Date:
20071210
Docket: A-53-07
Citation: 2007 FCA 390
CORAM: NOËL
J.A.
SEXTON
J.A.
TRUDEL
J.A.
BETWEEN:
DIRECTOR OF MILITARY
PROSECUTIONS
Appellant
and
CHIEF MILITARY JUDGE
and COURT MARTIAL
ADMINISTRATOR
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
NOËL J.A.
[1]
This is an
appeal by the Director of Military Prosecutions (“DMP”) from a decision of the
Federal Court whereby Snider J. (the “Applications Judge”) refused to compel
the Chief Military Judge (“CMJ”) to assign a military judge and require the
Court Martial Administrator (“CMA”) to issue the order convening a court martial.
The DMP asks that this decision be set aside and that an order be issued
compelling the CMJ to assign a military judge to preside at a Standing Court
Martial and compelling the CMA to convene a Standing Court Martial forthwith.
[2]
For ease
of reference, the statutory and regulatory regime relevant to the disposition
of this appeal is set out in Annex I to these reasons.
RELEVANT FACTS
[3]
The
Canadian Forces have created a special operations unit, whose function is the
conduct of counter-terrorism operations, Joint Task Force 2 (“JTF2”). Information
concerning the identity of JTF2 members as well as their movement or deployment
is protected from public release, to avoid injury to Canada’s national defence
(National Defence Security Instruction number 27 (“NDSI 27”); NDHQ Instruction
DCDS 05/1993, Security and Public Affairs Policy – Joint Task Force Two (“DCDS
05/1993”). This policy provides that information such as names, addresses and
specific employment of Canadian Forces personnel cannot be publicly associated
with JTF2. Also protected from public disclosure is information concerning the
movement or deployment of unit personnel for a particular operation (Affidavit
of Major Cloutier, Appeal Book, p. 74, para. 6).
[4]
The
accused is a warrant officer serving in JTF2. It is alleged that on August 10 2005,
while serving in Afghanistan with his unit he committed
aggravated assault and ill-treated a subordinate, who was also a member of JTF2.
The first offence is said to have been committed contrary to section 130 of the
National Defence Act, R.S. 1985, c. N-5 (the “National Defence Act”) and section 268 of the Criminal
Code and the second, contrary to section 95 of the National Defence Act
(Affidavit of Major Cloutier, Appeal Book, p. 73, para. 3 and p. 75, para. 10).
[5]
In
order to bring the accused to justice, recourse was had to the military justice
system. The military justice system is a two-tiered tribunal structure that
includes a summary trial system and, the more formal court martial system.
There is no permanent court martial. Rather, it functions through an ad hoc
court martial that is constituted as and when it is convened to address
specific charges. A court martial can sit within or outside of Canada wherever it can
conveniently be convened.
[6]
Pursuant
to this scheme, the charges were referred to the commanding officer of the
accused who then referred them to the Deputy Chief of the Defence staff who in
turn referred them to the DMP, together with the Record of Disciplinary
Proceedings, the Report of Investigation and the evidence, all of which were
classified SECRET (Affidavit of Major Cloutier, Appeal Book,
p. 74, para. 8). A recommendation that a court martial dispose of the charges
also accompanied the referral.
[7]
The DMP,
who by virtue of sections 165 and 165.11 of the National Defence Act, is responsible for the
preferring of all charges to be tried by court martial – as well as the conduct
of all prosecutions (section 165.11 of the National Defence Act), the
determination of the type of court martial that is to try the accused and for informing
the CMA of that determination (section 165.14 of the National Defence Act)
– preferred the charges
for trial by a Standing Court Martial and her delegate completed a charge
sheet.
[8]
Given the
nature of the information which had to be reflected in the charge sheet pursuant
to subsection 110.06(2) of the Queen’s Regulations & Orders for the
Canadian Forces (the “QR&Os”), including in particular the name of the
accused together with his unit of operation, the name of the alleged victim as
well as the precise location in Afghanistan where the offences are alleged to
have been committed, the charge sheet was classified SECRET pursuant to
DCDS 05/1993 (Affidavit of Major Cloutier, Appeal Book, p. 75, para. 11; Cross-examination
of Major Cloutier, Appeal Book, pp.203, 204). Pursuant to the legislative
scheme, the DMP forwarded the classified charge sheet to the CMA, in order for
the CMJ to assign a military judge to the case, pursuant to section 165.25 of
the National Defence Act, and for the CMA to issue an order convening a Standing Court
Martial, pursuant to subsection 165.19(1) of the National Defence Act.
