Date: 20100412
Docket: A-274-09
Citation: 2010 FCA
95
CORAM: NOËL J.A.
EVANS J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
JAYESHKUMAR
PATEL
Respondent
Heard at Toronto, Ontario, on April 12, 2010.
Judgment delivered from the
Bench at Toronto,
Ontario, on April 12, 2010.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: NOËL
J.A.
Date: 20100412
Docket: A-274-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 95
CORAM: NOËL
J.A.
EVANS
J.A.
DAWSON J.A.
BETWEEN:
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Applicant
and
JAYESHKUMAR PATEL
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Toronto, Ontario, on April 12, 2010.)
NOËL J.A.
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review of the decision of Umpire Stevenson rendered
pursuant to the Unemployment Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23 (the Act),
holding that the respondent Jayeshkumar Patel (the claimant) had good cause for
leaving his employment, and allowing the claimant’s appeal from the earlier
decision of the Board of Referees (the Board) on that ground.
[2]
In it earlier
decision, the Board held that the claimant’s reason for quitting his job, i.e. caring
for his two children, had not been shown to be “just cause” within the meaning
of section 29 of the Act:
Interpretation
29. For the purposes of sections 30 to 33,
…
(c) just
cause for voluntarily leaving an employment or taking leave from an
employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable alternative to leaving or
taking leave, having regard to all the circumstances, including any of the
following:
…
v) obligation to
care for a child or a member of the immediate family,
…
|
Interprétation
29. Pour
l’application des articles 30 à 33 :
[…]
c) le
prestataire est fondé à quitter volontairement son emploi ou à prendre congé
si, compte tenu de toutes les circonstances, notamment de celles qui sont
énumérées ci-après, son départ ou son congé constitue la seule solution
raisonnable dans son cas:
[…]
(v)
nécessité de prendre soin d’un enfant ou d’un proche parent,
[…]
|
[3]
The Umpire overruled
the decision of the Board on the basis that it was unreasonable. The reasoning
adopted by the Umpire for reaching that conclusion is captured in the following
three paragraphs of his reasons:
…
Whether one has just cause to voluntarily leave an
employment depends on whether he had no reasonable alternative to leaving
having regard to all the circumstances including several specific circumstances
enumerated in section 29 of the Employment Insurance Act one of
which is an "obligation to care for a child".
The Board of Referees said Mr. Patel had the
reasonable alternatives of hiring a babysitter, using a day care facility or
requesting a leave of absence. I do not think it can be presumed that suitable
babysitters or day care facilities are readily available to everyone but the
Board of Referees seems to have applied such a presumption. While Mr. Patel did
not request a leave of absence from his job it seems highly unlikely that one
would have been granted as it would have been for an indefinite period of time.
…
Parents are responsible for the care of their
children, especially children as young as the Patel children were at the time.
In my view the Board's decision was not reasonable and the Board failed to consider
"all the circumstances".
[4]
For the reasons which
follow, we agree with the applicant that the Umpire improperly labeled the
decision of the Board as unreasonable and hence, had no basis for interfering
with it.
[5]
The Board mentioned
in the course of its reasons that:
[t]he claimant stated he
quit because he cannot get the babysitter he wishes; no leave of absence was
requested.
[6]
The Board went on to
ask whether, having regard to all the circumstances, the claimant had a
reasonable alternative to leaving his employment. In the end, it concluded that
he did since he had the option of hiring a babysitter, using a day care
facility, or requesting a leave of absence.
[7]
The Umpire’s
rejection of the first two options is based on the conclusion that such services
could not be presumed to be available. However, the burden of establishing just
cause rests on the claimant. His evidence in this regard was that he did not
want to take the children to a babysitter and there is no suggestion that he
attempted to find childcare. As such, it was not unreasonable for the Board to
assume that such services were available to the claimant.
[8]
With respect to the
third option, i.e. seeking a leave of absence, the Umpire assumed a fact for
which there was no foundation in that nothing on this record allows for the
conclusion that a leave of absence, if sought, would have been refused. Again,
the burden rested on the claimant to establish just cause and it was incumbent
upon the claimant to establish that leave would have been refused if requested.
Having failed to do that, it was reasonable for the Board to hold that the
claimant had not demonstrated that he had no other reasonable alternative.
[9]
The application for
judicial review will be allowed, the decision of the Umpire will be set aside
and the matter will be returned to the Chief Umpire or one of his delegates for
re-determination on the basis that the claimant left his employment without
just cause.
"Marc
Noël"
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-274-09
(APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE HONOURABLE
JUSTICE STEVENSON, UMPIRE, DATED MAY 21, 2009, CUB 72421)
STYLE OF CAUSE: ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA v.
JAYESHKUMAR PATEL
PLACE OF HEARING: TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING: APRIL 12, 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: NOËL, EVANS & DAWSON JJ.A.
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: NOËL J.A.
APPEARANCES:
Adam Rambert
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
Jayeshkumar
Patel
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(SELF-REPRESENTED)
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Myles Kirvan
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
|
FOR THE APPLICANT
|
N/A
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
(SELF-REPRESENTED)
|