Date: 20100617
Docket: A-637-08
Citation: 2010 FCA 165
CORAM: EVANS
J.A.
PELLETIER J.A.
STRATAS
J.A.
BETWEEN:
ANDREW MARK BUFFALO also known as ANDREW
MARK FREEMAN
suing on his own behalf and on behalf of
all persons who became members
of the SAMSON CREE NATION on or after
June 29, 1987
Appellant
and
CHIEF and COUNCIL of the SAMSON CREE
NATION and the
SAMSON CREE NATION and HER MAJESTY THE
QUEEN as
represented by the MINISTER OF INDIAN
AFFAIRS
AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STRATAS J.A.
[1]
This is an
appeal from an order of Justice Mactavish of the Federal Court: 2008 FC 1308.
She dismissed the appellant’s motion to certify a proposed class proceeding.
[2]
In careful
and thorough reasons, the motions judge found that the appellant had not met a
number of the requirements for certification as a class proceeding. These
requirements are set out in Rule 334.16 of the Federal Courts Rules,
SOR/98-106. This Rule reads as follows:
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Conditions
334.16
(1) Subject to
subsection (3), a judge shall, by order, certify a proceeding as a class
proceeding if
(a) the pleadings
disclose a reasonable cause of action;
(b) there is an
identifiable class of two or more persons;
(c) the claims of
the class members raise common questions of law or fact, whether or not those
common questions predominate over questions affecting only individual
members;
(d) a class
proceeding is the preferable procedure for the just and efficient resolution
of the common questions of law or fact; and
(e) there is a
representative plaintiff or applicant who
(i) would
fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class,
(ii) has
prepared a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of
advancing the proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class
members as to how the proceeding is progressing,
(iii) does
not have, on the common questions of law or fact, an interest that is in
conflict with the interests of other class members, and
(iv)
provides a summary of any agreements respecting fees and disbursements
between the representative plaintiff or applicant and the solicitor of
record.
Matters to be considered
(2)
All relevant matters shall be considered in a determination of
whether a class proceeding is the preferable procedure for the just and
efficient resolution of the common questions of law or fact, including
whether
(a) the questions of
law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members;
(b) a significant
number of the members of the class have a valid interest in individually
controlling the prosecution of separate proceedings;
(c) the class
proceeding would involve claims that are or have been the subject of any
other proceeding;
(d) other means of
resolving the claims are less practical or less efficient; and
(e) the
administration of the class proceeding would create greater difficulties than
those likely to be experienced if relief were sought by other means.
Subclasses
(3)
If the judge determines that a class includes a subclass whose
members have claims that raise common questions of law or fact that are not
shared by all of the class
members so that the
protection of the
interests of the subclass
members requires that they be separately represented, the judge shall not
certify the proceeding as a class proceeding unless there is a representative
plaintiff or applicant who
(a) would fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the subclass;
(b) has prepared a
plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing the
proceeding on behalf of the subclass and of notifying subclass members as to
how the proceeding is progressing;
(c) does not have,
on the common questions of law or fact for the subclass, an interest that is
in conflict with the interests of other subclass members; and
(d) provides a
summary of any agreements respecting fees and disbursements between the
representative plaintiff or applicant and the solicitor of record.
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Conditions
334.16
(1) Sous
réserve du paragraphe (3), le juge autorise une instance comme recours
collectif si les conditions suivantes sont réunies:
a)
les actes de procédure révèlent une cause d’action valable;
b)
il existe un groupe identifiable formé d’au moins deux personnes;
c)
les réclamations des membres du groupe soulèvent des points de droit ou de
fait communs, que ceux-ci prédominent ou non sur ceux qui ne concernent qu’un
membre;
d)
le recours collectif est le meilleur moyen de régler, de façon juste et
efficace, les points de droit ou de fait communs;
e)
il existe un représentant demandeur qui:
(i)
représenterait de façon équitable et adéquate les intérêts du groupe,
(ii) a
élaboré un plan qui propose une méthode efficace pour poursuivre l’instance
au nom du groupe et tenir les membres du groupe informés de son déroulement,
(iii) n’a
pas de conflit d’intérêts avec d’autres membres du groupe en ce qui concerne
les points de droit ou de fait communs,
(iv)
communique un sommaire des conventions relatives aux honoraires et débours
qui sont intervenues entre lui et l’avocat inscrit au dossier.