[9]
The CMJ
refused to assign a military judge because, in her opinion, doing so in
circumstances where the charge sheet and the accompanying documentation is
classified SECRET would contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and the open court principle, as codified by section 180 of the National
Defence Act. Given this refusal, the CMA has been unable to fulfill her
duty to issue a convening order since she could not identify the military judge
whose name is to appear on that order pursuant to subsection 111.02(2) of the QR&Os.
[10]
Upon being
notified of the CMJ’s decision, the DMP took steps to alleviate the concerns of
the CMJ. The DMP advised both the CMJ and the CMA that, although the charge
sheet would initially have to be sealed, the prosecutor would, upon the court
martial being convened, make an application before the military judge assigned
to preside for an order limiting public access to the classified information to
be disclosed during the trial.
[11]
The
solution proposed by the DMP is set out in the following passage quoted by the Applications
Judge at paragraph 26 of her reasons:
Indeed, the straightforward, practical and lawful solution to address the
legitimate concern raised by the CMJ with respect to [how] the classified
information contained in a charge sheet can be protected would be for her to
assign a military judge to permit the CMA to convene a court martial. This
military judge would then have jurisdiction to determine the DMP's preliminary
application brought pursuant to s. 180 of the National Defence Act to
protect the information in issue from public disclosure. In this manner, a full
and frank debate could be held with respect to this issue before the military
judge who will then apply the "Dagenais/Mentuck" approach in
determining whether or not to grant the request of the prosecution.
[12]
The immediate problem
sought to be resolved by the DMP in advancing this proposal was to prevent
classified information from being disclosed before a ruling could be rendered
on the matter. Although, subsection 180(2) of the National Defence Act
allows proceedings to be held in camera (in whole or in part), and
subsection 112.03(2) of the QR&Os authorizes a Standing Court Martial, once
convened, to deal with preliminary motions, no such motion can be addressed
until a military judge is assigned and takes the oath, an event which,
according to the prescribed procedure, only takes place at the commencement of
the court martial proceedings for which the military judge is assigned
(paragraph 112.05(4)(a) of the QR&Os). The solution proposed by the
DMP requires that the charge be sealed until such time as a military judge is
assigned and is in a position to rule on the issue of disclosure. (The complete
process in sequence is set out in Annex II to these reasons.)
[13]
Despite
repeated requests that the matter be reconsidered, the CMJ maintained her
decision not to assign a military judge. Faced with this continued refusal, the
DMP brought applications before the Federal Court to compel the CMJ and the CMA
to perform their respective duty to assign a military judge and to convene a
Standing Court Martial.
[14]
The
application against the CMA (Court file No. T-1967-05) and the one against the
CMJ (Court File No. T-1968-05) came before the Applications Judge, who
dismissed both in a single set of reasons. This is the decision under appeal. Before turning to this
decision, it is useful to first review the decision of the CMJ.
CHIEF MILITARY JUDGE DECISION
[15]
In a
memorandum to the CMA, (also sent to the DMP), the CMJ sets out her reasons for
refusing to assign a military judge (CMJ’s Reasons, Appeal Book, p. 147). The
reasons begin with the following (CMJ’s Reasons, para. 1):
You have
asked me to assign a military judge to a matter where the charge sheet and
accompanying documentation is classified secret in its entirety. I have
considered this matter carefully and have come to the conclusion that I cannot
assign a military judge to a proposed court martial in such a circumstance. I
would direct you to advise the prosecution and defence involved of my decision
and provide them a copy of this letter.
[16]
The CMJ
then sets out the statutory framework within which she is making her decision
(CMJ’s Reasons, para. 2):
One of the
statutory duties of the Chief Military Judge, pursuant to section 165.25 of the
National Defence Act, is to assign military judges to preside at courts
martial and to perform other judicial duties under the National Defence Act.
In exercising this function, as with any other judicial function, the Chief
Military Judge must comply with the laws of Canada and more specifically the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada, the Court Martial Appeal Court and, where applicable, the Federal Court
of Canada.
