Date: 20081112
Docket: A-511-07
Citation: 2008 FCA 352
CORAM: LINDEN J.A.
EVANS J.A.
RYER J.A.
BETWEEN:
MARGARET HORN
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AS REPRESENTED BY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
AND
BETWEEN:
SANDRA WILLIAMS
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AS REPRESENTED BY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on November
12, 2008.
Judgment delivered from the
Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on November
12, 2008.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT BY: EVANS J.A.
Date: 20081112
Docket: A-511-07
Citation: 2008 FCA 352
CORAM: LINDEN J.A.
EVANS
J.A.
RYER
J.A.
BETWEEN:
MARGARET HORN
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AS REPRESENTED BY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
AND
BETWEEN:
SANDRA WILLIAMS
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
AS REPRESENTED BY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on November 12, 2008)
EVANS J.A.
[1]
This
appeal is from a decision of the Federal Court (2007 FC 1052), in which Justice
Phelan dismissed actions by Sandra Williams and Margaret Horn, both status
Indians, for declarations that their employment income in the taxation year
1995 and, in Ms Williams’ case, 1996 as well, was “situated on a reserve” and
thus exempt from tax by virtue of section 87 of the Indian Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. I-5.
[2]
The
appellants made two principal arguments before us. First, they said, the Trial
Judge erred in law by applying the “connecting factors” test to determine where
the appellants’ employment income was situated. They argue that in McDiarmid
Lumber Co. v. God’s Lake First Nation, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 846 (“God’s Lake”),
the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the appropriate test was the
location of the debtor, thereby implicitly overruling a long line of decisions
from this Court applying a connecting factors approach to determining whether employment
income is situated on a reserve for the purpose of section 87.
[3]
We do not
agree. The issue in God’s Lake was whether funds in a bank account were
exempt by section 89 of the Indian Act from seizure. The Court
determined this issue by looking solely to the location of the debtor, that is,
the branch of the bank where the funds had been deposited.
[4]
However,
the Court expressly stated (at para. 18) that the “contextual form of analysis”
was appropriate for, inter alia, cases involving a taxation transaction “where
the location is objectively difficult to determine”. It quoted (at para. 17)
the observation of the court below that God’s Lake was “not concerned
with where a transaction is located for the purposes of taxation.” The Court
also referred with approval to the adoption of the connecting factors approach
in Williams v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 877, the origin of this Court’s jurisprudence
on the location of employment income as personal property for the purpose of section
87, even though Williams concerned employment insurance payments.
[5]
In our
view, the words quoted above from God’s Lake make it clear that the
Supreme Court has not issued an invitation to this Court to revisit its well
settled law. The Supreme Court has so far refused leave to appeal from the
section 87 cases decided by this Court applying the connecting factors analysis
to determine the location of employment income for tax purposes. Short of
Parliamentary intervention, only the Supreme Court of Canada may review the
soundness of the analytical framework developed and consistently applied on the
issue by this Court.
[6]
Second,
the appellants argue, if the connecting factors test is applicable, Justice
Phelan erred in his application of it to the facts. Since the application of
the law to the facts is a question of mixed fact and law, the appellants must
establish that his decision is vitiated by palpable and overriding error, or
that he did not apply the correct legal test.
[7]
For the
most part, the appellants criticise the Judge’s reasons on the ground that they
attach too much weight to the location, surrounding circumstances and nature of
their work with the clients to whom they were “leased” by their employer, Native
Leasing Services. The appellants work for not-for-profit organizations delivering
social services off-reserve in Hamilton and Ottawa to aboriginal people (some of whom
resided off-reserve and some on-reserve) and, in the case of Ms. Horn, to non-aboriginals
as well. Conversely, the appellants say, the Judge gave insufficient weight to
the on-reserve location of the employer, to the benefits accruing to the
reserve from both the employer’s presence on the reserve and its activities,
and the appellants’ employment, and to Ms Williams’ residence on and Ms Horn’s continuing
connections to a reserve.
[8]
It is primarily
the function of a trial judge to assess the relative weight to be given to the constituent
elements of a multi-factored test in the particular circumstances of a case. Applying
the “connecting factors” test is a very fact specific exercise. This Court may
not substitute its view for that of the judge, absent a palpable and overriding
error in the application of the test or an error of law.
[9]
In our
opinion, Justice Phelan’s analysis is consistent with the guidance provided by
this Court in its previous decisions, including the particular weight given by Shilling
v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2001] 4 F.C.R. 364, 2001 FCA
178, to the location, nature and other circumstances surrounding the work which
gave rise to the employment income. We can detect no overriding and palpable
error in the Judge’s treatment of the relevant factors, either individually or
as a whole.
[10]
However,
we agree with the appellants that whether employment income is earned in the
“commercial mainstream” is a conclusion to be drawn from an examination of the
connecting factors, and not a reason in itself for concluding that employment
income is not situated on a reserve: Recalma v. Canada (1998), 158
D.L.R. (4th) 59 (F.C.A.) at para. 9.
[11]
To the extent
that Justice Phelan may have expressed a different view, and we are not sure
that he did, we would respectfully disagree. Nonetheless, even if he erred as
the appellants allege, any error was not sufficiently material, when considered
in the context of his reasons as a whole, to warrant our intervention.
[12]
For these
reasons, the appeal will be dismissed with one set of costs.
“John M. Evans”
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-511-07
(APPEAL FROM REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PHELAN DATED OCTOBER 16, 2007, DOCKET
NO.
T-2241-95.)
STYLE OF CAUSE: MARGARET HORN v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN
RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
AND BETWEEN:
SANDRA WILLIAMS v. HER MAJESTY
THE QUEEN IN
RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED
BY THE
MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: NOVEMBER 12, 2008
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: (LINDEN, EVANS & RYER JJ.A.)
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: EVANS J.A.
APPEARANCES:
Brian A. Crane
Max Faille
|
FOR THE APPELLANT
|
Gordon Bourgard
Sandra Phillips
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Brian A. Crane
GOWLING
LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP
Ottawa,
Ontario
|
FOR THE APPELLANT
|
John H. Sims, Q.C.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|