Facteurs pris en compte
(2)
Pour décider si le recours collectif est le meilleur moyen de
régler les points de droit ou de fait communs de façon juste et efficace,
tous les facteurs pertinents sont pris en compte, notamment les
suivants :
a)
la prédominance des points de droit ou de fait communs sur ceux qui ne
concernent que certains membres;
b)
la proportion de membres du groupe qui ont un intérêt légitime à poursuivre
des instances séparées;
c)
le fait que le recours collectif porte ou non sur des réclamations qui ont
fait ou qui font l’objet d’autres instances;
d)
l’aspect pratique ou l’efficacité moindres des autres moyens de régler les
réclamations;
e)
les difficultés accrues engendrées par la gestion du recours collectif par
rapport à celles associées à la gestion d’autres mesures de redressement.
Sous-groupe
(3)
Si le juge constate qu’il existe au sein du groupe un
sous-groupe de membres dont les réclamations soulèvent des points de droit ou
de fait communs que ne partagent pas tous les membres du groupe
de sorte que la protection
des intérêts des
membres du sous-groupe
exige qu’ils aient un représentant distinct, il n’autorise l’instance comme
recours collectif que s’il existe un représentant demandeur qui :
a)
représenterait de façon équitable et adéquate les intérêts du sous-groupe;
b)
a élaboré un plan qui propose une méthode efficace pour poursuivre l’instance
au nom du sous-groupe et tenir les membres de celui-ci informés de son
déroulement;
c)
n’a pas de conflit d’intérêts avec d’autres membres du sous-groupe en ce qui
concerne les points de droit ou de fait communs;
d)
communique un sommaire des conventions relatives aux honoraires et débours qui
sont intervenues entre lui et l’avocat inscrit au dossier.
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[3]
Failure to
meet any of these requirements is fatal to certification. The motions judge
found that the appellant had not met a number of them.
[4]
The first
requirement that the appellant did not satisfy was the identification of issues
of fact or law common to all of the class members: Rule 334.16(1)(c).
The appellant had only stated that “on questions of fact, the members of the
proposed class are all members of Samson” and “on questions of law, they are
all governed by the same federal statutory regime and they are all owed the
same fiduciary obligations”: the motions judge’s reasons at paragraph 86. The
motions judge observed (at paragraph 89) that “[t]o be appropriate for
certification in a class action, common
issues require precise definition for inclusion in the
certifying order, and are usually framed in the form of questions to be
answered in the course of the litigation.” This, she found, the appellant had
not done.
[5]
The second
unsatisfied requirement was that “a class proceeding [be] the
preferable procedure for the just and efficient resolution of the common
questions of law or fact”: Rule 334.16(1)(d). In determining this, the
motions judge properly had regard to the matters set out in Rule 334.16(2). In
particular, she examined Rule 334.16(2)(a) and the question of whether “the
questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members.” She found (at paragraph 103) that the task of assessing this was
“virtually impossible” because of the failure of the appellant to identify any
common issues of fact or law requiring resolution through the class proceeding.
The respondents, however, had identified several issues that would require
individualized assessment. Given the appellant’s failure and the respondents’
submissions, she was driven to the conclusion (at paragraph 131) that “the
individual issues clearly predominate.”
[6]
The third
unsatisfied requirement was the appellant’s failure to prepare an acceptable
litigation plan, as required by Rule 334.16(1)(e)(ii). The motions judge
(at paragraph 146) rejected the appellant’s assurances that any such plan would
be reached through the case management process or that the Federal Court
Rules would provide “a template” for the litigation plan. In her view, the
litigation plan must be comprised of much more: it must “demonstrate that the
plaintiff and his counsel have thought the process through, and that they grasp
its complexities” (at
paragraph 148). Summarizing the jurisprudence (at paragraph
151), she developed a helpful, non-exhaustive list of matters to be addressed
in a litigation plan, and she found that the appellant addressed none of these.