[17]
The CMJ
outlines at paragraph 3 the usual process followed in convening a court martial
and writes, “The usual process followed in convening a court martial is that a
charge sheet, without any classification on its face is received at the Office
of the Chief Military Judge”. Subsequently, a military judge is assigned, who
can then consider issues of confidentiality as per subsection 180(2) of the National
Defence Act.
[18]
However,
where the charge sheet is classified, assigning a judge “would be to accept a
presumption of secrecy” (CMJ’s Reasons, para. 6):
No public
notification could be made of the fact the court martial was taking place as
all relevant information such as the nature of the charges, the identity of the
accused and the time, date and place the court martial is to be held would all
be covered by the classification imposed by the prosecution and could not be
made public. The accused would be in the position of having to make an
application if he or she wished to have her or his trial open. No other
interested parties could or would be informed of the existence of the charges
or of any such application. Any such application would be made in the context of
an existing presumption of secrecy. If no such application is made, then the
court martial is not open to the public.
[19]
The CMJ
goes on to explain some of the practical difficulties which this would entail
(CMJ’s Reasons, para. 7):
Indeed, on a
very practical level, this approach would raise issues such as how a court
martial could begin, given that Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the
Canadian Forces, subsection 112.05(2), elaborating on section 180 of the National
Defence Act, states that at the beginning of court martial proceedings,
members of the public shall be admitted? How could the accused be brought
before a court martial that is open to the public and identify him or herself
as the accused person when his or her identity is classified by the charge
sheet? How could the prosecutor comply with the regulatory requirement at the
beginning of a court martial to read the charge sheet?
[20]
At the
close of her reasons, the CMJ reiterates her view that assigning a judge where
a charge sheet is classified would be tantamount to sanctioning a closed trial
(CMJ’s Reasons,
para. 9):
It may be
possible to provide an unclassified charge sheet to permit the assignment of a
military judge. I do not know. In this case however, the effect of assigning a
military judge to a court martial, which the government has designated as
classified, is to accept and to follow a presumption of secrecy.
FEDERAL COURT DECISION
[21]
The Applications
Judge begins her reasons by indicating that in order for a writ of mandamus
to issue, there must be a duty to act. She goes on to examine the question whether
in the absence of a judicial determination that a charge be kept confidential,
there is a legal duty for the CMJ to assign a military judge (Reasons, para.
7).
[22]
Before
examining this question, the Applications Judge observes that while subsection
180(2) of the National Defence Act allows a military judge to order that
proceedings be held in camera where this is necessary in the interests
of public safety or defence, no such order can issue until a military judge is
actually assigned. According to the Applications Judge (Reasons, para. 18):
As
the National Defence Act exists today, preliminary matters may be heard
and determined only after a military judge is assigned to preside over the
court martial and the court martial is convened. There is nothing in the National
Defence Act that allows for the appointment of a military judge to consider
preliminary matters such as the sealing of a charge.
[23]
The Applications
Judge then points to a proposed amendment to the National Defence Act
which died on the order paper of the last Parliament (section 50 of Bill C-7,
An Act to amend the National Defence Act, 1st sess., 39th
Parl., 2006):
187. At any time after a charge has been
preferred but before the commencement of the trial, any question, matter or
objection in respect of a charge may, on application, be heard and determined
by any military judge or, if the court martial has been convened, the judge
assigned to preside at the court martial.
|
187. À tout
moment après le prononcé d’une mise en accusation et avant l’ouverture du
procès de l’accusé, tout juge militaire ou, si la cour martiale a déjà été
convoquée, le juge militaire la présidant peut, sur demande, juger toute
question ou objection à l’égard de l’accusation.
|
According
to the Applications Judge this provision, if enacted, would have provided a
complete answer to the problem with which she was confronted. However, the
amendment did not pass and her task therefore was to determine whether, in the
absence of a legislative process by which preliminary matters of
confidentiality can be addressed, the CMJ had the duty to assign a military
judge (Reasons, para. 20).
[24]
Dealing
with this question, the Applications Judge said (Reasons, para. 27):
I do not
dispute that, once assigned, a military judge would have jurisdiction to
consider an application for confidentiality (s. 180, s. 187, National Defence Act). However, the question before me
arises prior to the assignment of the military judge. What is obvious is that
there is no possibility, within the ambit of the National
Defence Act or its regulations, of dealing judicially with
confidentiality matters prior to the assignment of a judge. Until that time,
there is no court. The question is not whether the court martial judge can
consider these matters; he or she can. Rather, the relevant question is: can
the Administrator and the CMJ take the steps to convene a court martial without
judicial consideration of whether certain information (the name, service number
and rank of the Accused) may be withheld at that stage?
