a judicial challenge
against the wisdom or soundness of a government policy (Maple Lodge
Farms Ltd. v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 7-8). This does not, however,
preclude the court from making a determination as to the legality of a given
policy (Canada (Attorney General) v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, [1980] 2
S.C.R. 735 at 751-752; Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, at
140). Because illegality goes to the validity of a policy rather than to its
application, an illegal policy can be challenged at any time; the claimant need
not wait till the policy has been applied to his or her specific case (Krause v. Canada (C.A.), [1999] 2 F.C. 476, at para. 16).
[25]
Turning
to the merits, section 16 of the Canada National Parks Act authorizes
the Governor in Council to make regulations as follows:
16. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations
respecting
…
n) the control of
businesses, trades, occupations, amusements, sports and other activities or
undertakings, including activities related to commercial ski facilities
referred to in section 36, and the places where such activities and
undertakings may be carried on;
|
16. (1)
Le gouverneur en conseil peut prendre des règlements concernant :
…
n) la réglementation
des activités — notamment en matière de métiers, commerces, affaires, sports
et divertissements — , telles que, entre autres, les activités relatives aux
installations commerciales de ski visées à l'article 36, y compris en ce qui
touche le lieu de leur exercice;
|
[26]
The
Regulations deal with the control of business through the licensing process. The
material provisions are as follows:
4.1
The superintendent may, on application by a person in accordance with section
4, and having regard to the matters to be considered under subsection 5(1),
issue a licence to that person to carry on the business indicated in the
application.
5. (1) In
determining whether to issue a licence and under what terms and conditions,
if any, the superintendent shall consider the effect of the business on
(a)
the natural and cultural resources of the park;
(b)
the safety, health and enjoyment of persons visiting or residing in the park;
(c)
the safety and health of persons availing themselves of the goods or services
offered by the business; and
(d)
the preservation, control and management of the park.
(2) The
superintendent must set out as terms and conditions in a licence
(a)
the types of goods and services that will be offered by the business; and
(b)
the address, if any, at which, or a description of the area in the park in
which, the business is to be carried on.
(3)
Depending on the type of business, the superintendent may, in addition to the
terms and conditions mentioned in subsection (2), set out in a licence terms
and conditions that specify
(a)
the hours of operation;
(b)
the equipment that shall be used;
(c)
the health, safety, fire prevention and environmental protection
requirements; and
(d)
any other matter that is necessary for the preservation, control and
management of the park.
|
4.1
Le directeur peut, sur présentation d'une demande conforme à l'article 4 et
après avoir pris en considération les éléments mentionnés au paragraphe 5(1),
délivrer un permis visant l'exploitation du commerce mentionné dans la
demande.
5. (1) Le directeur doit, pour décider s'il y a lieu de délivrer un permis
et, le cas échéant, en déterminer les conditions, prendre en considération
les conséquences de l'exploitation du commerce sur les éléments suivants :
a) les ressources naturelles et culturelles du
parc;
b) la sécurité,
la santé et l'agrément des visiteurs et des résidents du parc;
c) la sécurité et la santé des personnes qui se
prévalent des biens ou services offerts par le commerce;
d) la préservation, la surveillance et l'administration
du parc.
(2)
Le directeur doit indiquer à titre de condition dans le permis :
a) les types de biens et services qu'offrira le
commerce;
b) l'adresse du
commerce, le cas échéant, ou une description des lieux du parc où il sera
exploité.
(3)
Compte tenu du type de commerce visé, le directeur peut, en sus des
conditions visées au paragraphe (2), assortir le permis de conditions portant
sur ce qui suit :
a) les heures d'ouverture;
b) l'équipement à utiliser;
c) les exigences visant la santé, la sécurité,
la prévention des incendies et la protection de l'environnement;
d) tout autre élément nécessaire à la
préservation, à la surveillance et à l'administration du parc. DORS/2002-370,
art. 10(F).
|
[27]
The
regulation making power found in the Canada National Parks Act contains
no limitation which would prohibit the drawing of distinctions between various
classes of businesses. The Regulations promulgated pursuant to that power deal
with the regulation of business by means of the licensing power. That power is
very broad. The Regulations do not contain any explicit limitation on the
Superintendent's power to distinguish between classes of businesses. In fact, subsection
5(3) permits the Superintendent to impose conditions on a business license
which depend upon the type of business. Those conditions include matters
related to "the preservation, control and management of the park." I
have no difficulty concluding that the legislation and the regulations are
sufficiently broad to permit the Superintendent to impose conditions on
business licenses which vary with the kind of business.
[28]
Moresby's
argument is that it is one thing to distinguish between a hardware store and a
restaurant but quite another to distinguish between a Haida owned business and
a non-Haida owned business. The nature of the business being regulated may
require special conditions to be imposed; the personal characteristics of the
owner of the business do not impose a similar requirement. In fact, given human
rights legislation and the equality provisions of the Charter,
conditions or limitations based on race are generally contrary to public
policy.
