Date: 20100518
Docket: A-263-09
Citation: 2010 FCA 129
CORAM: EVANS
J.A.
TRUDEL
J.A.
STRATAS
J.A.
BETWEEN:
GEORGE BONAVIA JR.
Appellant
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT
(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 18, 2010)
EVANS J.A.
[1]
This is an
appeal by George Bonavia Jr. from a judgment of Justice Favreau (Judge) of the
Tax Court of Canada, dated May 28, 2009 (2009 TCC 289), dismissing his appeal
from a notice of reassessment dated April 28, 2005. In that reassessment, the Minister
of National Revenue (Minister) added $118,097.14 to the appellant’s income for
the 2001 taxation year, on the basis that it was a benefit to him out of or
under a registered retirement savings plan pursuant to paragraph 56(1)(h)
and subsection 146(8) of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th
Supp.) (Act).
[2]
However, prior
to the hearing of the appeal before the Tax Court, the Minister changed the
basis of the reassessment because the fund established by Mr Bonavia had been
registered as a retirement income fund within the meaning of subsection
146.3(1) of the Act, and not as a retirement savings plan. In the reply to Mr
Bonavia’s amended notice of appeal, the Minister relied on subsections 146.3(5)
and 56(2) of the Act to justify the reassessment.
[3]
We are not
persuaded that the Judge committed any reviewable error in dismissing Mr
Bonavia’s appeal. For substantially the reasons that he gave, the appeal will
be dismissed. Counsel for Mr Bonavia advanced four arguments in his oral
submissions before us.
[4]
First, the
amended pleadings did not accurately state the basis on which the Minister
sought to justify the reassessment, because they described Mr Bonavia’s
retirement fund as a “registered retirement investment fund”, not a
“registered retirement income fund”, the term used in section 146.3 of
the Act. However, in the agreed statement of facts, the parties correctly
describe the fund, and the argument before the Tax Court proceeded on that
basis.
[5]
In our
view, the Minister’s failure to request an amendment to the pleadings to
correct this mistake in no way prejudiced Mr Bonavia. The Minister’s
misdescription of the fund in the notice of reply is no more than a clerical
slip, and does not warrant the intervention of this Court.
[6]
Second,
the documents produced by NBI in Trust Inc. (NBI) and Canadian Corporation
Creation Centre (CCCC) constituted a sham because they contained a fundamental
misrepresentation by the principals of NBI and CCCC about the nature of the
transactions, without which the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) would not have transferred
to CCCC the retirement income fund that it was administering for Mr Bonavia,
and the Minister would not have registered the purported retirement income plan
under the Act. Accordingly, counsel says, the Minister cannot rely upon these
documents as the basis for concluding that Mr Bonavia’s retirement income fund
was transferred from RBC to CCCC.
[7]
We
disagree. In our view, this was nothing other than a fraudulent
misrepresentation, of which Mr Bonavia, among others, was the victim. Since Mr
Bonavia was not a party to the misrepresentation it was not a “sham” within the
meaning attributed to that term by the Supreme Court of Canada in Stubart
Investments Ltd. v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536 at 545 and 572,
which precluded the Minister from relying upon the documents as effecting a
transfer of the funds from RBC to CCCC.
[8]
Third, amounts
from the retirement income fund were not “received” by Mr Bonavia for the
purpose of subsection 146.3(5) of the Act. The only money that Mr Bonavia “received”,
counsel said, was the approximately $82,000 that he thought was paid to him by
NBI as a loan.
[9]
We do not
accept this argument. The Judge found as a fact (at para. 27(b)) that
the retirement income fund was transferred from RBC to CCCC at the direction of
Mr Bonavia. In our opinion, there was sufficient evidence before him to support
this factual finding. Counsel conceded in oral argument that if a direction to
transfer the funds to a third party had been given by Mr Bonavia, he had
“received” them for the purpose of subsection 146.3(5) of the Act.
[10]
Fourth,
the Judge erred in applying subsection 56(2) to the facts of this case because
this is essentially an anti-avoidance provision. We disagree. In our view, the
Judge correctly identified (at paras. 26 and 27) the four criteria of the legal
test referred to in Neuman v. The Queen, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 770
at para. 25, and made no reviewable error in applying them to the facts before
him.
[11]
For these
reasons, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
“John
M. Evans”
FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: A-263-09
(APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE TAX COURT
OF CANADA, DATED MAY 28, 2009, DOCKET NO. 2006-3535(IT)G)
STYLE OF CAUSE: George
Bonavia Jr. v. Her Majesty The Queen
PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: May 18, 2010
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: (EVANS, TRUDEL, STRATAS JJ.A.)
DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: EVANS J.A.
APPEARANCES:
Robert McMechan
|
FOR THE APPELLANT
|
Daniel
Bourgeois
Pascal Tétrault
|
FOR THE RESPONDENT
|
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Robert McMechan
Professional Corporation
Ottawa, Ontario
|
FOR THE
APPELLANT
|
Myles J.
Kirvan
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
|
FOR THE
RESPONDENT
|