[25]
According
to the Applications Judge, the open court principle extends to every stage of a
proceeding including the one which follows the preferment of the charge and
precedes the assignment of a military judge. She writes at paragraph 39:
What is
evident is that, at this preliminary stage, all of the parties involved are
subject to DCDS 05/1993. That is, the DMP, the Administrator and the CMJ are
bound to keep confidential certain information contained in the charge; they
must obey military orders. This, in my view, creates a very real apprehension
that none of the three decision-makers can bring an unfettered discretion to
the question of disclosure at this preliminary stage. (As an aside, I assume
that a military judge assigned to the court martial would not be bound to
follow such orders where they conflict with his or her judicial duties.)
Without a separate, independent review of the question of secrecy at this
stage, how can we be satisfied that the need for confidentiality outweighs the
need for full and immediate disclosure?
[26]
She goes
on to conclude in the next paragraph that the unilateral decision by the DMP to
seal the charge pending review by the military judge violates the open court
principle (Reasons, para. 40):
Given the
nature of the charges and the possible impact on the Accused and others who may
have an interest in the proceedings, I see no reason why the same
constitutional protections afforded at the preliminary stages of criminal
proceedings, should not apply to all stages of proceedings involving the
Accused. In my view, it offends the underlying principles for the DMP to
unilaterally seal the charge or for the CMJ to accept this decision of the DMP.
Because the decision of the DMP offended the open court
principle, the CMJ did not have to perform her statutory duty to assign a
military judge, and therefore, a mandamus could not issue.
[27]
The Applications
Judge then addressed the question whether in any event the DMP had met the
burden demonstrating that there were no adequate alternative remedies for
addressing the problem (Apotex Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994]
1 F.C. 742 (C.A.), aff’d [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1100). According to the Applications
Judge, the DMP had two alternatives to sealing the charges, i.e., obtaining an
administrative accommodation or acting pursuant to section 38 of the Canada
Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c, C-5 (the “Canada Evidence Act”)
(Reasons, paras. 45-72). The existence of these alternatives was sufficient in
itself to justify her refusal to issue a writ of mandamus (Reasons,
para. 73).
POSITION OF THE PARTIES
[28]
The DMP
submits that under section 165.25 of the National Defence Act, the CMJ
had a legal duty to assign a military judge and that the DMP’s proposal that
the charge be sealed and a military judge be assigned so that an application
under subsection 112.03(2) of the QR&Os and subsection 180(2) of the National
Defence Act can be brought to deal with the issue of confidentiality, is the
only viable solution. The DMP submits that the same process had successfully
been employed in a nearly identical situation in the past (Affidavit of Major
Cloutier, Appeal Book, p.75, para. 9).
[29]
According
to the DMP, the Applications Judge erroneously accepted the conclusion by the
CMJ that a classified charge sheet would somehow render the entire trial
presumptively secret and that, therefore, she was required to consider the
constitutionality of a secret court martial. The proper presumption, according
to the DMP is that the trial would be “presumptively open” (DMP’s Memorandum of
Fact and Law, paras. 35, 39).
[30]
Furthermore,
the Applications Judge erred in finding that the open court principle applied at
the stage where the CMJ assigns a military judge. According to the DMP, the
CMJ’s duty to assign a judge is an administrative task to which the open court
principle does not apply (DMP’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras. 44, 45).
[31]
Finally,
the Applications Judge failed to recognize that the open court principle is not
absolute. As the Supreme Court of Canada explains in Toronto Star Newspapers
Ltd. v. Ontario, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (“ Toronto Star”), the
interlocutory protection of sensitive information, even if by unilateral action
of one of the parties, is constitutionally permissible. This action in this
case (i.e., the unilateral sealing of the charge) will allow the assigned
military judge to hear and decide the extent to which the classified information
can be protected from public disclosure (DMP’s Memorandum of Fact and Law,
paras. 47-49).
[32]
With
respect to the question whether there are adequate alternative remedies, the
DMP submits that the Applications Judge erred in suggesting that an
administrative accommodation might have been available. The DMP further submits
that section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act cannot possibly apply.
