Date: 20080527
Docket: A-558-07
Citation: 2008 FCA 148
Present: TRUDEL
J.A.
BETWEEN:
DBC MARINE SAFETY SYSTEMS LTD.
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondents
REASONS FOR ORDER
TRUDEL J.A.
[1]
The
Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) is seeking leave to intervene
in this appeal of a decision of Mosley J. of the Federal Court (2007 FC 1142).
The appellant, who has already requested that a date be set for the hearing,
consents to the motion. The respondent requests that the motion for leave to
intervene be dismissed.
[2]
Mosley J.
dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of the decision of the
Commissioner of Patents who issued a notice declaring a patent application (‘846)
abandoned for failure to respond to an examiner’s requisition by the prescribed
deadline. This notice was sent out after the reinstatement period had expired.
[3]
It appears
that a patent examiner sent to the appellant’s agent a letter containing two
requisitions.
[4]
The
Applications Judge found that the appellant’s agent had overlooked one of the
requisitions and, while recognizing that the Patent Office erred in failing to
follow its normal practice of providing a timely “courtesy” notice, he
concluded that the application was abandoned by operation of the law, that the
Commissioner had no discretion to that regard, and that the Court was unable to
provide a remedy.
[5]
In its
Notice of Appeal, filed on December 5, 2007, the appellant raises three grounds
of appeal, two of them requiring the interpretation of paragraph 73(1)(a)
of the Patent Act and of Rule 29 of the Patent Rules. The last
ground of appeal deals with the procedural fairness of the current Patent
Office practice.
[6]
The
relevant provisions read:
Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985 c.P-4
|
73. (1) An application
for a patent in Canada shall be deemed to be abandoned if the applicant does not:
(a) reply in good faith to any requisition made by an
examiner in connection with an examination, within six months after the
requisition is made or within any shorter period established by the
Commissioner;
(b) comply with a notice given pursuant to subsection
27(6);
(c) pay the fees payable under section 27.1, within the
time provided by the regulations;
(d) make a request for examination or pay the prescribed
fee under subsection 35(1) within the time provided by the regulations;
(e) comply with a notice given under subsection 35(2); or
(f) pay the prescribed fees stated to be payable in a
notice of allowance of patent within six months after the date of the notice.
(2) An application shall also be deemed to be abandoned in any
other circumstances that are prescribed.
(3) An application deemed
to be abandoned under this section shall be reinstated if the applicant:
(a) makes a request for reinstatement to the Commissioner
within the prescribed period;
(b) takes the action that should have been taken in order
to avoid the abandonment; and
(c) pays the prescribed fee before the expiration of the
prescribed period.
(4) An application that has been abandoned pursuant to paragraph
(1)(f) and reinstated is subject to amendment and further examination.
(5) An application
that is reinstated retains its original filing date.
[ Emphasis
added]
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73. (1) La demande de
brevet est considérée comme abandonnée si le demandeur omet, selon le
cas :
(a) de répondre de bonne foi, dans le cadre d’un
examen, à toute demande de l’examinateur, dans les six mois suivant
cette demande ou dans le délai plus court déterminé par le commissaire;
(b) de se conformer à l’avis mentionné au
paragraphe 27(6);
(c) de payer, dans le délai
réglementaire, les taxes visées à l’article 27.1;
(d) de présenter la requête visée au paragraphe
35(1) ou de payer la taxe réglementaire dans le délai réglementaire;
(e) de se conformer à l’avis mentionné au
paragraphe 35(2);
(f) de payer les taxes réglementaires
mentionnées dans l’avis d’acceptation de la demande de brevet dans les six
mois suivant celui-ci.
(2) Elle est aussi considérée comme abandonnée dans les
circonstances réglementaires.
(3) Elle peut être
rétablie si le demandeur:
(a) présente au commissaire, dans le
délai réglementaire, une requête à cet effet;
(b) prend les mesures qui s’imposaient pour éviter l’abandon; et
(c) paie les taxes réglementaires avant
l’expiration de la période réglementaire
(4) La demande abandonnée au titre de l’alinéa (1)f) et
rétablie par la suite est sujette à modification et à nouvel examen.
(5) La demande rétablie conserve sa date de dépôt.