[7]
Finally,
given the appellant’s failure to identify any common issues of fact or law and
to give due consideration to the proper description of the proposed class, she
questioned the appellant’s ability to “fairly and adequately represent the
interests of the class,” as required by Rule 334.16(1)(e)(i). Therefore,
the motions judge concluded that the requirement that there be a suitable
representative plaintiff had not been made out in this case.
[8]
On all of
these matters, we substantially agree with the motions judge’s analysis and
conclusions. She identified the correct legal principles that must be brought
to bear under Rule 334.16. She relied upon well-accepted class action
authorities, particularly authorities from British Columbia and Ontario, where the class proceedings
rules are similar to Rule 334.16. In examining and applying the principles in
those authorities, she was also fully cognizant of the purposes underlying
class proceedings, discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Western
Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534, 2001 SCC 46,
Hollick v. Toronto (City), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158, 2001 SCC 68, and Rumley
v. British Columbia, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184, 2001 SCC 69.
[9]
The
motions judge then applied these principles to the facts in a reasonable way,
reaching appropriate conclusions, and expressing them in detailed, cogent
reasons.
[10]
In oral
submissions, counsel for the appellant (not counsel on the original motion) submitted
that the motions judge should have granted an adjournment to the appellant in
order to allow the appellant to improve the quality of his motion, review the
deficiencies in it, and meet the certification requirements. The appellant
conceded, however, that he did not ask the motions judge for an adjournment. He
also submitted that the motions judge knew that there were some common issues
and should have gone further and identified these, even though the appellant
had not.
[11]
The
essential submission here is that the motions judge was obligated to help
further. In support of this, the appellant cited the purpose of class
proceedings, which includes facilitating access to justice. He also observed
that courts in class proceedings play a more active and flexible role than they
do in many other types of litigation. They regularly exercise their discretion
to give relief different from that sought in a notice of motion for
certification, such as by changing the definition of the common issues.
[12]
I accept
that in certification motions, and in the post-certification period, courts can
be quite active and flexible because of the complex and dynamic nature of class
proceedings: for example, they must always remain open to amendments to such
matters as the class definition, the common issues and the representative
plaintiff’s litigation plan, and they can play a key role in case management.
[13]
However, the
role of courts in these areas, active and flexible though it may be, does not
extend to an obligation to grant adjournments, even when not sought, in order
to permit those seeking certification to cooper up their motion or to help them
meet the substantive certification requirements under Rule 334.16. The burden
of satisfying the certification requirements is solely upon those seeking
certification and a motions judge, of course, must remain a neutral arbiter of
whether those requirements have been met.
[14]
In this
case, the motions judge found that the appellant had not discharged this
burden. It is for those seeking certification under Rule 334.16, not the
motions judge, to grapple with the substance of the matter and to meet the
substantive certification requirements under Rule 334.16, including the
requirement that they be capable of “adequately represent[ing] the interests of the class.”
This, the appellant, did not do.
[15]
Before
leaving this issue, I note that the motions judge did exercise her discretion
in favour of considerable flexibility toward the appellant, even though the
appellant had not offered much to satisfy the certification requirements. For
example, more than once during the hearing, the motions judge allowed the
appellant to change the class definition, even during the appellant’s reply
submissions. Further, despite rejecting the final class definition offered by
the appellant, she was able to develop a class definition, based on the
evidence before her (at paragraphs 71 to 74). Finally, she considered whether
she should allow the appellant to refile a litigation plan (at paragraph 153).
In the circumstances, the appellant was afforded every opportunity to establish
the certification requirements, but fell short.
[16]
In
summary, the motion judge found that the appellant had not met a number of the
requirements for certification under Rule 334.16 and so she dismissed the
motion for certification. I see no reviewable error on her part and, indeed, I substantially
agree with her analysis and conclusions. On the facts before her, she was not
obliged to adjourn the certification hearing on her own motion or further
assist the appellant.
[17]
Therefore,
I would dismiss the appeal. In accordance with Rule 334.39 and consistent with
the motion judge’s decision not to award costs, I would order no costs of the
appeal.
“David Stratas”
“I
agree
John M. Evans”
“I
agree
J.
D. Denis Pelletier”
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