According to the DMP, there is no reasonable alternative to the solution that
she proposes. (DMP’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras. 55, 56 and 62-68).
[33]
The CMJ
supports the decision of the Applications Judge essentially for the reasons
that she gave. The CMJ insists in particular on the Applications Judge’s
conclusion that the CMJ has no duty to proceed with the assignment of a
military judge in the absence of a legislative process by which preliminary
matters of confidentiality can be addressed. According to the CMJ all the
issues raised in this appeal should be analyzed with this legislative gap in
mind (CMJ’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, para. 34).
[34]
The CMA
for her part adopts a neutral position. She maintains that the CMA has the duty
to issue a convening order only to the extent that the CMJ has a duty to appoint
a military judge. Accordingly, the critical issue is whether the CMJ has this
duty (CMA’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, para. 22).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[35]
The
parties did not make elaborate submissions on the applicable standard of
review. I accept, as the CMJ suggested at paragraph 38 of her Memorandum of
Fact and Law, that the decision to grant relief in the nature of a mandamus
is discretionary in nature. However, the issue whether the solution proposed by
the DMP offends the open court principle such that the CMJ no longer must
perform her statutory duty to assign a military judge, raises a question of law
which must be assessed on a standard of correctness.
[36]
The
DMP submits that the Applications Judge and the CMJ committed a fundamental
error by conducting their analysis on the basis that the trial of the accused
would be presumptively secret, if allowed to proceed on the basis of a
classified charge. According to the DMP, had they conducted their analysis on
the basis that the trial of the accused would be open, they would have reached
a different conclusion.
[37]
In
this respect, I note that although the CMJ did hold that “… the effect of
assigning a military judge to a court martial; which the government has
designated as classified, is to accept and to follow a presumption of
secrecy” (Reasons of the CMJ, para. 9), the Applications Judge did not accept
that the trial of the accused, would be presumptively secret. Her assumption
was that a military judge would act in accordance with his or her judicial
duties (Reasons, para. 39).
[38]
The
position taken by the Applications Judge is the correct one. By their oath of
office, taken at the commencement of the proceeding to which they are assigned,
military judges swear that they will exercise their judicial functions with
impartiality (section 112.16 of the QR&Os). Like any other judge, the
military judge assigned to the present case would be called upon to weight any
claim for non disclosure against the open court principle, and determine the
extent to which, if any, information should not be made public.
[39]
The
Applications Judge’s problem with the solution proposed by the DMP is not based
on concerns about the military judge’s capacity to address the issue of
disclosure once a court martial has been convened (Reasons, para. 27). It rests
entirely with the fact that at the pre-assignment stage, none of the actors
(the DMP, the CMJ or the CMA) can bring an unfettered discretion to the
question of disclosure (Reasons, paras. 35, 39). According to the Applications
Judge, the presumption of openness of court proceedings must also be observed
at that stage, and the sealing of the charge by the DMP before a judge is
assigned offends the open court principle (Reasons,
para. 40).
[40]
In my
respectful view, this gives the open court principle an effect which it does
not have. The open court principle is not absolute. As was stated in Toronto Star, supra, (para. 3):
The freedoms
I have mentioned [freedom of communication and freedom of expression], though
fundamental, are by no means absolute. Under certain conditions, public access
to confidential or sensitive information related to court proceedings will
endanger and not protect the integrity of our system of justice. A temporary
shield will in some case suffice; in others, permanent protection is warranted.
[41]
Where
information is sought to be protected from disclosure in a court proceeding, a balancing
exercise must be conducted by an independent decision maker in order to
determine whether the open court principle outweighs the interests sought to be
protected by preventing the information from being disclosed (Toronto Star, supra,
at paras. 7, 8). In this case, the decision by the DMP to seal the classified
charge was taken in order to allow a military judge to rule on the question of
disclosure.
[42]
The Applications
Judge insists on the fact that at the particular stage when the charge was sealed
(i.e., after it was preferred but before a judge was assigned), neither the
DMP, the CMJ or the CMA could “bring an unfettered discretion to the question
of disclosure” since they were all bound by the policy reflected in DCDS
05/1993 (Reasons, para. 39). No doubt this is so, but that it seems is why the
DMP had to take steps to allow a military judge to bring an independent view on
the matter. The decision under appeal holds that the DMP lacks the necessary
independence to decide the matter of disclosure and yet prevents the DMP from
taking the only step which could be taken in order to bring the matter before a
decision maker whose discretion is unfettered.