[Je souligne]
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Patent Rules, S.O.R./96-423
|
29. (1) Where an examiner examining an
application in accordance with section 35 of the Act or the Act as it read
immediately before October 1, 1989 has reasonable grounds to believe that an
application for a patent describing the same invention has been filed, in or
for any country, on behalf of the applicant or on behalf of any other person
claiming under an inventor named in the application being examined, the examiner
may requisition from the applicant any of the following information and a
copy of any related document:
(a) an identification of any prior art cited in respect
of the applications;
(b) the application numbers, filing dates and, if
granted, the patent numbers;
(c) particulars of conflict, opposition, re-examination
or similar proceedings; and
(d) where a document is not in either English or French,
a translation of the document, or a part of the document, into English or
French.
(2) Where an examiner
examining an application in accordance with section 35 of the Act or the Act
as it read immediately before October 1, 1989 has reasonable grounds to
believe that an invention disclosed in the application was, before the filing
date of the application, published or the subject of a patent, the
examiner may requisition the applicant to identify the first publication
of or patent for that invention.
(3) Subsections (1)
and (2) do not apply to any information or document that is not available or
known to the applicant, provided that the applicant states the reasons why
the information or document is not available or known.
[Emphasis added]
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29. (1) Lorsque l’examinateur chargé de l’examen d’une demande conformément
à l’article 35 de la Loi ou de la Loi dans sa version antérieure au 1er octobre 1989 a des motifs raisonnables de
croire qu’une demande de brevet visant la même invention a été déposée dans
tout pays ou pour tout pays, au nom du demandeur ou d’une autre personne se
réclamant d’un inventeur désigné dans la demande examinée, il peut exiger
que le demandeur lui fournisse les renseignements suivants et des copies
des documents connexes :
(a) toute antériorité citée à l’égard de ces
demandes;
(b) les numéros des demandes, les dates de dépôt
et les numéros des brevets s’ils ont été octroyés;
(c) les détails relatifs aux conflits,
oppositions, réexamens ou procédures analogues;
(d) si le document n’est ni en français ni en
anglais, une traduction en français ou en anglais de tout ou partie du
document.
(2) Lorsque
l’examinateur chargé de l’examen d’une demande conformément à l’article 35 de
la Loi ou de la Loi dans sa version antérieure au 1er octobre 1989 a des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’une invention
mentionnée dans la demande faisait l’objet, avant la date du dépôt de la
demande, d’une publication ou était brevetée, il peut exiger que le
demandeur précise la première publication ou le brevet se rapportant à cette
invention.
(3) Les paragraphes
(1) et (2) ne s’appliquent pas aux renseignements et documents qui ne sont
pas à la disposition du demandeur ou qui ne sont pas connus de lui, dans la
mesure où il donne les motifs pour lesquels ils ne le sont pas.
[Je souligne]
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[7]
In its
notice of appeal, the appellant’s first ground of appeal is that the Applications
Judge erred in deciding that to reply “in good faith to one requisition in an
office action containing two is not the equivalent of replying in good faith to
both [requisitions]” (at paragraph 31 of the reasons for judgment). It is in
that context that the appellant suggests that paragraph 73(1)(a) of the
Act is to be interpreted in such a way that it refers not to the formal demands
to perform a duty but to the document containing the demands (at paragraph 56
of the appellant’s memorandum of fact and law).
[8]
The second
ground of appeal turns around Mosley J.’s conclusion that the Commissioner of
Patents “has no inherent jurisdiction to relieve against inadvertent errors or
omissions such as occurred in this instance” (at paragraph 28 of the reasons
for judgment).
[9]
Finally,
the appellant raises a last ground of appeal pertaining to procedural fairness.
[10]
On March
25, 2008 the appellant filed its memorandum of fact and law. In it, the
appellant limits its arguments to the first two grounds of appeal.
[11]
On April
23, 2008, the IPIC filed its motion for leave to intervene. It “proposes to
address this Court from the broad prospective of the patent profession in Canada” (at paragraph 5 of the
IPIC’s written representations on the motion). The IPIC is a professional
association of patent agents, trade-mark agents, and lawyers practicing in all
areas of intellectual property law. According to the IPIC, it has a membership
of 1,700 individuals.