[29]
In
my view, the question of administrative discrimination resolves itself as
follows. The regulation making power conferred upon the Governor in Council by
the Canada National Parks Act is not limited so as to prohibit
discrimination between classes of business. Thus the Governor in Council is
competent to promulgate regulations which authorize discrimination (in the
administrative law sense) between individuals and businesses. This, in itself,
sets the present case apart from the municipal law cases relied upon by Moresby
where the delegated authority, the municipal council, lacks the power to
discriminate unless it is specifically conferred by the legislation.
[30]
The
Regulations passed by the Governor in Council contemplate distinctions being
drawn between businesses, but not, says Moresby, the type of distinction being
drawn in this case. As noted earlier, administrative law discrimination deals
with drawing distinctions, as opposed to the basis on which such distinctions
are drawn. Unless the distinction drawn by the Superintendent can be shown to
be contrary to public policy, there is nothing in the Regulations which would
preclude the type of distinction being drawn here. In the end the question is
whether the allocation of access to the Park between Haida and non-Haida tour
operators is contrary to public policy.
[31]
Public policy takes its color from the context
in which it is invoked. Discrimination on the basis of race is contrary to
public policy when the discrimination simply reinforces stereotypical
conceptions of the target group. However, there is legislative support for the
proposition that discrimination designed to ameliorate the condition of a
historically disadvantaged group is acceptable. See, for example, section 16 of
the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, where Parliament
authorizes the adoption of special programs designed to prevent or reduce
disadvantages suffered by groups when those disadvantages are based on
prohibited grounds of discrimination. See also the Employment Equity Act,
S.C. 1995, c. 44, which mandates programs designed to increase the
representation of visible and other minorities in the workplace. Even the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms contains a reservation at subsection 15(2) to the
effect that the constitutional guarantee of equality "does not
preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration
of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups". Consequently, the
proposition that discrimination based on race is contrary to public policy is
too broad. Discriminatory provisions designed to ameliorate the condition of
the historically disadvantaged are not contrary to public policy.
[32]
The
rationale given for the Haida Allocation Policy is found at paragraph 45 of the
affidavit of Anna Gadja, sworn March 28, 2004, (Tab 6 – Compendium of Evidence
of the Respondent Attorney General of Canada) where the following appears:
45. One of
the principal reasons for setting aside a portion of the overall allocation for
Haida commercial tour operators was that Haida businesses had been "frozen
out" of the Park Reserve by the AMB following the introduction of the
business licensing system in 1996 and the decision not to license any new
businesses. That was not the case in 1993, at the time the Gwaii Haanas
Agreement was created, and the Agreement does not speak to that issue directly.
Given the spirit of the Gwaii Haanas Agreement, under which both parties share
and cooperate in the planning, operation, and management of the Archipelago, it
was decided by the AMB to correct this inadvertent circumstance whereby the
Haida had been "frozen out" of opportunities to participate in
commercial tour operations in Gwaii Haanas by creating a separate Haida
allocation pool.
[33]
The
"freezing out" of Haida businesses to which Ms. Gadja refers was the
result of the AMB decision to freeze tour operations in the Park at the time
that the business licensing system was introduced. As there was only one Haida
tour operator at the time (which subsequently lost its license for inactivity),
the Haida were effectively precluded from acquiring tour operator licenses by
the AMB's own policy.
[34]
A
further consideration in the decision to allocate one-third of the available
quota to Haida tour operators appears in the affidavit of Ernie Gladstone,
sworn April 1, 2004 (Tab 15 – Compendium of Evidence of the Attorney General of
Canada):
11. Given
the importance of Haida culture to the Park Reserve and to the visitor
experience, the AMB considered the possibility of a complete lack of Haida
participation in the conducting of commercial tours in the Park Reserve to be
unacceptable, as this would have resulted in a considerable void in the
interpretation of the area's natural and cultural heritage.
[35]
This
is squarely within the mandate given to the Superintendent by subsections 5(1)(a)
and (d) of the Regulations.
[36]
In
the end result, I conclude that the Regulations authorize the Superintendent to
discriminate between classes of businesses and that the distinction drawn on
the racial or ethnic origin of the owners of commercial tour businesses is not
a distinction which is void on public policy grounds.
[37]
It
follows from this that Moresby's argument with respect to administrative
discrimination fails. As a result, I would dismiss Moresby's appeal.
CONCLUSION
[38]
In
conclusion, I am of the view that the distinction drawn by the Superintendent,
acting through the AMB, between Haida and non-Haida tour operators is not ultra
vires the Superintendent on the basis that it results in discrimination
between classes of businesses which is not authorized by the governing
legislation. In my view, the Regulations are wide enough to include the power
to draw such distinctions or, following this Court's decision in Sunshine
Village Corp., there is nothing in the Act or the Regulations which would
prohibit such a distinction.
[39]
I
would therefore dismiss this aspect of the appeal. This decision, taken with
our decision with respect to the balance of the issues, would lead me to
dismiss the whole of Moresby's appeal.
"J.D.
Denis Pelletier"
"I
agree
M. Nadon J.A."
"I
agree
K.
Sharlow J.A."