[43]
In my
respectful view, the solution proposed by the DMP is both necessary and legal.
It allows for the charge to be brought before a military judge in circumstances
where he or she will be in position to assess and decide the question of
disclosure. Although the proposed amendment to section 187 of the National
Defence Act would assist in resolving the problem (see paragraph 23, supra),
the legality of the solution proposed by the DMP is not dependent on this
amendment. (I question the saving effect which the Applications Judge appears
to be willing to give to this amendment because pursuant to it, the DMP would
still have to unilaterally decide, for a time at least, that information be
sealed before the issue could be decided by a military judge. Furthermore in terms of the timing of this decision, the
situation would remain the same as it is now, unless provision was also made
for military judges to take their oath immediately upon being appointed for
their fixed term or to accelerate the time when a military judge assigned to a
particular case takes the oath. No amendment other than the one proposed with
respect to section 187 of the National Defence Act was brought to our
attention).
[44]
The
existing legislation allows a court martial to hold in camera hearings
where public safety or defence concerns makes this necessary (subsection 180(2)
of the National Defence Act), and subsection 112.03(2) of the QR&Os as
it presently reads provides a military judge with the authority to hear and
determine any question, matter or objection “[a]t any time after a Standing
Court Martial … has been convened”. It follows that a military judge, after a
Standing Court Martial is convened, and upon being sworn at the commencement of
the proceeding, would have the authority to address the question of disclosure in
camera upon the appropriate motion being brought. I note in this regard
that the military judge is sworn before the rules require that the charge be
read.
[45]
The Applications
Judge did express the concern that DCDS 05/1993 would prevent the convening
order – which must be read at the commencement of the proceedings – from making
any reference to the named accused (Reasons, para. 22). However, the identity
of the accused, without association with JTF2, is not classified information
(see Affidavit of Major Cloutier, Appeal Book, p. 74, para. 6), and there is
nothing in the information which must be contained in the convening order that could
result in such an association being made (see subsection 111.02(2) of the
QR&Os). Although, in some instances the place where the Court is to be
convened may itself constitute classified information, this issue does not
arise in this case given that the DMP has advised that the trial will take
place in Canada (Memo from DMP to CMA, Appeal
Book, p. 157 at para. 12).
[46]
The CMJ also
suggested that the sealing of the charge by the DMP would prevent the CMA from
providing proper instructions with respect to the publication of the notice of
the court martial as required by paragraph 111.13(2)(e) of the QR&Os
(CMJ’s Memorandum of Fact and Law, paras. 52-58). However, there is no requirement
that the charge sheet be included in the notice of hearing and nothing prevents
adequate public notice from being given in the present case, i.e., that a court
martial will convene at a particular date, time and place to try the named accused,
on charges of aggravated assault and ill-treatment of a subordinate alleged to
have been committed by the accused on a specified date, while serving in Afghanistan.
[47]
Applying
the prescribed procedure to the present case – on the assumption that the CMJ
fulfils her statutory duty to assign a judge – the accused would be brought
before the court at the commencement of the proceeding (paragraph 112.05(2)(d)
of the QR&Os), the convening order would be read (paragraph 112.05(3)(a)
of the QR&Os), the judge would take the oath (paragraph 112.05(4)(a))
and the DMP would then be in a position to bring an application that the charge
be kept confidential by order of the Court before the rules require that it be
read (paragraph 112.05(5)(e)).
[48]
The only
thing that needs to happen in order to reach that stage, is that the charge be
sealed for a time.
[49]
In my
respectful view, this way of proceeding does not offend the open court
principle. As noted in Toronto Star, supra, (at para. 3) there may be
instances where public access to sensitive information related to court
proceedings will endanger and not protect the integrity of our system of
justice and where sealing information for a brief period of time is necessary
to achieve this end. In this case, no one takes issue with the fact that the
DMP must abide by the policy set out in DCDS 05/1993. The result therefore is
that unless the matter of disclosure can be brought before an independent
decision maker in the manner suggested by the DMP, the accused will likely never
be brought before justice.