[12]
To
succeed, the IPIC must demonstrate how its participation in the proceedings
will assist in the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the
proceeding (Canadian Union of Public Employees (Airline
Division) v. Canadian Airlines International Ltd., [2000] F.C.J. No. 220 (F.C.A.) (QL) at
paragraph 9, [C.U.P.E.]). In C.U.P.E., at paragraph 8 of his
reasons, Noël J.A. enumerated the factors to be considered on deciding whether
a motion to intervene must be allowed:
a. Is the proposed intervener
directly affected by the outcome?
b. Does there exist a justiciable
issue and a veritable public interest?
c. Is there an apparent lack of
any other reasonable or efficient means to submit the question of the Court?
d. Is the position of the
proposed intervener adequately defended by one of the parties to the case?
e. Are the interests of justice
better served by the intervention of the proposed third party?
f.
Can the
Court hear and decide the cause on its merits without the proposed intervener?
[13]
The Court
has the inherent authority to allow the intervention (Canadian Pacific
Railway Company v. Boutique Jacob inc., 2006 FCA 426 at paragraph 21). It
is not necessary that all of the factors be met by a proposed intervener.
[14]
However, the
IPIC submits that it meets all of the criteria and it proposes to make three
submissions said to be “different than those put forward by the parties”. They
are:
1. The words “fails to reply to
any requisition” found at paragraph 73(1)(a) are ambiguous and can lead
to several interpretations meaning that the “applicant has not replied to even
one requisition, or that the applicant has not replied to all requisition”.
2. Under paragraph 73(1)(a)
of the Act, silence can be a “good faith” response to a requisition.
3. An applicant is entitled to
legitimately expect a notice from the Patent Office in time to reinstate under
subsection 73(3) of the Act when the Patent Office considers the application to
be abandoned for lack of good faith response and thus not allowing for the
issuance of the patent (at page 44 of the Motion Record).
[15]
The
respondent argues that the motion should be disallowed, adding that the
interest of the IPIC is jurisprudential and indirect. There is no public
interest.
[16]
Considering
the factors mentioned in C.U.P.E., supra, I fail to see how the IPIC’s
participation in the appeal will assist this Court to determine the relevant
issues. The interpretation of the Act is well within the expertise of the
Court.
[17]
I agree
with the respondent that the effect of the Court’s decision will be simple and
narrow: the ‘846 patent application filed by the appellant will either be
reinstated, or it will not. This result cannot be said to directly affect the
IPIC or its members. The IPIC has an interest in the objectives of the patent
regime, and the attainment of some of these may be affected by the legislative
interpretation applied in the present case. However, this does not amount to a
“veritable public interest” as found in Benoit v. Canada, 2001 FCA 71.
[18]
The
present case provides reasonable and efficient means by which the question at
issue may be submitted to the Court (C.U.P.E., Ibid.).
[19]
The
grounds of appeal, as stated by the appellant in its notice of appeal and as
discussed in its memorandum of fact and law, certainly cover the two first
submissions of the IPIC, that is the interpretation of paragraph 73(1)(a)
of the Act.
[20]
As for the
third submission proposed by the IPIC, its interest is in the “adjudication of
the applicable law and procedure that will affect pending and future
applications for patent in Canada” (at paragraph 5 of its
written representations, page 44 of the Motion Record).
[21]
On this
last point, I note that the appellant has already raised the importance of this
appeal for the legal profession practicing in patent law. It writes, at
paragraph 20 of its memorandum of fact and law:
20. …Further, if the
logic of the Application Judge is accepted, there is a very real risk that a
very large number of patents allowed by the Commissioner to issue prior to 2004
may be subjected to litigation and risk being held invalid.
[22]
Therefore,
I conclude that the interest of justice would not be better served by the
IPIC’s intervention. The Court can hear and decide the case on its merits
without its intervention.
[23]
For these
reasons, the motion for leave to intervene should be dismissed with costs in
favour of the respondents.
"Johanne
Trudel"
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-558-07
STYLE OF CAUSE: DBC Marine Safety Systems Ltd.
v. The Commissioner of Patents and
The
Attorney General of Canada
MOTION DEALT WITH IN WRITING WITHOUT
APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: TRUDEL J.A.
DATED: 20080527
WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:
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Robert H.C.
MacFarlane
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FOR THE PROPOSED INTERVENER IPIC
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John H.
Sims, Q.C.
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FOR THE RESPONDENT
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SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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Bereskin & Parr
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FOR THE PROPOSED INTERVENER IPIC
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John H. Sims,
Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
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FOR THE RESPONDENT
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