[50]
I
respectfully conclude that allowing the charge to be sealed by the DMP for the
brief period required to allow a military judge to assess the issue of
confidentiality in accordance with the “Dagenais/Mentuck”
approach, does not offend the open court principle, and that the Applications
Judge erred in holding otherwise. (The extended time period during which the
charge has remained sealed in this case is attributable to the CMJ’s refusal to
assign a military judge and the ensuing proceedings).
[51]
The Applications
Judge went on to hold that in any event a mandamus could not issue since
there were equally effective means of protecting the classified information
from public disclosure. She first observed (Reasons, para. 48):
While it was
not fully argued before me, I wonder whether the DMP has done everything
possible to solve this issue prior to preferring the classified charge. There
may be administrative steps that could avoid the problem of a classified charge
sheet, thereby providing an effective alternative remedy. The DMP did not
present any evidence that any other options had been explored. During
cross-examination on his affidavit, Major Jean-Bruno Cloutier was asked what
other options were considered. He was prevented from answering the questions by
the DMP's counsel.
[52]
I agree
that if there were administrative steps that could be used to avoid the problem
with which the DMP was confronted, they should have been pursued. However, the
question which the Applications Judge should have asked is whether the DMP had
any alternative means to sealing the charge sheet pending the assignment of a
military judge in order to have the issue of confidentiality decided. Based on
this record, I am of the respectful view that no alternate avenue was open to
the DMP.
[53]
The
suggestion by the Applications Judge that the accused be removed from the JTF2
unit so as to allow the charge to proceed unsealed is not a solution. For an
alternative remedy to be adequate, it must resolve the issue with which the DMP
was confronted. On the record before us, the DMP had no authority to affect
such a posting, nor can it be suggested that the assignment of personnel in the
Canadian Forces should be based on considerations other than operational ones.
[54]
The Applications
Judge went on to consider the possible application of sections 37 and 38 of the
Canada Evidence Act. She held that, for purposes of the test for mandamus,
section 37 is not an effective alternative remedy (Reasons, para. 71). With
respect to section 38, the Applications Judge held that there was a reasonable
possibility that this provision could properly be invoked in order to prevent
the classified information from being disclosed at the preliminary stage and
therefore serve as an effective alternative to the solution proposed by the DMP
(Reasons, paras.
60-68). She concludes that part of her reasons by suggesting that “the DMP
should explore that possibility” (Reasons, para. 60).
[55]
In order
to bar the issuance of an order of mandamus, it is not sufficient to
advance hypothetical or speculative solutions. The alternative must be
“sufficient and convenient in the true legal sense of the words” (British
Columbia v. British Columbia (Minister of Finance),
[1935] S.C.R. 70 at p. 86). Section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act has
not been shown to meet that test in this case since it does not address the
fundamental problem, i.e., the assignment of a military judge and the convening
of a court martial to rule on the question of disclosure and try a service
charge.
[56]
Section 38
applies when a participant to a proceeding notifies the Attorney General (and
the Minister of National Defence in the case of proceedings before a service
tribunal) that he or she expects that “sensitive information” or “potentially
injurious information” will be disclosed to the public (subsection 38.01(1) of
the Canada Evidence Act). No such issue can arise before a military
judge is assigned (subsections 38.01(2) and (4) of the Canada Evidence Act).
At that stage, the only persons by whom and to whom classified information may
be disclosed are the DMP, the CMJ and the CMA, each being authorized to receive
the classified information (paragraph 38.01(6)(c) of the Canada
Evidence Act).
[57]
Furthermore,
the obligation to notify only arises if there is an underlying “proceeding”,
which the Canada Evidence Act defines as a “proceeding before a court,
person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information” (definition
of “proceeding” section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act). Only a court
martial once convened has this jurisdiction (subsections 179(1) and (2) of the National
Defence Act). At the stage we are at, there is no underlying proceeding.
[58]
I
therefore conclude that there was no effective alternative to the solution
proposed by the DMP. It follows that the CMJ had the duty to assign a military
judge and the CMA had the corresponding duty to convene a Standing Court
Martial.
[59]
For these
reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the Applications
Judge and rendering the decision which she ought to have rendered, I would
order the CMJ to
assign a military judge to preside at the Standing Court
Martial of the accused and the CMA to convene a Standing Court Martial
forthwith. As no costs were sought by the DMP, I would make no award.
“Marc Noël”
“I
agree
J. Edgar Sexton J.A.”
“I
agree
Johanne Trudel J.A.”